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Abstract 
The Community Charge (poll tax) was seen by both its supporters and 
'. opponents alike as an attempt to promote the British New Right's concept of 
responsible~ active citizenship in local politics. The reaction of different groups 
of citizens to the tax is explored through a detailed case study of events in the 
. . 
London Boroogh of Ealing, an archetypal London suburb. Here, as in most 
urban areas, organised anti-poll tax protestors clashed with lVIPs, councillors and 
the local magistracy, who played a large role in enforcing the measure. It shows 
how the protestors attempted to mobilise a 'moral community' built around the 
idea of 'fair' taxation and promote a campaign of civil disobedience to force 
abolition. 
This in tum compelled local actors to make principled choices about the 
enforcement of a law of which many of them strongly disapproved. The 
protestors' tactics seemed to strike a popular chord and at least a fifth of all 
Ealing charge-payers (and eight million people nationally) failed to pay the tax 
in 1990/91. However, the detailed evidence also suggests that non-payment can 
best be seen as a mass expression of bloody mindedness, rather than a concerted 
and organised campaign of civil disobedience. Nevertheless the protests had 
important implications for the practise of left-wing citizenship in contemporary 
Britain and served to highlight growing divisions between the mainstream and 
radical Left. 
Previously published academic accounts have addressed the 'high' politics of 
the poll tax. The thesis explores instead the 'popular' politics of the poll tax 
crisis in a suitably local setting and so redresses an imbalance in the literature. It 
therefore makes an original contribution to knowledge and understanding of the 
relationship between conventional means of political participation, radical 
popular protest movements and competing concepts of citizenship. 
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Introduction 
A Popular Politics of the Poll Tax? 
In 19~6 I.came across a copy of a book by David Butler, Andrew Adonis and 
Tony Travers called Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll 
Tax. 
1 In many ways it was an impressive read, setting out the historical and 
political context in which the poll tax was conceived and implemented and full 
of detailed research about the meaning ascribed to the crisis by the political class 
and others in the 'Whitehall village'. All this combined with an intelligent 
discussion of the possible implications of the tax for British democracy in the 
late twentieth century. Yet ultimately, it did not satisfy and I increasingly found 
myself asking - 'where on earth has the anti-poll tax movement and the non-
payment campaign gone?' 
Of course how and what you see is determined by what you look for. Butler et al 
surveyed the 'high' politics of the poll tax and concluded that this spectacular 
policy failure was symptomatic of a wider malaise in the British political 
system. The notion that the poll tax can best be seen as a problem of elite 
governance remains a strong theme in much of the mainstream literature about 
the tax, but by no means all. For example, most politicians' memoirs, 
biographies and works of contemporary history _ for the period tend to view the 
poll tax as an immediate party political crisis that had only short-term effects on 
the political system. Others, notably Margaret Thatcher, sought to stress the 
ideological purpose of the tax as a conscious attempt to tum 'dependants into 
citizens'.2 The poll tax also called forth a large 'technical' literature, including 
government and Audit Commission reports, legal guides and detailed analysis of 
the likely and actual effects of the tax produced by voluntary organisations. This 
latter strand tended to be overtly hostile to the tax as a social policy. 
Three dominant themes emerge from this literature to explain the poll tax's 
obvious lack of popular legitimacy. Firstly, most commentators (but particularly 
Conservatives) tlag up the fact that the poll tax cost more than the rates for most 
households. Many accounts are therefore replete with tables of 'winners and 
losers' and at times seem to assume a near-mechanistic relationship between the 
level of the charge and its popularity. Similarly, the poll tax is widely cast as 
,''" unworkable because of the practical problems attendant upon any universal, flat-
rate charge in a modem industrial society. Thirdly, the legitimacy of the tax was 
undermined by its obvious unfairness, in that it did not reflect an ability to pay. 
But the problem of inequality and its direct effect on the poor tends to be only 
seriously discussed by leftist voluntary organisations, such as the Child Poverty 
Action Group. 
All in all then, according to most accounts, the poll tax is best viewed as a policy 
'mistake'. True, it highlighted some real shortcomings in British liberal 
democracy, but the system came good in the end. Hence the decision of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party to unceremoniously jettison both the tax (and 
its leader) in the face of various opinion poll findings and by-election results. 
The politicians listened, parliamentary democracy worked. From this 
perspective the organised protest campaign was a fringe movement of the 'far 
left' and as such, was almost by definition, a peripheral actor in a drama whose 
principal leads were career politicians, various institutional actors and 
newspaper editors. The protestors and millions of non-payers (if they appear at 
all) are therefore cast as a sort of undifferentiated stage army, occasionally 
entering stage left in turbulent crowd scenes, but more usually remaining back-
stage, identifiable only by a muted background hubbub to which the main 
players occasionally lend an ear. 
This was not how I remembered it. At this point I should perhaps come clean. 
Before I undertook this research my knowledge of the poll tax as a political 
issue had been largely derived from personal experience. Between 1989-1993 I 
was a very active participant in the anti-poll tax campaign in the London 
Borough of Ealing. I had written and handed out leaflets, spoke at public 
meetings and rallies, attended demonstrations, advised people unable (or 
unwilling) to pay the tax, represented some in court, visited people convicted of 
non-payment in prison and so on. I also served as the chair and later press 
otTtcer of the Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation and so, in a small way, actively 
shaped the direction taken by the movement. In short, I was an activist not an 
observer and the meaning I attributed to events necessaril y reflected that fact. 
. ' .. My over-riding perception was that the politics of the poll tax were driven and 
shaped at almost every tum by a distinctly popular level of political 
participation, which found expression in a number of interesting ways. At first 
public antipathy travelled along 'conventional' political pathways such as the 
letters to the MP, votes at local elections and by-elections and the occasional 
orderly demonstration. If that had been all that had happened, so far, so 
unremarkable. But popular feeling soon broke out of these constraints and came 
to include more direct forms of political action. These included riots and 
disorderly protests at Town Halls and national demonstrations, the 
disappearance of nearly a million people off the electoral register in an effort to 
avoid the tax and most importantly of all, non-payment as a mass phenomena 
which involved at least eight million individuals by 1991. Of course, many of 
these non-payers were simply trying to get away with it, but in a real sense that 
did not matter. For whatever their motives, the fact that so many people were 
bloody minded ultimately made it unworkable. Poll tax non-payment therefore 
represents the biggest instance of popular protest since the general strike of 
1926. Yet all these remarkable events receive scant, if any attention in the 
mainstream literature. 
In part this imbalance may reflect the nature of some of the accounts produced 
by left-wing opponents of the poll tax, which tend to be strongly polemical in 
intent and content. One strand, produced by leading national protestors (such as 
Tommy Sheridan and Margaret Reynolds) seeks to portray the anti-poll tax 
movement as a primarily organised phenomenon and eulogise the role of a 
vanguard-style Marxist leadership in mobilising popular opinion.
3 
Another 
important strand, exemplified by Danny Burn's influential and perceptive 
account of the anti-poll tax movement in the South West, tends to flag up the 
spontaneity of the protests, casting the opposition to the tax as a revolt by the 
community." Taken together, this literature provides much information about the 
movement in some regions, such as the South West, the North West and 
Scotland. But it also tends to be long on rhetoric and short on detail at a more 
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local, authority-wide level. This is a pity, for as this study shows, the anti-poll 
tax movement was in practise a highly parochial phenomenon, although the 
national political context and a centrally determined legislative framework also 
,h tended to encourage a near-uniform response from local authorities. 
Surprisingly perhaps, a detailed and sustained critical examination of the 
character of the movement (and especially the ambiguous meaning of non-
payment) also tends to be largely absent. The 'people' and the 'protestors' are 
often portrayed as undifferentiated parts of the same 'struggle'. But the highly 
politicised protestors were almost by definition unrepresentative of most 
'ordinary' people in a generally apathetic political age. That does not mean that 
they were incapable of articulating and mobilising popular feeling on the poll 
tax as a single issue - all the evidence suggests that the anti-poll tax movement 
was unusually successful in this regard. But the relationship between the 
protesters and public opinion was often a complex one and needs careful 
exploration. 
So in deciding to embark upon this project I hoped to address some of the 
omissions and shortcomings in the existing literature by considering the 
importance of the 'popular' politics of the poll tax. Such a project raises a 
number of theoretical and practical problems and before outlining the research, it 
is worth explaining why the study uses the concept of 'active citizenship' as a 
framing device. 
Why 'active citizenship'? 
The concept of citizenship has proved useful in explaining the relationship 
between the individual and the state, as it 'provides a framework of legitimation, 
a vocabulary of motive that draws on prevailing cultural ideas and provides the 
discursive conditions for discussions of social policy.,5 From one perspective, 
active citizens are economically autonomous and responsible social actors. From 
another, active citizens seek to tum their beliefs and ideals into reality by doing 
things, by participating in the politics of their society, by engaging with their 
fellow citizens. Both these broad notions of active citizenship were much 
discussed in the late 1980s and played a discernible role in shaping the final 
form of the poll tax. For the Conservative government's efforts to roll back the 
frontiers of the state, to end a debilitating 'dependency culture', to control 
.'~ profligate (left-wing) local authorities and so generally recast the conduct and 
temper of politics in a neo-liberal form all found expression in the Local 
Govemmeot Finance Act 1988. The tax was therefore an unusually 'ideological' 
measure and was rightly perceived as such by its supporters and opponents alike. 
This was significant, for as I will show, the poll tax was also a profoundly 
unpopular measure that was consistently opposed in principle by around 70% of 
the population. There was a general consensus that that the poll tax was a 'bad 
law' which failed to accord with majority values concerning 'fair taxation'. 
However, there are plenty of other laws which are widely perceived to be unfair. 
What differentiated the poll tax was that almost every adult citizen was asked to 
pay it. As a result, they could not dismiss the tax as someone else's problem, or 
banish it from their consciousness with the switch of the TV remote control. 
Instead, everyone was forced to address a question that normally goes by the 
board: should we obey a law we disagree with and so rely on the electoral 
process to seek redress? After all, the payment of taxes remains the main, formal 
duty that most citizens owe the state. To violate that duty is to bring into 
question the wider relationship between the state and its citizenry, however 
incoherently. In the event, the majority of the population chose to obey, but 
millions of others did not. 
This dilemma was naturally of particular concern to the British Left, with whom 
much of this discussion is concerned. In general, the poll tax forced the Left to 
choose between two forms of political citizenship: an institutional form of 
participation that stayed within the law and let the electoral process run its 
course· or a more radical form of resistance, based on civil disobedience and , 
non-payment. Once the organised anti-poll tax movement chose to sink the tax 
through direct action, it inevitably came into conflict with the political 
establishment, the institutionalised Labour movement, local councillors and 
magistrates. I will suggest that the inter-reaction bet\veen these groups went 
beyond a simple clash of interests - although this was obviously important. For 
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the conflict also represented a profound disagreement about the proper means by 
which 'good' citizens should seek to effect political change. In that sense the , 
poll tax crisis cannot meaningfully be separated from the wider debate about 
1. citizenship. 
All this was primarily played out at a local level, where the tax was enforced. 
The primary focus of this study is therefore unashamedly local and deals with 
the experience of the anti-poll tax movement in an archetypal London suburb -
the London Borough of Ealing. The approach partly reflects the localised nature 
of the anti-poll tax movement itself It also seeks to fill an obvious gap in the 
literature as so far no other detailed study of the London anti-poll tax movement 
has yet been undertaken. Obviously, the Ealing experience was not necessarily 
representative of all other areas in the capital - in a sense that would be absurd 
once we accept the importance of localism - but it would be wrong to 
exaggerate the differences between specific London boroughs either. 
Finally, in adopting the concept of citizenship as a framing device I do not seek 
to belittle the usefulness of other ways of looking at the poll tax. For example, at 
various times I actively considered approaching the issue in tenns of the concept 
of political legitimacy, or as a specific social policy or by adopting a political 
science perspective and approaching the anti-poll tax movement as a New Social 
Movement. Ultimately, I chose to pursue the question of citizenship because it 
seemed the best means of framing a discussion about the potential and 
limitations of political action in contemporary Britain 
AN OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH 
The first chapter discusses the poll tax in light of the Conservative government's 
conception of 'active citizenship'. It finds that the poll tax, as a policy, can be 
convincingly explained as an attempt to implement key ideological nostrums of 
the British New Right and so encourage an 'active citizenship' of economically 
independent, socially altruistic and politically conservative individuals. This 
vision of citizenship was violently criticised in the period and is brietly 
compared to the Left's alternative conception of a rights-based citizenship. 
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However, the poll tax can also be seen as an attempt to address some specific 
traditional and more immediate political problems, including hostility to the 
rates within the Conservative Party, a desire to limit public expenditure and 
disputes with local government. 
Chapter two begins to discuss the popular politics of the tax in Ealing by 
outlining the organisational development of the Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation 
and its affiliates. It shows that although the campaign came to involve a large 
number of people drawn from an unusually broad range of political traditions, it 
was largely initiated and sustained by the socialist and trade union left. The 
Federation was shaped by the particular characteristics of the poll tax and 
evolved into a highly parochial, loose, non-hierarchical protest organisation that 
proved capable of mounting an effective local campaign of civil disobedience 
and adapting to changing circumstances. Finally, the nature of the campaign is 
discussed and the experience in Ealing is set against some other theories 
regarding the anti-poll tax movement. 
Chapter three outlines the rhetoric of anti-poll tax protest and seeks to assess 
how far the protestor's language and tactics accorded with majority opinion. 
Thus qualitative 'textual' evidence derived from written sources and interviews 
with local actors is compared with quantitative surveys on public attitudes and 
participation. The chapter concludes that the rhetoric of anti-poll tax protest can 
best be seen as a conscious attempt to mobilise a 'moral community' opposed to 
the principles embodied in the tax, that cut across traditional age, class, spatial, 
ethnic and political lines. The apparent effectiveness of this appeal helps explain 
why the anti-poll tax movement in Ealing and elsewhere was able to hinder the 
local state as it attempted to enforce the tax. 
The protestors called upon local Labour councils not to implement the tax, local 
authority workers to refuse to collect and the local community not to pay it. 
These direct action tactics were consistently opposed by the leadership of the 
Labour Party and trade unions and received only patchy support among the 
movement's rank and tile. Chapter four explores why the mainstream left 
proved so reluctant to countenance any form of extra-parliamentary action, even 
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though the tax promised to emasculate its traditional support-base In local 
government through the introduction of a Unified Business Rate and by 
establishing a 'rational' incentive for local citizens to vote for low spending 
(Conservative?) councillors. It concludes that the failure of the anti-poll tax 
movement to engage with the traditional left meant that mass non-payment 
emerged as the chief tactic almost by default. 
Chapter five discusses the relationship between political violence and the anti-
poll tax campaign. Through a detailed account of the major national anti-poll tax 
demonstrations organised in 1990, it shows that the protestors in Ealing neither 
expected, nor desired rioting to occur at these demonstrations. However, many 
protestors also tended to see police actions as a direct physical attack upon the 
movement and the right to protest. In order to explain this mounting hostility to 
the police, the wider question of citizenship and violent protest in the 1980s is 
assessed. 
Chapters six and seven both describe and assess the campaign of non-payment 
in Ealing and elsewhere. Chapter six deals with the protestors' attempts to 'clog 
up the courts' at the liability order stage of the recovery procedure and so make 
the tax unworkable. It shows how this campaign brought the Federation into 
conflict with the local councillors and the lay magistracy and describes their 
reaction. It concludes that the authorities were forced to bend, subvert or simply 
ignore the law in order to pass liability orders. against the mass of non-payers 
due to the sheer weight of numbers. As a result, the liability order stage revealed 
differing perceptions of what was the 'public interest' among rival groups of 
local active citizens. 
Chapter seven takes up the story after the liability order stage and outlines the 
. 
coercive measures used by Ealing council against the borough:s non-payers, 
including attempts by bailiffs to seize property and the jailing of defaulters. It 
shows that the anti-poll tax movement continued to hinder payment and 
'. 
politicise non-payment, but largely failed to deflect the authorities from their 
chosen course. After the government's decision to abolish the tax the nature of 
the campaign changed radically and protestors effectively formed a support 
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group for those (invariably poor) local citizens facing imprisonment for poll tax 
debts. 
The final chapter seeks to draw all these threads together and show how the 
popular politics of the poll tax revealed two broad sorts of 'active citizenship' 
for the contemporary British left. The first, adopted by the institutional left, 
stressed the desirability of 'New Realism', of abandoning potentially 
controversial left-wing policies, of working within the existing political 
framework and the necessity of obeying the law pending the outcome of a 
general election. The second much more incoherent model of citizenship 
exemplified by the anti-poll tax movement was built around expressive protest, 
scepticism about the ability of Britain's electoral system to allow radical change 
or reflect the norms and values of the majority and a willingness to break the 
law. Both models can partly be explained as alternative responses on the part of 
left-wing active citizens to Thatcherism. Finally, the legacy of the poll tax 
protests for both the institutional and radical left's notion of citizenship is 
considered. 
Two appendices supplement these chapters. The first is intended as an aid for 
those unfortunate readers not intimately acquainted with the Queen of Suburbs 
and provides a brief social and political history of the borough, its geography 
and information about its social, economic and ethnic composition in the early 
1990s. The second appendix discusses some -{)f the sources and raises some 
methodological issues associated with the study, including the problems posed 
by my own involvement as an activist within the Ealing Federation. 
1 D. Butler, A. Adonis and T. Travers, Failure in British Government. The Polit~cs 0lthe Poll 
Tax., OUP, Oxford 1994 
2 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, Harper C~llins, London 1993 
J T. Sheridan & 1. McAlpine, A Time to Rage. Polygon, Edinburgh, 1994: M. Reynolds . 
Uncolleclable: The story of the Poll Tax Revolt. Greater Manchester AntI-Poll Tax FederatIOn. , 
1992 'I 
4 Danny Bums, Poll Tax Rebellion. AK Press, Stirling. 1992 
S John Scott, Po\'er~v & Wealth: Citizenship, deprivation and privilege, Longman. London. 199~. 
pl54 
9 
Chapter One 
The Poll Tax and an Active Citizenship of the 
Right 
For the first time a government had declared that anyone who could 
reasonably afford to do so should at least pay something towards the 
upkeep of. .. the services from which they benefited. A whole class of 
people - an "underclass" if you will - had been dragged back into the 
ranks of responsible society and asked to become not just dependants but 
citizens.l 
There are two obvious ways of approaching the poll tax. Firstly, it can be seen as 
an expression of the governing philosophy, an overtly ideological attempt to 
'turn dependants into citizens'. Secondly, the poll tax can be approached in more 
narrow political sense, as a practical piece of 'statecraft' that aimed to address 
particular political problems faced by British Conservatism in the 1980s. Of 
course neither of these two approaches are mutually incompatible and while it is 
convenient to distinguish between the two, the ultimate aim of this chapter is to 
synthesise both. This in turn should allow a coherent and hopefully convincing 
account of the poll tax to emerge that will inform the discussion in subsequent 
chapters. 
This chapter will therefore seek to adopt a staged approach. First I will outline 
the dominant view of 'citizenship' within British Conservatism in the period, 
with a particular emphasis on the idea of 'active' citizenship. Although the 
primary focus of the chapter remains the British Right, I will briefl~ ou.t1ine some 
of the obvious objections to this notion of active citizenship raised by the Left in 
the period. Secondly, I will identify the main political imperatives th~t 
encouraged the government to introduce a poll tax in the first place and set oot 
the chief characteristics of the resulting Local Government Finance Bill (1988). 
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Finally I ask how far the poll tax can be seen as an expression of the British :-.'ew 
Right's ideological project. 
Thatcher's Citizens 
British Conservatism has tended to distrust ideology as a basis of policy, 
stressing instead the virtues of pragmatism and common sense rooted in , 
tradition, history and experience? The party has emphasised a series of values, 
including an emphasis on individualism, law and order, private property, 
hierarchical social relations and low taxation, within a cohesive national 
community secure from the threat of external aggression. Conservative 
politicians have therefore tended to react flexibly to particular policy problems, 
even if that meant abandoning, ignoring, or modifying its core values. This 
capacity to 'change in order to conserve' apparently served the party well in the 
post-war era and allowing it to accommodate major shifts in the relationship 
between the British state and its citizens following the creation of a welfare state 
and the adoption of Keynesian demand management after 1945. But by the mid-
1970s a supposedly 'new', overtly ideological emphasis became dominant on the 
British Right, which stressed a more vigorous blend of economic liberalism and 
the primacy of the market in regulating human affairs, together with an appeal to 
social conservatism. 
New Right theorists were highly SUSpICIOUS of the modern state's supposed 
propensity to become 'overloaded' as politicians engaged in a form of 'pork 
barrel' politics to attract votes and appease the demands of organised interest 
groups.3 The state therefore increasingly promoted an inefficient, bloated public 
sector, funded through punitively high rates of taxation, at the cost of 
entrepreneurial economically 'active' citizens. 'Excessive' PU?lic spending not 
only distorted the operation of the market but also directly encouraged higher 
inflation which in tum led to conflict between employers and 'producer groups'. , 
Thus, a key policy aim of any government of the New Right was to encouraAe 
wealth creation through the market by restricting the role of the state, cutting 
public expenditure and lowering taxation. 
1 1 
Secondly, the New Right became concerned about the growth of a 'dependency 
culture', as the welfare state increasingly took over roles that would previously 
have been undertaken by individuals, their families or the 'community'. Again, 
this sapped economic dynamism and distorted the operation of the market 
economy, by reducing incentives to work and artificially boosting 'uneconomic' 
and ultimately 'unaffordable' wage rates. But most importantly, significant 
sections of the population - an 'underclass' - were becoming wholl y reliant on 
the state to meet their needs. According to Charles Murray, the 'underclass' was 
defined by its behaviour, measured by the propensity to have illegitimate 
children, commit crime and a refusal to get a job in the knowledge that the state 
would foot the bill. 4 Such a position of mass dependency was moral~v corrosive 
and encouraged a host of other social problems, including the break up of the 
family, disdain for the rights of property and a general decline in the public 
respect for authority. 
Most, if not all of all these general assumptions directly challenged the majority 
of post-war social theorists, who according to the New Right, equated, 'the 
notion of citizenship with the pursuit of socialist goals of egalitarianism'. 5 But 
initially at least, few Thatcherites seemed interested in formulating a more 
dynamic or coherent vision of citizenship to take its place. However, concern 
grew among many leading Conservatives that a moral vacuum may lay at the 
heart of their governing philosophy, which could easily be cast as nothing more 
than a celebration of selfishness, philistinism and crass materialism. Willetts, 
although a staunch supporter of Thatcherism in general, later articulated the 
. f 6 growmg sense 0 unease: 
Our deepest fear about the direction our country is taking is that somehow 
we are becoming worse people - more self-centred, mO.re aggressive, 
hostile to excellence and achievement, less civil and less wilhng to give 
time and effort to any cause greater than ourselves. 
• • 
Similarly, David Green argued that the 'language' of Thatcherism, based on the 
notion that all individuals were 'utility maximisers', failed to 'embrace the full 
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gamut of ideals, passions, motives, duties, hopes, doubts and fears which are the 
reality oflife,.7 
The question of duty also exercised many One Nation Conservatives who 
, 
suggested that market philosophies might undermine national cohesion and 
respect for the rule of law. As Gilmour put it: 8 
if people are not to be seduced by other attractions, they must at least 
feel loyalty to the state. Their loyalty will not be deep unless they gain 
from the state protection and other benefits. Homilies to cherish 
competition and warnings against interference with market forces will 
not engender loyalty. People will not tolerantly sit back and wait for 
impersonal forces to overcome disaster. They expect and demand 
action, and if they do not get it they are likely to look elsewhere or take 
action themselves. If the state is not interested in them, why should they 
be interested in the state? 
Clearly, something more was needed and following the 1987 general election a 
Thatcherite vision of the 'active citizen' emerged out of the New Right's 
ideological undergrowth. 9 
In search of the active citizen 
There is no single summary of the Conservative concept of 'active citizenship' in 
the period and the idea tended to develop piecemeal, through a series of speeches 
delivered by Douglas Hurd (then Home Secretary), Thatcher and other Tory 
ministers in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In many ways their rhetoric 
merely reiterated many of the key themes long associated wit? the New Right, 
but there was also a new emphasis on the altruistic, public spirited citizen 
operating within the wider political and social community.lO The Tory 'active 
citizen' therefore displayed two faces to the world: that of the sturQY, 
independent economic citizen and the engaged, responsible political citizen, 
active within the wider community. 
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Naturally the Thatcherite economIc citizen eschewed 'dependency' on state 
welfare and instead embodied what Letwin called the 'vigorous virtues' of self 
reliance, rationality and independence that supposedly lay deep \\"ithin 
'traditional British morality'. 11 Here it was assumed that rising disposable 
income since 1950 had created a level of prosperity sufficient to allow for a 
fundamental redefinition of the relationship between a community of 
economically autonomous individual citizens and the state. Increasingly 
individuals and families would have a far greater degree of choice, new freedoms 
to buy services, such as education or pensions, rather than be confined to (an 
inferior) state provision. As Thatcher put it in an address to supporters in 
Cheltenham, ironically delivered on the same day as poll tax protestors rioted in 
Trafalgar Square: 12 
we put our faith ... in the millions of people who spend what they earn, 
not what other people earn. Who make sacrifices for their young family 
or their elderly parents. Who help their neighbours and take care of their 
neighbourhoods ... You don't expect the moon. But you do want the 
opportunity to succeed for yourselves and your children. 
This emphasis on earning and spending was inseparable from the wider issue of 
taxation, which served as the most important point of connection between 
individuals and the state. 
The Tory active citizen had a clear duty to obey the law and contribute to the 
national community through taxes. But the state also had an obligation to see that 
the level of taxation did not encourage these same citizens to become (or remain) 
economically 'passive'. High taxes might actually prevent people from reaching 
their full potential as moral individuals by delegating responsi?ility for the well 
being of their fellow citizens onto the state and so choking off the well·springs of 
human compassion and private philanthropy. Moreover, according to the New 
Right, the history of the post war period had clearly shown the ability of t.~e 
'majority' to tyrannise the 'minority' by voting for high levels of progressive 
taxation which most simply did not have to pay. This in turn violated 
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fundamental principles of justice and compromised the freedom of the 
individual. 
Such ideas were hardly new - the phrase 'active' and 'passive' citizenship had its 
origins in the French Revolution, when the National Assembly distributed 
political rights on the basis of taxes paid on property. Majority British liberal 
opinion in the nineteenth century also shared the general assumptions that 
'responsibility' and property went hand in hand: 13 
It is important that the assembly that which votes on taxes, either 
general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay 
something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, 
disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every 
motive to be lavish and none to economise ... It amounts to allowing 
them to put their hands into other people's pockets, for any purpose 
which they think fit to call a public one. 
Of course most Conservatives combined these quite traditional concerns about the 
rights of property with a more upbeat assessment about the potential benefits of 
mass democracy, which could enhance liberty by forming a strong bulwark 
against the encroachment of the state. At a local level, democracy might also help 
develop individual political and social skills and help allocate public goods and 
services in the most effective way. So although few, if any, leading British 
Conservatives advocated a return to a franchise based on property qualifications 
or multiple voting, the desirability of building a strong measure of personal 
accountability and responsibility into the political process seemed clear enough. 14 
Nevertheless, there appeared to be a tension between Mill's tra?itional liberalism 
and the more purely market orientated nostrums of the New Right, which as we 
have seen, did not accept that mass democratic participation was likely to 
allocate public goods in the most effective way.15 This was particularly true a!. a 
local level. Here, citizens were best seen as consumers who could rationally 
weigh up the cost-benefits of services provided by local authorities when set 
against the cost of local taxes. These consumer-citizens, according to Tiebout, 
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were faced with a number of options. 16 If dissatisfied they could 'exit' the 
locality or 'voice' their complaints in the hope of securing redress. Those 
consumers unable to move or protest, or who were generally happy with the 
balance between services and tax provided by their authority could respond with 
'loyalty'. In short, the sorts of assumptions (and terminology) employed by free 
market economists could be applied to local government. A number of obvious 
criticism of this notion of local citizens as consumers readily spring to mind. For 
example, it is not easy for people to simply 'exit' localities chosen on the basis of 
jobs, family and community ties, as they might a supermarket. Nor is it 
realistically possible to undertake the sort of detailed cost-benefit analysis 
proposed by Tiebout and other New Right theorists. Nevertheless, the approach 
tended to favour the idea of an individual charge, paid by every local citizen in 
return for local services. 
The stress placed by Conservative and liberal theorists on the primacy of the 
'private domain' of individuals, friends, families and personal associates had a 
number of other political implications. For example, domestic pre-occupations 
left many people largely without the time or inclination to become active in 
politics - a point apparently confirmed by low tum outs at local elections and a 
general lack of interest in local government. 17 It also implied that the boundaries 
of politics should be deliberately kept limited, encompassing only those spheres 
of human activity, like defence, macro-economic management or taxation that 
were necessarily carried out collectively. Nevertheless, this network of familial 
and market relationships could serve as a coherent 'extended order' based on 'the 
suppression of the primitive instincts of solidarity, group altruism and group 
decision' .18 Thus the New Right's definition of citizenship stressed the civil and 
political virtues of the market 19 
The market decentralises power right down to every -individual 
consumer, so that a grand, continuous general election is in progress the 
whole time, a vote being cast whenever a share or a security of an article '. 
or a service is bought and sold. This is an economic democracy in which 
there are no privileges - everybody's dollar is as good as everybody 
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else's dollar - and where the mightiest corporations and capitalists have 
had to bow to the collective wishes of the humblest citizens. 
Consequently, the British New Right exhibited at times a fierce hostility towards 
(usually left-wing) 'activism' and 'activists', who were almost by definition 
unrepresentative of the loyal, largely apolitical 'silent majority'. Highly 
politicised interest and pressure groups, such as trade unions or even single-issue 
protest movements like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament therefore 
became in a real sense 'the enemy within'. Moreover, the means by which they 
pursued their ends, like strikes or (often illegal) acts of protest either held the 
wider community to ransom or threatened the rule of law. For Selboume these , 
attempts to empower citizens through extra-parliamentary collective action were 
based on a series of contradictory claims: 20 
rights to participate in the political process [are claimed] but also rights 
to withhold support from, and even attack that process on the grounds 
that it is "not democratic"; rights to act as a citizen, but also rights to 
choose not to; above all, the right to be treated by the state as citizen in 
whatever circumstances. 
In short, if every citizen is free to disobey any law with which they disagree, 
social disintegration and the dissolution of the civic bond could not be far behind 
But not every form of social and political activism was automatically suspect. 
Liberal democracy requires ordinary citizens to vote and called into being mass 
political parties with active memberships to both campaign in elections and 
select suitable candidates to hold public office. But this activism, channelled 
through established and responsible political institutions, is essentially limited 
and based on constructive co-operation within generally understood· rules and 
values. As such it remained qualitatively different from 'socialist' activism based 
on confrontation, protest and ultimately, the capture of state institutions in or~~ 
to intervene in the 'private domain'. But the record of the consensus years and 
the logic of state power suggested that even Conservatives might be forced by 
political interest group pressure into encouraging an unduly 'activist' state. 
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New Right advocates of active citizenship were therefore keen to stress that 
other, perhaps more potent means of helping the community than involvement in 
political parties and institutions existed. Active citizens could contribute just as 
well by serving as a JP, looking after a sick elderly neighbour, joining a 
Neighbourhood Watch scheme or perhaps becoming involved in charitable work. 
But again, these individual acts of altruism, which taken together would 
represent a genuine community, required the state to withdraw as 'the real sign of 
a civilised society is ... that voluntary, charitable organisations can meet human 
needs without coercive taxation and the employment of public officials... The 
biggest threat to collective action comes from the state.' 21 Nor could social and 
political activism be meaningfully separated from economic activism. Ignatieff 
summed up these assumptions well: 'without property a citizen cannot be 
independent; without the income of property, an individual will not have the 
leisure necessary to be a good citizen. Without property, the citizen is passive, 
the ward of the state, a dependent on the benefit cheque, the social services and 
the housing department'. 22 
Interestingly, many Conservatives believed that their vison of active citizenship 
was most likely to flourish in the much-maligned suburbs, places indeed, like the 
London Borough of Ealing. Willetts' eulogy to the British suburb is therefore 
worth quoting at a little length: 23 
The British suburb is not the place of rootless, miserable apathy either 
People, admittedly, do pursue their material aspirations - to own their 
own house, to be able to afford a good holiday - but these are not immoral 
or shameful. And at the same time the suburbs comprise rich networks of 
voluntary associations ... Even that urge to home-owner~hip, satisfied 
more successfully in the 1980s than in any other decade, has given people 
new and stronger ties to their neighbourhood. Ownership and belonging 
go together 
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'. 
Some obvious objections 
As we might expect, the Conservatives' conception of the 'active citizenship' 
evoked hostility and even derision from the mainstream British left, Howe\'er. it 
is not my intention here to debate the British New Right's conceptualisation of 
'citizenship' in any depth. Instead, I have sought to identify some of their main 
ideological assumptions in order to help contextualise the poll tax as a policy. 
Nevertheless, one important explanation for the poll tax's obvious lack of 
legitimacy was that it overtly embodied philosophical principles that were 
radically out of kilter with dominant popular opinion regarding 'fair' taxation, 
And as the Thatcherites were right to emphasise, the whole issue of taxation 
remained highly emblematic of the wider relationship between the individual and 
the state. It would therefore be useful to briefly outline some of the more obvious 
criticisms at this point. 
Firstly, the New Right's emphasis on individualism within a market economy 
was rejected as both simplistic and essentially wrong in principle. Human beings 
were not simply 'rational' economic actors, weighing up their every act in terms 
of self-interest, profit and loss, but instead functioned as part of a wider 
community with its own morals, culture and traditions, many of which may well 
mediate or reject altogether market values. Human beings were primarily social 
animals and as such embodied a number of often contradictory interests and 
characteristics which (however uneasily at times) could operate together: 
competition and co-operation, self-interest and altruism, individualism and a 
sense of community were not mutually exclusive qualities. Each could be 
harnessed to shape a more harmonious, equitable and dynamic society. At the 
very least, such a goal required that a basic minimum standard of life and 
meaningful opportunities for personal growth should be mad~ available every 
citizen. 
To this end the maJonty of the British Left (and many One Natipp 
Conservatives) continued to promote a rights based conception of citizenship:4 
This vision of' social citizenship' found most its most effective voice in the work 
of the sociologist T H. Marshall, whose seminal series of lectures on citizenship 
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and social class remain central to academic debate. 2s Marshall proposed an 
essentially dynamic conception of the citizenship ideal in history, which he 
argued, had burgeoned and grown in staged movements with the advent of 
industrial capitalism. Briefly stated, the establishment of civil rights in the 
eighteenth century and political rights in the nineteenth had facilitated popular 
and institutional pressure for social citizenship rights in the face of gross social 
inequality and economic hardship. Indeed, for Marshall this 'drive towards social 
equality [was but] the latest phase of an evolution towards citizenship which has 
been in continuous progress for some 250 years'. 26 Henceforth citizens would 
have full access to the sorts of social necessities, like full employment, welfare 
benefits, housing, health and education by right. Such social rights would allow 
them to reach their full potential as individuals as part of the wider national 
community. 
Many on the left were therefore quick to accuse the Conservatives' of proposing 
an essentially negative view of obligation.27 It was all very well to stress the duty 
of the individual citizen to be economically active, but for a variety of reasons, 
including illness, the need to provide childcare or simply the existence of mass 
unemployment, this was not always possible. Moreover, in a society 
characterised by social inequality, it was simply misleading to assume that all 
citizens enjoyed equal opportunities and resources, irrespective of their gender, 
ethnicity and above all, class position.28 These apparently self-evident facts of 
life had encouraged the notion of universal social rights in the first place. 
Moreover, according to the Left, Thatcherite rhetoric about individual 
philanthropy should be seen as a deliberate attempt to obscure its wider (and 
ongoing) efforts to centralise power and more closely control local institutions 
and voluntary organisations. And yet these same institutions, not individuals, 
. 
actually pursued and promoted welfare in practise. This in tum re-emphasised the 
importance of the citizen as an active participant, whether as a voter or within 
trade unions, political parties, community groups and even single issue prot~ 
campaigns. Ultimately, a collective form of active citizenship had made possible 
the transformation of the British state from a primarily coercive instrument. into 
one that aimed to secure a decent 'minimum' for every citizen.29 Institutions like 
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local government, however imperfectly, accepted communal responsibility for 
the provision of public services, relief of hardship and poverty. Realistically, 
institutions in modern mass societies, rooted in the communities they served and 
checked by a vigorous and democratic civil society, would remain central to the 
promotion of social advancement and individual empowerment. 
So any rhetoric that cast active citizenship 'in terms of securing the framework of 
law and order within which the individual will pursue his or her own good, and 
perhaps in the process make charitable contributions to the worst off' was not 
only loose, windy and potentially morally suspect, but also largely beside the 
point.30 Small wonder then, that the right's rhetoric should therefore contain few 
if any practical proposals which might bring about a return to a philanthropic 
'golden age', other than tax cuts for the wealthier sections of the population (and 
more improbably still, the adoption of a local poll tax?). 
The Left also rejected most of the New Right's assumptions regarding the 
potentially corrosive effects of taxation. For proponents of social citizenship, it 
seemed axiomatic that meaningful levels of individual welfare within a capitalist 
economy could only be provided if a sufficiently high tax base existed to pay for 
them.3l Quite properly then, the vast majority of citizens did pay progressive, 
universal taxes through income tax and national insurance. If this tax burden was 
largely shouldered by the economically 'active', as the New Right pointed out, 
then this was for a very good reason - some wer-e too poor to directly contribute. 
So any concept of 'fair' taxation must assume that each person or business 
should contribute resources commensurate with their wealth and should not be 
linked in any way with political rights. As one Labour Party publication put it, 
'any reform of local government finance has to take as its starting point that 
democracy is based on citizenship and not on wealth. The universal franchise is 
not negotiable' (original emphasis). 32 
However, support for the mainstream left's model of social citizenship was fl?'l 
universal. Certainly most Marxists in the period continued to argue that the 
concept of a common 'social citizenship', based on universal rights within a 
national community, was ultimately an illusion that masked the realities of a 
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society divided by mutually antagonistic classes. They also objected to the 
limitations of social citizenship as an emancipatory aspiratio~ which implied 
that the best that could be hoped for was not socialism, but a modified form of 
capitalism. 33 The trajectory of government policy since the mid 1970s had shown 
how contingent these supposed 'rights' were upon the continued willingness of 
the dominant class to uphold them. The changed and difficult economic 
conditions that characterised the period after the ending of the 'long boom' 
suggested that the idea of social citizenship may well have run its course. 
But the majority of the Left (including Marxists) were also conscious that social 
'rights' gained in the post-war era had also ushered in tangible gains for the 
majority of the working class and were therefore unquestionably worth 
defending. A policy like the poll tax not only undermined the welfare state in 
general, but also represented a significant attack on the living standards of 
ordinary people in its own right. Even so, the striking thing about the tenor of 
many of the objections raised by the left was their obvious assumption that the 
Conservatives were intent on pursuing an essentially ideological project. It 
followed that their policies could no longer be meaningfully understood as 
'pragmatic responses to financial and administrative problems. As financial and 
administrative instruments, they defy all conventional rules of good taxation and 
public administration. Rather they are an instrument of policy, a tool of social 
engineering, aimed at altering social relationships, ideas and values'. 34 
Once again, this criticism was by no means confined to the usual leftist suspects 
and many One Nation Conservatives cited the poll tax as perhaps the supreme 
example of the government's tendency to value ideology over 'common sense'. 
A GOl 0 35 s 1 mour put It: 
The poll tax was the culmination of the Thatcherite market or· rather 
supermarket philosophy ... in the Thatcherite philosophy the people of this 
country were not so much citizens as consumers. 
This characterisation of the poll tax as an ideological measure has much to 
recommend it, but it should not obscure the way the poll tax as a particular 
2~ 
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policy attempted to resolve several long standing political problems that 
exercised British Conservatism in the post-war period. 
The politics of the poll tax 
A number of political factors prompted the Conservatives to replace a property 
based domestic rating system that had endured for some four hundred years with 
a poll tax. In part, the Local Government Finance Act 1988 can be seen as the 
culmination of a long established hostility to the rates within the British 
Conservative Party and its electoral supporters - a point I will return to shortly. 
But by far the most important issue prompting reform remained the increasingly 
problematic relationship between central and local governments, tensions that 
tended to be largely (although not exclusively) expressed from the mid-1970s 
onwards through disputes over local finance and local taxation. 
For most of the period between 1945 and 1979 local and central government 
operated a system of territorial politics, described by Bulpitt as a 'dual polity'. 36 
This rested on the respective autonomy of the centre to pursue 'high' politics 
(foreign and defence policy, macro-economic strategy) while political 
collaborators within the 'periphery' implemented and managed the 'low' politics 
of social and welfare policy. However, the expansion of public health, planning, 
social services and education and housing in the post-war period considerably 
increased the purview of local authorities which-became responsible for around a 
quarter of all government spending, half of which was provided by national 
government grants. 
This growing institutional importance implied that the centre might become 
increasingly wlnerable to pressure from the localities, whi~h displayed 'the 
potential to drive a wedge into its philosophies and policies,.37 -Certainly, the 
1970s did see the growth of a more confident and ideological municipal left, 
which occasionally directly challenged the centre over specific policy issues, ~~ 
it would be wrong to exaggerate the seriousness of this challenge.38 For as 
Butler et at noted,-'until the 1980s the system had always managed to jog along ... 
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Under Mrs Thatcher relations between central and local government suffered a 
virtual breakdown'. 39 
Why did this occur and why did it encourage the government to consider 
replacing the rates with a poll tax? From the mid-1970s many local authorities 
were faced by a double cash squeeze as the government cut rate support grants 
and inflation increased costs and eroded the real value of revenue. As a result 
, 
domestic and business rates tended to rise in the period, compromising the 
centre's traditional attempts to direct macro-economic strategy. This seemed to 
flag up the fact that the current system did not provide a direct relationship 
between local tax rates and the amount local authorities actually spent. Such 
concerns cut across party lines but were particularly pressing for the 
Conservative administrations of the 1980s as they sought to roll back 'the 
frontiers of the state', reduce costs on business, tackle inflation and generall y 
curb public spending. 40 
But it is unlikely that these pressures, in themselves, would have been enough to 
prompt any government to take the unpredictable and potentially dangerous step 
of abandoning the rates wholesale. For example, in 1981 the government issued a 
Green Paper on local government finance which examined four policy options -
the retention of the rates, a local sales tax, a local income tax and a poll tax. Each 
was set against the criteria of practicability, fairness, ease of administration, the 
degree of financial control offered the centre and suitability for all tiers of 
government. The subsequent report concluded that while the rates were hardly 
ideal, there was no satisfactory alternative,.41 Moreover, a determined campaign 
waged by the mass media to discredit 'loony left' councils, the abolition of the 
GLC and Metropolitan counties, the determination of most local politicians to 
stay within the law, centrally imposed cash limits and 'rate capping' all 
combined to curb local authority confidence and budgets. (See Chapter Four for 
the experience in Ealing). Nevertheless, a number of political factors continued 
to push the government in the direction of a poll tax as a solution to the probl~t;' 
of accountability in local government. 
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The Conservative party had long displayed a latent hostility to the rates, although 
this tended to become particularly marked during general election campaigns and 
at a local level, where the issue was often conflated with the wider question of 
home ownership as a source of middle class social identity.42 Bulpitt's excellent 
summary of this 'divisive' ratepayers' culture bears obvious comparisons with 
J.S. Mill's comments: 43 
It perceived two major actors In the local political process; the 
'ratepayers' and the 'rest', or the 'haves' or the 'have-nots'. In some 
senses this was merely the national class conflict model of politics 
transferred to the local level. But the ratepayers theme ... was more than 
that. It represented the survival of pre-democratic ideas in the twentieth 
century: local politics and local councils were regarded as the preserve of 
the private property owners who paid a local tax, the rate directly. The 
rest, principally council house tenants, were not perceived as legitimate 
local citizens; in some way they had acquired the suffrage by trickery and 
misunderstanding. Since local councils spent the ratepayers money, only 
those who paid the rates directly should be allowed to participate in the 
political process. 
Certainly, in the 1980s only 18 million electors, out of an approximate total of 40 
million, paid rates. Some 3.5 - 4 million 'ratepayers' also received a full or 
partial rebate and these were disproportionately clustered in Labour supporting 
urban areas. According to the New Right, the majority of citizens therefore had a 
clear 'rational' incentive to vote for high spending, high taxing (Labour?) 
candidates, in the knowledge that they would benefit from enhanced services 
without having to pick up the tab. Similarly, 'punitive' local business rates were 
a check on wealth creation and enterprise. Even Nigel Lawson, who was 
generally hostile to the poll tax, believed its purpose was 'to rescue business 
from the swingeing rate increases levied by local authorities on a sector which, as 
such, had no vote'.44 As one leading Scottish advocate of the poll tax saw it, .',if 
ever there was a recipe for political irresponsibility, the rating system is it' 45 
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,But for all these criticisms, the rates retained a surprising degree of popular 
legitimacy, as custom and usage over time served to elevate them into an 
accepted part of the social fabric - something to be grumbled over perhaps, but 
essentially 'normal'. The system also enjoyed the advantage of being relatively 
simple to collect and easy to understand. But above alI, however imperfectly, a 
rate based on property values did seem to reflect an ability to pay, certainly in 
comparison to a poll tax. In that sense, they were perceived as fair. 
All this fuelled scepticism among Thatcher and others ministers about the 
practicality of ditching the rates. 46 Nevertheless pressure for change continued to 
mount within the grass roots of the Conservative party, especialIy after a 
damaging rate revaluation exercise in Scotland in 1985 led to increased bills for 
many natural Tory supporters.47 Crucially, this frustration was increasingly 
voiced by Tory backbenchers and as Young acerbically noted, Thatcher 'was 
always attentive to the House of Commons, but strictly to her own side of it'. 48 
Internal party management thereafter emerged as a major factor in shaping the 
direction of policy and almost 'every key decision in the polI tax saga was made 
in the immediate run up to a party conference, by ministers anxious for 
something to wave from the rostrum'. 49 
So in March 1985, the government formally committed itself to the idea of 
replacing the rates with a poll tax. The process by which this broad policy 
intention was translated into the Local Government Finance Act 1988 has been 
exhaustively described in great detail elsewhere and is of only limited relevance 
to any discussion of the popular politics of the poll tax. 50 However, a number of 
brief general points can usefully be made. Firstly, the genesis of the polI tax saw 
little meaningful consultation with interested institutional actors, including local 
government. Instead the detailed policy proposals were largely the preserve of a 
small group of politicians, civil servants, academics and other individuals, linked 
by remarkably close political and social ties. This example of what Marquand 
called 'club government' was exacerbated by the surprisingly supine attitu~e 
adopted by the vast majority of Conservative backbenchers to such a 
controversial and radical policy and the necessary legislation was passed without 
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significant amendment. What then, were the mam provIsions of the Local 
Government Finance Act 1988? 
Again, it is not necessary to consider in any detail the mechanics of the poll tax 
as an administrative measure, many of which will become apparent in succeeding 
chapters. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the community charge legislation 
may have been straightforward in principle, in detail it was 'anything but'. 51 
Firstly and most obviously the Act abolished domestic rates and replaced them 
with five kinds of payment, of which the most important (and common) was the 
'personal community charge'. Each adult over 18 was now eligible to pay, 
although a few social and professional categories, such as clergymen or the 
homeless, were exempt. A system of rebates was made available and individuals 
on benefit or with low incomes could potentially secure an 80% exemption. 
Secondly, the legislation removed the right of local authorities to set the level of 
non-domestic (eg business) rates and instead created a Uniform Business Rate, 
set by the central government. Thirdly, the treasury retained its power to 'cap' 
local authorities it deemed to be spending excessively - a 100/0 rise in local 
spending would produce a 40% rise in poll tax. 52 
All these clauses were based on the assumption that the final- personal 
community charge bills issued to individuals would be relatively low. For 
example, the government projected an average charge of £278 for the 1990-91 tax 
year. However, from an early stage it became clear that these projections were 'a 
massive exercise in self-delusion' due to a combination rising inflation and a 
parsimonious rate support grant settlement for the 1990, which directly fed into 
higher bills. 53 The government therefore arranged a series of central subsidies 
with the aim of ameliorating the worst effects of the charge for 'losers' in the 
localities. These included a 'safety net' scheme (which effectively distributed the 
. 
revenue gains under the poll tax from wealthy to poor areas) and a transitional 
relief scheme (which limited losses for individual households). 
Although meaningful opposition to the poll tax in parliament was limited, the 
legislation provoked considerable degree of criticism from a minority within the 
Conservative party, led by Sir George Young, the ~lP for Ealing-Acton, 
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However, Young's rebelliousness, like that of all other Tory MPs, had definite 
limits and by ] 989 he concluded that 54 
I spent most of 1988 opposing the Poll tax without success. The Bill is 
now an Act and I have no plans to re-open the debate. I believe it best to 
wait two or three years to see how the new system settles down. 
The other established parties, local authorities, trade unions, church groups, 
voluntary organisations and of course, an increasingly vibrant, extra-
parliamentary grass roots anti-poll tax movement were not so constrained. 
Can then, the poll tax be seen as an attempt to implement the ideology of the 
New Right? Such a claim sits uneasily with important features of the legislation, 
which directly contradicted Thatcherite rhetoric regarding the need to make local 
government more accountable to its citizens by establishing a direct correlation 
between voting and spending. For example, the provision of Community Charge 
Benefits modified the flat rate nature of the charge. But then, even the most 
ideological of New Rightists would (presumably) have drawn back from levying 
a wholly uniform charge and some rebate scheme was therefore inevitable? 
Nevertheless, the existence of a benefit scheme potentially blurred the sort of 
direct accountability envisaged by the government. So did the decision to retain 
capping powers and the centralisation of non-domestic rates under the Unified 
Business Rate, which left central government, not the local electorate, as the 
ultimate arbiter of levels of local authority spending. 55 
So under the poll tax only about 25% of local government expenditure was raised 
locally. 56 Even so, local authorities levied poll tax bills far in excess of the 
government's initial expectations. Subsequent attempts to keep bills down 
through safety netting and transitional relief schemes - however "politically 
desirable from the perspective of Conservative's MPs - further complicated the 
picture. Finally, experience was to show that the poll tax did 1101 reduce pubHc 
spending and limit tax rises. In the event, the various administrative costs 
associated with the transition to poll tax and back to council tax has been 
estimated at least £3 billion (or 0.5% of GOP in the early 1990s). 57 
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It was tempting then, from a Thatcherite perspective, to conclude that the poll tax 
failed not because it was a 'bad' law, but because irresponsible, socialist local 
authorities seized the opportunity to 'jack up spending and blame the 
government'. 58 Successive ministerial decisions also created unnecessary 
anomalies by moving the policy further away from the basic principles it was 
intended to embody. Thus it was claimed, for all the obvious problems associated 
with the implementation of the poll tax, more and more people were coming to 
believe that everyone ought to contribute something to the upkeep of services 
which they use. It followed that there was no basic conflict between the 
principles and philosophy of the New Right - given tangible expression in the 
community charge - and wider popular opinion. 
Conclusion - A taxing notion of community 
The introduction to this chapter suggested that there are two distinct (but not 
mutually exclusive) ways of approaching the poll tax as a policy. Firstly, the tax 
could be seen as an attempt to address pressing political problems faced by the 
government, including ongoing conflict between the centre and the localities, a 
desire to limit public spending and resentment against the rates among core 
Conservative supporters. The second approach stresses the ideological basis of a 
measure that attempted to turn 'dependants into citizens', embodying the New 
Right's belief in the virtues of individualism, economic independence and 'fair' 
taxation as a means of encouraging 'responsible' political behaviour on the part 
of both voters and government. As Ridley remarked: 'Why should a duke pay 
more than a dustman? It is only because we have been subjected to socialist ideas 
for the last fifty years that people think this is fair. ,59 However, these market-
based nostrums were increasingly tempered in the period by calls for 'active 
. 
citizenship' within the community, expressed through existing political, voluntary 
and social institutions and through individual acts of altruism and philanthropy 
" 
Common sense suggests that the poll tax - like any other political act - was 
shaped by a mixture of philosophical and 'practical' considerations. But the 
evidence presented in this chapter has tended to underline an obvious ideological 
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dimension. This was certainly how Thatcher and many of her most avid 
supporters saw it and in that sense, the official name of the poll tax - the 
Community Charge - was of more than passing interest. Indeed, Thatcher 
reputedly showed a surprising degree of agitation whenever the words 'poll tax) 
were mentioned, 'drumming her fingers on the table as if it were a piano, and 
saying that it must not be a called a poll tax' but a Community Charge. 60 
This is potentially important, for while the practical shortcomings of the poll tax 
did much to undermine its popularity, they cannot ultimately explain its failure to 
secure legitimacy. Instead, the majority of British citizens in the late 1980s 
simply did not share the highly individualistic, market led Thatcherite notion of 
community embodied by the tax. As MacGregor presciently predicted: 61 
the poll tax may have gone too far. [It is] seen as offensive by large 
numbers of the British people. Up to now, the public seem to have borne 
the tearing apart of the social fabric with surprising equanimity ... Now 
that the attack on democratic principles has cut through the outer layer of 
public sentiment and struck at the core values of fair play and liberty, the 
British people may have had enough of the great experiment. 
The following chapters will show that not only was MacGregor right in her 
assessment of the poll tax as a particular policy, but that the tax also served to 
mobilise a powerful wave of popular protest which directly challenged (or 
subverted) the New Right's notion of active citizenship. 
A number of other ironies soon became readily apparent. Instead of the poll tax 
promoting personal 'responsibility', millions of ordinary citizens consciously 
sought to avoid paying it. Instead of inducing citizens to vo~e 'rationally' for 
low-spending Conservative councillors, the poll tax proved a serious electoral 
liability. Instead of promoting 'responsible' participation within the existing 
democratic structures, nearly a million people simply disappeared off t!1e 
electoral roll, while hundreds of thousands of others attended protest meetings 
and (often unruly) demonstrations. Instead of the tax encouraging an 
individualistic active citizenship, expressed through personal philanthropy or 
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participation in civic society, it encouraged another, altogether more radical type 
of local activism in the form of a large-scale leftist anti-poll tax movement, 
committed to promoting mass civil disobedience. In the next chapter I therefore 
begin this discussion of the popular politics of the poll tax by looking at the 
development of that movement in one of Willett's beloved 'British suburbs) the , 
London Borough ofEaling. 
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Chapter 2 
A well organised and vociferous campaign' 
This is a chapter of two parts. The first traces the genesis of the Ealing anti-poll tax 
campaign and reviews its organisational development. It argues that the 
organisational trajectory of the campaign was largely dependant on two factors: the 
course of national political events and the personal and political demands posed by 
the campaign's tactical shift away from propaganda and towards civil disobedience. 
It shows that although the majority of anti-poll tax activists came from a socialist or 
trade union background, the campaign developed a more wide ranging coalition of 
protest and established links with other sections of the EaIing community. The 
second part of the chapter seeks to place the Ealing protestors' experience in the 
wider regional and national context. It briefly outlines the history and political 
composition of both the All Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation (hereafter the All 
Britain Federation) and then discusses the organisational links between local 
campaigns and these national and regional bodies. Finally, it considers what, if 
anything the organisational and political composition of the anti-poll tax movement 
might tell us about its nature and significance as a proponent of a particular form of 
direct, citizen action. 
Ealing Against the Poll Tax 
The first initiative to form an anti-poll tax campaign in Ealing came from 'Ealing 
Fightback' a ginger group of Labour Party members, trade unionists and community 
activists established in January 1988 to oppose cuts in local services (see chapter 
four). Like the majority of left-wingers, Ealing Fightback members saw the poll tax 
as a threat to the independent tax raising powers of local authorities and highlighted 
the likelihood of higher bills for ordinary citizens. 2 So as early as Summer 1988, the 
group resolved to organise a conference of Ealing Labour Parties and trade union 
branches with a view to discussing 'the Labour Party strategy on Poll Tax, to look at 
the Scottish experience and ... develop a strategy we can use locally'. J However little 
was done for the rest of 1988 and the proposed conference did not materialise until 
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January 1989. Unfortunately, there appear to be no extant papers from this 
conference and little information is available, other than it was attended by a number 
of local councillors and trade union representatives. But it is clear that it was this 
gathering that decided to launch a borough-wide protest campaign. 
Ealing A-gai?st the Poll Tax Campaign (EAPTC) was formally established at a 
meeting of 15 labour and community activists held on 21 March 1989. The meeting 
was attended by a fairly representative sample of the Ealing Left, including the 
president of the Indian Workers Association (IW A), Piarra Khabra (elected Labour 
l\1P for Southall 1992), Valerie V az (a Labour councillor), Oliver New and Lionel 
Millar (Ealing Trades Council officers), Anita Patel (Ealing Trade Union Resource 
Centre), Cathy Ludbrooke (Secretary, Southall Constituency Labour Party) and 
David Wahl (President Ealing NUT and convenor of Ealing Fightback). They went 
on to agree some fairly modest future priorities. Firstly, the campaign would 'put 
pressure on the Labour Council to produce information on the poll tax' by raising 
awareness of the issue within the Trades Council, the Labour Group, Labour Party 
wards, trade unions and affiliated organisations through the distribution of 'a simple 
but fairly hard hitting leaflet'. 4 This emphasis on campaigning within the labour 
movement was to be supplemented by more public activities, like petitioning and 
leafleting, with a view to holding a demonstration in Southall later in the summer. 
As organised opposition to the poll tax increased throughout 1989, EAPTC served 
as the main co-ordinating body until the creation of a Federation in May 1990. Until 
the implementation of the poll tax on 1 April 1990 campaigners naturally tended to 
focus on disseminating propaganda and information about the poll tax as widely as 
possible. These sorts of activities did not require any over-elaborate structures and 
EAPTC remained a largely informal (and so flexible) organisation. For example, 
there was no written constitution and only two formal positions were created - that 
of 'convenor' (who undertook mailings, minute taking etc) and a treasurer. A few 
individuals played an important part in 'kick-starting' the campaign, including Rosa 
Ward, who served as campaign convenor up until the creation of the Ealing 
Federation in tvlay 1990. She was employed as an advice worker in the borough's 
Trade Union and Resource Centre and \vas therefore well placed to access resources 
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and effectively promote the campaign in the Ealing labour movement. As convenor, 
Ward also conducted correspondence with outside political, community and trade 
union bodies, including the EaIing Labour Group in the council. The other officer, 
Sukh Sander, the campaign treasurer, was also full-time worker with the IWA. 
Meetings-were attended by representatives of local anti-poll tax groups (as and when 
they formed), local public sector trade unions, some Labour ward organisations and 
Ealing Green Party. But as public hostility towards the tax burgeoned both EAPTC 
(and local anti-poll tax groups) increasingly began to attract the support of 
individuals with no particular history of political affiliation. These sorts of protestors 
tended to favour more informal modes of decision making, either in principle (in the 
case of Green activists) or because they had little experience of more bureaucratic 
means of political management. Crucially, they were also highly receptive to the 
idea of non-payment as a tactic. The importance of the Scottish precedent in 
encouraging Ealing campaigners to pursue a non-payment campaign can hardly be 
over-stated and the process was actively encouraged from early 1989 onwards by 
local supporters of the Militant Tendency. For example, local Militants energetically 
organised a contingent to join other London protestors travelling up Scotland on a 
specially chartered 'red train' to attend an anti-poll tax demonstration in Glasgow on 
March 1989. However, the non-payment strategy was certainly not the preserve of 
any particular group or faction and by autumn 1989 had become the prevailing 
orthodoxy among protestors. 
EAPTC therefore undertook a number of co-ordinating activities in 1989 and early 
1990 aimed at establishing a network of local anti-poll tax groups throughout the 
borough. One leaflet produced in 1989 advised readers thae: 
Between now and April when they will start to collect payment, EAPTC 
aims to get leaflets out to every household as the first step of setting up 
Anti-Poll Tax groups in every Street, Tenants Association and workplace. 
Two or three people are enough to start a local Anti-Poll Tax Group. 
EAPTC can give you help and support to do this. If you'd like to get 
involved come along to our regular Saturday morning street stalls in Acton, 
GreenfordINortholt and Southall or contact us on [telephone number]. 
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Although these ambitious organisational aspirations were to remam largely 
unfulfilled, the demand for publicity material, such as stickers, leaflets, posters and 
T -shirts from local groups soon exhausted the borough campaign's rather meagre 
financial resources and they were left with no alternative but to fund activities 
themselves. Even so, the financial position of the campaign at the end of 1989 
illustrates both the sorts of activities undertaken and its support base. Most 
expenditure mainly arose from printing, postage and the costs of organising a 
demonstration. Sources of income included Ealing Trades Council (£101), Ealing 
NUT (£100), sale of T-shirts (£145) and donations. 6 Interestingly, some donations 
(£245 in total) were secured after Piara Khabra personally appealed to Southall 
shopkeepers along the route of an anti-poll tax demonstration to make a donation of 
£1.7 However the accounts tend to downplay the resources actually available, as they 
ignore other' donations in kind', such as use of photocopiers, inclusion of material in 
mailings by sympathetic trade union branches, community groups and Labour Party 
branches. 
By the end of 1989 discussions in EAPTC began to focus on the organisational 
shortcomings of the present arrangements. 8 Two related problems prompted the 
decision. Firstly, although the full organisational implications of proposals for a 
campaign of non-payment remained opaque, it was assumed that 'tighter' 
organisation and locally based support groups would be essential. Secondly, it was 
generally agreed that a more formal structure based on some loose form of 
representative democracy, with delegates from local anti-poll tax groups, trade 
unions and other community organisations was required. So as early as October 
1989 the campaign agreed in principle to form a borough-wide federation of local 
anti-poll tax groups. 
A gazetteer of Ealing anti-poll tax groups 
In Ealing three types of local anti-poll tax group had developed by the end 1990, 
although in practise there was always a certain degree of overlap: 
o Area based 
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o Estate based 
o V ocationall y based 
The descriptions that follow of their organisational development has been drawn 
from extant local written records and material and interviews with key organisers 
and activi'Sts in each group. 
Acton Anti-Poll Tax Unions 
The anti-poll tax campaign in Acton was initiated by supporters of the Militant 
Tendency in March 1989, then operating through the local branch of a rather 
obscure front organisation named the Youth Trade Union Rights Campaign. 9 Two 
Militant members, Michael O'Connell (a computer engineer) and Peter Tomlinson 
(a museum assistant) emerged as the main organisers and public voice of the Acton 
campaign and played an active part within the borough-wide Federation. Militant 
supporters were more prominent in the Acton APTU than in any other within the 
borough. Given the Labour Party's oft-repeated charge that such groups were little 
better than 'Militant fronts', it may therefore usefully serve as a brief case study 
from which to assess the organisation's role at a 10calleveI. I will return to Militant 
as a national issue within the anti-poll tax movement later in the chapter. 
Although agitation about the poll tax began in March the first serious efforts to 
establish an anti-poll tax union began in September with a public meeting attended 
by 50 local residents of the South Acton Estate, jointly undertaken with the South 
Acton Residents Association Federation (SARAF).l0 This collaboration was made 
possible by the involvement of Yvonne Say (a full time tenant's rights worker 
employed by SARAF) and a number of other tenants' activists. By December 1989 
membership had reached 410 in Acton overall, prompting campaigners to divide the 
area into five - North, South, West, East and Central - with people 'responsible for 
areas, similar to shop stewards' .11 But as Michael O'Connell recalled: 12 
The ideal situation would have been for [these] four or five anti-poll tax 
unions being very active, people involved, sending delegates to the Ealing 
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Federation and then in turn the whole thing being very alive and democratic. 
That was the aim ... But it didn't get to that stage. 
Instead an essentially loose network evolved, including people who attended local 
public meetings, local and national demonstrations, staffed information stalls and 
telephone. trees. The Acton campaign also put much effort into establishing a 
network of people who 'would [leaflet] the area around where they lived.' The total 
paid membership of the various Acton groups reached about 1000 by March 1991. 13 
Over the duration of the campaign (some three or four years) some 200 people were 
actively involved, including a 'hard-core of about 50 people 'who were always there 
and always prepared to do something and stuck it out'. 
Who were the active protestors, how old were they and what were their political 
affiliations, if any? Although their social background was inevitably mixed, the 
campaign attracted the support of unemployed people, single-parents, and 
pensioners, as well as people in full time employment. So according to Yvonne Say, 
a large number 'were if anything of the under-class, as a lot of the people in [areas 
like] South Acton don't work - they're impoverished because they don't have a 
job,.14 In terms of age most established political activists were in their twenties and 
early thirties, but the wider membership tended to be older. The political affiliation 
of most Acton supporters was broadly Labour supporting (with a few ex-Tory 
voters). However, as we have seen, Militant members (but also a number of Socialist 
Workers Party members) were prominent and could meaningfully be said to have 
served as the organisational and political 'leadership' of the campaign in the area. 
Does this in itself substantiate the Labour Party's accusation that local anti-poll tax 
unions, like that in Acton were merely 'front' organisations for the 'hard left' with 
little 'genuine' popular support? 
Although the avowed priority of groups like Militant was to defeat the tax, they 
'made no secret of the fact' that they wanted 'to get people involved in a radical. left 
socialist party ... But in retrospect it didn't really happen'. 15 The relative failure of 
left groups to recruit in Acton (and elsewhere) merely reflected the interests of the 
vast majority of both passive and active supporters, who were mobilised by this 
particular issue. Of course there were also 'bigger' questions implicit in the 
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campaign and most were generally 'anti-Tory'. But as John Cudmore, leader of 
Labour Council and the local member for South Acton conceded, 'ordinary, hard up 
'. people ... with no previous political agenda associated themselves with the campaign' 
out of a deeply felt opposition to the tax and could therefore not be seen simply as 
'dupes' of the far left.16 Certainly there is little evidence of friction between local 
residents·of ~he South Acton area and left activists, although anyone put off by the 
presence of 'militants' would presumably have voted with their feet. Nevertheless, 
according to Yvonne Say the relationship was generally harmonious because left 
activists 'worked with people, they didn't try to take over or dominate, so it was 
OK ... Just a friendly bunch of lads really. ,17 
By August 1990 it was becoming apparent that the attempt to establish five separate 
anti-poll tax unions in Acton was over-ambitious. While some areas, such as South, 
Central and North Acton were functioning reasonably well, the Ealing Federation's 
organising committee noted that 'distribution and activity was not going ahead' in 
East and West Acton and suggested that all the Acton APTUs should meet jointly. 18 
Although, the Acton groups declined after the abolition announcement activity was 
maintained in connection with vociferous campaigns following the jailing of 
Michael O'Connell and Frank and Sylvia Mathews (see chapter seven). By the 
autumn of 1992 the Acton Anti-Poll Unions were effectively moribund. 
Southall Against the Poll Tax 
As so many active supporters of Ealing Against the Poll Tax Campaign lived and 
worked in the north of the borough there was a relatively smooth transition to a 
distinctly 'Southall' organisation in December 1989. Like other groups, the staple 
activities of SAPT included street stalls, public meetings, door-te-door leafletting 
and socials. However, less emphasis was placed on formal membership and ··a 
mailing list of some 150 committed supporters was maintained instead. Of these, 
there were some 25 consistent 'activists' drawn from diverse political backgrounds. 
According to Eve Turner (a local government officer and Socialist Outlook 
supporter) 'apart from 2 or 3 of us no one was in anything'. 19 Similarly the social 
composition of the group was diverse, including pensioners, students, local 
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government workers and a number of Asian families who 'enthusiastically 
supported the campaign'. 20 
This was significant, for above all Southall was, and remains, characterised by its 
large Asian community (see appendix one). Almost all commentators felt that the 
poll tax .se~erely effected minority ethnic communities and the campaigners 
naturally sought to build support among the area's Asian population. However, by 
early 1990 activists sensed some reluctance to formally join the campaign, because 
'Southall has a strong community tradition [and] people are organised through 
established organisations/temples'. 21 Interestingly, a similar problem was recorded 
in the St Paul's area of Bristol, another inner-city area with a large minority-ethnic 
population: 22 
sometimes in the places where the Anti-Poll Tax Unions were weakest ... 
resistance was strongest. For example, St Pauls was almost the only area in 
Bristol which couldn't sustain an Anti-Poll Tax group. Local people didn't 
feel the need to set up new groups because, as in many city areas, they 
already had strong networks of solidarity and there was already a high level 
of general hostility to officials of any sort ... the consensus not to co-operate 
resulted from local communication through informal networks. 
Even so the Southall campaIgners consciously sought to connect with fonnal 
community groups and organisations: 'We tried different things. We went to the 
temples, but we got more support at the Hindu temples than at the Sikh temples 
[whose] leaders were very right-wing, in the sense that they were basically Tories. ,23 
Interestingly the 'Untouchables' temple, Western Road, Southall proved most 
friendly, circulated leaflets and allowed an Asian supporter of the campaign who 
could speak 'community languages' to address the congregation. Other local groups 
were approached and agreed to distribute material, including the Indian Workers 
Association, Southall Black Sisters, the Southall Monitoring Group, then co-
ordinated by Suresh Grover, an anti-racist campaigner who would achieve some 
prominence in the furore over the murder of a black South London teenager, 
Stephen Lawrence. Southall Against the Poll Tax group continued to meet until the 
end of 1992 
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West Ealing & Hanwell Against the Poll Tax 
The West Ealing and Hanwell group was initially started in autumn 1989 by Astra 
Seibe, (a computer programmer and Green Party activist) who 'just got out [her] 
wall-paper t~ble and went out into the streets of West Ealing and started recruiting 
people'.24 By early 1990 there was sufficient interest to establish an organising 
committee.25 By March 100 members had joined, but this included only a few 
activists.26 By May membership had doubled to 200 and the number of activists had 
risen to 10.27 The political and social background of active members 'came from 
quite a number of different political persuasions', but most were clearly 'of the left', 
including Greens, Labour Party members and a few Communist Party supporters?8 
The group focussed on two main areas of work. Firstly, regular stalls were organised 
outside a local supermarket, which generally received 'a very positive public 
response,.29 Secondly, public 'information' meetings were organised in different 
parts of the West Ealing area including Hanwell, Northfields and the large Cuckoo 
Lane council estate. Interestingly, one campaigner 'found we got just as much 
support from the larger, middle class houses, as from people on housing estates. ,30 
By May 1991, WEHAPT had become effectively moribund, although the fact that 
several of the groups leading members were officers of the borough-wide federation 
probably hastened the process of decline. As the last newsletter produced by the 
group rather plaintively noted 'Some of us have been involved in the campaign for 
nearly two years now and are flagging a bit. We therefore need new activists to 
revitalise the campaign'. These were not forthcoming and as Astra Seibe recalled, 'it 
didn't disband so much as fizzle out after the tax was abolished. ,31 
Central Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Union 
Central Ealing APTU was initiated in November 1989 by Kevin Carlin (a carpenter 
and Labour Party member), Francois Fajolle, (a secretary and Labour Party member) 
and Richard Murgatroyd (a student and Militant member) and formally established 
at a public meeting of 1 SO people in March 1990. By February 1990 the group had 
224 members, rising to 302 by April. 32 In the absence of any large council estates, 
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its mam focus remained a regular Saturday street stall and fly-posting. The 
membership of the Central Ealing group reflected the 'bed-sit land' character of the 
Ealing Broadway area, with a high proportion of young, single supporters living in 
private-rented accommodation. The following table attempts to record something of 
this diversity by recording the known political affiliations and occupations of 
activists, -defined as people who regularly attended meetings, stalls and 
. 
demonstrations between spring 1990 and the abolition announcement.33 
Gender Political Affiliation Occupation 
M Labour Party member Carpenter 
M Militant member Student 
F Labour Party member Secretary 
F Militant member Teacher 
M Animal rights activist Unemployed 
M None Computer programmer 
F None Computer programmer 
F Labour Party member Student 
M Disabled Rights activist! Student 
Labour Party member 
F None Graduate Student 
F None Local government worker 
F Ex-Labour Party member Local government worker 
M Scottish Nationalist Clerical 
M Scottish Nationalist Clerical 
M Ex-Conservative Chauffeur 
F None Local government worker 
M None Clerical 
M Labour Party member Clerical 
M ex-SWP 
FIE lecturer 
F Labour Party member 
Manager 
M Class War 
Unemployed 
None Housewife F 
None Nurse F 
M Militant member 
Local government worker 
42 
M None ? 
Doubtful information is marked with a'.?' 
Given the potential sensitivity of involvement in the civil disobedience campaign it did not seem 
appropriate to identify the names of these activists. 
Clearly, this is a far from satisfactory exercise but some general themes are apparent. 
Firstly there is a fairly even gender split. Secondly, the political affiliation of most 
activists was broadly of the left, although a fair proportion had no marked political 
background or current loyalties to organised groups. Thirdly, the majority of 
activists worked in the public sector. In common with other area groups CEAPTU 
largely ceased to meet as a separate body by the end of 1991, although a network of 
about a dozen members continued activity through the auspices of the Ealing 
Federation. 
Greenford & N ortholt Against the Poll Tax 
Greenford and Northolt Against the Poll Tax (GNAPT) was initially established in 
autumn 1989, by two Labour Party members, Jim Ward (an electrician) and Peter 
Richmond (a social worker). Throughout 1989 and early 1990 the group gradually 
built support through a mixture of activities, including street stalls on Greenford 
Broadway, joint meetings with Ealing North Labour Party and several local tenants 
associations. By December 1989 it had roughly 200 paid members, which doubled 
to 400 by April 1990. However only some 30 members were 'involved in leafletting, 
the odd demo or lobby' and of these about 15 took responsibility for 'campaigning 
ideas, organisation and much of the street level work, public meetings, lobby's, 
street stalls fund raisina benefits and courts work. The political 'core activists' were 
, I:) 
drawn from the left of the Labour Party, a couple of supporters of the Marxist group 
Socialist Outlook, public sector trade unionists or Green/animal rights activists. 
Although the group was extremely busy and succeeded in spreading information 
about the poll tax non-payment campaign throughout the area, 'large scale activity 
did not happen'. H One activist, Rachel Jones (a Northolt teacher) believed this 
relative failure to successfully engage with the local community reflected the social 
realities of the area: 35 
Northolt and Greenford is the most depressing place to be in the world, in my 
view! You have people who are living in grinding physical poverty and 
others w.ho are culturally very impoverished as well. [So our] ability to get 
anything going in the neighbourhood was extremely weak. 
Jones also felt there was a sense in which some of the core organisers were 
'essentially [middle class] people who were travelling through,.36 This in tum meant 
that too much work fell on too few shoulders and hindered engagement with the 
local community. So when, in summer 1991 a number of activists moved from the 
area, those remaining felt that they 'had gone as far as they could' and the 
GreenfordINortholt campaign formally disbanded, although legal advice and support 
continued to be offered to individual non-payers. 37 
Vocational Groups 
In Ealing only three 'vocational' anti-poll tax groups - that is based on a particular 
workplace or occupation - were created. These were Ealing Council Workers 
Against the Poll Tax, Ealing Hospital Anti-Poll Tax Union and Ealing College Anti-
Poll Tax Union. The student's group proved to be particularly ephemeral, although 
Jonathon Vail, the full time President of the Ealing College Student's Union, was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the campaign and served on the Ealing Federation's 
organising committee. In practise this may have helped the anti-poll tax cause, as the 
Student Union itself tended to publicise national demonstrations and circulate 
propaganda and information around the college. Similarly, the Council Workers 
Against the Poll Tax group largely failed to take off (see chapter four). 
The only successful vocational group was based in Ealing Hospital. Links were first 
established when a speaker from EAPTC addressed the hospital's COHSE branch 
and from then on most activities were organised through the branch until the formal 
creation of an anti-poll tax union in March 1990. 38 The Hospital Workers APTU 
undertook a number of activities, including the dissemination of information about 
the legal consequences of non-payment to nurses living in residential 
accommodation and the hospital proper, a 'bill burning' and various fund-raising 
socials, in addition to loyally supporting the Ealing Federation's general activities. 
Why was it possible to establish a viable anti-poll tax group at this particular 
workplace a!1d not elsewhere? The evidence suggests that student nurses were 
particularly resentful of the poll t~ which effectively represented a substantial 
wage cut for an already lowly paid group of workers. Organisation was also aided by 
the fact that most student nurses lived on site, encouraging a strong sense of 
community and a certain social coherence. But probably the most important factor 
was the consistent and active support of Barbara MacLean (COHSE branch 
secretary) and other trade union activists in the hospital, who were able and willing 
to utilise the branch resources, including a pager service to all staff seeking advice 
on the poll tax. 39 
Estate based groups 
By April 1990 five small anti-poll tax unions had been created based on local 
authority housing estates, namely, Havelock (Southall), Golflinks (Southall), 
Radcliffe Way (Northolt), South Ealing (Central Ealing) and Hambrough 
(Southall). The process tended to follow a uniform pattern, with campaigners from 
outside the estate calling a public meeting in co-operation with local tenant's 
association activists at which a steering committee would be elected. For example, a 
public meeting of 50 residents of the Golflinks Estate in February 1990 people led to 
the creation of a committee of 5 residents. A petition against the tax and in favour of 
non-payment was then circulated around the estate and signed by 530 people. 40 
Similarly, in April 1990, Jim Green, a local resident of the only significant council 
estate in the central Ealing area attempted to establish a South Ealing Anti-Poll Tax 
Union. A subsequent public meeting on the estate was reasonably well attended with 
some SO local residents present, but only a few people were prepared to undertake 
consistent activity. 
So in practise all these groups were short-lived. As Mick Brooks, secretary of the 
Ealing Federation recalled, they would only survive 'if someone actually took 
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charge of things or they would whither on the vine. And there was nothing we could 
do centrally about that'. 41 In a sense, there was a certain inevitabilit y about tm s 
failure to endure beyond the high-water mark of poll tax protest in Spring 1990. For 
although estate based groups could most obviously call public meetings and give out 
information about the tax - clearly important tasks for any civil disobedience 
campaigH - ,their very parochialism hindered further development. Nevertheless, as 
the number of local anti-poll tax groups in the borough increased, the need for some 
sort of central co-ordinating body became more pressing. 
Ealing Federation 
The Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation was formally inaugurated on 1 May 1990 at a 
meeting of over 80 delegates and visitors from local anti-poll tax groups and 
affiliated trade union branches. The founding statement of the Federation, passed 
unanimously, noted that organisationally 'much has been achieved. We already have 
sixteen functioning Anti-Poll Tax Unions with over two thousand members. But a 
great deal remains to be done. ,42 The statement then went on to establish some 
constitutional arrangements: 
The federation shall be composed of all the Anti-Poll Tax Unions and Groups 
in the Borough set up in agreement with our objectives. They are entitled to 
up to four delegates at each meting [sic]. Local trade union branches, tenants' 
associations and other affiliated organisations are entitled to up to two 
delegates at each meeting. Delegates may not be mandated by their 
organisations but can be recalled at any time... All meetings will be open to 
anti-poll tax activists, but delegates shall be entitled to vote ... All statements 
in this resolution can be amended by a simple majority vote at a Federation 
meeting. 
This deliberately minimal and loose 'constitution' was designed to encourage active 
participation and was a far cry from more rules-based political and trade union 
organisations. The meeting also elected an officers committee (hereafter the 
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committee) as a second tier of organisation 'entrusted with the day to day running of 
the campaign' who were 'accountable to the federation and can be changed at any 
~ime'. 43 The founding statement identified twelve formal officers' positions, namely 
Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Chair, Treasurer, Membership Secretary, Press 
Officer, Campaigns Organiser, Newsletter Organiser, Trade Union Co-ordinator, 
Tenants' Association Co-ordinator, Legal adviser and Youth and Student organiser. 
In late 1990 a 'Bailliff Organiser' was also added. However, in practise there was 
considerable overlap between jobs and the committee meetings were open to all 
activists. 
Who were the core committee members? The following table shows the gender, 
( approximate) age, occupation and political affiliation of formal officers in may 
1990. 
Position Gender Age Occupation Political Affiliation 
Secretary M 42 Librarian Militant 
Assistant Secretary M 20s Engineer Socialist Outlook 
Chair M 24 Student Militant 
Treasurer F 32 Computer programmer Green Party 
Membership Secretary M 27 Carpenter Labour Party 
Press Officer F 20s Trade union official None 
Campaigns F 28 Teacher None 
Newsletter Organiser M 20's Museum Assistant Militant 
Trade Union Officer M 39 Train Driver Socialist Outlook 
Tenants' Association F ? Housewife None 
M 20s Teacher Labour Party 
Legal adviser M 20s Unemployed Animal rights 
Youth and Student M 20s Pres. Students Union 
None 
So as of May 1990 supporters of far-left groups held most of the principal officer 
positions. However, in summer 1990 the political composition of the core officers 
group shifted following the resignation of Mick Brooks (Secretary) and Richard 
Murgatroyd (Chair) from the Militant Tendency. Although their decision to leave 
Militant was largely prompted by wider concerns about the level of internal 
democracy and general direction of the organisation, the political balance of the 
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committee now shifted decisively towards the 'non-aligned,.44 This in tum may have 
helped maintain the unity of the federation, for it does seem that there was some 
I. irritation with Militant 'who felt perhaps a bit more ownership of the campaign than 
other people thought they had the right to,.45 Nevertheless, all the ex-committee 
members interviewed for this study broadly agreed that it was generally a 
'comfortable. milieu' to work in, that 'everyone's views were respected' and that the 
'principle of furthering the campaign was paramount'. 46 This is not unremarkable , 
given the British left's long established proclivity for sectarianism and doctrinal 
dispute. But then the poll tax was an unusually straightforward issue. 
Most strategic decisions regarding borough-wide tactics were made by the 
committee (which met approximately every month between May 1990 and May 
1991) and were subsequently endorsed by the full Federation meeting. Members of 
the committee also undertook routine administrative and organisational tasks, 
including organising demonstrations, training courses and events, producing leaflets, 
issuing press releases and establishing telephone advice 'hot lines'. Again, there was 
a consensus among activists interviewed that the committee was generally an 
efficient body. Rachel Jones believed that there 'was a seriousness there ... to do the 
business', although as she also conceded, 'perhaps I [would] think that because I 
was involved in it! ,47 
Certainly, the Secretary's report to the 1991 AGM was upbeat.48 He reported that 
since January 1989 the borough-wide campaign had produced some 62,000 leaflets, 
4,000 posters and 60,000 window bills. The Federation had also established links 
with various tenants' associations and community groups such as the Southall 
Monitoring Group and the Indian workers' association. Similarly a number of local 
trade union branches, including Ealing NALGO, COHSE, MSF, NCU and the NUT 
had affiliated to the campaign. In 1990 two large public demonstrations had been 
held and Ealing council had been lobbied on a number of occasions. In consequence, 
a large number of sympathetic articles had also appeared in the local press. 
However, this scale of activity had inevitably taken its toll and Brooks was also 
anxious 'to revamp the committee and make sure all the areas are adequatley [sic] 
represented,.49 The financial records of the Federation for 1990/1 confirm this 
general picture of organisational advance and frenetic activity. 50 Firstly, out of a 
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total income of £1,386.65, some £242 had been donated by 'trade unions, Housing 
Co-ops etc'; another £345 from local APTUs; £332 was collected from the public 
and at Federation events; and another £354 raised through socials and selling 
merchandise. The vast bulk of expenditure - £1,052.70 out of £1,339.44 - was on 
printing posters, leaflets and newsletters . 
. 
However it is less clear that the Federation committee always faithfully represented 
the experience of local groups and local activists. For example, one resigning 
committee member cited a 'lack [of] realism about what is achievable locally,.51 
Similarly, Eve Turner recalled sometimes 'sitting there thinking the local groups 
can't do this'. There were also differing perceptions of what the federation was 
actually for. Eve Turner believed that the Federation should have been more of a 
'co-ordinator [rather] than an initiator' .52 Oliver New thought occasional tensions 
over the role of the Ealing Federation reflected 'what was happening nationally. 
Because ... if you have this thing called the Anti-Poll Tax Federation and you then set 
it up on a more local level, presumably the idea is that the Federation would then 
control activity within the borough. In Ealing that was never going to happen. ,53 
But then democracy within any federal structure also depends heavily on the quality 
of communication between local groups and their own members and supporters. 
Shortly after the formation of the federation a circular set out the committees' 
expectations for local groups: 54 
Every functioning APTU will need a committee which meets monthly at 
least ... it is vital you are represented. Remember, the Fed only deals with 
secretaries of local APTUs, not with individual delegates ... It is up to you, the 
secretary, to pass on details of our meetings ... In view of the number of things 
happening and the need to keep all members involved, you should consider 
mailing all your members with a letter about recent developments. 
However, as we have seen, the various local groups essentially functioned as loose 
networks of activists, rather than tight-knit organisations with formal decision 
making structures and regular meeting dates. In that sense, many of these 
suggestions and expectations were simply unrealistic. For example, although most 
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local groups sought to recruit a 'mass' membership, by the Spring of 1990 many 
activists concluded that the £ 1 membership fee was not worth the considerable effort 
and resources required in mailing them. So even if we accept the figures provided by 
the five area based local groups as broadly correct (a bold step for even the most 
'respectable' political organisation!) it is clear that only a small proportion of 
members·co~ld be said to have been active, even in the minimal sense that they did 
something. 
Group Formal Membership Active 
Acton 1,000 200 
Southall 150 
West EalinglHanwell 200 10 
Central Ealing 400 25 
GreenfordINortholt 400 30 
Total 2,000 405 
But this relatively low level of activism may be a little misleading. As Tonge noted 
in a study of the anti-poll tax organisations in Bristol, Taunton and Glasgow, 
although 'formal membership of APTUs remained low, far greater numbers 
participated in marches demonstrations and the non-payment campaign. 55 
Nevertheless, Federation circulars regularly sought to remind secretaries that due to 
the federal structure they had 'a duty to pass things on,56 and most activists believed 
that 'you did feel genuinely that the people you were working with were going back 
and consulting [others]. There was as much democracy as there could be in that 
respect' .57 
According to Eve Turner, 'the strongest role of the Fed was bringing people together 
and keeping the political side of it alive because I think there was a bit of a tendenc.y 
for local groups to get on with the practicalities and didn't discuss the politics ... [At 
F ed meetings] we could keep on reminding ourselves what it was all about, rehearse 
arguments, exchange ideas and discuss publicity'. 58 As importantly perhaps, these 
occasions also allowed people to socialise together. For most of the activists 
interviewed agreed that although they were primarily motivated by wider political 
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concerns, involvement in the campaign could also be a lot of fun and a chance to 
make friends in an often impersonal urban environment. 
Although the Ealing anti-poll tax campaign experienced a period of organisational 
growth from March 1989 this appears to have been checked by the resignation of 
Margaret Thatcher in autumn 1990 and pushed into reverse by the abolition 
announcem~nt of March 1991. Thereafter, the various local tiers of organisation in 
the borough began to unwind at varying speeds. The estate based and vocational 
groups (with the exception of the Hospital APTU) became inactive first, followed by 
the area based groups, most of which had largely ceased to meet by the end of 
1991/early 1992. So in the latter period of the campaign the organisational emphasis 
began to shift increasingly towards the Ealing Federation, although this too 
experienced decline. This was formally acknowledged at the 1992 AGM, attended 
by only 30 activists. The meeting agreed to abolish the organising committee, open 
out all meetings and cut the number of officers' position to three (secretary, treasurer 
and rotating chair).59 Similarly, the Federation's accounts revealed a declining 
income of some £754.83, derived from donations and socials and a concurrently 
smaller expenditure of £659.90, the vast bulk of which (£545.00) had been spent on 
. . 60 pnntmg. 
Why did the Federation and its affiliates expenence such a rapid period of 
organisational decline? On one level the campaign was a victim of its own success. 
Once the government announced its intention to abolish the tax there was a real 
sense that the battle had been won. Yet this was not necessarily how many of the 
activists perceived it and the Federation's 1991 AGM agreed to continue to push for 
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an amnesty of poB tax debts: 
Since the Poll Tax is set to remain in existence for at least two years, most 
councils will feel the need to threaten bailiff action to collect money in. The 
ultimate sanction for non-payment is imprisonment... The campaign is 
[therefore] likely to change its nature and dynamics. There will probably be 
a series of standoffs, as has happened in Scotland over the last year, with 
bursts of intense conflict around bailiff activity. Above all, the threat of 
committal proceedings will force us all to move into top gear to protect our 
own. 
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Although this analysis exaggerated the actual impact of bailiffs, it was largely borne 
out by subsequent organisational developments up until the end of 1992, when the 
Federation issued its last circular. 62 The nature of many of the activities undertaken 
by the protestors, particularly the provision of legal advice and support for those 
threatened w}th jail, placed an increasingly onerous burden on activists. In effect. 
they had to become experts on quite complicated aspects of the enforcement 
procedure and then make time available during the day to provide support 
individuals in court. This was no easy task - a point that will become more readil y 
apparent when the mechanics of the civil disobedience campaign are examined in 
greater depth in chapters six and seven. Inevitably, as the cost of activism rose the 
numbers participating declined - a trend that was generally in keeping with the 
experience of other local groups and national and regional anti-poll tax 
organisations, to which we now tum. 
Outside the Borough - National and London-wide Organisational 
Developments 
As the number of local anti-poll tax campaigns grew in England and Wales pressure 
mounted for the creation of a nationally representative co-ordinating body. On 1 
September a Steering Committee with representatives of some 20 regional and city 
groups was established 'on the principles of mass non-payment, non-collection, non-
implementation and defending those threatened with prosecution for non-
payment'.63 A meeting of200 people, representing some 360 anti-poll tax groups on 
3 September, attended by Rosa Ward and Jo Langan from the Ealing campaign, then 
endorsed the Steering Committee's call for a 'representative, democratic conference 
of delegates', although even at this early stage some 'were furious at Militant's overt 
attempts to hijack the movement,.64 The All Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation was 
subsequently established on 25 November 1989 at a founding conference in 
Manchester Free Trade Hall, attended by representatives from some 550 local anti-
poll tax unions and 547 local trade union branches, Labour Parties and community 
organisations. It is often easy to exaggerate the importance of a single conference or 
meeting, but the decisions taken by this gathering defined the tactical orientation, 
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political composition and future organisational development of the anti-poll tax 
movement at a national level for the next three years. 
The conference unanimously resolved to support calls for a campaign of civil 
disobedience, already apparent in Scotland where the tax had been introduced in 
1989; and to .organise a central London demonstration in March 1990, the eve of the 
Poll Tax's introduction in England. A rather vague constitution was also agreed, 
which effectively left the Federation's principal officers - Chair, Secretary and 
Treasurer - in day-to-day control and subject to few regular or systematic checks. 
For instance, the National Committee of 11 regional representatives had to meet 
only four times a year and was in any case dominated by Militant members who held 
13 out of the 16 seats. Similarly, the Federation's Chair (Tommy Sheridan), 
Secretary (Steve Nally) and Treasurer (Maureen Reynolds) were all long-established 
Militant activists. The general 'managed' tone of the conference also tended to 
annoy many of the Ealing delegates, the majority of whom were not Militant 
members. 65 As one recalled, 'it wasn't a very democratic conference. There was 
obviously a preconceived notion of what was going to happen and come what may 
that was going to happen,.66 Another, ex-Militant member believed that 'the meeting 
was a rally, the level of discussion was pitiful. It was badly done ... a conference is 
supposed to be about division and debate [but] within Militant there was a fear of 
debate and contlict' which 'might put people off'. 67 
Despite these reservations the All Britain Federation remained the main national 
body within the anti-poll tax movement. Militant tended to explain this by stressing 
the virtues of its own leadership style, based on a Leninist conception of 
'vanguardism'. For example, Tommy Sheridan, Secretary of the Scottish Federation 
and the most prominent individual figure associated with the anti-poll tax campaign, 
believed that political leadership 'of the campaign was vital. Militant provided it. 
Our programme and tactics on how to beat the poll tax became the property of 
millions. It was leadership secured through democracy and discussion, not cunning 
or subterfuge'. 68 This last claim was bitterly disputed by Militant's opponents, who 
tended to see the All-Britain Federation in less Hattering tenns. As Danny Burns, 
one of the three non-aligned National Committee members saw it, a combination 
53 
factors meant that the All-Britain Federation was 'virtually irrelevant to the 
movement': 69 
As a 'federation' it had no direct control over its member groups. It could 
pass policies and take initiatives, but it was up to the local groups whether 
they 'Wa~ted to take part in them or not. Local groups had the power to do 
and say what they wanted and the majority of groups who didn't like the 
way the All Britain Federation was organised simply ignored it. Given this, 
the problems of the All Britain Federation were never seen as important 
enough to warrant splitting the movement. 
Even so, any national campaign could reasonably have been expected to efficiently 
discharge a number of co-ordinating functions, including public relations, the 
regular provision of information to affiliates, the organisation of national events 
such as demonstrations and the promotion of internal democracy and discussion 
through conferences and meetings. According to Burns, the sectarian nature of the 
Federation largely prevented the successful pursuit of all of these goals. For 
example, Burns and others believed that its failure to produce sufficient regular 
national newsletters was because the leadership 'wanted the Militant newspaper to 
become the voice of the movement'. 70 This led to the publication of various 
regional and grassroots newsletters by activists such as London Fight the Poll Tax, 
Stand Firm! and 3D (eg Don't pay! Don't collect! Don't implement!). Similarly, the 
Federation's attempts at influencing the media agenda were hampered by the 
perception among many national journalists that the body was a Militant 'front' 
organisation and so unrepresentative of public opinion.71 Its regular claims that the 
'National Federation is the only body seriously fighting the Poll Tax and now 
represents over 14 million people refusing to pay,n (my emphasis) therefore did not 
ring true. 
On the other hand, the All Britain Federation organised a number of national 
demonstrations, including the 31 March 1990 demonstration (see chapter tive), a 
'Peoples March Against the Poll Tax' in September/October 1990 and various 
conferences which did attract support from local activists in Ealing and elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the evidence from Ealing tends to support Burn's main argument that 
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as early as the Autumn of 1990 the All Britain Federation was clearly of declining 
interest to most local activists. For example, no Ealing representatives attended its 
second annual conference, which saw only 639 APTUs represented out of a national 
total of some 1,500.
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Nevertheless, the All-Britain Federation continued to function 
up until the tax's abolition and act as a national resource upon which local activists 
could draw, especially in their attempts to defend non-payers threatened with 
imprisonment. 
This last point is potentially important, for while many Ealing activists remained 
highly critical of Militant's general political approach, all interviewed for this study 
expressed 'a certain respect for what they did', especially in promoting the idea of 
non-payment. 74 Some went further: 75 
It was clear that without Militant taking the sort of initiative they did and 
without their national organisation the poll tax campaign wouldn't have 
been as well organised as it was. You would have still had a lot of local 
campaigns and [active] individuals but it was Militant that gave it a national 
perspective and kept the groups communicating with each other. 
By April 1990 local campaIgns, anti-poll tax UnIons or federations had been 
established in all the thirty-two London boroughs. One survey carried out by the 
London Federation in November 1990 provided addresses for over 210 London anti-
poll tax organisations, although this might underestimate the number of local groups 
as many boroughs (such as Ealing) gave only the details of the borough-wide 
federation. 76 Equally, it may well exaggerate organisational growth, as many of the 
groups listed could have been 'paper' organisations. Whatever the truth of this, by 
June 1992 a similar exercise listed only 130 London anti-poll tax organisations and 
even the congenitally optimistic leaders of the London Federation conceded that 
only two thirds of borough campaigns were 'functioning'. n 
Like almost all other London borough-wide campaigns, the Ealing Federation was 
affiliated to the All London Anti-Poll Tax Federation. It would add little to explore 
in any depth the various manoeuvres and shenanigans that proceeded the formal 
creation of the London Federation on 10 February 1990, except to note that all the 
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significant anti-poll tax organisations in the capital eventually agreed to participate 
in its founding conference.78 But again, strong reservations about the role played by 
Militant surfaced among some campaigners: 79 
I did start going to a London group based on anarchist and libertarian 
. groups. Basically it was a feedback-type meeting, people would say 
what they were doing, and what was going on in their areas ... I was 
quite surprised then, to hear that there was going to be another AlI-
London Federation. So I went along to the founding meeting and found 
it quite bureaucratic, in that the first group of people took it in turns to 
take notes and send out minutes, but in the All-London Federation the 
most important thing seemed to be electing various committee members 
and passing various resolutions. 
Although the Ealing Federation did elect delegates to London-wide meetings, by 
mid-1991 most attended only sporadically. In part, this declining sense of interest 
reflected the tendency of the Federation's leaders to place the day-to-day interests of 
their party over that of the movement as a whole. For example, a London Federation 
conference scheduled for June 1991 was abruptly cancelled on the spurious 
assumption that London anti-poll activists 'will be wanting to canvass for the Broad 
Left [eg Militant] candidate' in a by-election held in Liverpool Walton. 80 Inevitably, 
this limited both the Federation's effectiveness and its potential to attract more 
broadly based support. Nevertheless, even groups hostile to the Militant conceded 
that by April 1992, its activists were playing an important part in keeping the 
Regional Federations going.81 
Some London borough campaigns increasingly looked to another small but energetic 
regional group, the' All London Anti-Poll Tax Activists' (ALAPTA), as a source of 
information. This was set up as a direct result of 'unhappiness' with the way the 
. . 82 I leadership of both the All-Britain and London FederatIons were operatmg. n 
particular, it felt that the London Federation was not providing adequate and regular 
information to local campaigns and therefore resolved to print a monthly newsletter 
entitled London Fight the Poll Tax. But significantly, there was never any intention 
here to set up a rival regional co-ordinating body to the London Federation, for the 
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same reason that no organised national group was established in opposition to the 
All Britain Federation. 
For as this brief survey of national and regional organisational developments has 
shown, the organised anti-poll tax movement was primarily a local phenomenon. In 
forming -ant.i-poll tax organisations, the protestors were obviously engaged in a 
localised form of active citizenship, albeit one which was informed by a 
consciousness of wider national concerns and goals. Given this orientation, concerns 
about the effectiveness of national or regional organisations would always take 
second place to activity on the ground. But this obvious point casts little actual light 
on the nature of these campaigns. By way of a conclusion I will therefore seek to 
identify some of the main interpretations of the anti-poll tax movement as an 
organisation made by activists and commentators, and then consider how well each 
model accords with the experience of the Ealing protestors. 
Conclusion 
The 1980s saw an increasing interest among academic and media commentators in 
the apparent growth of 'New Social Movements', such as the peace, animal rights 
women's or environmental movements. 83 Although the term encompasses a wide 
range of political phenomena, from local campaigns to international environmental 
protest organisations, certain common features emerge. The 'new' social movements 
are said to be expressive, they rarely seek power, they usually concern single-issues, 
albeit ones that are often totemic of wider values and operate within loose, non-
hierarchical structures. They are often suspicious about the ability of existing 
institutional actors to effect change and aim to operate independently of them. Their 
clearest defining feature may well be the tactics they utilise, including fonns of 
iIIegal, direct action protest. 
Clearly the anti-poll tax movement shared some of these characteristics. This 
prompted Tonge to describe it as a 'pressure movement', that is a fusion of pressure 
groups and new social movement forms of activity. 84 However, as Byrne suggests, 
the movement cannot convincingly be cast as a social movement, at least within the 
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dominant definition used by political scientists, 'because its target was one specific 
policy; once the policy was changed, the raison d'etre of the campaign disappeared, 
as did the protest. A social movement, because of its emphasis upon widespread 
beliefs and values, has a scope and potential durability that a protest campaign does 
not' (original emphasis). 85 Byrne's point does need some qualification, for the 
campaigR did, however incoherently, articulate beliefs and values concerning the 
proper relationship between the individual and the state. Nevertheless, his main 
contention is sound. 
Other commentators (and participants) drew far bolder conclusions about the 
movement. Drawing upon their experience of the Avon Federation, Bums and 
Hoggett believed that 'one of the reasons the anti-poll tax movement has been able 
to achieve its broad base is because it is primarily based upon social networks 
strengthened by their geographical proximity'. 86 The informal nature of the 
campaign, with its strong emphasis on expressive action rather than 'boring' 
organisational and bureaucratic concerns meant that 'a mass campaign was built that 
reached into the heart of communities. In many areas it completely restored the 
whole idea of community and collective organisation'. 87 So the role played by 
organisations and individual activists in the anti-poll tax movement had to be placed 
within the wider context of the community 'fighting back,:88 
The power of parliament, the parties and the City have directly opposed 
themselves to the power of our communities ... As activists we are only part 
of the struggles of our communities [which] create and sustain the struggle, 
because they have to, while activists come and go, and occasionally end up in 
the councilor in parliament. The links for struggles exist outside of 
ideologies and parties. 
While it is clear that areas like Bristol did see large public mobilisations, such claims 
are perhaps inherently problematic given the slippery and highly subjective nature of 
the very notion of 'community', a point more fully discussed in the next chapter 
Certainly many commentators, such as Lavalette and Mooney, argued that most 
local anti-poll tax unions could not credibly be described as spontaneous and were 
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usually initiated and sustained by existing socialist and trade union activists. 89 This 
accords with the evidence outlined in this chapter. Although the Ealing campaign 
came to involve groups and individuals from other ( or no) political traditions during 
the high tide of anti-poll tax protest, this did not amount to a response by an Ealing 
'community' except in one important sense. For as I argue in the next chapter, the 
protestors d~liberately sought to mobilise a moral community, united around the 
proposition that 'fair' taxes should be based on an ability to pay. The fact that much 
of the active support for the movement fell away following Thatcher's resignation 
and the government's subsequent decision to abolish the tax, suggests that 
campaigners were motivated primarily by the poll tax as an immediate 
politicaVeconomic issue, rather than through participation in an ongoing community 
'struggle' . 
In any case, the important role played by established left activists probably had a 
number of benefits. Firstly, the campaign had access to human (and material) 
resources that might otherwise have been unavailable, for political activism is a skill 
that must be learnt, like any other. In particular, the confidence to discuss political 
issues freely and politely, to address large meetings effectively and to present 
complex ideas in an easily comprehensible way takes time to develop. It also meant 
that activists could draw upon their personal and material resources to integrate the 
anti-poll tax campaign within an existing local network of socialists, trade unions, 
tenants associations, community groups, left-wing Labour Party wards and even 
temples. While such networking remains hard to measure or document, it was 
clearly of some importance. For in uniting a range of disaffected individuals and 
groups in the borough, the anti-poll tax campaign was able to establish a sufficiently 
broad coalition of protest to sustain a viable organisational structure. 
But again, this cannot convincingly be described as a direct engagement with local 
spatial communities. For example, during winter 1989 to spring 1990 every lo~ 
group in Ealing held joint public meetings with local tenants' associations, attended 
by large numbers of people with no obvious political background. As we have seen, 
sometimes these events led to the creation of a number locally based anti-poll tax 
unions, but even this relative success was usually conditional upon the support of 
existing leaders of tenants' organisations. So there was a strong sense throughout of 
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active citizen speaking unto active citizen. However important a political issue, the 
poll tax alone was never likely to compel individuals to spontaneously combine \\ith 
their neighbours and 'restore the whole idea of community and collective 
organisation' . 
Nevertheless the rapid organisational growth of the Ealing anti-poll tax campaign in 
1990 did suggest that its arguments had struck a chord with majority public opinion 
In the words of one protestor, the local left emerged 'out of the ghetto,.90 Even 
Butler et aI., who remained generally dismissive of the organised protestors' 
importance in sinking the tax, conceded: 91 
In an organized and an unorganized way the mass public became involved. 
The poll tax provides a rare example of an issue which galvanized not only 
the Militant Tendency and the extreme left, but with it substantial numbers 
of the wider less politicized public ... As in 1381 the new tax became a 
lightening-conductor for a range of dissatisfactions with the government. 
The next chapter explains why the arguments of the anti-poll tax protestors were 
apparently so effective and ultimately proved capable of mobilising a 'moral 
community' against the tax. 
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Chapter Three 
Mobilising a moral community 
Enter Hamlet reading. .. 
Pol0n.ius: .. What do you read my Lord? 
Hamlet: Words, words, words!l 
Dramatists, actors, poets and jazz musicians often talk about their art in terms of 
'voices'. Sometimes an individual artist's voice can appear wholly novel, 
dramatically breaking with convention and so pushing the form onto a higher 
level of creativity. But any sense of innovation is often illusory, as closer 
analysis soon reveals the older traditions and precedents upon which the artist 
has built. Indeed, a sense of continuity is necessary for any sustained 
engagement with the audience, who can best appreciate the novel when it is set 
alongside the familiar. This notion of expression as a cumulative process is also 
helpful when considering the discourse used by opponents of the poll tax. 
Despite their failure to organisationally engage with local, spatial communities 
(see last chapter), the protestors nevertheless sought to portray the tax as an 
affront to the dominant values of the wider 'community' . Were they successful? 
Ultimately the poll tax failed because it did not secure legitimacy. In part this 
was an administrative problem, as the tax proved extremely difficult to collect 
and maintain, but opinion poll evidence showeq that around 70% of the public 
consistently opposed the tax in principle: as Michael Heseltine rather dryly 
observed, 'the public have not been persuaded that the community charge is 
fair'. This in tum suggests that the government's opponents effectively won the 
argument. 
The rhetoric of anti-poll tax protest in Ealing sought to highlight three main 
themes. Firstly, the protestors sought to cast the poll tax as 'unfair' by showing 
how it violated the popular consensus that taxes should, however imperfectly, 
reflect an ability to pay in an unequal society. Secondly, the tax was portrayed 
as economically disadvantageous for ·ordinary people' in general and the ·poor' 
in particular, both in tenns of increased bills and the likelihood that public 
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services would suffer from under-funding. This last point may have had a 
particular resonance in the period due to mounting public over the quality of 
public provision and fears for the future of the welfare state. Thirdly, the 
rhetoric seamlessly connected these grievances with a tangible means of redress , 
in the form of a mass campaign of non-payment. 
These arguments seemed to strike a chord with popular opinion and allowed the 
protestors to mobilise a 'moral community' against the tax. In order to explain 
this apparent success, the chapter has adopted a staged approach. Firstly, it 
outlines the key arguments, illustrations and themes advanced by opponents of 
the poll tax and then identifies the social and political groups they hoped to 
influence. Secondly, the meaning of 'community' in the context of the time is 
considered and compared with evidence from contemporary national attitudinal 
surveys and opinion polls to see how far the protestors appeal rang true with 
wider public opinion. The chapter concludes by arguing that the protestors' 
rhetoric can best be understood as an appeal to a moral community of active 
citizens, united by a clear sense of enlightened self-interest. 
The Peasants are Revolting 
The protestors' often used historical imagery as a means of undermining the 
legitimacy of the tax and frequently cited the example of the 'Peasants' Revolt' 
of 1381. Here it will be recalled, a mass uprising of peasants and rural artisans 
occurred in some southern counties, partly as a response to the imposition of a 
poll tax in 1377 and 1380. The revolt culminated in an armed demonstration in 
London, led by Wat Tyler and the execution of a number of unpopular officials 
and members of the court. After controlling the capital for several days, the 
rebels were dispersed and most of the leadership executed. Nevertheless, there 
remained a strong sense in which succeeding 'generations regarded the 1381 
poll tax as an object lesson in how not to tax'. 2 
So in drawing parallels with the poll tax of 1381 the protestors sought to 
illustrate two obvious points in a readily accessible way. Firstly, the latter day 
poll tax was cast as an archaic anachronism, an affront to common sense in a 
modern industrial society_ The Ealing protestors therefore typically 
characterised the poll tax as 'like Robin Hood in reverse - robbing the poor to 
pay the rich' _ 3 Similarly, visual imagery reminiscent of the Medieval era was 
incorporated into the protests.4 For example, in Nottingham protestors dressed 
as Robin Hood and Maid Marion threw 'custard pies' (shaving foam on paper 
plates) at- councillors setting the local poll tax rate and were subsequently jailed 
for one month each for their crime. Secondly, the 1381 revolt could be seen as 
just one episode in a long tradition of English dissent which included the 
Chartists, the Suffragettes and various heroic episodes from the history of the 
labour movement. 5 On these occasions, it was suggested, the 'common people' 
had risen in the face of tyrannical and unreasonable imposition from a central 
government concerned solely with the interests of the rich. Surely the precedent 
would be repeated in the case of this latter day poll tax? 
The Duke & The Dustman 
The protestors were assisted by the quite crude expressions of class interest 
shown by some members of the British establishment, the vast majority of 
whom could be expected to benefit financially from the new measure. The most 
obvious example of this came during the passage of the 1988 Finance Act 
through the House of Lords. Initially this was expected to be rather troubled 
affair, but in the event the new tax proved singularly attractive to a large 
majority of their Lordships and all significant amendments to the bill were 
defeated by 'the highest turn out of Tory peers in living memory' _ 6 Opponents 
of the tax suggested that this behaviour was motivated primarily by greed - on 
average peers were set to pay only a tenth of their present rate bills under the 
poll tax - a point expressed in one leaflet produced by Manchester protestors 
through the use of individual examples: 7 
Rates 
Poll Tax 
Gain 
Lord Vestey 
£5,017 
£180 
£4,737 
Duke of Bacceuch 
£1.454 
£220 
£ 1 ,234 
65 
Viscount Portman 
£ 1,321 
£133 
£ 1,188 
'. 
The episode was perhaps especially significant given the dominant notion of 
'upper class' in the period, which tended to be conceived in terms of social 
status, 'that is as having some sort of hereditary title - 'the aristocracy' - or 
living a 'hunting, fishing and country house' (upper class) lifestyle'. 8 
. 
The question of the increased cost for 'ordinary people' - when the poll tax was 
compared to the rates according to one 'best estimate', some 27 million people 
financially lost, while 8 million gained - naturally exercised public opinion and 
was therefore consistently emphasised by campaigners. 9 But this should also be 
set against the overall tax burden, which despite the government's, image as a 
tax-cutting administration, rose from 39% in 1979 of GNP to 43% in 1989. The 
generally regressive character of the government's taxation policies led to a 
steady increase in indirect taxes, national insurance contributions and income 
tax cuts for top earners. As a result, by 1988 the poorest fifth of the population 
paid out 40% of their income in taxes while the richest fifth paid out 350/0.10 The 
poll tax not only exacerbated these general trends, but also hit middle income 
groups the hardest. 
One public leaflet issued by Ealing campaigners could therefore hardly have 
been more explicit. Headed 'WHO WINS, WHO LOSES?' it set out the likely 
cost of the poll tax for household of various sizes and invited readers to 'check 
whether you are likely to be better oft'?' 11 Although an ostensible wish to 
provide such information about the new tax remained an important strand of the 
rhetoric it was never intended as an altruistic educational act and an alarmist 
, 
'spin' was invariably placed on any 'facts' tendered. For example, window 
posters produced in the Autumn of 1989 baldly stated (relative point size 
retained): 12 
EALING 
POLLTA..X 
£357 
CAN'T PAY 
\VON'T PAY 
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This proved an underestimate and the actual cost of the poll tax in Ealing was 
£435 for 1990/1. But as the newsletter of one local anti-poll tax union in the 
borough was quick to point out: 
Well in case you haven't heard the Poll Tax has now been set for Ealing _ 
£435 per year!! Which will mean the average Ealing household paying 
out around 32% in poll tax more than they did in rates last year ... But 
even if the Poll Tax had only been set at say £200 per person, we would 
still fundamentally oppose it, as it is not based on people's ability to pay. 
13 
Thus the likelihood of bigger bills was seamlessly linked to the wider issue of 
the unfairness and the unjust nature of 'a tax on being alive'. Here the protestors 
effectively turned Tory rhetoric on its head, with the poll tax cast as 
discriminatory precisely because everybody had to pay, a quality that they 
instinctively assumed to be unfair due to structural inequality in society. This in 
tum drew upon a more traditional language of class, which saw no tension 
between overtly economistic issues and wider questions of social justice. For 
example, a leaflet advertising a meeting on the Havelock Estate (Southall), 
organised by a Mr and Mrs Davies (two local residents) in conjunction with 
Southall activists showed both a strong vein of parochialism and class 
resentment: 14 
The Tory government is abolishing the rates and replacing them with a 
new Poll Tax. The Poll Tax is a flat rate charge - everybody pays the 
same. A duke will pay the same as a dustman. 
This Tory tax steals from the poor and gives to the rich. Most people 
on our estate will be worse off... To beat the tax we need to organise 
support on the estate and all over Ealing. 
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The Nurse and the Millionaire 
Many of these themes neatly dovetailed with attempts to highlight the way the 
poll tax apparently penalised 'productive' citizens. This drew upon a conception 
of citizenship as public service that had long been current within the British 
socialist tradition and the nurse soon came to assume some significance as an 
emblematic figure. Ealing campaigners were therefore keen to emphasise that 'a 
nurse at Ealing hospital living in one or two rooms, would pay the same amount 
as a millionaire living in a mansion in Hanger HiIl,.a Similarly, the case of Mrs 
Thatcher was juxtaposed against that of a student nurse: 15 
The Loser 
Denise Capstick is a student nurse at Guy's hospital in Southwark, South London. 
D She gets £7,300 for her demanding job, and reckons to make a further £50 a 
month in special duty payments and other income. 
D Home is a Southwark flat supplied by the NHS, which she shares with four other 
people. 
D At present her bill comes to £170 a year. 
D Under poll ta'{ that will rise to £570 a year. 
D Poll tax will cost Denise an extra £400 a year. 
The Winner 
Margaret Thatcher is Prime Minister. Her home when she isn't at 10 Downing Street 
is in Southwark, South London. 
D She gets £47.000 a year, while husband Dennis is reckoned to be a millionaire. 
Income is not a problem. 
D Home is a £475,000 neo-Georgian house in a desirable part of Dulwich on a 
private high security estate. 
D At present her rates bill comes to £3,000 a year. 
D Under poll tax that will fall to £570 a year. 
D Poll tax will save Margaret £2.430 a year . 
.. Hanger Hill. as any Eating residen~ would im~ed.i~tely recognise, is the wealthiest part of 
bo gh One resident in the 1990s mcluded Ned Kinnock MP rou . 
b8 
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Why this particular symbol? Arguably, in Britain nurses have a particular 
metaphoric quality due to the profession's strong association with the National 
Health Service and there was ample opinion poll evidence that many members 
of the public were growing increasingly concerned about the health of the ~~S 
at this time. The nurse was also traditionally thought to embody caring qualities, 
such ·as a s:nse of vocation and selfless public service. So 'Margaret', the 
'millionaire' who had famously declared that there was 'no such thing as 
society' was juxtaposed with Denise, a student nurse with 'a demanding job' 
who cared for others. This was always likely to be successful strategy. For 
example, one 1988 MaRl Public Opinion survey found that 79% of respondents 
thought that 'ideally' Britain should be 'A society in which caring for others is 
more highly rewarded' compared to only 16% who preferred 'A society in 
which the creation of wealth is more highly rewarded' .16 
The Wealthy Widow and the Council Tenant 
However the protestors were not alone in their use of emblematic figures. In 
seeking to justify the fairness of the poll tax, government ministers were wont to 
produce an equally affecting victim of the old rating system: the elderly widow 
living alone in a large family home, but who still paid the same as a family of 
four living next door. 17 The metaphor had the advantage of neatly underlining 
the unfairness of the rates, but in terms that would presumably appeal the 
government's middle British core constituency. However the protestors also felt 
able to use housing (and housing tenure) as a suitable arena in which to contest 
the fairness of the tax. For example, one Ealing leaflet invited the public to:
18 
Compare how poll tax will affect different sized household around the Borough 
1. Mr and Mrs Davies are council tenants living in Conrad Tower. South Acton 
Estate. Not being eligible for any rebates they pay full rates of £~63.32. When poll 
tax comes in they will pay£71~, a loss of £~.82 per week. 
2. The Shah family live in Saxon Road. Southall. There are 7 adults in the household 
The two elderlv members of the family qualify for a maximum rebate and only have 
to pay 20°';) of the poll tax. Despite this the total poll tax bill will be £ 1927.80 as 
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opposed to £521.82 they currently pay in rates, a loss of £1405.98 per year or £27.04 
per week. 
3. Mrs Benyon lives on her own in a large house in Chatsworth Road, Hanger Hill. 
After the poll tax comes in she will pay only £357. Because of the high [rateable 
value] of her home she pays £1,883.70 in rates, a gain of £1,526.70 a year or £29.35 
per ~eek. 
The conclusion was clear: 'those people living in parts of the Borough where 
unemployment is highest, incomes lowest and housing conditions at their worst' 
would be most severely effected. 19 Housing therefore became another metaphor 
for inequality, albeit a rather indistinct one. But appeals directed solely at 
council tenants could only go so far given that by the late 1980s the majority of 
households were owner-occupiers (see appendix one). In any case, for many 
people housing tenure was as likely to be conflated with neighbourhood than 
with the concept of social class. So according to Yvonne Say, a tenants' 
association activist on the South Acton estate, opposition to the poll tax among 
people in her area did reflect 'a sort of class solidarity' but 'people wouldn't 
have described it like that. They'd have seen it as the community sticking 
together,.20 
This suggests that the wider community (the people) broadly shared and 
acknowledged a common moral obligation to act in concert in order to provide 
for the disadvantaged. Even so, the language of protest either explicitly (or more 
often implicitly) sought to articulate a notion of solidarity more commonly 
associated with traditional Labourist discourse. For example, Dick Douglas, a 
Scottish Labour MP explained his decision not to pay the poll tax thus: 21 
Where I came from you had to stand up and protect the weaker sections 
of the community. My socialism is not the socialism of the books and 
the universities. It is the socialism of the tenement and the shipyard, 
where if you didn't stand up for the weakest they picked you otT one by 
one. This poll tax attacks the weakest. 
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This sort of rhetoric potentially had a wide appeal. For example, the Daily 
Mirror compared the social and economic situation of Dora Coull, a 77 year old 
'disabled granny' jailed for 14 days for wilful refusal to pay the poll tax, with 
that of Mrs Renee Perring JP, the magistrate who had sentenced her. 22 'Dora' 
lived in a two-bedroom tied cottage, without mains electricity, gas, sewerage or 
street-lights. 'Renee' on the other hand, lived in a 'luxurious four-bedroomed 
house in one of the best parts of royal Tunbridge Wells', with mains gas, 
electricity, 'well maintained' pavements and street lighting. But Dora paid only 
£20 poll tax a year less than Renee, prompting The Mirror to ask 'How can we 
call this fair?' 
Black and White 
Some Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners also tended to highlight the notion of 
community in relation to the borough's large minority ethnic population. A 
leaflet produced by various Southall voluntary groups compared the impact of 
the rates and the poll tax on 12 streets in the predominantly Asian Northcote 
ward, Southall. 23 It claimed that the average household contained 3.33 adults. 
Assuming the poll tax was set at £301, this would translate to a poll tax bill of 
circa £1002 per household, compared to an average rate bill of £502. The 
conclusions they drew were both radical and unequivocal (original emphasis): 
THE POLL TAX IS RACIST BECAUSE ..... 
FACT * Our families are larger than white families. 
FACT * Our houses are older and in worst condition. 
FACT * Our wages are lower and more of us are unemployed. 
AND SO ..... 
We will be worse off than whites. 
This in tum implied that the black and Asian people should oppose the poll tax 
as a distinct community. Leaving aside the question of whether it is ever 
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meaningful to speak about communities based on skin colour - for example the 
Asian population in the borough was (and is) highly heterogeneous _ this appeal 
to an 'imagined community' remained potentially powerful. For example, Acton 
anti-poll tax campaigners sought to highlight the importance of kinship through 
the case of the Grewal family, which contained eight adults and so might have 
attracted a poll tax bill of £2,500.24 Sukchain Grewal, described as 'the main 
breadwinner' was approvingly quoted as saying 'We are going to beat the poll 
tax by fighting back. If there is fighting to be done then the people in this family 
will do it. When they come round to this house to collect poll tax then they'll be 
in for a surprise'. However, this emphasis on community (or even family) self-
organisation was tempered by most organised protestors, who consistently 
emphasised the idea of unity, irrespective of ethnicity. 
Labour v Conservative 
Given the Labour and trade union background of most anti-poll tax activists 
there was never much doubt about which person (and party) they were going to 
publicly blame for the poll tax. Thus the protestors tended to preface any 
mention of the tax with adjectives that seemed to them at least to be self-
evidently negative. So this was not simply a poll tax, it was a Tory poll tax or 
Thatcher's poll tax. Similarly, the banner of the Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation 
portrayed a large cartoon of Frankenstein (labelled 'poll tax') in the act of 
strangling a distraught Mrs T. over the caption 'But you can't destroy me! I 
created you!' Perhaps Thatcher only had herself to blame for much of this 
rhetoric, which merely reflected her own oft-stated personal commitment to the 
poll tax as a flagship policy. But while the rhetoric remained consistently anti-
Tory, it was never overtly pro-Labour. In part this reflected the decision of the 
local Labour council to administer the tax as effectively as possible (see next 
chapter) and the growing hostility towards the anti-poll tax campaign on the part 
of the national and local Labour Party. Even the election of a Conservative 
administration in Ealing in May 1990 did little to encourage overt support for 
Labour and relations between the anti-poll tax protestors and councillors of all 
parties remained fraught. 
...... 
Similarly, if the grievances highlighted by the protestors seemed clear &nou~ 
the question of which fonn of local taxation should replace the poll tax (if and 
when it was repealed) was left opaque. This was no accident, for although the 
opposition political parties were canvassing various alternatives throughout the 
period, the c~mpaigners resolutely refused to endorse any of them. Such a policy 
had the obvious advantage of establishing abolition as a simple and unequivocal 
means of redress and so limited the capacity of partisan loyalties to undermine 
some key themes of the campaign's rhetoric. Instead, broad ethical principles 
were posed as criteria upon which any alternative to the poll tax should be 
based, such as fairness, ability to payor simply a restoration of the status quo. 
Consumers and Citizens 
Several strands of the protestors' rhetoric flagged up the implications of the tax 
for the relationship between the individual citizen and the local authority. Most 
commonly the protestors (and indeed the wider labour and trade union 
movement) sought to highlight the potentially dire impact of the tax on local 
authorities, which, it was claimed, would no longer be able to provide 'decent' 
public services under the new funding arrangements. Similarly, the campaigners 
claimed that henceforth local 'communities will no longer have the right to run 
local affairs as they see fit: the right to decide what services we need and how 
we think they should be paid for'. 25 This linkage between the poll tax and cuts in 
public services potentially appealed across the class spectrum and served to 
undermine Tory claims that the new charge was fair because everybody who 
used public services should contribute towards their cost. 
For the campaigners were unequivocal in their opposition to the idea of cutting 
services in order to have lower poll tax bills - hardly surprising given the public 
sector background of most activists. As one leaflet put it (original emphasis and 
relative point size): 26 
1'3 
. 
The Tory Poll Tax Game 
"Heads You Lose -
Tails You Lose" 
On 8
th 
March Ealing Council will decide how much Poll tax we will have to 
pay. In order to keep the current level of Council services, the Poll tax would 
have to be £490 per person. To get a lower Poll Tax rate of around £450 and 
to avoid the Government's Poll Tax capping, there would have to be cuts in 
our vital services. 
Whatever decision is made the Tory Poll Tax is a disaster in Ealing. The vast 
majority of people will be WORSE OFF. 
We will have to pay MORE MONEY FOR POORER COUNCIL 
SERVICES. Does this make sense? 
Such concerns were not necessarily the preserve of domestic service users, or 
for that matter, public sector workers. For example, a revealing letter from Mr 
M.J.M Chevalier, the representative of Quaker Oats Ltd on Ealing Council's 
Non-Domestic Ratepayers Consultation Panel predicted that because of the poll 
tax, the council was 'clearly going to experience severe financial difficulties 
during 1990/1 and the following years. 27 Interestingly, Mr Chevalier was under 
no illusions about the class nature of the new tax, although his proposed solution 
was perhaps rather optimistic: 
That there are wealthy people within the borough who will benefit from 
the Community Charge is clear, and it is possible that some of these will 
wish to help the borough. 
But if the poll tax served to arouse concerns about the provlsiOn of public 
services among the generality of the 'middling sort', this was most obviously the 
case amongst its 'radical wing', predominantly employed as public sector 
workers in the caring professions. As the previous chapter showed, many of the 
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most active anti-poll tax protestors in Ealing were teachers, social workers and 
local government officers. Each area of social and economic life tends to create 
its own distinctive discourse (or jargon) and the rhetoric of 'Equal 
Opportunities' was prominent in these occupational sectors by 1990. This 
discourse tended to subsume class within a list of groups that together 
compris~ the 'disadvantaged', such as benefit claimants, members of ethnic 
minorities, women, the elderly and the disabled. As many of these groups had 
been largely exempt under the rates, they were almost by definition set to lose 
out. Again, this helped boost opposition to the tax amongst a wide swathe of 
liberal and leftwing opinion. 
The Hapless Citizen mauled by the Bureaucratic Leviathan 
The second rhetorical strand concerning the relationship between citizen and the 
state took a radically different tack. This sought to suggest that the poll tax 
represented a 'sinister threat... to our democratic rights and individual 
freedoms,.28 The Ealing protestors therefore warned that every local authority: 
will employ Poll Tax snoopers... Identity cards and/or numbers are a 
possibility ... The Poll Tax will operate as a Pass Law encompassing the 
entire adult population. When adults move they will have to inform the 
relevant local authorities and if marriages break up the partners will have 
to pass on each others whereabouts to avoid being liable. 
In part this merely reflected fears among the wider British left regarding the 
general authoritarian drift of government policy and echoed concerns expressed 
by the Labour Party and various public sector organisations about the implicit 
linkage between the payment of the poll tax and the right to vote. For it was 
feared that those unable to pay the tax would prove reluctant to place their 
names on the electoral register in order to avoid registration for the new charge. 
This might in tum also undermine essential social citizenship rights as 'the vast 
majority of people who register and pay the tax are likely to be aware that they' 
can no longer approach a social worker, a housing benefit adviser or even a 
librarian in confidence'. 19 
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After the first bills were issued Ealing Council began to institute often 
controversial recovery procedures against non-payers, including the use of 
bailiffs and the 'ultimate sanction' of imprisonment (see chapters six and seven). 
Thus a new type of victim of the tax was readily identifiable. Similarly, many 
individmds suffered as a result of administrative 'cock ups' associated with the 
recovery procedure. The tax was then cast as 'unworkable', 'heartless' and 'an 
affront to common sense'. So two themes central to the Ealing campaigner's 
rhetoric came together; namely a portrayal of the poll tax as a fundamentally 
incompetent policy, which also arbitrarily attacked the poor. 
Active and Passive Citizens 
Many of these criticisms were indistinguishable from those made by mainstream 
political opposition parties, One Nation Conservatives, trade unions, voluntary 
organisations and local authorities. What set the organised protestors' apart was 
their persistent emphasis on 'peoples' power', expressed through collective civil 
disobedience in the form of mass non-payment, as a means of making the tax 
unworkable. Like the juxtaposition between the productive and parasitic citizen 
embodied in the emblematic use of the nurse and millionaire, this in tum drew 
upon established notions of active citizenship present within the British socialist 
tradition. But how was this conception of active citizenship to be expressed? As 
one leaflet, issued a month before the first bills were despatched in Ealing, put it 
(original emphasis):30 
Thatcher has never listened to public opinion, so how can we defeat the 
poll tax? Allover Eastern Europe 'people's power' has shown that 
unpopular governments can be stopped. In Scotland over ONE MILLION 
PEOPLE ARE REFUSING TO PAY ... Scotland has shown the way. Ifwe 
all refuse to pay the government will be helpless. 
THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE A STAND 
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This broad-brush appeal was supplemented by another, more detailed, even at 
times pedantic, language of protest. For example, in 1989 the Ealing protestors 
issued various advice sheets and circulars that outlined the opportunities 
available offered by the poll tax registration process to disrupt implementation:3! 
. Here are some ideas/information ... 
- People who have not filled in the 2nd [registration] form will now have received 
a reminder. 
- If at this stage you do not fill in the form or you fill it in incorrectly, then soon 
you will be visited by someone from the Community Charge Registration Unit. 
- They will attempt to get people to fill in the form on the doorstep. 
- There are a variety of delaying tactics you can use. For example the Brent 
campaign against the Poll Tax have advised people to avoid, if possible, filling in 
the form there and then. You can do this by saying: 
- You're on your way out 
- You're a visitor 
- You're the babysitter 
- You're watching Neighbours 
- or any other reasonable excuse that can delay! ! 
Such advice displayed a number of characteristics that would recur in material 
produced by protestors throughout the period of the campaign. For example, the 
reference to the anti-poll tax campaign in the Borough of Brent, which lies 
adjacent to Ealing, is indicative of networking between protestors from different 
areas and groups. This allowed information to be shared about the various 
administrative measures undertaken by other local councils and some of the 
legal implications of non-payment. Secondly, the advice displayed a marked 
attention to detail and a correspondingly sound understanding of the recovery 
procedure. Such expertise derived partly from necessity, but also again suggests 
the involvement of public sector professionals whose work entailed the 
interpretation and implementation of tax and benefit regulations. Thirdly, the 
advice displayed a concern with 'knowing your rights', conjuring up shades of 
the self-informed (and invariably 'bloody awkward') archetypal barrack room 
lawyer. All these qualities would be much in evidence when the non-payment 
campaign proper got under way. 
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Any rational person actively considering non-payment naturally sought detailed 
"'nd accurate information about the likely costs and legal consequences. The 
~aling campaign therefore followed the example of Scottish protestors and 
produced a large print run of some 40,000 A4 leaflets, to be distributed to every 
household i~ the borough. One side simply said 'PAY NO POLL TAX' and 
doubled as a window poster. The other, under the heading 'YOU, THE POLL 
TAX AND THE LAW' reminded readers that the 'Tories and the mass media 
will be putting out lies to try and frighten people into paying up.' It continued -
'These are the facts about poll tax non-payment. Please read it carefully, 
photocopy it and pass it on'. 
There was also a distinctive oral strand within the informational rhetoric. Public 
and joint meetings with tenants associations proved a relatively effective way of 
promoting the idea of non-payment. Many of these meetings were lively affairs, 
'full of people for whom standing orders might as well relate to the parade 
ground,.32 The audience tended to be primarily interested in receiving 
information, rather than discussing the political iniquities of the tax. This posed 
something of a challenge to some Ealing leftists who were far more used to 
delivering extended rhetorical denunciations of the Tory government and all it's 
works. In such an atmosphere it could often prove difficult to strike the right 
balance and on one occasion a speaker from the campaign was thrown out of a 
meeting of seventy members of the Limetrees ResidenCs Association (Northolt) 
after some members of the audience judged his speech to be 'too political'. 33 
As Mick Brooks, Secretary of the Ealing Anti-Poll tax Federation recalled: 34 
it was no good going onto an estate, with a hundred people turning up, 
who've ... decided not to pay a bill for the first time in their life out of 
some principled position and just ranting that the poll tax is evil. Because 
they knew it was evi 1. What they wanted was reassurance and they 
wanted a strategy. So these weren't 'rants' these meetings. 
So you'd ask "What happens when you get a bill?" ... "What happens 
if you don't pay it?" ... "What happens if you get the red bill?".. And 
7R 
you'd go through this, stage by stage, right up until the committal 
proceedings. 
~y advocacy of civil disobedience inevitably posed a number of personal and 
moral dilemmas, which are discussed more fully in chapter eight. Others were of 
immediate p~actical import. For example, a liability order passed against a non-
payer could affect their credit rating - a far from trivial matter for some at a time 
of economic contraction. However, the 'ultimate sanction' of imprisonment was 
naturally most off-putting. The protestors therefore sought to diffuse such fears 
by emphasising that (assuming you had the necessary wherewithal) any legal 
action could be halted immediately upon payment of the outstanding debt. So at 
public meetings activists would seek to remind potential non-payers:3S 
that at the eleventh-and-a-half hour and fifty-fifth minute they could 
make an offer and get out if they weren't prepared to go for it. And we'd 
never criticise anyone. People would say "if this happens I'm out of it" 
and we'd say "fair do's". 
Similarly, campaigners were aware that an exclusive emphasis on non-payment 
could potentially weaken their coalition and emphasised that while 'some 
people, for whatever reason, may feel obliged to pay. This does not exclude you 
from our campaign... we want our campaign to include everyone in the 
Community who is opposed to the Poll Tax' (original emphasis).36 
Nevertheless, the protestors were always clear that people's power could only 
succeed if a sufficiently large critical mass of citizens was mobilised to render 
the various efforts of the state to collect the tax ineffective (original emphasis):37 
''What will happen to me if I refuse to pay the Poll Tax?" This is the 
main question Anti-Poll Tax campaigners are asked every day. If we are 
to build a mass campaign of non-payment ... it is vital that every member 
of the union knows the answer. 
All mass campaigns of civil disobedience are based on one simple 
fact _ it is impossible for any government to jail its entire population ... 
The important point for us is that non-payment will only work if it is 
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done by millions of people. This is why we must build a MASS 
CAMP AIGN. Not only to protect us from the courts, but it will also give 
more and more people the confidence not to pay. 
WE DO NOT WANT TO BE MARTYRS 
WE WANT TO STOP TIIE POLL TAX by making it impossible to 
collect. 
A moral community? 
This discussion has so far revealed three consistent themes. Firstly, there is a 
strong emphasis on material interest: the poll tax will be costly for 'ordinary 
families', some individuals will simply not be able to afford it and even those 
who are better off will suffer from declining standards of local public services. 
Secondly, there is a calculated ethical appeal: the poll tax is intrinsically 'unfair' 
because 'everybody has to pay' irrespective of their economic position. Thirdly, 
the citizenry are invited to actively oppose the tax (and by implication the 
government), both of which can be overturned by collective acts of civil 
disobedience. In order to express and illustrate these broad themes the 
campaigners tended to draw upon emblematic figures from a broad range of 
social milieux. This was most usually expressed through the use of contrast and 
juxtaposition: 
[J The duke and the dustman 
o The nurse and the millionaire 
o The wealthy widow and the council tenant 
[J Black and white 
[J Citizens and consumers 
[J The hapless citizen mauled by the bureaucratic leviathan 
[J The active and passive citizen 
These various discontents coalesced into a relatively coherent appeal to two 
sorts of community, namely a community of intere.'"t and a moral commlilliZv. 
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However, it is worth emphasising that any concept of community is an 
inherently slippery concept. For there is a danger that such talk is nothing more 
than 'words, words, words' that subsume (and therefore obscures) identities 
based on geography, class, gender, age, ethnicity and ideology under a single 
all-embracing category. Any attempt to define the term soon reveals a 
bewildering range of (usually overlapping) attributes and identities: 38 
a Community as heritage - a common sense of tradition or identity. 
a Community as social relationships - 'patterns of interrelationship reflected 
in kinship, neighbouring, mutuality, support and social interaction often 
deriving from the residential base.' 
a Community as the basis of collective consumption - an aggregation of the 
needs of neighbourhood or groups for local public goods. 
a Community as a source of influence and power - through collective action, 
or conversely, as a source of resignation and a shared sense of 
powerlessness. 
a Communities of interests - shared by trade unionists, business, unemployed 
etc. 
a Communities of place - based on locality and neighbourhood. 
a Imagined Communities - based on ideological and religious belief 
The sheer diversity of these attributes questions the usefulness of 'community' 
as a descriptive term. This may be especially true of a place like Ealing, which 
like most London suburbs has a socially diverse, multi-ethnic and highly mobile 
population (see appendix 1). So it seems hard to imagine that any political 
discourse resting on the idea of community could successfully serve as a 
mobilising device? Yet a number of factors allowed the protestors' rhetoric to 
do just that, not least because all British adults were expected to pay at least a 
portion of the poll tax, and so compelled to strike some sort of attitude towards 
the issue. Moreover, the particular political context in which the poll tax crisis 
occurred encouraged many people to subsume wider discontents into this one 
grievance and thus enabled the protestors to simultaneously appeal to a 
community of interest and a moral community. 
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The rhetoric directed at communities of interest tended to highlight themes that 
had traditionally figured prominently in socialist discourse - the juxtaposition 
between 'rich and poor', 'nurse and millionaire'. But others were directed at 
'new' interests, based around ethnicity, gender and even housing tenure. 
Together, these various groups made up the 'people'. So despite their socialist 
and trade union background, most active protestors tended to use language that 
was closer to Gladstonian rhetoric of the 'masses and the classes' than an appeal 
to a militant working class. This in tum helped them to mobilise another 
'imagined community', that is a moral community. 
Significantly, the evidence suggests that the protestors' moral and ethical 
arguments against the tax were in line with majority public opinion, which as 
Crewe argued, had 'not been converted to economic Thatcherism - not to its 
priorities, nor to its economic reasoning, nor to its social values'. 39 The poll tax 
may therefore have helped solidify public concerns about the generally 
regressive character of the government's taxation policy. Successive British 
Social Attitudes surveys from the mid-1980s revealed a consistent willingness 
among a majority of the public to pay higher taxes in return for better public 
services. The 1990 survey also recorded that some 82% of respondents believed 
that those with high incomes should pay more in tax. 40 It should come as no 
surprise then that attitudinal surveys and opinion polls also showed that the poll 
tax was not a popular measure. 41 Moreover, feeling against the unfairness of the 
tax seems to have largely cut across class lines.42 An effective alliance between 
various strata of British society, from the concerned middle-class owner-
occupier to the single mum subsisting on benefits on sink estates was therefore 
assumed to be possible. 43 
The protestors challenged a key Conservative argument - that public goods, like 
private goods, should be subject to the market, that everybody who used publ ic 
services should directly 'pay' for them, that individuals were primarily 
responsible for their own welfare. Again, evidence from the period suggests that 
they were pushing at an open door. For example, the British Social Attittldes 
survey of 1991 asked respondents a series of questions regarding the proper role 
of the state: 44 
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On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the governments' responsibility to: 
'. a) ... provide a job for everyone who wants one? 
b) ... reduce income differences between rich and poor? 
c) ... provide health care for the sick? 
d) ... provide a decent standard of living for the old? 
e) '" provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed? 
Although only the answers to questions ( c) and (d) indicated a firm consensus, 
the general tenor of public opinion seemed clear enough: 
a) % 
b) % 
c) % 
d) % 
e) % 
Definitely 
should be 
24 
42 
85 
79 
32 
Probably 
should be 
40 
32 
15 
20 
48 
Probably should 
not be 
22 
16 
1 
15 
Definitely should 
not be 
15 
10 
5 
But exaggerated or crude claims regarding the existence of a 'popular' 
consensus, characterised by altruism and solidarity, in juxtaposition to an elite, 
neo-liberal consensus promoted by the Conservative government and its 
( wealthy) supporters should be avoided. Whatever their rhetoric, these same 
politicians continued to allocate funds to maintain key areas of public sector and 
the welfare state. Moreover, many ordinary citizens experienced tangible 
improvements in living standards in this period and appeared largely indifferent 
in the face of rising inequality. Perhaps this was because poverty often remained 
hidden, either geographically enclaved due to the North-South divide, or 
because of patterns of housing distribution which left the poor concentrated in 
'sink' estates or inner-city areas. Rejection of the poll tax as a particular policy 
cannot therefore be crudely equated with a popular desire to re-institute the 
policies of the consensus era. 
Nevertheless, evidence from attitudinal surveys does seem to support Paul 
Bagguley's conception of popular antagonism to the tax as a form of what E.P 
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Thompson called the 'moral economy' of the crowd. 45 Thompson originally 
proposed the idea in relation to eighteenth century food riots which, he 
suggested, were not simply driven by purely economistic concerns, but also 'the 
belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, 
that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community'. 46 
Baggule)"s extension of the concept to the poll tax therefore assumes that the 
tax: 47 
violated what is seen in Britain as legitimate and what is illegitimate in 
terms of taxation. What Thatcher described as 'dragging the underclass 
into citizenship' violated people's notions of what was acceptable, and 
indeed affordable. What was previously a political market, a regime of 
taxation regulated by a moral imperative around the economic ability to 
pay, became a free market where everyone was to be forced to pay. 
In short, opponents of tax sought to mobilise a moral community built around a 
sense of enlightened-self interest and a popular consensus on fair taxation. 
But there was no similar consensus regarding the civil disobedience tactics 
proposed by anti-poll tax campaigners. Again, this is reflected in survey 
evidence of the period which showed that the poll tax crisis neither provoked 
nor reflected a systemic legitimacy crisis in Britain, although there is some 
evidence of legitimation problems. For example, an IeM poll in April 1994 
found that 71% of respondents agreed with the statement: 'The voting system 
produces governments which do not represent the views of most ordinary 
people,.48 On the other hand, only a minority of respondents in the same survey 
(some 30%, mainly younger respondents) agreed with the claim that 'Britain 
was not a democracy'. Nevertheless one wide-ranging comparative survey 
project concluding that public cynicism towards established political actors and 
institutions in the late 1980s was on the rise. 49 Another 1988 survey suggested 
that only a minority of the public believed that key elements of the British state 
could be trusted to serve the public interest 'just about always' or 'most of the 
. ,50 tIme: 
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The Police 
Civil Servants 
Goverrunents of any party 
. . 
Local councillors of any party 
Journalists on national newspapers 
Serve the public interest 
'just about always' or 
'most of the time' 
51% 
46% 
37% 
31% 
15% 
Despite the publics' declining attachment to conventional political actors, 
support for democratic values remained strong. However, there was a general 
tendency for those furthest to the left to be most cynical about politicians and 
the least trusting of government. 51 Did this encourage left-wing citizens, or 
anyone else for that matter to engage in protest activities and by-pass existing 
pathways of political participation? I return to this important question more fully 
in chapter eight, but it is worth noting here that cynicism is as likely to 
encourage apathy as it is to encourage action. According to Marshall et ai, the 
majority of British citizens in the 1980s accepted the current order as a 'largely 
unalterable' fact of life. 52 Most people therefore displayed a form of 'informed 
fatalism' towards politics - cohesion was 'rooted more in resignation and routine 
than consensus and approval' . 53 On the other hand, attitudinal surveys 
conducted since 1983 do appear to indicate a rising trend in support for illegal 
means of protest, at least in principle: 54 
On exceptional occasions people should follow their consciences even if it means breaking the 
law. 
1983 1984 1986 1989 1991 1994 1996 
% agreeing 46 42 43 48 47 56 55 
Was then the poll tax 'exceptional' enough to justify acts of civil disobedience 
in a liberal democracy? Any issue of conscience is by its nature subjective. but 
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the organised protestors clearly assumed that a combination of moral and 
economic objections to the tax meant that it was. As Tony Benn put it: 55 
the idea that 'conscience is above the law' is deeply entrenched in our 
collective sub-conscious and even a decade in which the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average has been worshipped in preference to the Ten 
Commandments has absolutely failed to obliterate an old conviction that 
what is morally wrong can never be politically right. 
However, this belief in the efficacy of civil disobedience failed to WIn the 
support of many on the traditional left, including the Labour Party and the trade 
unions which continued to favour a model of active citizenship based on the 
existing electoral pathways, political institutions and pressure groups. And yet 
this highly politicised, anti-Tory constituency would logically be expected to be 
most receptive to the protestors' arguments? In the next chapter I consider the 
reasons for the failure of the civil disobedience tactic to take root in the Labour 
movement and its implications for the organised protest campaign. 
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Chapter Four 
The Labour Movement 
and Civil Disobedience 
The previous chapter outlined the reasons why the British left (together with 
manY' One ~ation Conservatives and Liberals) unequivocally opposed the poll 
tax and the principles that informed it. It suggested that these arguments allowed 
the left to mobilise a 'moral community' against the tax, based around the 
limited contention that a 'fair' tax must reflect peoples' ability to pay. However, 
there was much less unanimity about the proper means by which organisations 
and individuals should actively seek to oppose the poll tax. Demands by the anti-
poll tax movement for a campaign of civil disobedience therefore served to 
polarise left-wing opinion. The three central objectives adopted by the Ealing 
Federation at its founding meeting were typical of the protestors concept of 
peoples' power, allied with the existing institutional strength of Labour councils 
and national trade unions: 1 
* 
non-implementation by the council, including a refusal to penalise 
non-payers. 
* non-collection by the workers involved, including a refusal to deduct 
Poll Tax arrears from wages and benefits, and support from their trade 
unions for such action. 
* a mass non-payment campaign with Anti-Poll Tax Unions and Groups 
in every street, on every estate and in every workplace. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the first two objectives, namely local 
government (non-implementation) and the trade unions (non-collection). The 
Ealing anti-poll tax movement's attempt to organise a mass non-payment 
campaign is considered in detail in chapters six and seven. 
The fact that some form of civil disobedience remained central to all these 
objectives implied that iIlegal political action by individuals and institutions was 
a legitimate means of resisting the poll tax. In part this can be explained by the 
wider political context of fill de siecle Thatcherism. For the cumulative 
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experience of the 1980s suggested to many on the left that conventional party 
politics simply didn't work and that the electoral system was so cast as to 
consistently allow a minority of the population to repeatedly elect an over-
'. powerful and 'extreme' government. But others drew precisely the opposite 
conclusion and argued for a 'New Realist' response to Thatcherism. Ultimately, 
this proved most persuasive and the labour movement continued to seek to effect 
political change through lawful and electoral means. As a result, the protestors 
became progressively isolated from potential allies in the Labour Party and the 
trade union movement. This failure shaped the character and tactical direction of 
the organised anti-poll tax campaign. But the ensuing debate also revealed much 
about the different means by which left-wing active citizens hoped to resist the 
poll tax. So whatever else they may have achieved, the protestors forced both 
Labour Party members and local public sector trade unionists to consider issues 
that in the normal course of events would simply have passed by default. This 
was particularly true for local Labour councillors, who were charged with 
implementing the tax. 
Don't Implement! 
From the outset, the Labour movement believed that the poll tax represented a 
clear danger to the independence of its traditional institutional bastions in local 
government. As Ron Todd, (TGWU General Secretary) bluntly put it, poll tax: 2 
is feared by people who respect the role played by local government. 
They know it means we will see the stage by stage dismantling of this 
vital part of our lives. They sense that it means the end of genuine 
democratic control which now exists so that people can vote for the sort 
of local services they want. 
Others warned that the new tax 'undermines accountability - the very notion it 
was meant to enhance [because] the government will control around three 
quarters of councils' income'.) 
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Certainly the poll tax: was wholly in line with general direction of the 
Conservatives' post-1987 legislative programme, which successively curtailed 
the power and fiscal independence of local government through vigorous 
'. 
. application of rate-capping, the introduction of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering and the Local Government Finance Act (1988).4 The percentage of 
locall y. det~nnined council expenditure shrank from 40% in 198011 to 15% in 
1992/3.5 Simiiarly, the purview of local councils became more restricted. For 
example, the Local Government & Housing Act (1989) severely limited capital 
expenditure on housing; the Education Reform Act (1988) introduced a national 
curriculum, local management of schools and encouraged schools to seek grant 
maintained status; and the Housing Act (1988) encouraged council tenants to 
transfer to private landlords. As Steven Sears, a senior Labour Ealing councillor 
saw it, the aggregate effect of these changes would be considerable: 6 
Unless the PM changes her mind ... the council you elect in 1990 will be 
so hamstrung by central government rules and regulations that whoever 
you vote for, it will be Whitehall that wins. [So] when serious and 
respected local councillors say that the present Government is set on a 
course that will not leave a shred of democracy they are not 
exaggerating. 
It seemed then, that the stakes for local government could hardly be higher and 
Ealing anti-poll campaigners called upon the Labour council to refuse to 
'implement the Tory tax:, cut our services, fine non-payers and non-registers' .7. 
Yet up until its loss of office at the May 1990 elections, Sears and the rest of the 
Ealing Labour group set about implementing the tax: with an administrative 
enthusiasm that belied their more public statements of opposition. All this begs 
an obvious question. If the implications of the poll tax: were potentially so 
serious, why did Ealing Labour councillors so dutifully participate in their own 
self-emasculation? In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to brietly 
outline the fortunes of Ealing Labour council between 1986 and 1990 and then 
set its experience in the context of national party developments. 
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Ealing Reds establish 'Kremlin' in leafy suburb - shock! 
The financial and political problems experienced by Ealing council in the 1980s 
were not untypical of those faced by most other London Labour authorities. 
These included threats of rate-capping by central government, calls for non-
~om~liance, left-right conflicts within the labour group and sustained accusations 
of 'loony leftism levelled by the Conservative party and the popular press. 
However, these conflicts never reached the sort of intensity experienced by 
Labour administrations in boroughs like Brent or Lambeth. Nevertheless like , 
them, Ealing council experienced a series of financial crises and as a result 
disputes about local taxation progressively came to dominate the politics of the 
borough. Consequently, the experience of the Labour council in the period was 
not, on the whole, a happy one. By the time Labour was defeated in the 1990 
local elections, a majority of the group was clearly demoralised, unsure of where 
it was going and subject to rancorous personal and political disputes. This in tum 
does much to explain why the local Labour party offered no serious institutional 
resistance to the poll tax. 
The 1986 local elections saw substantial Labour gains throughout London. In 
Ealing, where the Conservative's had been in control since 1974, Labour 
benefited from an average 12.5% swing on a 40% tum-out (Labour - 47, 
Conservatives - 20, Liberals _3).8 The new Labour group contained a diffuse 
range of personalities and political currents which, in the parlance of 1980s 
'Labourologists' ranged from 'moderate' to 'hard left'. A number of long 
established white working class members stood on the right of the party and 
remained influential in the administration's early years. Their outlook had been 
largely shaped by the experience of the consensus period, when the relationship 
between central and local government had generally been benign. As a 
consequence, they were largely unprepared for the Thatcherite onslaught on local 
government of the 1980s (see chapter one) and often seemed irritated by the 
preoccupations of many their collea!:,rues. 
The majority of the group could loosely be labelled as 'soft left'. Although the 
term defies easy detin'ition, the 'soft left' emphasised issues of gender, race and 
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sexuality; generally supported nuclear disarmament; and (sometimes uneasily) 
supported the Kinnock leadership. Prominent figures included Len Turner (group 
leader), Phil Portwood (Chief Whip), Hilary Benn (deputy leader), John 
'. Cudmore, Steven Sears, and Gareth Daniel. Additionally a loose group of some 
10-12 councillors associated with London Labour Briefing stood on the 'hard-
left', .including Kevin Vaness, Ruth Clarke, Ruth Blunt and Valerie Vaz . 
. 
However, support for the 'hard left' fell away quite rapidly under the pressures 
of office. Finally ethnicity added another dimension as the group contained 10 
Labour councillors of Asian origin, drawn from Southall's large Asian 
community. Given their numerical position and the importance placed on equal 
opportunity policies by all political currents within the group, these Asian 
councillors could (when working in a co-ordinated fashion) prove influential. 
The sorts of issues raised during the 1986 election campaign cast the parties in 
rather traditional terms. The Conservatives stressed the alleged political 
extremism and financial irresponsibility of their opponents and underlined their 
central commitment to keep rates low. 1 Labour emphasised improved services, 
including the admission of rising fives to primary education, a pledge to build 
1,500 homes, better housing services, a rent freeze and the promotion of equal 
opportunities in the borough through the creation of three 'units' eN omen, Equal 
Opportunities and Race). The Ealing party's manifesto, drawn up by Labour's 
Local Government Committee (LGC) rather than the group, ran to over 100 
pages and contained 500 pledges. After the election, an exuberant Kevin Vaness, 
LGC Secretary, proudly declared that the 'manifesto represents the most detailed 
plan ever produced by a political party for the borough of Ealing and its 
implementation will lead to the most radical alteration in the delivery of Town 
Hall services ever seen'. 9 
In the event due to a combination of financial shortfalls, rate-capping, national , 
legislation and subsequent political divisions these heady ambitions were to 
remain largely unfulfilled. Hence the furore that surrounding the budget-making 
process every year, which came to assume a ritualistic quality. The annual cycle 
I Under the Conservatives, the slogan '&ling -lowest rates in West London' was used as the 
council's post-nwrk. 
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of dissen'sion would typically begin in January with rows within the Labour 
group, fuelled by disputes within the wider party and expressions of alarm from 
the local government trade unions. This would usually be followed in February 
,'. by a period of mud-slinging between the parties in the council chamber. In 
March, the council's final budget-setting meeting would invariably attract public 
demonstrations from an aggrieved assortment of ratepayers and local 
. 
government workers. Inevitably, this process served to propel the question of 
local government finance to the forefront of political discourse in the borough. 
The budget for 1986 was largely inherited from the outgoing Conservative 
administration and was therefore something of a 'holding operation'. Some 
reserves were utilised to immediately fund the creation of the new units and to 
improve provision for selected services. 10 The 1987 budget proved much more 
controversial (and politically damaging) with a rate rise of 65%. While this was 
clearly a large percentage rise by any measure, Labour argued that they had 
inherited an unrealistically low rate level. The increased cost of rates would, it 
was hoped, be offset by a marked improvement in service provision. However, 
following threats from the central government of an enforced rate cap in 1988, 
the Labour council effectively' capped' itself The rates were therefore reduced 
by 23% and some £9 million of cuts implemented. In 1989, on the eve of the poll 
tax's introduction, a rate rise of 31 % was agreed with a further £12 million of 
cuts. In 1990 a final poll tax figure of £435 per charge-payer, was agreed, 
together with cuts of £13 million. Throughout this period, 'creative accounting', 
including the depletion of reserves, sale of capital assets and borrowing were 
also deployed in order to keep cuts to the minimum. 
The cumulative political effect of these budget decisions was debilitating, not 
least because the climate of financial stringency served to undennine public 
support for many of the council's policies. This was particularly true of equal 
opportunity initiatives, which were cast as wasteful and irrelevant to the 'real' 
needs of residents by the Conservative opposition. In this context, the Tory 
leader Martin Mallam argued, central government controls on Ealing' s budget 
were wholly justified: 'They will have to make cuts. Sure. But the cuts must 
come from the extra anny of [equal opportunity] bureaucrats they have installed 
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In what is lovingly known as the Kremlin by its inhabitants,.ll Mallam's 
equation of the Town Hall and the 'Kremlin' was of a piece with the wider 
'loony left' campaign run by the government and its supporters in the national 
'. media. Although Ealing tended to escape the worst of these smears, several 
national tabloids ran Ealing-related headlines such as '£5 million bill for lefties' 
race spieS:, 'Romps for gays on the rates' and the (untrue) allegation that the 
library servic~ had banned the nursery-rhyme Robin Redbreast because of sexist 
connotations. 12 The Sun even described a neutering programme for feral cats as a 
grant to 'underprivileged kittens' - although it is not recorded whether any cats 
castrated under the programme were grateful for this particular piece of 
municipal munificence. 13 Nevertheless, the council's public emphasis on equal 
opportunity issues tended to reinforce the impression that white working class 
areas were being neglected. Taken together, all these factors undermined 
Labour's support, a point reflected in a series of by-election losses after 1987 
and ultimately in the 1990 council elections proper. 
The second important political effect of each successive budget crisis was the 
confusion, division and demoralisation engendered within the Labour group 
itself. This was a cumulative process, but the decisive moment appears to be the 
decision to 'self-cap' in 1988. Len Turner, the group leader, publicly expressed 
his sense of powerlessness, complaining that 'If we can't give voice to the public 
will then there's no role for us'. 'We are beaten whichever way we tum.' 14 Such 
a climate tended to exacerbate political divisions within the group, which came 
to a head in 1989 when the budget seemed to combine the worst of all worlds -
cuts and a large rate increase. The first signs of revolt came from the right, which 
had grown increasingly frustrated with the continued rise in the rates and the 
possibility of conflict with central government. In January 1989 Len Curtis, 
chairman of the Environmental Services Committee resigned his seat, citing 
unspecified 'policy disagreements'. 15 His public denials that the resignation had 
anything to do with the council's budget proposals did little to diminish its 
impact. At the budget-setting meeting in March two other Labour right-wingers 
broke ranks and criticised the proposed rate rise. 16 Councillor Ron Johnson's 
comments were particularly revealing. Waving angrily at Labour's front bench, 
he claimed that: 
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t. 
I'm only a backbencher and they don't listen to me, they just expect me to 
vote when I'm told to ... I've been torn apart with what's gone on but up 
to now I've gone along with it. [But the council] officers warned us in 
1987 that if we went over the top we had every chance of being rate-
capped.l've had enough. Let the young ambitious ones who have messed 
. 
it up carry on and sort out the mess. 
A direct challenge to the cuts in the 1989 budget was also mounted from the left, 
channelled through 'Ealing Fightback', a pressure group comprised of leftwing 
Labour Party members and local public sector trade unionists. As we have seen, 
Ealing Fightback was also influential in kick-starting the anti-poll tax camapaign 
in the borough. In February Ealing-Southall Labour Party threatened to deselect 
any Labour councillors who voted for cuts and a number of public 
demonstrations were mounted. Within the Labour group, four influential left-
wingers - Kevin Vaness (Chair, Housing Committee and Group Secretary), 
Valerie Vaz (Deputy Leader), Ruth Clark (Chair, Women's Committee) and 
Ruth Blunt (Vice-Chair Women) came out publicly against further cuts and 
voted against the council's budget. In a statement, the four declared that: 17 
Many Labour councils have fought for years to resist the Tory cuts but 
most have now resigned themselves to managing those cuts and hoping 
for a return of a Labour government ... We believe that Labour Councils 
must not do the Tories' dirty work for them. Ealing council must begin 
to build a fightback against Tory policies, by joining those who provide 
Council services and those who use them to maintain those services. 
But what exactly, did the no-cuts councillors mean by a 'fightback' in this 
context? The declaration remained studiedly vague about the tactics that the 
council should pursue in any confrontation with the government. Significantly, it 
failed to call for a policy of illegality or 'non-compliance' which was seen as 
d h· h' t ,18 But 'past its time' and would have amounte to not mg more t an ages ure . 
in the absence of a strategy of non-compliance, cuts could only hope to be 
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avoided through another large rate rise, which would in tum, provoke more rate-
cappmg. 
The majority of the group certainly reacted badly - all four were removed from 
their positions and according to one left councillor 'it got very unpleasant' and 
the rebel~ w~re subject to regular bouts of 'personal abuse' .19 It was now clear 
that the hard left was effectively isolated and shorn of influence. Meanwhile the 
leadership of the group rapidly shifted rightwards. In July 1989 Len Turner 
stepped down as council leader and was replaced by John Cudmore. Even though 
the Tory leader, Martin Mallam, had an obvious vested interest in promoting 
charges of 'loony leftism', he was forced to reluctantly concede that Cudmore 
was a 'middle of the road' and 'moderate' politician. The new leader was 
certainly conscious of the splits in the party and perceived his primary task as to 
'rebuild the unity of the group'?O 
There was a recovery job to do, specifically with an election coming up ... 
[M y] first year [was about] trying to hold things together and to deal with 
immediate financial problems which we had brought, at least partially, 
upon ourselves. 
A kind of dreamland 
While Ealing Labour councillors remained preoccupied with their own local 
difficulties the national party leadership was growing increasingly alarmed as the 
locus of debate around the poll tax shifted away from the perceived iniquities of 
the tax (hardly a contentious issue) and towards the desirability of civil 
resistance. As the poll tax had been introduced in Scotland a year before England 
and Wales it seemed natural to look North of the border for guidance and 
inspiration. Unfortunately, there was clear evidence of growing support for a 
non-payment and non-collection strategy in Scotland. So much so, that by 1988 
Neil Kinnock felt compelled to denounce civil disobedience in an address to the 
Scottish Local Government conference as 'a policy of despair' and 'a kind of 
dreamland,.21 
c)7 
'. 
Yet in some ways the 'Scottish precedent was only of limited relevance to most 
Labour supporters in England and Wales. For example, in the 1987 general 
election Conservative electoral support slumped to only 24 %, underlining the 
growing nationalist dimension within Scottish politics. To many Scots it seemed 
that the Westminster government now lacked electoral legitimacy, which in tum 
encouraged (~ather loose) talk within the Scottish labour movement about a 
potential major constitutional crisis - the so-called 'doomsday scenario'.22 Such 
sentiment was naturally encouraged by the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), 
which sought to outflank Labour on the left and in 1988 called for a campaign of 
non-payment to sink the 'English' poll tax. An SNP bye-election victory at 
Glasgow Govan in 1988 in which poll tax non-payment emerged as a major issue 
suggested that such a policy could potentially secure mass public support. 
So whether on the grounds of principle or electoral expediency, many Labour 
Party members began to seriously consider a strategy of civil disobedience in 
1988-9. For example, a Special Recall Conference of the Scottish Labour Party in 
April 1988 saw a majority of constituency delegates vote for non-payment, 
although the leadership were able utilise the trade union block vote to win the day 
(512,000 against non-payment, 225,000 for). Even a number of Scottish Labour 
l\1Ps, including George Galloway, Denis Canavan and Robin Cook pledged not to 
pay. Indeed, by March 1990 the total number of Labour MPs nationally 
committed to non-payment had reached 28, but most buckled fairly quickly under 
intense pressure from the party leadership.23 At the grassroots of the party there 
was a higher level of support for the notion of civil disobedience and a survey of 
party members found 41.9% of respondents 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the 
proposition that the 'Labour Party should support individuals who refuse to pay 
the poll tax'. 24 
Nevertheless in the absence of a nationally co-ordinated civil disobedience,. , 
campaign, acts of defiance undertaken by Labour local councillors tended towards 
the individualistic and episodic. For example, in March 1990 four leftwing 
Haringey councillors resigned from the Labour group after the charge was set at 
£573 per person. In Manchester, a city The Economist was later to dub the 'non-
payment capital of Britain', John Byrne, Deputy Leader of the council and chair 
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of the city anti-poll tax Federation, was removed from all positions along with 
other non-paying councillors. 25 In Leicester 10 Labour councillors voted aaainst 
:;, 
the city councils budget in protest at cuts and the poll tax. 26 There is no available 
t. information as to the total number of individual Labour councillors throughout the 
country who refused to pay. But if the experience ofEaling is fairly representative 
they were.a small minority and few of these established strong connections with 
local organised anti-poll tax campaigns. Only Liverpool City Council, long 
dominated by the left, offered more substantial institutional support, providing the 
Merseyside Federation with offices and waiving the £5000 a year rent. 27 
The individualistic nature of these protests allowed the party leadership a certain 
degree of flexibility. For so long as non-payment was a personal matter of 
conscience, a simple official renunciation by the party generally sufficed to 
deflect Conservative charges of irresponsibility and political extremism. 
However any suggestion that Labour councils should utilise their institutional 
power to resist implementation of 'unjust' Tory legislation, including the poll 
tax, was a different matter altogether. 
Collecting in the most effective way 
The majority of Ealing Labour councillors appear to have perceived the poll tax 
as an administrative, rather than a political problem. Viewed in that way, the tax 
became simply another 'bad law' thrown up by a hostile government, to be 
managed by canny and pragmatic tactics. Phillip Portwood, chair of the Finance 
Sub-Committee, argued that although 'the council is firmly opposed to the poll 
tax in principle we are equally committed to collecting it in the most effective 
way. After all, if someone evades the tax they are forcing up the amount their 
neighbours will have to pay'. 28 There was certainly little sign that Labour either 
saw (or sought to portray) the poll tax as a fundamental threat to local 
government in Ealing. 
Indeed councillors seemed more concerned about the number of potential 
, 
Labour voters who might disappear otT the electoral register in order to avoid 
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paying the new tax. Although even then, as John Cudmore later conceded: 'I 
don't think we were imaginative enough to think that the [tax] was permanently 
going to disenfranchise huge chunks of our traditional supporters' .29 Similarly 
'. there is no evidence that the Labour group even discussed the detailed 
implementation of the tax, let alone considered caIls for civil disobedience. 
Insteap, ~trategic decisions were taken by the group's leading lights in 
consultation with council officers. This was probably deliberate. As one ex-
councillor put it - 'Some of the key figures in the Labour group had a feeling 
that this was going to be a sticky ride. The easiest thing was to let things go by 
default. Because if we discussed the poll tax all the time, you might lose control 
of the debate, so the [line] was we have to collect it. ,30 
In the absence of detailed local discussions the group relied heavily on advice 
from the centre. In a sense, this again helped to 'normalise' the poll tax as an 
issue, as Labour groups were accustomed to following directions from the 
national party, which issued regular NEe Action/Advice Notes to Labour 
Groups. 31 Consequently, the council's actions accorded closely with the national 
party's 'key campaign priorities' which they hoped would 'tum people's dislike 
of the poll tax into support for Labour at the next election'. 32 The first priority 
identified by the national party was therefore to 'make sure responsibility for 
poll tax is placed fairly and squarely where it belongs - on the government which 
has introduced it and not on the local authorities which have the unpleasant duty 
of implementing it'. 33 This could largely be pursued through public 
campaigning, press releases and so on, but the council also wished to go further. 
So in September 1989 Ealing's Policy (Finance) Sub-Committee agreed that 'the 
Community Charge function should have a different identity to the Council's 
main delivery of services' and 'set up the Ealing Community Charge and Rating 
Office (ECCRO) with a different Council logo and telephone number. Wherever 
possible subject to financial resources ECCRO should distance itself from the 
Council's main services to the community".34 There is little evidence to suggest 
that this distancing operation was successful - hardly surprising given that the 
poll tax collection office was situated in the Town Hall. 
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The national party also sought to 'give people the facts on the poll tax and help 
them to assert their rights under the legislation'. 35 Working on the assumption 
that (on this occasion at least) bad news was good news, the council regularly fed 
'. the local press 'horror stories' about the poll tax. Thus as early as October 1988 
the council issued a report estimating that the first year's poll tax would be 
around £250 per head. 36 The study found that at this level, a family of 7 adults 
that had paid £522 under the rates would face a 'massive' bill of £ 1 625 under , 
the poll tax. In May 1989 the council increased its estimate of per capita poll tax 
to £324.37 In March 1990 the council circulated to every household details of a 
CIPF A survey predicting that poll tax would be 20-25% higher than government 
estimates through the supposedly 'non-political' borough magazine, Ea/ing 
Voices. By that stage the final poll tax figure had risen to £435. 
It is difficult to judge the effect of this 'information' campaign. On the one hand 
the growing cost clearly alarmed many residents and helped undermine public 
support for the new tax. But this could just as easily backfire given Ealing 
Labour's association with high rate rises. Certainly the national party worried 
that Labour councils would be blamed, especially as the government had ordered 
that every council should print the 'meaningless' national benchmark figure of 
£278 poll tax on every bill. 38 Labour groups were therefore urged to emphasise 
unfairness, the arbitrary nature of the final bills (with some Tory councils like 
Wandsworth and Westminster clearly receiving preferential treatment), the loss 
of services if poll tax was set at government approved levels and the impact of 
the 'safety net'. 
The problem for Labour was that the new system of local government finance 
was so opaque it proved almost impossible to produce a straightforward answer 
to the apparently simple question of who should take the blame for the high 
level? Even so Portwood and other councillors routinely (and accurately) , 
claimed that Ealing's poll tax would be increased by some £27 due to the 
government's 'safety net scheme'. Similarly, the introduction of a unitied 
business rate meant that only £61 million of the £72 million raised from this 
source would go to the borough.39 But however earnestly the council sought to 
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glve people 'the facts' it is doubtful such explanations meant much to the 
average Ealing resident. 
t. Perhaps the likelihood of increased bills encouraged the council to actively 
comply with the national party's third campaigning priority, to 'help people to 
offset. the. worst effects of the tax ... by ensuring, for instance, that everyone 
entitled to a rebate receives it,.40 Certainly the council energetically promoted the 
Community Charge Benefit scheme through various means including local 
newspaper advertisements and information in council offices. Two types of 
brightly coloured posters were produced and placed on lamp posts. One urged 
people to claim a rebate and the other urged people to register to vote. Some anti-
poll tax campaigners attempted to subvert the message, scrawling 'Go on - give 
yourself a 100% rebate - Don't pay!' on these posters. In February 1990 the 
national party recommended that councils should hold a 'Rebate Week' and the 
borough dutifully organised a number of Saturday morning advice stalls in local 
shopping centres. 41 Interestingly, some workers from the Housing and 
Community Charge Benefit section staffing these stalls used the occasion as an 
opportunity to engage in a petty act of subversion and prominently wore anti-poll 
tax stickers, to the amusement of many Saturday morning shoppers:G 
Nevertheless, the campaign to encourage rebate applications was a success, 
perhaps too much of a success, as the Housing/Community Charge Benefit 
section subsequently proved unable to cope with this unprecedented number of 
applications (see chapters six and seven). 
On a more positive note party members were urged to 'argue for a system of 
local taxation which relates to people's ability to pay'.·n In February 1990 the 
party sought to move beyond this rather vague formulation and relaunch its 
scheme for a combined property and income tax as an alternative to the poll tax. 
The proposals were generally ill received and were superseded by a proposal for 
'a reformed and modernised property tax' in July 1990.
44 
But as Butler et al 
wryly noted, at this stage 'nothing Labour could do could detract from the mess 
the government were now in' and the public in Ealing, as elsewhere, were 
generally unaware and inditTerent to these policy debates.
45 
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All these measures accorded well with attempts by the party to publicly distance 
itself from any calls for civil disobedience, which as far as the Labour leadership 
was concerned, was simply an attempt by Militant to 'embarrass the party 
leadership and to point up the attractions of its own more simplistic approach to 
politics,.46 On 21 May 1990 the National Executive Committee formally 
proscribed support for the All Britain Anti-Poll Tax Federation which it asserted 
. ' 
could 'be regarded as a Militant Tendency front organisation,.47 Significantly, 
the injunction included 'local organisations called 'Anti-Poll Tax Unions' which , 
effectively ruled out co-operation with all local groups, irrespective of their 
political composition. Throughout this period Ealing Labour therefore used 
every opportunity to show it opposed the local anti-poll tax campaign by the 
simple expedient of having nothing to do with it. For example, a suggestion from 
Councillor Valerie Vaz that the group should receive a delegation from EAPTC 
was turned down without discussion by the chief whip, Phillip Portwood.48 All 
further attempts to pressurise the party to begin a dialogue, including a resolution 
passed by Southall CLP and a direct request from Piara Khabra, the Southall 
prospective parliamentary candidate were similarly received. It therefore became 
increasingly politic for anyone with pronounced personal ambitions to distance 
themselves from active support for the protestors and Khabra ceased to attend 
their meetings or speak on anti-poll tax platforms. 
Overall then, the programme put forward by the Labour (and faithfully 
implemented in Ealing) seems to support Benn's contention that by Spring 1990 
the party was 'more frightened of the anti-poll tax campaign than of the poll tax 
itself. 49 But it also possessed a number of strengths. Firstly it was 'safe' - a 
quality easily recommended to many Labour supporters after the turbulent 
1980s. In that sense, the consistent emphasis on the electoral process as the only 
feasible means of securing change helped maintain the party's internal cohesion. 
Moreover, by promoting rebates and trumpeting Labour's principled opposition 
to the tax, local authorities could appear caring, protective and responsible at the 
same time. Opinion poll evidence was certainly encouraging, with support for 
. so 
Labour rising to 54% by March 1990, compared to 30% for the ConservatIves. 
However there was also a sense in which Labour was simply riding along the , 
wave of poll tax unpopularity. Moreover, it was doubtful whether the party's 
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actions could meaningfully be described as a 'political' campaign at all. After all 
Eating council (like every other) could reasonably be expected both to provide 
information about the new tax: regime and promote the national rebate scheme 
,I. both as part of its statutory duty. Whatever the rhetoric deployed, these were in 
reality straightforward administrative measures that aided effective 
impleI]1entation. So attempts by Labour councils to distance themselves from the 
poll tax: tended to be undermined by the fact that they were collecting it. 
Registering opposition and compliance 
Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that Ealing anti-poll tax 
campaigners became increasingly critical of the Labour council and there 'was a 
lot of feeling that the hypocrisy of the councillors should be exposed,.Sl In an 
open letter on behalf of EAPTC, Oliver New and Jo Langan complained that it 
was all very well for the council to publish figures estimating that 2 out of 3 
adults would be worse off under the poll tax:, but these 'are the same people who 
voted the Labour councillors into office and expect real opposition. Instead they 
have received limp statements of non-agreement. ' S2 The council should therefore 
use the opportunities offered by the compilation of the community charge 
register to hinder the implementation of the tax:. For as a 'head tax' the poll tax 
obviously required an accurate head count and the council's subsequent billing 
and recovery procedure was predicated on this list of charge payers. S3 The Local 
Government Finance Act 1988 therefore placed each local authority under a 
statutory duty to regularly update the register, utilising a wide variety of sources, 
including council records and records from privatised monopolies such as British 
Telecom or British Gas. However, it became fairly clear in Ealing, as elsewhere, 
that the registration process would throw up various practical problems, that can 
perhaps be summed up by the tag - 'people move about, houses don't'. 
The very notion of a register provoked claims that the efficient administration of 
the poll tax posed a serious threat to civil liberties and individual privacy.'4 The 
legislation formally empowered the Registration Officer (Tim Dauncey, the 
council's Chief Finance Officer) to act independently of councillors when 
compiling information. Thus councillors could only 'make representations' if 
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they felt concerns over particular aspects of the compilation of the register. Of 
course this formal position underplayed the power of councillors. As Dauncey 
was keen to emphasis in a reply to a query by Councillor Ruth Clar~ he had 
t. 'always sought Members agreement to the course of action I am taking'.ss There 
is no evidence that tensions surfaced regarding civil liberties issues in Ealing . 
• 
The question· of fines proved far more problematic. In anticipation that some 
people would deliberately seek to evade the poll tax by evading registration, the 
1988 Act made non-registration a civil offence liable to a £50 fine for a first 
refusal and £200 for a second. However, these penalties were imposed at the 
discretion of the charging authority and could therefore be waived as a political 
act, if the local authority so chose. 56 This element of discretion offered 
councillors a relatively risk-free means of hindering implementation of the tax 
without falling foul of the law. There was also a feeling that non-registration was 
somehow qualitatively different from non-payment, more of a delaying tactic 
than an outright call for civil disobedience. Nevertheless, any decision not to 
vigorously pursue the registration process could potentially prove very effective. 
As Eve Turner pointed out, in "Lambeth, where returns are lowest at 20 per cent, 
the council has said it will not fine non-registrants. The difference is that in 
Ealing they have not said this". 57 
Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners therefore argued that given Ealing council's 
purported commitment to protect the disadvantaged in the borough, it would be 
'utter hypocrisy' for fines to be deployed against non-registers.S8 The appeal was 
bolstered by examples of 'respectable' Labour politicians refusing to register, 
including a number of Scottish MPs and MEPs. Closer to home in the 
neighl?ouring London Borough of Hillingdon, nine Labour councillors, including 
the group leader Brian Hudson and his deputy Jane Rose-Williams, publicly 
refused to register. 59 In Ealing things tended to be more low key. So in October 
councillor Ruth Clarke, prompted by the campaign, 'sought clarification' on the 
imposition of penalties for non-registration from Labour's local government 
committee. She reported back to Rosa Ward (secretary of EAPTC) that 
Councillor Phillip Portwood had been 'ambivalent, to say the least'.6O There the 
lOS 
matter seems to have ended, reflecting the majority position of Labour members 
who wished to collect the poll tax 'as effectively as possible'. 
'. Initially at least, the wisdom of such a stance seemed confirmed by the lack of 
any obvious popular resistance to registration. By September officials reported 
an overall registration rate of 94.38% (201,603 people), with some minor 
. 
variations in the rate of return within the borough:61 
No. of returns 
% of returns 
Central 
30,406 
93.6 
East 
21,705 
90.3 
West 
27,367 
94.6 
North 
29,551 
98.1 
The council hastened to publicise the high rate of return and signalled its 
intention to fine some 7,000 residents £50 for not returning the necessary 
s:'. 62 
J.orms. However, all was not quite as rosy as the figures suggested. For 
example, although the number of residents registered for the charge had 
continued to rise, by December 1989 it still fell some 15,026 short of the 
population established in the 1987 census (208,950 and 223,976 respectively). 
This shortfall prompted Tim Dauncey, the Director of Finance to concede that 
'Obviously the council would have to pursue the matter of non-registration 
further,.63 Similarly, by May 1990 the council estimated that only 1,800 of the 
borough's 8,000 students had registered.64 But the problems associated with 
registration would only become fully apparent when collection was under way. 
Nevertheless, given this high level of registration, anti-poll tax campaigners were 
faced with something of a tactical dilemma - should they encourage individuals 
to refuse to register as a fonn of protest? Clearly, a certain degree of individual 
awkwardness would cause some administrative problems and was therefore to be 
encouraged. For instance at a rally in Southall in July 1989, Anita Patel of '. 
EAPTC suggested that 'if registration is bogged down sufficiently then the 
council will be reduced to sending forms out by recorded delivery as well as 
having to resort to hiring more officers to knock on doors,.65 But ultimately, non-
registration posed too many problems to be viable as a strategy of mass protest. 
For the council could draw upon many sources of information to compile the 
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register; making it difficult to evade. Moreover the penalty C.or non . t . ,II-regIs ratIOn 
(unlike non-payment) was an immediate fine. This was important, for the 
protestors were aware that although they could 'give support to 
,'. individuals/groups if they have not registered ... we do not have the kind of 
resources to help with fines etc'. 66 In any case, the Scottish experience showed 
that high-levels of non-registration did not necessarily equate with high levels of 
. 
payment once the bills were finally issued. The protestors therefore reluctantly 
concluded that 'at this stage all we could do is encourage people to delay filling 
in the form but avoid being fined'. 67 
People's power 
Nevertheless the agitation continued and by the Spring of 1990 the poll tax was 
emerging as the pre-eminent political issue in the borough. Certainly the anti-
poll tax campaign was now at the height of its activity in terms of public 
meetings, protest events, demonstrations, information-stalls, fly-posting and a 
mass leafleting campaign. Their efforts fuelled mounting public disquiet over the 
high level of the new charge - with losers outnumbering winners by two-to-one 
according to the council's own estimates. For the protestors, both high bills and 
non-payment were linked. As one campaigner, Kevin Carling, put it, 'For a lot of 
people it is not going to be a case of refusing to pay, but not being able to pay'. 68 
This more radical temper seemed confirmed by events on 8 March, when 
campaigners protested outside the Town Hall on the night that the council set the 
level of poll tax for 1990/1. 
The Ealing Town Hall demonstration was just one of many held in February and 
March 1990. According to Bagguley these involved some 22,000 people in fifty 
different townS. 69 Other estimates suggest a higher degree of public involvement, 
with Bums claiming that over 50,000 people attended local demonstrations in the 
South West alone.70 Some of these protests showed a distinct potential for 
disorder. In Bristol police drew truncheons and charged a crowd of 500 
protestors, five officers were injured and twenty-one arrests made. Every one of 
the 32 London boroughs saw town hall demonstrations, ranging from 200 people 
in Waltham Forest to a reported 5000 in Hackney, where again, serious clashes 
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between police and protestors occurred. In Lambeth a demonstration of some 
1,000 people saw 37 arrests, 10 police injuries and was followed by a small-scale 
riot in which a police car was overturned. The behaviour of these local crowds 
aroused anxiety among sections of the media. Echoing rhetoric that had become 
almost ritualistic by the late 1980s, the Sunday Times alleged that the Town Hall 
riots were o~ganised by the 'far Left' : 
The methods are increasingly elaborate: on Tuesday loud hailers from a 
Militant stall were used to incite the crowd to break police lines, on 
Thursday vans were bussing youths into Hackney; by Friday night the 
mob that rioted in Lambeth was controlled by the use of a drumbeat and 
orders issued on mobile telephones. 71 
Talk of crowds controlled by drumbeats seems almost resonant of a pre-
industrial age. But other journalists questioned this characterisation: 
At Plymouth, where several were arrested a rally [of some 5,000] was in 
part organised by Hilda Biles, a housewife and former Tory voter. 
Superintendent Derek Roper said that the majority of those arrested were 
local. He noted "people with hoods on inciting the crowd to kill the 
police", but did not know if they belonged to any organisation. Among 
those arrested was an elderly man who broke two windows in the council 
offices with his walking stick. 72 
Given the overall national picture, Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners were a little 
alarmed by the possibility of violence and worned that it might alienate public 
support. For example, campaigners in Acton reported that at their Saturday stalls 
there were 'more arguments than usual about the reports of violence at council 
10bbies,.73 But in practical terms there was little that could be done and the 
campaign concentrated on securing as high a tum-out as possible. 74 
Another aim of the demonstration was to present a petition, signed by some 
5,000 residents, demanding that the council refuse to 'implement the poll tax, 
make cuts and fine non-payers and non-registers'." In fact the petition had been 
'. 
ready for presentation to the leader of the council for some time
7 
but John 
Cudmore, presumably well aware of its symbolic significance, proved reluctant 
to accept it. Eventually he agreed to take the petition in private and on the 
understanding • that he would under no circumstances present it to the Lord 
Mayor in the full Council.76 If that was not acceptable7 EAPTC should 'ask one 
of a number. of Labour Group members whose names I assume you are familiar 
with'. In the event7 Councillor Ruth Blunt presented the petition on behalf of the 
campaIgn. 
On the night of 8 March it became immediately apparent to most anti-poll tax 
activists that this was likely to prove an unusual demonstration7 both in terms of 
size - the crowd numbers fluctuated between 500 - 750 throughout the evening-
and in its political and social composition.77 The crowd also reflected the ability 
of the poll tax to mobilise a disparate 'coalition of protest' including 'a 
scattering' of left-wing activists7 public sector trade unionists7 a delegation from 
Ealing Hospital's nursing home, families, council tenants and individuals with 
no obvious political affiliation. This combination seemed to lend the proceedings 
a certain degree of spontaneity. So, instead of the usual speeches from activists, 
ordinary members of the crowd were invited to take the megaphone and 'have 
their say'. Similarly, many people brought home-made placards and banners and 
came in family groups. Others decided to turn up after hearing about the 
demonstration on Radio Sunrise, a Southall-based community radio station 
catering mainly for Asian residents. Many of the councillors and protestors 
present recalled being surprised by the number of passing motorists who shouted 
approving comments or blew their horns in support. Apart from a few incidents 
of shoving and a couple of eggs thrown at police there were no violent incidents 
and the temper of the crowd remained generally good humoured. Although 
. Ealing campaigners were happy with this outcome, one later sarcastically noted 
that media coverage 'was limited to the local press, as there was no violence 
[and] therefore there was nothing newsworthy for the national media!,78 
Meanwhil~ inside the council chamber the mood was growing progressively 
more fraught. The police had allowed only 24 demonstrators into the public 
gallery but even they proved sufficient to disrupt proceedings, with speeches 
'. 
drowned out and a steady shower of tom up agenda papers thrown at councillors. 
Councillor Ruth Blunt then presented the campaign's petition to the Mayor. As 
the budget meeting got under way John Cudmore felt it necessary to reaffirm the 
council's determination to 'administer [the poll tax] in the knowledge that when 
a Labour government is elected it will be abolished'. Phillip Portwood, in his 
capacity as c.hair of the finance sub-committee once again denounced the impact 
of the government's 'safety net' on the borough. After a two hour debate the 
budget was passed with three Labour councillors - Ruth Blunt, Ruth Clarke and 
Kevin Vaness - voting against. During the debate these councillors also 
announced their intention not to pay the poll tax amidst jeers and shouted insults 
from some other members of the Labour group. Later, on the Town Hall steps 
they received a far warmer reception from the assembled protestors. 
What was the meamng of this demonstration? Although the episode was 
certainly less dramatic than some other Town Hall protests, it did seem to show 
the growing 'popular' dimension of the politics of the poll tax. The fact that the 
issue of civil disobedience should emerge as the main focus of both press reports 
and the comments of local politicians was in itself significant. As Tony Ward 
recalled, although most of those present accepted that come-what-may the 
council was going to set a poll tax rate for Eating that night: 
It didn't feel like a defeated crowd. OK, you were asking the [councillors] 
to change their mind on the poll tax but you sort of knew they weren't 
going to. You didn't feel that you were losing. People weren't cowed or 
defeated. 79 
So Labour had apparently failed to sideline the issue of non-implementation and 
non-payment and shift the agenda onto ground of its own choosing. 
Nevertheless, Labour councillors rejected suggestions that this demonstratio~ 
and others like it throughout the country, meant that proponents of civil 
disobedience were anything other than a small minority. Instead, they argued, 
most people at the demonstration simply saw it as a chance to protest against the 
poll tax, rather than an opportunity to signal their intention not to pay. Whatever 
the truth of this, the May 1990 elections were to show that despite its best efforts, 
11n 
Ealing Labour council had failed to distance itself from the political fall-out 
associated with the tax. 
Something extraordinary 
Some trepid.ation about Ealing' s high poll tax was evident among Labour 
supporters in the run up to the May elections. For example, in March Labour 
Councillor Gareth Daniels once again plaintively asked residents to 'bear in 
mind that the level of the poll tax is clearly the government's fault' and 
remember that although 'the poll tax is unfair, we are forced to implement it'. 80 
Nevertheless, bolstered by the obvious unpopularity of the poll tax and Labour's 
convincing lead in national opinion polls, most Ealing Labour Party supporters 
approached the forthcoming elections 'in a mood of quiet confidence. So the 
Conservative Party's victory on 4 May came as a surprise to almost all local 
politicians and commentators, with the new Tory leader, Martin MaIlam, going 
so far as to dub the result 'something extraordinary' and 'inexplicable'. 81 
Expressed in terms of seats, the result was dramatic enough, with 17 Tory gains. 
However, expressed as a percentage of the vote, it was clear that the first past the 
post electoral system had served to exaggerate the swing, with 45.7% voting 
Conservative and 44.1 % Labour. Significantly 14 of the 17 Tory gains were 
within the Ealing North constituency, covering Northolt and Greenford. Here the 
Conservative won 55% of the vote and Labour 38%. Nor did the Ealing result sit 
easily with the London-wide and national picture. While it is true that in London 
the Conservatives gained control of the neighbouring borough of Brent and 
increased their majorities in the heavily subsidised 'flagship' councils of 
Wandsworth and Westminster, the general trend of Conservative loss seemed 
clear enough. Thus on a 48% tum out Labour gained 400 seats in London (but 
lost 137) while the Conservatives lost 360 (but gained 164).8:2 Similarly, 
elections in the Non-Metropolitan Districts and Metropolitan Districts saw the 
Conservatives also sutTered heavy losses. Nevertheless. the retention of 
Wandsworth and Westminster allowed the Tories to present the results as an at 
least partial justification of the tax. The point was taken up by John Curtice, \vho 
believed that the electoral data showed a statistical correlation between poll tax 
1 1 1 
rates and fluctuations in the Conservative vote. In general, the Tories polled best 
in Conservative authorities which had set a low poll tax and worst in those 
Labour authorities with a low poll tax. Consequently, it appeared that 'the poll 
tax was taken by a sizeable number of voters as a reliable guide to the efficiency 
and competence of the local council'. 83 
• 
From the outset the Ealing Conservatives sought to confront the issue of high 
poll tax levels head-on, asserting that the 'Community Charge will bring home to 
all the value of 'good housekeeping' in Ealing's affairs. Their manifesto 
promised a 'return to sanity and £50 off your poll tax' to be achieved by 
disbanding the various equal opportunities units, sacking 'political advisers and 
quitting the Town Hall. 84 While the financial calculations underpinning such a 
populist platform would not have sustained much prolonged scrutiny it did 
succeed in highlighting two of Labours weak spots.b Similarly, the importance of 
the poll tax was also confrrmed by John Cudmore, who concluded that people 
'believed we were responsible for the poll tax. We argued that we couldn't get it 
below £435 without cutting services. We will have to see. ,85 
But it is hard to see how, on the basis of the 1990 local election results, the poll 
tax had ushered in a period of 'responsibility' on the part of the electorate. While 
it is possible to cite some examples of Tory gains, the general picture was of a 
serious defeat for the governing party. For although there was a connection 
between high poll tax levels and the electoral fortunes of the major parties, a 
number of other (often parochial) factors were probably as important. In 
particular, the result in the London boroughs was effected by the inter-connected 
issue of councils perceived competence as basic service providers and the 
'Loony Left' media controversies of the 1980s.86 As John Cudmore saw it, the 
council 'suffered from an image we gained in the first year and in certain parts of 
the borough we still haven't recovered from it'. 87 The decision to raise rates by 
65% continued to damage the party, especially as many voters perceived only 
small tangible gains in return. As another ex-councillor put it" 
b Apparently Martin Mallam kept a sign above his desk which read 'If you can't convince them. 
confuse them' (GQZ~II~ 11-5-90) 
11'2 
~ ~i c)) 
.; f 
---
The Labour council was very good at providing services for people in 
Acton and Southall, both needy areas of the borough with large minority 
ethnic communities. And that was perfectly right. But what it didn't do 
was address the needs of the white working class electorate ... areas like 
Northolt and Greenford saw nothing. 
Whatever the reasons for the Conservative victory, it was immediately apparent 
that the May result had a number of potentially important implications for the 
organised anti-poll tax campaign in the borough. On one reading, the result 
seemed to confirm their oft-repeated contention that any decision by Labour 
councillors in Ealing and elsewhere to collect the poll tax would damage the 
party and hit Labour's core constituency hardest. There is certainly general 
evidence that the party was aware that its stance on the poll tax could easily lead 
to charges of hypocrisy. For example, the Local Elections Campaign Pack for the 
May 1991 elections provided model policy positions in a question and answer 
format, which is perhaps worth quoting at a little length: 89 
Q. If the poll tax is such a bad and unfair tax why are labour councils 
forcing people to pay it?' 
A. They have no choice. The government has framed the law in such a 
way that local councils and local councillors are required to enforce the 
poll tax. And ·if they didn't collect it then councils would have to start 
sacking home helps, closing parks and shutting schools. Of course, 
Labour councils are doing all they can to make sure that those who have 
difficulty paying poll tax get all the rebate due to them ... 
Question three continued: 
II ') . Q. Whal's I.,abour 's aUihlde towards those who dOll 'I pay their po lax. 
A. The Labour Party believes that people should pay their taxes -
however bad they are. The real answer to the injustice of the tax is to 
work for a Labour government. .. 
111 
While it is improbable that the whole question of non-payment surfaced as a 
significant issue in Ealing in May 1990 as poll tax collection had barely got 
underway, this general stance was hardly likely to encourage much active 
support for Labour among the local left, let alone anti-poll tax protestors. Indeed 
the protesto~s, as an organised force, made no significant intervention in the 
election campaign, although some activists (particularly Militant supporters, 
ironically enough) canvassed for the party. Interestingly, although the Ealing 
Green Party publicly supported the idea of non-payment of the 'unfair, 
undemocratic and absurd' poll tax, the Anti-Poll Tax Federation retained a 
formally non-partisan position, underlining once again their residual loyalty of 
most activists to the labour and trade union movement.90 Nevertheless the 
Conservative victory had important consequences for the anti-poll tax campaign. 
Firstly it allowed it to unequivocally associate the 'Tory' poll tax with Ealing's 
Tory council. Secondly, the result decisively ended any hope that the Labour 
group might be persuaded support a policy of non-implementation and so 
removed an obvious distraction from the non-payment campaign. 
Entering a local state of denial? 
At the beginning of this chapter I asked why, if the implications of the poll tax 
were potentially so serious, did Ealing Labour councillors so dutifully participate 
in their own self-emasculation? In the light of the council's record up to 1 May 
1990 such a question may seem fanciful. While it is true that local authorities 
could have refused en masse to implement the poll tax there is simply no 
evidence to suggest that this was ever likely to happen in Baling, or elsewhere. 
Was then Kinnock right in scornfully labelling calls for non-implementation as 
'a kind of dreamland'? His view certainly accords closely with Butler et al's 
assertion that non-implementation campaigns were: 'in reality doomed from the 
start. Mrs Thatcher's government was used to dealing with recalcitrant councils. 
Legislation was now drafted to be watertight and, if possible, judge-proof The 
Local Government Finance Act gave local authorities legal obligations which 
they could not avoid. ,5)1 This ostensibly 'common sense' view was later echoed 
by Donald Dewar, who claimed that while Labour was 'prepared to consider any 
U4 
effective weapons that came to hand ... a boycott threw up too many practical 
problems' .92 
Moreover, local governments' subordinate constitutional position undermined its 
authority to challenge the poll tax, or for that matter, any other national policy. 
Certainly; l~cal authorities in the twentieth have displayed only a limited 
capacity to confront national governments. For example, in the Edwardian 
period, local authorities in Wales and the North undertook a sustained campaign 
of 'passive resistance' to scupper the implementation of the 1902 Education Act , 
but after a protracted wrangle and some compromises, the centre got its way.93 
The 1920s also saw Poplarism directly challenge existing funding arrangements 
in order to raise benefits paid under the Poor Law with more success.94 Similarly, 
in 1972 councillors in Clay Cross, Derbyshire refused to raise council house 
rents in line with national legislation and were subsequently surcharged and 
disqualified from office. 
However, by the mid-1980s the idea of institutional resistance by Labour 
councils was becoming more popular, partly as a reflection of the shift to the left 
in the party, but more particularly as a response to Conservative rate-capping 
policy.95 In 1984, the party's local government conference even went so far as to 
support a policy of 'non-compliance' by local authorities refusing to set a rate. 
Both the Annual Conference and the National Executive Committee 
subsequently endorsed the strategy. 96 Predictably, the national leadership 
energetically sought to overturn the policy. Kinnock warned that 'We don't want 
to weaken the broad coalition by wrangles over legality or public dramas or 
exciting excursions. Our basic concern is - and must remain - jobs, services and 
democracy,.97 Pending the election of a Labour government, Labour councils 
should continue to serve as a 'dented shield' to protect the poor and 
disadvantaged from the Tory's worst excesses. Meanwhile, financially hard-
pressed or rate-capped councils were encouraged to look towards 'creative 
accountancy' as an alternative to direct political confrontation. 
Although the 'dented shield' strategy generally stuck, two left-wing Labour 
controlled local authorities, Lambeth and Liverpool, refused to set a rate in protest 
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at government controls on their spending limits. Others threatened to do so. The 
councillors concerned were suspended from office, surcharged, routinely 
lambasted by the mass media, government ministers and Labour's national 
leadership, who expelled some from the party. Effectively then, the national 
leadership of all the established political parties and the media continued to act in 
consort when faced with any extra-parliamentary action by local councillors. 
Similarly, all the main political players either actively promoted, or in Labour's 
case tacitly accepted, a political discourse that branded the municipal left as a 
'loony left'. 
Given this weight of authoritative OpInIOn it is hardly surprIsmg that this 
particular 'story' of municipal politics should have come to predominate.98 It may 
be useful then to recall that this was not how many Labour activists, including 
most supporters of the Ealing anti-poll tax campaign tended to see it. Ken 
Livingstone's alternative account of the municipal left is therefore worth quoting 
at a little length: 99 
Whether it was the miners' strike, the Falklands War [or] 'loony left' 
councils... our leaders seem to accept unquestioningly the agenda and 
even the parameters of debate set by our political opponents ... 
[Yet] the government's attacks on local councils had rebounded 
badly on Tory support in various key areas. In Liverpool the support for 
the Labour council in its fight with the government had squeezed the 
base of the Tories almost to the point of extinction. In Lambeth, the 
banned and surcharged Labour councillors were replaced by an even 
bigger Labour majority. In London, popular support for the GLC had 
surpassed that achieved by Labour in the 1945 and 1966 general 
elections ... 
In retrospect it seems incredible that so much time was devoted to the 
leadership's crusade against the left in the party that they never got 
round to launching a campaign against the poll tax. 
Even so, the vast majority of Labour councillors, including those who would 
have placed themselves firmly on the left of the party, rejected calls for non-
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implementation and objected to any tactic that could be seen as 'a vote of no 
fid ° th d to , 100 con 1 ence In e emocra lC process . F or as Donald Dewar sought to 
'remind' delegates to the 1988 Annual conference, any party that aspires to be in 
government cannot 'afford to have selective amnesia when it comes to the law of 
the land' .101 If this meant leaving the way open to more radical campaigners 
against the poll tax, including proponents of civil disobedience, then so be it. 102 
It is tempting therefore to see the poll tax episode as simply another example (if 
more were needed) of the British labour movement's deep attachment to existing 
constitutional arrangements. As Milliband put it: 'the Labour party has always 
been ... dogmatic - not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system. 
Empirical and flexible about all else, its leaders have always made devotion to 
that system their fixed point of reference and the conditioning factor of their 
political behaviour' .103 Similarly, the national Labour party had consistently 
displayed a certain suspicion of its supporters in local authorities and tended to 
favour a 'statist' approach to many policy questions which might better ensure a 
uniform public service in areas like health and education. Again, this tended to 
limit the potential of local activism. 
But there is also another important element in the response of mainstream 
Labour councillors to the poll tax - a sense of exhaustion. John Cudmore 
believed that 'the 1986-1990 administration was a fairly chastening experience 
to the Ealing Labour Party. There was very much a reaction by 1989 against 
anything that could be seen as outside the law,.104 Similarly, Ruth Blunt recalled 
that 'the party in 1990 was a different party from that of 1985. [Then] there was 
a spirit of hope, that you could still do some things, stop bad things happening ... 
I think there was a decline in people's energy after a whole decade of 
Thatcherism,.105 In such a climate of demoralisation it was unlikely that calls for 
non-implementation would ever find much purchase. 
Was there an alternative? 
It hardly takes a leap of historical or political imagination to conclude that 
provided cOlllldl/ors were prepared to.go beyond the Imr, the introduction of the 
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poll tax actually furnished many practical opportunities to scupper 
implementation. Firstly, the sheer scale of the administrative changes required by 
the new tax can be gauged by the fact that some 15,000 new staff were employed 
. 11 h . 106 natlOna y to get t e new system up and runnmg. Most obviously then, local 
authorities could simply have done nothing, declined to set up the necessary 
machinery to collect the tax and so left the ball firmly in the government's court. 
Formally this would have triggered an immediate confrontation with central 
government, including surcharge. 
Councillors could have responded by taking action to further undermine the 
legitimacy of the poll tax by resigning and seeking re-election on a specifically 
anti-poll tax, non-collection ticket. Alternatively, Labour councils and the wider 
labour movement (with or without the co-operation of other opposition parties) 
could have used their institutional position to organise a 'people's referendum' 
asking whether the poll tax should be introduced in their area. The Peace Ballot 
of 1935 could feasibly have served as a precedent. Such an exercise in direct 
democracy was attempted by Labour's Milton Keynes council, whic~ when 
faced with a parsimonious central grant, cuts in services and redundancies, asked 
local citizens whether they supported an above inflation increase in their council 
tax. 107 In short, Labour councils could have attempted to use their institutional 
power to mobilise public opinion as part of a direct challenge to the 
government's 'flag ship' policy. 
Such a strategy, while inevitably full of risks, could only have been 
contemplated if a sufficiently powerful critical mass of local authorities were 
committed to supporting non-implementation. But could it have forced even as 
combative a politician as Mrs Thatcher to reconsider? The protestors naturally 
flagged up the unpopularity of both the tax and the government in 1990. 
However, they were not alone in judging the overall political context as 
particularly unfavourable to the Conservatives. As John Major recalled: 108 
If you actually look at the situation in 1990 when I became prime 
minister, the party was very split, the poll tax had been a complete social 
and economic disaster, we had a recession that had been building up as a 
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result of the boom in the late Eighties, we had interest rates in double 
figures, we had very high inflation, we had unemployment nSIng 
dramatically, we had growth going into the ground. There was a full scale 
recession with negative equity. 
Nevertheless, any counterfactual built around non-implementation remaInS 
unconvincing. Not necessarily because it was, a priori, doomed to fail, but 
because the majority of those who would have had to implement or support it _ 
the national Labour Party, local councillors and local authority workers - lacked 
the necessary political will to pursue such a radical and combative strategy. As 
Andrew Marr noted: 109 
the problem for left-wing and liberal advocates of local government is 
that their logic... directly challenges the logic of the British political 
system itself. To speak of entrenched powers in a centralised state whose 
Parliament claims absolute sovereignty is little short of revolutionary. 
And yet these are such mild-mannered revolutionaries one cannot quite 
believe that they have the backbone to follow through the consequences 
of their arguments. 
This emphasis on 'backbone' actually accorded quite closely with the views of 
most anti-poll tax protestors who saw the decision of Labour councils to 
implement the poll tax primarily as a failure of leadership. They suggested that if 
local government was really as emasculated as Labour councillors were wont to 
claim - that they were 'beaten whichever way they turned' - then why continue 
to be so compliant? An open confrontation with the government over the whole 
question of local finance would better protect the interests of Ealing's citizens 
than by passively accepting 'death by a thousand cuts'. In any case, the 
protestors were adamant that many poor people would simply be unable to pay -
it would therefore be immoral (as well as bad politics) for Labour councils to do 
°d full 0))0 the Tories' dirty work for them. As Sheri an scorn y put It: 
I suppose it must be easy to wrap yourself up in the white flag of 
surrender if you do not have to live with the consequences of defeat. .. 
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Could [the poor] afford to sit in their prison-grey homes watching the 
damp blur the wallpaper pattern, waiting for the ballot box to speak at 
some future time? 
Yet calls for non-implementation effectively cast Labour councillors as a radical 
'vanguard' - a role they fundamentally rejected, either on principled political 
. 
grounds or through fear of the personal consequences. Instead, most believed 
that their primary duty, irrespective of rate capping, the poll tax or any other law, 
was to run services as efficiently as possible and serve as a bridge between the 
public and the local administration. Most were prepared to put in long hours to 
this end - an average of 82 hours a month in 1991 according to one survey. III 
Within this schema there was no place for direct confrontations with central 
government and the argument that widespread non-payment was ultimately self-
defeating, as any shortfalls in council revenue would simply make a bad funding 
situation worse, was a strong one. Moreover, at a subtle level the shrinking 
prerogatives of councils and the shift in role from provider to 'enabler' 
increasingly encouraged a culture of'managerialism' among most councillors. 
Ultimately then, the growing conflict between the anti-poll tax campaigners and 
Ealing Labour council reflected not so much a mutual incomprehension, but 
rather a profound disagreement over what was the proper role of the left-wing 
'active citizen' in local government. I return to this essential issue in chapter 
eight, which more fully compares the different models of active citizenship 
revealed by the poll tax crisis for both the 'institutional' and radical British Left. 
Similar tensions were to surface between the protestors and trade union 
organisations over the demand for non-collection. 
Don't Collect! 
The socialist and trade umon background of so many Ealing anti-poll tax 
activists naturally encouraged them to emphasise the organised working class as 
primary agents of protest. But any hopes that trade union action might prevent 
collection of the new tax were to remain unfultilled. As Mick Brooks, secretary 
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of the Ealing FederatIon saw It: 
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One of the mistakes of perspective that we had when we started off was 
that we expected more support from local authority workers in the form 
of strike action. And we didn't get it. The reason for that is obviously 
betrayal by the national labour movement the rue and the Labour 
Party_ .. But if you take the average NALGO or NUPE member, if they 
weren't going to get national support they were snookered. 
The apparent failure of the trade unions to offer a lead seemed to confIrm a wider 
(perhaps perennial) frustration felt by many trade union activists with the 
reluctance of the British labour movement to countenance any overt form of 
political industrial action. 
Like the Labour Party, the trade union movement was apprehensive about the 
implications of the poll tax from an early stage and between 1987 and 1991 the 
majority of unions passed resolutions at successive annual conferences 
condemning the tax in principle. Some public sector trade unions also spent large 
sums on adverts and publicity events. For example, in April 1990 NALGO 
launched a 'non-party' poster campaign urging people to 'Vote NO to the Poll 
Tax!' in the May local elections at the cost of some £250,000. 113 Most of the 
criticisms they levelled against the charge were indistinguishable from those put 
forward by the Labour Party. The regressive nature of the tax and its potentially 
baleful effect on civil liberties were all emphasised, as were concerns regarding 
the threat to the powers and fInancial independence of local government. This 
last issue was of course directly relevant to public sector trade unions, which 
feared that the new tax regime represented a direct and immediate threat to their 
members' livelihoods. A motion passed by the 1989 annual conference of the 
town hall clerical union, NALGO, summed up the prevailing mood of alarm: 'If 
it is not stopped, the poll tax will ... result in widespread cuts in local authority 
services, with major consequences for the jobs and conditions of N ALGO 
members.,114 
So for public sector trade unionists at least, it was possible to argue that the poll 
tax was a genuine industrial issue, albeit one with heavy political overtones 
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Nevertheless, this overt political quality was to prove a source of contention and 
complicate the response of the trade union movement. For while it seemed 
straightforward that unions should oppose the tax in principle, it was far less 
:Jbvious how this could best be done effectively both within the law and within 
the dominant tradition of non-political trade unionism. This was especially 
important- as. most trade union leaderships sought to buttress attempts by Neil 
Kinnock to shift the Labour Party to the right and so make it 'electable'. Overtly 
political action would, it was argued, recall the supposed anarchy of the 1970s 
and so expose both the Labour Party and the trade unions to charges of 
irresponsibility and extremism. Nevertheless, the poll tax served to highlight 
tensions between left and right in the trade union movement as to what was the 
proper political role of industrial action and strained the commitment of some 
members to constitutional pathways of protest. 
All this begs a number of questions. Firstly, did events in Ealing and elsewhere 
support the protestors' charges of 'betrayal'? How did local activists seek to 
influence national policy and how much support did they enjoy at a rank and file, 
as opposed to activist level? In short, were calls for non-collection ever viable? 
A grand coalition 
A number of bureaucratic factors have historically tended to boost the 
importance of the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC). The trade union 
policy-making process formally revolves around the annual or biennial 
conference, which theoretically at least, 'instructs' trade union leaderships. The 
annual conference therefore becomes an arena in which different sectional and 
political groups (including the leadership itself) contest ideas and alternative 
policies. Of course, in practice there is often something a little unreal about the 
set-piece debates, for all their sound and fury. For union leaderships, simply by 
virtue of their ability to manage the day-to-day affairs of the union, can usually 
ignore or creatively interpret awkward conference decisions. Nevertheless, 
because the STUC congress etfectively kicks off the conference season, 
decisions can often define the agenda of other labour movement bodies. 
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By the late 1980s the STUC had developed a well established campaigning 
repertoire which sought to unite as many strands of organised public opinion, 
including academics, trade unions, welfare pressure groups, business, the 
:hurches and, political parties within 'grand coalitions'. According to the official 
historian of the STUC, as 'the Conservatives' electoral mandate in Scotland 
shrivelled, a. new form of civic politics began to gather force, one which 
contrived to embody Scotland's collectivist traditions in conscious defiance of 
the cult of individualism that underpinned the new Conservative thinking.' 115 
Certainly a pronounced nationalist undertone was apparent as a Scottish 
Consensus formed around specifically 'Scottish' issues, such as the threatened 
closure of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (1972), the Ravenscraig steel mill in the 
1980s and calls for greater devolution. 116 So it seemed natural that the STUC's 
anti-poll tax campaign, Stop It, launched in 1988, should follow the by-now 
familiar pattern. 
One perhaps inevitable effect of the tactic was that the STUC remained publicly 
committed to constitutional methods of protest. Anything less would hinder 
attempts to form a grand coalition against the tax. John Rafferty, secretary of 
Stop It, was by 1988 firmly against any calls for non-payment. Any form of civil 
disobedience was, he rather dourly asserte~ a 'chic', 'trendy' form of 'fashion 
politics' which would directly threaten the jobs of local government workers. 1l7 
Moreover, non-payment must inevitably 'create electoral problems for Labour 
politicians' and make marginal seats 'so essential to the formation of a Labour 
government, all the more elusive next time round' .118 However, in deference to 
mounting public opposition to the tax, the public were urged to foul up the 
registration process through time-wasting enquiries and the STUC set up a hot-
line to offer suitable advice on how this might be achieved. 
This strategy soon came under criticism from within the STUC on a number of 
grounds. Firstly, it was difficult to avoid registration. Secondly, previous 
attempts at grand coalitions had, by and large, proved ineffective in the face of 
the sustained hostility of the national Conservative government. Why should 
Stop It be any different? In any case, the spectre of a resurgent and radicalised 
Scottish nationalism naturally threatened Labour-supporting trade unionists, who 
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believed that if anyone was going to lead the anti-poll movement, it should be 
them. As one delegate to the STUC's 1988 Congress saw it: 
we are the elected leadership of the Labour and trade union movement. 
Our remit is protect our membership and their dependants and society in 
general. We have started this process with the Stop It campaign, but we 
must now clearly state that if Stop It fails we must publicly ... support the 
campaign of non-payment of this unjust tax. 119 
Privately many leading members of the sruc agreed and Campbell Christie, 
general secretary, later publicly refused to pay. Nevertheless sustained and 
'powerful pressure behind the scenes' from Donald Dewar, Labour's shadow 
Scottish secretary helped ensure that such individual protests did not become 
official STUC policy.120 Similarly all pressure to campaign jointly with the 
largest grass roots anti-poll campaign - the Scottish Federation - were brushed 
aside, despite the best efforts of the protestors. As Tommy Sheridan later 
ruefully observed, the Federation 'chased the STUC in the way a besotted 
schoolboy might pursue a woman who's just not interested'. 121 
The policy adopted by the national TUC developed on near-identical lines to that 
of the STUC, although arguably in England and Wales the political pressure for 
civil disobedience within the trade union movement was more easily contained 
due to the absence of a nationalist dimension. The ruc's 1988 Congress 
resolution further attempted to flesh out objections to the poll tax as a trade 
union issue. 122 For example, concern was expressed as to the effect of the poll 
tax on employees living in temporary accommodation as part of their jobs. The 
new legal responsibilities of local authority treasurers were condemned as 
'invidious' and represented 'government interference in local authority staffing 
matters'. The TUC also adopted the STUC's grand coalition tactics and sought to 
involve 'all other groups who do or are likely to oppose' the poll tax so long as 
they were 'operating within the law'. 
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An unholy alliance? 
But proponents of civil disobedience envisaged a very different sort of campaign 
that transcended any individualised response to the tax, or for that matter, the 
apparently toothless grand coalition favoured by the TUC. Instead, millions of 
non-payert> in the community could unite with local authority trade unionists 
refusing to implement, collect or prosecute non-payers. Such a strategy was 
necessarily vague, but a number of possible scenarios could be envisaged. Most 
obviously, key public sector workers, such as DHSS staff and local government 
employees involved with revenue collection, could deliberately refuse to 
implement the poll tax on overtly political grounds. In an appeal to trade 
unionists the Strathclyde Anti-Poll Tax Federation suggested that 'workers in 
Computer Services Sections refusing to co-operate ... could have a very 
disruptive effect. The potential of action against non-payers could be limited if 
workers in the Assessors and Finance department refused to hand over 
information' .123 However, caution was also necessary, as 'these workers have not 
previously been in the forefront to take action and if they do so now they would 
be vulnerable ... particularly since few councils have declared themselves willing 
to refuse to co-operate with the Tax'. There were 'therefore two prerequisites ... 
First of all a mass movement of non-payment must be built, otherwise sections 
of workers will be left isolated, and secondly wherever workers are prepared to 
place their jobs on the frontline by refusing to co-operate we must prepare now 
for proper solidarity support from the wider trade union movement. ,124 
From a national trade union perspective such a strategy immediately posed a 
number of general problems. Most obviously, any 'political' action which would 
contravene the existing legal definition of 'lawful' industrial action. The 
sequestration of the NUM's funds in the mid-1980s left trade unionists in no 
doubt that this was a serious problem. Political industrial action would also fly in 
the face of long established traditions of a politically impartial public service. 
Any campaign of civil disobedience could only be successful as part of a co-
ordinated national campaign, which in tum necessitated the active and 
constructive support of national trade union leaderships. As we have seen, this 
was never likely to be forthcoming. However, if overtly national political action 
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proved too difficult, local disputes by poll tax collection and enforcement staff 
. ' 
ostensibly about conditions of service issues, could effectively halt collection. 
While such action would remain within the law, it would be limited to particular 
Luthorities and not represent a direct national challenge to the government or the 
new tax system. Nevertheless, anti-poll tax campaigners welcomed all local 
disputes inv~lving revenue collection staff with alacrity. Another source of 
contention that could be exploited might arise if employers attempted to deduct 
unpaid poll tax from their employees' wage packets at the request of local 
authorities. In the event, a marked reluctance of local councils to pursue wage 
arrestments in the early 1990s left this possibility largely academic. 
Despite the formidable practical and political problems implicit in each of these 
strategies calls for civil disobedience failed to die down and between 1988 and 
1990 most individual trade union conferences seriously debated the merits of a 
such a strategy. Even the TGWU, was forced to concede that the 'campaign to 
refuse to pay the poll tax, a resistance campaign, has gained some solid support 
in Scotland, and is likely to find echoes in England and Wales'.125 Even so, 
members were advised that the 'TGWU has not supported this campaign in the 
sense that it does not believe it is right for a union to take decisions about the 
tactics which individuals and community groups may wish to make, and be 
responsible for'. 
Inevitably the debate was most acute in the public sector unions. Several smaller 
traditionally left-wing unions, such as NAPO and FBU, came out in favour of 
non-payment. Indeed, the FBU went as far as denouncing the 'role played by the 
Labour Party leadership in Scotland' .126 However, campaigners were well aware 
that the most important union in this context was NALGO, whose members' 
collected the tax. As in every other union, powerful currents within NALGO 
opposed civil disobedience. The most prominent voices raised against such a 
policy came initially from the Executive (and full time officials). According to 
Jim White of Scottish NALGO, a non-coltection strategy was an 'adventurous 
policy aimed deliberately at binding L~al Government Unions as the shock 
troops who will defeat ... the poll tax. TJ,tN ... is never, not now, and never will 
d . ,127 be a broad base campatgn. 
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However, for many activists or Executive members the issue was not quite as 
clear cut as White's trenchant statement implied. For the effect of the poll tax on 
local government's revenue-raising powers and political independence was 
potentially so serious as to demand immediate action Therefore it was arguably 
in the b~st interests of NALGO's members to challenge the Conservative 
government upon uniquely favourable ground. So almost despite itself, the 
national union became increasingly ambivalent about the Scottish civil 
disobedience campaign. For example, in May 1989 the union's monthly journal, 
distributed free to every member, interviewed sympathetically on its front page 
two Scottish members who were refusing to pay.128 Similarly, the union's 1989 
Conference moved the union much closer towards an illegal strategy. The 
conference resolved: 129 
* that NALGO will support mass non-payment and other forms of civil 
disobedience if and when they become viable options as a result of 
raising public consciousness through campaigning ... 
* to pressure local authorities through means appropriate to local 
circumstances not to pursue non-payers of the tax through civil 
penalties 
* to instruct the [Executive] that branches be encouraged to ... pursue 
this policy by all means, including if appropriate industrial action. 
Some anti-poll tax campaIgners were understandably jubilant, but as events 
would show, their optimism was largely misplaced. 130 Despite an apparently 
militant tone, the wording of these key action points was sufficiently vague to 
allow the national union and local branches to interpret them freely. For 
example, the qualified support for non-payment ('if and when' it became 
'viable') was to all intents and purposes meaningless. Even so, both the 
leadership and more right-wing sections of the union were clearly alarmed by 
many of the sentiments expressed and the possible implications of the policy. 
Something more than ritual expostulations was needed if the disparate currents 
within NALGO were to be successfully managed. By 1990 the leadership had 
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come favour a strategy that met demands for a more robust response to the poll 
tax half-way, but still kept within the law. Thus after a prolonged (and perhaps 
pregnant) silence, in May 1990 the union's journal once again discussed the 
tactics open to NALGO members. John Stevenson, branch secretary Lothian 
Region, emphasised the personal nature of the union's response131 
We've supported people's rights not to pay. But say it's not for us to 
hinder implementation. Recently the branch has voted to take action of 
up to half a day in support of those who've had their bank accounts 
frozen for non-payment. So we do support people. But we wouldn't tell 
them that they shouldn't, mustn't pay. That's not our role to take. 
Meanwhile, back in Ealing ... 
As we saw in chapter one, Ealing trade unionists played an important role in the 
creation of the organised anti-poll tax campaign in the borough before April 
1990 and used their contacts with local branches to circulate appeals for help, ask 
for donations and promote model resolutions. Such efforts were, perhaps 
predictably, most successful with public sector unions. For example, Ealing 
NUT, which contained several prominent anti-poll tax activists, proposed a 
motion to the union's 1990 annual conference in favour of mass non-payment. In 
response the NUT leadership ruled large sections of the motion outside the aims 
and objects of the union, including any reference to non-payment. Melanie 
Griffiths, the Ealing delegate was amused to recall how her attempts to move the 
now emasculated motion were continually interrupted by the President, who 
forbade her to even mention the words 'non-payment' and eventually switched 
off the microphone and ordered her off the rostrum.132 However, behind the 
knockabout lay a more serious question: how far could the poll tax be seen as a 
trade union, rather than a political or 'community' issue? 
This dichotomy hindered the efforts of the Ealing protestors to establish 
organisational links with particular work-places. In Ealing, the only viable work 
place anti-poll tax union established was based at Ealing Hospital and drew most 
of its support from student and newly qualified nurses living in hospital 
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accommodation (see chapter two). Other public sector professionals, by virtue of 
their position, could use their day-to-day work to make a political point about the 
poll tax (or even hinder its implementation) with the justification that they were 
defending their client's confidentiality. For example, NALGO members in a 
number of West London housing associations refused to 'give any information at 
all' about. th~ir tenants to local councils.133 But the key arena for agitation 
remained Ealing council and it was here that campaigners naturally focussed 
their efforts to promote a non-collection strategy. 
As we have seen, NALGO's 1989 Conference policy seemed to suggest that 
there was at least a possibility that local government workers might take some 
sort of action to hinder collection of the tax. A number of influential individuals 
within the branch, including the branch secretary Chris Morey and the branch 
chairperson, Eve Turner, were in favour of non-collection in principle. 
Additionally some shop stewards and rank and file NALGO members, 
particularly within the Housing Benefit/Community Charge section and Housing 
DepartmentlO were also active in local anti-poll tax unions both within and outside 
the borough. But as experienced trade unionistslO most harboured few illusions 
about the genuine problems inherent in such a strategy and were well aware that 
calls for non-collection did not necessarily enjoy universal support, even among 
activists. According to Eve Turner it 'was a bit of a mixed bag. As a general 
principle you wouldn't come across any NALGO activist that supported the poll 
tax. I think they did support non-paymentlO but there were more reservations 
about non-collection because of the practical issues.' 134 
NeverthelesslO a motion in support of non-collection was passed at the 1990 
branch AGM with a large majority. The branch also agreed to propose a similar 
motion to NALGO's 1990 Annual Conference, but significantIylO those members 
from the revenue department present at the adoption meeting generally 
abstained. 13' The motion was 'written in a certain way to get through the 
conference [and] was very pragmatic', calling upon the national union to 
campaign for non-collection rather than an outright demand for immediate 
action. 136 Although if passed such a motion would incrementally, rather than 
decisively shift the union towards active support of civil disobedience, it would 
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have been of symbolic significance in the Spring of 1990, the high-water mark of 
anti-poll tax protest. So much was at stake and Ealing's motion provoked a tense 
and at times acrimonious debate. 
Eve Turner, moving the motion, predicted cuts of some £13 million in Ealing as 
a direct resul~ of the new tax and concluded that 'If we don't get rid of the poll 
tax it will get rid of us'. In the debate, every speaker for the motion emphasised 
that, in line with the 1989 Conference decisio~ 'mass-non payment' had now 
'become a reality' and the union was therefore duty bound to actively consider 
calls for civil disobedience. In reply, opponents of the motion pointed out that 
calls for non-implementation were simply unrealistic and 'too late'. After all, 
NALGO members, however reluctantly, had been involved in setting up the new 
tax system for well over a year and a half Alan Jinkinson, (General Secretary-
elect) warned delegates that a non-collection strategy would fall foul of the Tory 
trade union laws. Thus the debate's 'outcome will determine whether we stay 
within the mainstream ... Or whether ... NALGO would be put out front with its 
head on the chopping block'. On a card vote, Ealing's motion was defeated by 
380,165 to 220,108. The decision effectively ended any hopes that NALGO 
would support a non-collection strategy and the All-Britain Anti-Poll Federation 
declared itself 'Frankly disappointed .,. but we have to say that the union 
leadership has once again let us down'. 137 
But had it? In the absence of contemporaneous survey evidence it is of course 
impossible to definitively assess the mood of council workers at this time and 
any account must remain impressionistic. All the anti-poll tax activists who 
worked for the borough interviewed for this study agreed that the majority of 
council workers opposed the tax in principle, but there remained a mixture of 
views and 'some home owners supported [it] as Ealing had recently introduced 
&'. h ,138 
massive increases in the rates so it represented a reduced expense lor t em . 
Despite the potential of the new tax to adversely effect their conditions of 
service, opinions appeared to be 'not so much a reflection of them as council 
workers but as members of the public'. 139 Gill Reavey, a Housing department 
, 
worker recalled how members of her office held a whip-round to loan a female 
, 
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colleague money to enable her to avoid imprisonment for non-payment in 1991 
(see chapter seven). 140 
However, attempts by some council-worker activists to organise a workplace 
based group - Ealing Council Workers Against the Poll Tax - in Spring of 1990 
foundered after only three meetings, although campaigners had more success in 
. 
persuading their colleagues to attend lobbies of council meetings. PI Other 
council workers engaged in petty acts of subversion. For example, staff in one 
advice bureau referred people who had been summonsed for non-payment to the 
Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation's 'hot-line,.142 Sympathetic workers in the 
Finance Department also kept anti-poll tax campaigners fully briefed about the 
levels of non-payment and difficulties with the collection process. 143 The 
information was then routinely passed onto the local press in the hope of 
embarrassing the council. So fears that the non-payment campaign might be 
resented as a possible threat to funding and jobs proved unfounded. According to 
Chris Morey cuts 'were happening anyway. The election of a Tory council in 
May 1990 was much more significant'. 144 In any case, both the national and local 
union were at pains to portray the 21 'capped' authorities in 1990 undertaking 
cuts as 'victims of the poll tax axe', including boroughs that were directly 
adjacent to Ealing, such as Hillingdon, Brent and Hammersmith. 145 
But benign tolerance or even open support for non-payment fell well short of the 
campaigners' initial goal of encouraging revenue staff to refuse to collect the tax. 
A number of factors explain this failure. Firstly, the decision of the national 
union to repudiate non-collection discouraged local branch officers from calling 
for political action to defeat the tax, which would only make sense if undertaken 
on a national level. If in the unlikely event Ealing NALGO had issued such an 
appeal, any resulting action would have been unofficial with all that implied in 
terms of legal and material support for the workers involved. In any case, there 
was scant evidence that the members in the Finance Department actually wanted 
to undertake political strike action. Chris Morey's explanation for this reluctance 
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You are actually asking these people to become a kind of unchosen 
vanguard. In fact the union has done that from time to time, has looked 
at revenue staff as a weapon against the employer ... But what the Union 
has learnt across the country is that you can't keep going back to the 
same people. They say "Why usT' In Ealing that was never a viable 
option, ~iven the people who worked in the [Finance] section. In those 
days most might have been conservative with a big 'C' ... they didn't 
necessarily see the connections. A lot of them had a very traditional 
view of public service, as non-political and you do what your told. 
Nevertheless, industrial relations problems did arise in connection with the poll 
tax in Ealing and elsewhere. For example, in Greenwich poll tax collection 
workers undertook protracted official strike action in 1990 over regrading issues. 
In Sheffield housing staff refused to undertake training connected with the poll 
tax. Similarly, in Southampton housing staff refused to co-operate with plans to 
place poll tax collection boxes in housing offices because they meant more 
work-load and 'constitutes a real security risk'. In Ealing, Community Charge 
collection staff also threatened industrial action in March 1991 over health and 
safety fears when dealing with charge-payers and demanded 'protective screens 
between defaulters and ... security guards or police officers present at all times 
during the interview process'. 147 Such concerns hardly suggest that the staff saw 
non-payers as joint participants in a struggle to defeat an iniquitous tax. 
Although some sought to portray these sorts of disputes as part of the wider 
political struggle against the tax, such claims were generally less than 
convincing. 148 
Non-collection - a non-option? 
All this begs an obvious question. Why, if the prospect of a non-collection 
strategy was so unlikely, did anti-poll tax activists in Ealing and elsewhere 
campaign for it? After all, they were hardly political tyros? Many held 
responsible positions in their local branch and so enjoyed close personal 
knowledge of the mood of their colleagues. Moreover, all the evidence shows 
they were well aware how diflicult it would be to get such a strategy ofl~ the 
I .., ..., 
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ground, let alone make it stick. Were calls for non-collection, as many of its 
opponents claimed, mere 'political posturing' or 'adventurism' - just another 
~xample of the often noted disparity between the left-wing political views of 
nany branch activists and the majority of rank-and-file members. Certainly the 
strategy assumed a high level of political consciousness among trade union 
members.- It . also fitted into orthodox Marxist doctrine, which emphasised the 
organised working class as primary agents of change. For example, for much of 
1989 the Socialist Workers Party continued to advocate an essentially syndicalist 
strategy based on 'industrial action and the involvement in the Labour 
movement' .149 This assumed that even 'large numbers of people organised in the 
community' rather than on a workplace basis would not 'have the strength to 
win. The state machinery, through fines, arresting of wages and so on, can wear 
down community resistance.' 150 To their subsequent embarrassment, some 
Scottish SWP members therefore initially paid the tax. However, the failure of 
the non-collection campaign and the apparent success of non-payment in 
Scotland led almost all Marxists to reappraise their position, including the SWP. 
The history of the British trade umon movement after 1945 offered few 
precedents of directly and explicitly 'political' industrial action aimed at 
changing a particular government policy, unless, like Heath's Industrial 
Relations Act, it directly threatened to remove existing trade union immunities. 
This seemed to confirm Hain' s charge that many on the left were far too ready to 
romanticise the potential of industrial action to secure political change. 151 Indeed, 
there is a real sense in which calls for a refusal to collect were out of kilter with 
most members' perceptions of what trade unions were actually jor, with the 
majority continuing to see work-place, pay and conditions of service issues as 
f h · . 152 the proper concern 0 t elr UnIons. 
But did this hold true in the more politicised context of town hall trade 
unionism? A survey of NALGO members conducted by the national union 
concluded that the average member was 'a 40 year old home-owning Guardian 
and Public Service reader who is not in a political party but is more likely to vote 
Labour while insisting they are moderate,.153 The survey also found that most 
members had joined the union in order to secure 'better pay, work conditions' 
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and improved pensions. However, a top campaigning priority was 'saving the 
NHS'. This accords with other survey evidence from the period which found that 
only 19% of service workers retained trade union membership because they saw 
it as a 'way of creating a more just society' or a belief in 'solidarity'. 154 
However, it is also worth stressing that there is no evidence that rank and file 
trade unionists had adopted an individualistic 'Thatcherite' view of the danaers 
• :0 
of collective organisation. 155 
While these wider debates about the proper purpose of trade unionism lurked in 
the background they were rarely openly voiced. Instead attention tended to focus 
on the tactics which might best meet the challenges posed by the breakdown of 
the post-war consensus. In the eyes of many trade unionists, the late 1980s was 
essentially a period of retrenchment and defeat. As one comprehensive study of 
trade unions saw it, by 1990, 'what had been in the eyes of many outsiders and 
members ten years earlier, a united self-confident social movement as well as a 
powerful industrial bargainer, often seemed more closely akin to a demoralized 
collection of special interest groups' .156 Such fears seemed confirmed by the 
decline in national membership, from a peak of 13.3 million in 1979 to 9.9 
million in 1990. 157 The response of national trade union leaders and many local 
activists was essentially defensive, a strategy of 'new realism' that sought to 
protect the essential fabric of the unions and maintain existing conditions as far 
as possible, pending the election of a Labour government. Within this schema, 
any calls for civil disobedience to defeat the poll tax could only be provocative, 
counter-productive and doomed to failure. The problem for the trade union right 
was that up to 1990 the results of 'new realism' could hardly be deemed a 
success. For example, public sector wage rises throughout the period generally 
lagged behind inflation and cuts in local services became an annual and 
increasingly traumatic occurrence in many authorities (including, as we have 
seen, Ealing). Moreover, moderate tactics did not speed the election of a Labour 
government in the 1987 or 1992 general elections. 
All this fuelled left-wing criticism. Andy Dixon, an NUT executive member and 
supporter of the non-payment campaign argued that the trade union response to 
the poll tax once again showed that the: 158 
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problem is not just that we have a determined and VICIOUS Tory 
government to fight but also the leaders of our movement [who] are 
a ted with the disease of NEW REALISM. This so-called new realism 
IS really OLD DEFEATISM. The TUC and the official trade union 
movement has not been so completely outside of a mass popular 
movement of this kind for many years. 
Thus the poll tax as an issue presented an ideal, perhaps unique, opportunity for 
the organised working class to effectively link up with the unorganised working 
class in pursuit of a (defensive) political goal that would benefit the whole 
community. From this perspective the non-collection tactic was wholly 
appropriate. While such action would inevitably entail breaking current trade 
union laws, so be it. However, the argument was fatally undermined not by the 
machinations of national trade union leaders but by the marked reluctance of 
public sector workers to undertake any form of industrial action. This in part 
reflected a wider rejection of militancy, as the high-point of anti-poll tax 
agitation coincided with a marked decline in the total number of days lost 
through strikes and the number of recorded disputes. 159 
While it is ultimately impossible to disprove the suggestion that a decisive lead 
from the trade unions could have mobilised members to undertake political 
industrial action to sink the tax, it was particularly unlikely in such a climate. But 
it is also worth noting that most anti-poll tax activists and their supporters in the 
trade unions believed they were duty-bound to promote the virtues of political 
trade unionism anyway. Anything less would implicitly validate the failed values 
and policies of a right-wing leadership that had consistently proved itself 
incapable of rising to the challenges posed by Thatcherism. 
Conclusion - Non-payment by Default? 
By autumn 1989 it was clear to Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners that calls for 
non-implementation and non-collection were unlikely to be successful. Given the 
failure of these strategies to take root it is tempting to conclude that non-payment 
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emerged as the campaign's primary tactic almost by default. After all, most 
protestors rightly assumed that many would not be able to pay, that the new 
system would offer opportunities for evasion and that considerable logistical 
problems would occur. Protestors were also aware that a number of academic 
studies and reports commissioned by local government organisations, trade 
unions and t~ink tanks confirmed the suggestion that the poll tax could easily 
prove uncollectable. 160 All that remained to be done then, was to build an 
alliance between these' can't payers' and principled 'won't payers', outraged by 
the unfairness of the tax. But however logical this seemed in theory, nobody 
could be sure that mass non-payment would ever actually occur. The Ealing 
protestors therefore anxiously looked towards the experience in Scotland. As 
Rachel Jones recalled: 161 
I can remember very clearly being in my flat, decorating and listening to 
this programme on the radio about the introduction of the poll tax in 
Scotland where it was already seen to be having major [collection] 
problems, just before it was introduced in England and Wales. So people 
knew that there were already going to be problems with it and that it was 
not working in Scotland. 
Scottish local authorities had issued the first bills in April 1989 and almost from 
the outset the payment figures were the subject of fierce claims and counter 
claims - a pattern that would later be repeated in Ealing (see chapters six and 
seven). By mid-October the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities issued the 
first authoritative estimate of payment levels, suggesting that 15% of eligible 
charge-payers, some 600,000 people had not paid. The Scottish Federation was 
quick to point out that this figure excluded some 500,000 others who were 
seriously in arrears and 300,000 who had 'disappeared'. 162 In short, some 1 
million Scots had not fully paid their poll tax, as compared with a default rate of 
less than 1 % under the rates. While a clear majority of Scots had paid up, it was 
obvious that non-payment on this scale, if extended over time, might leave the 
system 'unworkable'. 
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Meanwhile the example of Scotland was not lost on other political actors in the 
borough. As Councillor Gareth Daniels, Labour chair of the Environment 
Committee ruefully observed, 'an unjust tax cannot become a just one by 
inkering with the level at which it is set. When the poll tax was introduced in 
Scotland, some of the highest levels of non-payment were recorded in Shetland, 
which had one of the lowest poll tax levels - people were opposed to it in 
principle. ,163 AIl this reinforced a growing conviction that mass non-payment in 
Ealing was not simply possible, but likely. Meanwhile, as protestors and 
councillors alike prepared for the introduction of the tax, popular tempers 
continued to rise. The depth of this anger was revealed by a series of unusually 
large and disorderly national demonstrations, which are considered in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Poll Tax Riots 
The dominant conception of active political citizenship within liberal 
democracies assumes that people should seek to effect change in a 'peaceful 
and responstble manner' through existing democratic institutions and political 
structures.} We might therefore, logically expect demonstrations, parades and 
protest marches to play only a limited role in British political life. This seems 
to be borne out by one, admittedly small scale survey of popular attitudes to 
political participation conducted in 1985-6 which found that the majority of 
respondents (72.4%) would 'never' attend a protest march. 2 Moreover, 
although the 1970s saw increasing numbers of people willing to attend 
demonstrations, pickets and sit-ins,3 the proportion of the public participating 
in these sorts of 'unconventional' activities had not significantly altered 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. 4 But there still remains a strong sense 
in which protest demonstrations have 'become the major non-electoral 
expression of civil politics', especially for the organised left.5 As Marquand 
saw it, this does not necessarily denote a rejection of dominant political 
values: 6 
the politically competent potential protestor is a blood-brother to the 
good citizen of liberal democratic theory. He is likely to tum to protest 
not because he does not understand the system or accept its norms, but 
because he has been disappointed in it: because he comes to feel that it 
has let him down. 
So as street protest became more normal (and thus ritualised), it also tended to 
become 'a continuation of conventional political participation by other means' 
and empirical evidence does suggest that if anything, people attending 
demonstrations or pickets were more likely to also participate in conventional 
political activities. 7 Yet the political meaning of demonstrations remains 
highly contingent on both the particular political context in which they occur 
and in Britain at least, the extent to which good order is maintained. For when 
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political protests take a violent tum they immediately become something else 
and are widely perceived as both a challenge and a threat predominant 
political norms and values. Implicitly, 'democratic' means of securing change, 
through elections, discussion and consultation within a mutually agreed legal 
or constitutional framework, are superseded by overt, unpredictable and 
morally ambivalent forms of crowd conflict. Political riots may also threaten 
the personal safety of the police, members of the public and private property. 
Significantly then, the vanous public demonstrations, rallies, sit-ins and 
pickets associated with the anti-poll tax movement became linked with the 
problem ·of political violence for elite politicians, the media, state authorities 
and the protest organisers alike. This linkage may well have been misleading 
or unfair, for the vast majority of anti-poll tax protest events passed off 
peacefully. It also tends to assume that such violence was a consciolls political 
act and as I shall show, there is little convincing evidence that the anti-poll tax 
protestors actually desired violent protest. Nevertheless, political perceptions 
and discourse do not automatically reflect reality and the question of political 
violence therefore remains a central theme that should be addressed by any 
serious enquiry into the popular politics of the poll tax. Firstly, this chapter 
seeks to place events in their proper historical context and looks at the 
'problem' of crowd disorder in the post-war period and considers how this 
might have affected the outlook and assumptions of the organised anti-poll tax 
movement. Secondly, it describes in some detail various national anti-poll tax 
demonstrations held in 1990-1, with a particular emphasis on the dramatic 
confrontation in Trafalgar Square and its environs on the afternoon and 
evening of 31 March 1990. Throughout this discussion I will consider rival 
explanations for the militant temper of poll tax protests put forward by key 
national (and local) political actors and ask what, if anything, they tell us about 
the meaning of active citizenship in the period. 
The Problem of Violence 
By the late 1960's many felt confident that a 'conquest of violence' had 
occurred in British political life. 8 Certainly, if Northern Ireland is considered 
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separately, domestic politics since 1945 had remained largely pacific and 
political demonstrations predominantly peaceful in comparison with many 
other European countries. This happy state was thought to reflect the uniquely 
'] ~h' system of policing protest by consent, the socially cohesive benefits 
of consensus-style social and economic policies and the existence of a well-
established democratic culture. After 1968 the number of violent 
confrontations at political protests increased dramatically, fuelling elite fears 
that British society was becoming potentially 'ungovernable'. As one 'expert' 
on public order saw it in 1973, 'it must now be regarded as normal for any 
major demonstration to be exploited for wider revolutionary aims'. 9 Certain 
episodes, such as the mass picket of Saltley Gate Coke Depot (I972) achieved 
something approaching mythic status for some on the New Right and 
strengthened their determination to re-establish 'order' through more stringent 
public order legislation and the promotion of a sense of personal 
responsibility. 10 
But the propensity of such protests to lead to violence should not be 
exaggerated. As Parry et al note, whatever 'the impression given by media 
reporting of occasional violent incidents, political violence is something so set 
apart from the 'mainstream' of political protest in mainland Britain that it 
barely registers in a national survey'. 11 Nevertheless, demonstrations bring 
large crowds together in an implicitly confrontational context and so remain 
inherently more likely to see outbreaks of conflict between protestors and the 
police. Again, this is potentially important, as the police serve as the most 
obvious and immediate symbols of state authority at demonstrations, and are 
easily perceived as their 'hard front, the pioneer corps, the disciplinary arm, 
the shock troops'. 12 By the late 1980s many on the left had come to believe 
that the right to peaceful protest was being eroded. In part this reflected fonnal 
changes in the law governing trade union picketing rights and other public 
order legislation which increased police discretionary powers.13 But most 
commonly, a broad swathe of Left opinion pointed to the apparent 
paramilitarisation and politicisation of the police, most evident during the 
Miners' Strike (1984-5), as tangible evidence of a new authoritarianism under 
Thatcher. 14 As one anti-poll tax organisation saw it: 15 
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It is widely accepted that the last fifteen years have seen significant 
changes in the way that public protests, demonstrations and pickets are 
policed ... that policing has become a political tool to contain opposition 
to government policy. Serious questions have to be raised as to whether 
the policing of events is designed to preserve public order or to 
criminalise political protest and beat protestors off the streets. 
Logically then, the cumulative experience of violent confrontations on picket 
lines, disturbances on sink estates and the inner cities and at demonstrations 
shaped the 'folk memory' of poll tax protestors and encouraged antipathy 
towards the police. But did it actually affect their behaviour? 
Trafalgar Square Demonstration 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the founding conference of the All-Britain 
Federation resolved to support calls for a campaign of civil disobedience and 
to organise a central London demonstration on 31 March 1990, the eve of the 
Poll Tax's introduction in England and Wales. The Scottish Federation also 
planned to hold a demonstration in Glasgow to 'celebrate a year of non-
payment'. Both these decisions were generally well received among local 
activists throughout the country, who desired a national show of strength. 
However, as we also saw, the Militant Tendency controlled the All-Britain 
Federation from the outset, prompting the Labour Party and ruc leadership to 
denounce the anti-poll tax movement as a Militant 'front' organisation. On 
these grounds alone, the 'official' labour movement resolutely refused to have 
anything to do with either forthcoming demonstration. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) this indifference, the demonstration acted as 
something of a catalyst for organisational growth and seems to have 
encouraged local groups to communicate and co-operate with each other. For 
example, the Ealing Hospital APTU arranged over-night accommodation in 
the nurse's home for about 50 ~laidenhead protestors, who were passIng 
through the borough along the route taken by rebels during the Peasant's 
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Revolt of 1381, with the intention of joining up with the mam rally at 
Trafalgar Square. Local groups also used the demonstration as an occasion in 
which to gather support from other established actors, including trade union 
branches, the Labour left, community organisations, tenants associations and 
student unions. But the campaigners remained primarily interested in reaching 
out mor@ directly to unorganised public opinion and the Ealing Federation 
concentrated on leafleting and fly-posting for the event, billed as 'the Demo,.16 
Although the majority of people minded to attend could be expected to go as 
individuals or in family groups and use public transport, some local anti-poll 
tax unions did hire buses in order to pick up contingents from local housing 
estates, including the Golflinks (Southall) and South Acton. 17 On the day 
itself, the main Ealing contingent gathered at Ealing Broadway station, filling 
two or three tube carriages. 
Interestingly, in some areas efforts to build support for the demonstration were 
hampered by fears of violence. As we saw in Chapter Four, the potential for 
disorder at poll tax protests had became evident in February and March 1990 
during demonstrations outside English town halls as local councils met to set 
the level of the new charge. The Avon Federation reported that it l8 
expected to send 40 plus coaches to London. Last week one of the 
local coach companies pulled out on the grounds of 'politics' and 
'violence'. When they were rang up and were told that there were 
hundreds of OAPs and kids booked on the coaches and they were 
extremely angry, they didn't bat an eye lid. When we told them that 
we were aware that they had a number of big union contracts which 
they were likely to lose and they had two hours to think about it, they 
rang back within an hour and a quarter guaranteeing whatever we 
wanted. 
But it would be misleading to exaggerate fears among both the protestors and 
the authorities that the forthcoming national demonstration was i"evitab~r 
going to lead to violence. For example, the police turned down the organisers 
request for the march to be re-routed to Hyde Park in the expectation of a 
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significantly higher tum out than the 20,000 originally expected, on the 
grounds that less than a week's notice had been received. 19 Even a decision to 
issue a press release by the Federation calling for non-violence was largely 
prompted by a desire to deflect press criticism after the Town Hall riots rather 
, 
than any particular fear that the forthcoming march would be anything other 
than ove~helmingly peaceful and orderly. Nevertheless it argued that 'a clash 
with the police does not achieve anything positive' and that demonstrators 
should 'be on guard against provocateurs who may seek to incite violence'. 20 
Both local groups and the All-Britain Federation were keen to highlight 
parallels with 'peoples' power' protests then much in evidence in Eastern 
Europe and China: 21 
Across the world people have seen on their televisions and in their 
newspapers images of a government in its death throes. Ours. Its fatal 
move was to introduce a tax straight from the middle ages ... in the hope 
that everyone would take it lying down. Well we haven't. 
Certainly, if the political base of the anti-poll movement had been confined to 
the 'usual (leftist) suspects' it is unlikely that the demonstration would have 
proved of more than passing interest. But instead, the event clearly revealed 
capacity of the movement to mobilise large numbers of individuals with little 
or no previous history of political activity and as a consequence the crowd 
gathered on 31 March in Kennington Park was unusually large. Estimates of 
attendance, as ever a disputed commodity, range from 40,000 to 300,000?2 
Probably the best estimate would be around the 200,000 mark - columns of 
protestors were still leaving Kennington Park by the time Trafalgar Square 
(which will only hold 60,000) was full. Unfortunately, no survey was 
attempted to identify the occupations and social composition of the crowd, but 
a number of generalisations are possible. Firstly, both the protest organisers 
and the media generally agreed that family groups and pensioners were 
prominent and that 'most demonstrators were young and the vast majority 
were working class' with about half coming from London and its immediate 
environs. 23 That said, the organised Left was much in evidence with large 
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numbers of radical literature sellers, anti-poll tax union, local Labour Party 
and trade union banners present. There was also a small anarchist contingent, 
including members of 'Class War', a group that subsequently received a high 
degree of media attention. Nevertheless, most Ealing protestors were struck by 
the heterogeneous nature of the crowd:24 
I still have this vision of going under this bridge and seeing this old 
pensioner, who looked like someone who had never been on a protest, 
who was not a stereotypical activist of any sort, with his crutch up in 
the air shouting No Poll Tax! 
Another recalled: 25 
I can remember arriving and the place was heaving. Wherever you 
looked there were just thousands of people. I got chatting to these two 
women who had never done anything political in their lives. But they 
were going to do this... I thought 'wow'! This really is a coming 
together of such a range of people. 
Initially at least, the mood of the crowd was predominantly 'very happy, very 
determined ... like a carnival' and there seemed no reason to expect that events 
might turn ugly. 26 Indeed, just before the demonstration set off at about 1 pm, 
stewards called for a vote on whether or not the march should be peaceful and 
'it looked like every hand in the park was raised,.27 However, it soon became 
obvious that sections of the crowd, perhaps emboldened by the size of the 
demonstration or 'excessive drinking and a small amount of cannabis 
smoking', displayed a strong antipathy to the police. As the crowd advanced 
towards central London, lights and tapes were broken, pushing and shoving 
occurred and police were barracked and sworn at. By the time the crowd 
crossed Lambeth Bridge it had expanded to fill the whole street: 2R 
We were going up from Embankment, just south of the river, and the 
crowd was wide in the street. The police had a plan to keep it to half the 
road and they had big bolJards and tapes to keep us in. But these were 
14R 
getting knocked over [which] is an unusual thing for a crowd to do. But 
it is also an unusual thing for the police to let them do. They couldn't 
stop it. 
When the demonstration reached Whitehall tensions rose considerably as 
about 300 marchers staged a sit down protest opposite Downing Street. 
. 
Despite numerous requests by stewards and police this group, predominantly 
comprised of anarchists and Socialist Worker Party members, refused to 
move. The subsequent course of events in the next few minutes is disputed, 
but it is clear that some desultory missile throwing occurred, while the 
majority of the demonstrators moved past the still relatively localised 
confrontation and entered Trafalgar Square. The subsequent police enquiry 
accepted that the attempt to end the sit-down protest was the initial flash-point 
for the riot. However, the report argued that the decision was justified in order 
to avoid a crush that 'would' endanger lives. 29 But as we have seen the 
passage into Trafalgar Square, while restricted, was not closed. Moreover, by 
focussing on this particular incident, the report tended to downplay later 
tactical decisions regarding the use of riot squads and equipment. 
Whatever the truth of this, at about 3.30 p.m. the duty commander ordered 
mounted police units to move in and break up the sit-down protest, with foot 
squads in close support. Batons were drawn and used aggressively, although 
dedicated riot squads were not yet deployed. Some sections of the crowd, 
incensed by what it perceived to be inappropriate and heavy-handed tactics 
fought back and the police were initially forced to retreat. Further scuffles and 
missile throwing ensued as the fighting in Whitehall rapidly began to escalate. 
Meanwhile, in Trafalgar Square a still-peaceful crowd was addressed by 
leading left-wing Labour MPs Tony Benn, George Galloway and leaders of 
the Federation. Gradually, both the speakers and crowd members became 
aware of the disturbance in Whitehall, which by degrees, spread into the 
Square proper. Within half an hour 'probably the worst [riot] to take place in 
central London for over a century' was well under way.30 
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Police tactics throughout the first stage of the riot, characterised by a series of 
(bitterly resisted) attempts to clear the crowd in Trafalgar Square, "vere 
certainly controversial. For example, semi-armoured vans drove through the 
crowd at relatively high speeds and the deployment of mounted units proved 
provocative to many in the crowd, who pelted them with missiles. In any case, 
the s~eer. volume of people in the square hampered operations considerably, 
for although' only some 6,000 people were consistently involved in the 
fighting, many others either looked on or vocally supported the rioters. This 
posed operational problems for the police who perhaps understandably, seem 
to have experienced difficulty in accurately distinguishing between active 
rioters and others. Demonstrators were also able to take material from buildina 
o 
sites, such as scaffolding poles, fire extinguishers and rocks, to some extent 
redressing the police advantage in weaponry and protective equipment. A 
number of buildings were attacked and set alight, including the South African 
Embassy in Trafalgar Square itself. 
However, the course of the riot cannot simply, or primarily be explained as a 
public order problem. For example, the political nature of the event is 
underlined in video footage, which shows the crowd chanting anti-poll tax 
slogans at police officers throughout the confrontation.31 Others instinctively 
placed their experience within an international context, referring to 
contemporaneous examples of 'people's power' from Eastern Europe and 
China. For instance, one rioter recalled people chanting 'Stah-zee! Stah-zee! 
Stah-zee!' at police.32 By about 5.30 p.m. the police had largely succeeded in 
pushing the crowd out of Trafalgar Square into the Strand/Charing Cross 
Road, a victory that soon proved distinctly hollow as the displaced rioters 
spread into the West End. Trouble continued throughout the evening and as 
darkness fell the number of attempts to loot shops, attacks on expensive cars 
and even police stations in the West End increased. These actions were later 
JJ 
characterised as attacks on symbols of wealth and power by some protestors. 
During the disturbances a total of 542 police officers were injured and 42 
recorded complaints were made against the police, but no police otlicers, of 
whatever rank, were subsequently disciplined. No tigures are available for the 
number of protestors injured. Damage to property cost well over £3 million. In 
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all, 1,985 crimes were reported, with 408 arrested on 31 March and a further 
123 subsequently.34 This investigation, Operation Carnaby, involved 125 
officers full time and the Crown Prosecution Service, in an unprecedented 
move, set up a special unit, which assembled over 90 hours of video tape and 
seized 30,000 photographs from newspapers and individuals. 
Why did this initially peaceful protest take such a violent turn? The question is 
potentially revealing and remains central to any political account of the 
Trafalgar Square riot, as different political and institutional actors struggled to 
both exonerate themselves and pin responsibility for the riot on their 
opponents. The subsequent debate revealed two broad explanations. The first 
account, promoted by the political 'establishment', that is elite politicians, the 
police and the mass media blamed the riot on a combination of apolitical 
criminal hooliganism and the actions of 'far-left' extremists. The protestors on 
the other hand, tended to cast the riot as a justified reaction by the crowd to 
police brutality and incompetence. Others went further and claimed the 
demonstration had been deliberately attacked by the state in order to discredit 
the anti-poll tax movement. Each account has important implications for any 
wider discussion of active citizenship in the period. 
The Establishment Account 
It is an obvious point, but like the rest of humanity, the diverse attitudes and 
political views that underpin the actions - including rioting - of crowds at 
protest events are socially constructed and primarily accrue meaning through 
the judgements and responses of others. In a more parochial pre-industrial age 
this audience would tend to be local, confined to inhabitants of the county, the 
town or even the village in which the disturbance occurred. In the modern age 
the mass media, politicians and the police (at times hardly indistinguishable) 
display a historically unprecedented capacity to shape and assign meaning to 
particular events. 
Media responses to riots since the late 1960s have tended to follow a fairly 
consistent agenda. They begin from the assumption that all political violence 
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is intrinsically undesirable and more importantly perhaps, morally indefensible 
in a liberal democracy which allows the public to effect change through the 
ballot box. Consequently, with the occasional exception of the liberal press, 
the media almost invariably tends to see riots as the work of a minority of 
(sometimes foreign) agitators and far-left extremists, who consciously 
highjack demonstrations against the wishes of the majority of peaceful 
participants. In this schema the police are cast as long-suffering victims who 
respond to violence rather than play any significant part in initiating it. This 
sits easily alongside other, highly traditional notions of riots and the sorts of 
people that participate in them, derived from Le Bon's notion of a fickle , 
irrational mob comprised largely of the criminal residuum and easily 
manipulated by demagogues. Such treatment tends to depoliticise the meaning 
of riots, casting them primarily as public order problems rather than 
expressions of political or social tension. 
All these elements were present in most media accounts of the Trafalgar 
Square poll tax disturbances. For example, The Times claimed that after the 
demonstration 'many rioters could be seen taking the Underground home with 
that same air of fulfilment after mayhem that one often sees in a football 
crowd' .35 Similarly, the state was actively helped in its endeavours during 
Operation Carnaby by the tabloid press, with one of Maxwell's Mirror Group 
newspapers going so far as to publish pictures of alleged rioters under the 
headline "If You Know 'em, SHOP 'EM,?6 Interestingly, a certain degree of 
hostility towards the media among both protestors (and rank and file police 
officers) had become evident during the course of the riot with photographers 
and camera crews targeted for attack. One Sunday Mirror reporter later 
expressed fears that the coverage could lead to her being attacked at 
demonstrations as a 'police informer'. 37 
But on balance the extensive media coverage of the riot did not prove 
disastrous for the protestors, as the violent scenes from Trafalgar Square 
transmitted in live news broadcasts inevitably show incidents of police, as well 
as crowd violence, eliciting some public sympathy. Prominent shots of anti-
poll tax placards dominated most TV reports, which also contained interviews 
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with protest organisers. Agai~ this helped shape popular perceptions of the 
riot as a primarily political event, rather than a simple case of hooliganism or 
mob disorder. This may have been important, for by 1990 there was a sense of 
familiarity, even routine in media responses to most demonstrations, which 
rarely received more than a few column inches unless violence occurred. As 
Tommy Sherida~ chair of the All-Britain Federatio~ ruefully acknowledged: 
'there is no way we would have got those headlines or the massive 
international coverage if there had not been a riot,.38 
Perhaps mistakenly, the Conservative government initially sought to reprise 
the spirit, if not the precise form, of the 'enemy within' rhetoric of the mid-
1980s and consciously played up the political significance of events. r..1argaret 
Thatcher therefore cast the protests as an unholy alliance of left-wing 
extremists and the criminal 'underclass' of the unemployed and home]ess: 39 
The violent riots of 31 March in and around Trafalgar Square was [the 
underclass'] and the Left's response [to the poll tax]. And the eventual 
abandonment of the charge represented one of the greatest victories for 
these people ever conceded by a Conservative Government. 
However, there is no evidence that either the protest organisers or the majority 
of the 'left' either wanted or positively approved of the disorder and only a 
handful of those arrested on the day were established anti-poll tax activists. 
Moreover, Thatcher's description of the rioters as the 'underclass' was highly 
questionable. According to the main legal defendants group, only a third were 
unemployed and one lawyer described his Trafalgar Square clients as 'nearly 
all in full time employment, including a couple of civil servants ... not the sort 
of people you've been led to expect ... what you could call extremely 
bl ' 40 respecta e. 
The second thrust of the government's case was more overtly partisan. In a 
statement to Parliament the Home Secretary, David Waddington, sought to 
41 
link the riot with the 28 Labour MPs who had pledged not to pay the tax. 
However, such charges v.'ere never likely to find much purchase given the 
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determination of the official Labour movement to distance itself from the 
organised anti-poll tax movement (see Chapter Four). Indeed, the leadership 
seemed to have consciously seen the event as an opportunity to underline their 
moderation and responsibility. For example, Roy Hattersley, Labour's deputy 
leader, condemned the violence 'without reservation or qualification', called 
for 'exemplary punishment' of convicted rioters and expressed sympathy for 
injured police officers, with no mention of casualties among the protestors. 
Similarly, the ruc noted that 'the media's preoccupation with unlawful and 
sometimes violent anti-poll tax protest undoubtedly deflected attention from 
arguments about fairness, social justice and civil liberties'. 42 
It seemed then, that despite the obvious attempts of various elite politicians to 
use the riot as an occasion on which to score party political points off each 
other, the general 'establishment' line was clear. The riot was the work of 
criminals and agitators. The police were victims not perpetrators. By 
advocating illegal civil disobedience tactics, the anti-poll tax movement had 
implicitly encouraged violence and lawlessness and so put itself outside the 
pale of respectable public opinion. Needless to say, that is not how the 
protestors saw things. 
The Protestors' Account 
The initial reaction of the protest organisers was clearly shaped by fears that 
the riot might fatally wound their attempts to influence public opinion and 
hinder constructive engagement with mainstream political parties and pressure 
groups. For example, statements made by Tommy Sheridan and Steve Nally 
(Chair and Secretary, All Britain Federation) sought to blame 'trouble-makers' 
and 'anarchists' for the violence and promised to organise a labour movement 
enquiry into the disturbances which would, if necessary, 'name names'. The 
stance prompted the New Statesman to pithily (and accurately) sum up all-
party opinion thus: 'The Tories tried to scapegoat the Labour Party, Labour in 
turn tried to scapegoat Militant and the Socialist Workers, and they tried to 
scapegoat Class War - who grabbed the buck with enthusiasm. ,43 But within 
days it became obvious that the Federation's initial position was untenable, not 
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least because any characterisation of the rioters as 'trouble-makers' did not 
seem to accurately reflect the experience of those present on the day. As 
importantly, the idea that the anti-poll tax movement should collaborate with a 
hostile state was widely seen as wrong in principle and a tactical mistake to 
boot.44 One Ealing protestor recalled: 45 
I thought that their reaction was quite disgusting. The first interviews I 
saw were on the Sunday immediately after the event and I don't think 
they had the whole picture then. What I found most disgusting was they 
said they would actually give names to the police. 
Another activist drew even more radical conclusions and believed that not 
only had the rioters done 'the right thing' under the circumstances, but that the 
Federation's leadership should have openly said SO:46 
The horse they were riding was a mass movement. It wasn't a legalistic 
thing. And that mass movement did the cause a tremendous amount of 
good that day ... The reaction of most people wasn't ''Horror! Horror!" 
these poll tax people are rioting. It was these people are rioting against 
the poll tax and I don't like the poll tax either. [So] the Tories wouldn't 
be sanguine ... They'd be thinking, if this is the first year, what the 
bloody hell will happen next year? 
Another Ealing protestor, Francois Fajolle, remained puzzled by the strength 
of feeling provoked by the riot. Drawing upon her own experience as a French 
citizen, she noted: 'I couldn't see what the problem was. In France you haven't 
had a proper demonstration unless there's been a riot! ,47 
Certainly there is no evidence that the riot prompted a public backlash against 
the anti-poll tax movement, or that concerns over the violence bolstered 
support for the poll tax, which according to opinion polls declined even further 
in popularity.48 According to most Ealing protestors' interviewed for this 
study, the demonstration did not substantially dent public support for their 
although some adverse comments were received on stalls and campaign. 
, 
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meetings in the weeks that followed. This low key public reaction seems to 
accord with Reiner's suggestion that in an increasingly 'post-modem' society, 
characterised by 'greater cultural herogeneity, economic fragmentation and 
global diffusion' it is 'far less likely that particular protests and disorders will 
be seen as other than single issues, local troubles, however serious they are in 
themselves. 49 However this should also be set against convincing evidence of 
a decline in popular deference towards the police by the end of the 1980's. For 
example, one survey concluded that public confidence 'in the police and 
prison service is low and falling, and the public is rather more cautious now 
than it was about derogating powers to the police'. 50 Similarly, younger people 
were 'especially supportive of the right to protest, wary of police surveillance 
and sympathetic to ethnic minorities'. However, the same survey also revealed 
a marked ambivalence towards political radicals, with respondents almost 
evenly split when asked whether 'people who want to overthrow the 
government through revolution' should be allowed to hold public meetings 
and publish their views. 51 
On another level the riot may have helped bolster support for the non-payment 
tactic as a better way of defeating the tax. Three days after the riot one 
Hanwell resident wrote to the Ealing Federation: 52 
Following the march and rally at Trafalgar Square this weekend I find I 
am now totally frustrated and appauled [sic] the efforts of some 
200,000 people to peacefully show their anger and opposition to the 
tax... has now gone to waste through the actions of those whose 
concerns are not with the implementation of this tax but with the state 
system itself... I now realise that the only way to break this tax is 
through solidarity, peaceful tactical but rigorous campaigning and 
vociferous non-payment... Therefore I wish to join you. 
These conclusions certainly accorded with the majority view among Ealing 
campaigners who tended to oppose violence at protest events on pragmatic 
rather than moral grounds. As one recalled: 'I was pissed off ... It didn't need 
[a riot]. The demonstration was too big be ignored or dismissed as a hardened 
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group of activists,.53 Another believed that 'Joe Average felt that it had been 
hijacked by anarchists and sectarians, who had spoilt a good days protest, a 
peaceful protest,.54 Thus while the Federation's initial promise to 'name 
names' remained clumsy and deeply problematic, there was also a sense in 
which any general attempt to distance the movement from violent protest was 
both· sensibl.e and in step with majority opinion. Nevertheless, as a detailed 
picture of the day's events emerged, the Federation felt compelled to rapidly 
reverse its original position and claimed that the police had undertaken a 
premeditated political attack on the demonstration: 55 
The Met[ ropolitan Police] in my opinion, were under instruction to 
provoke aggression in order to discredit our movement. They thought 
they could contain the resulting violence and win the day. But they 
underestimated the strength of feeling, the size of the crowd. That's 
why senior officers were forced to admit afterwards: "We lost it, we 
lost it". 
Thus police actions constituted nothing less than an attack on the right to 
protest, a point echoed by the feminist journal Spare Rib, which concluded 
that 'in this country, peaceful protest would never even be allowed to get to 
the stage it got to in Tiananmen Square'. 56 
Others on the Labour left argued that the actions of the police were better 
understood in the wider context of 'the Thatcher years [in which] brutal police 
tactics have been so regular that the have gained a certain 'legitimacy"'. 57 
They also suggested that if the official labour movement had organised the 
demonstration the rioting would not have occurred. For as we have seen 
leaders of the 'official' labour movement refused point blank to sponsor 
national demonstrations against the tax. But this was not in itself unusual, for 
by the late 1980s the labour movement, keen to shed any residual image of 
'loony leftism' seemed reluctant to call extra-parliamentary protests regarding 
allY issue. This was potentially significant, for rioting is rare at demonstrations 
called and organised by national labour movement bodies, partly because their 
superior organisation and resources help ensure a smooth passage on the day 
157 
But more importantly perhaps, such demonstrations become 'respectable'. For 
example, a detailed study of police tactics in public order situations in London 
in t L - -lily 1990s found that the attitude of police became more positive if 
the' re organised by bodies like the TUC, as senior officers were acutely 
aware that any spectacular breakdown of order would damage their career 
prospects. 58 While it is speculative to claim that the flashpoint for the rioting 
on 31 March 1990 would not have occurred if the protest had somehow been 
more 'official', a more temperate police response could reasonably have been 
expected. 
Again, this highlights the primary role of the police, rather than the crowd, in 
shaping events. But some anarchists present tended to see police actions less in 
terms of an organised political conspiracy and more in terms of habitual, 
repressive brutality: 59 
I have no love for the state or their Aunt Sallies, the police ... We can't 
and shouldn't wait for them to attack us (as they inevitably do) so its on 
their terrain and their conditions. But where I was, on the Strand, it was 
the police that started the trouble ... Why did they do it? Is it simply 
because they cannot accept people being on the streets, whether it's at a 
football match, a rave or a demonstration? 
So in practice, despite the common ideological assumption shared by most 
activists that the police were ultimately agents of a hostile state, their attitudes 
were surprisingly contingent on police behaviour. As Margaret Reynolds, of 
the Manchester Federation recalled: 60 
In the North West hundreds of protests went off without violence. I can 
only recall a couple of incidents locally, both caused by odd 
individuals. Most of the ordinary police were co-operative and turned a 
blind eye to our many contraventions of petty council bye-laws. Stories 
were legend of police who said they supported us and took poll tax 
stickers home with them because so many of them were badly hit by 
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the tax. But some were extremely provocative and it took a lot of effort 
to restrain our patient and angry troops. 
One veteran Ealing demonstrator, Eve Turner also tended to explain the 
trouble in essentially common sense terms: 61 
As usual [the police] were trying to shut down the demonstration before 
it actually finished. And then people get worked up and freaked out. 
I've seen it before... I mean its no point pretending that the people 
involved did absolutely nothing. les a bit of a two way process. [First] 
the police stir everybody up, they create a bit of tension, people panic 
and they throw things, because its a sort of defensive reaction and the 
police come in ten times harder. Then it gets out of hand. 
Although there was a consensus among anti-poll tax protestors that the police 
were primarily responsible for the violence, opinion varied as to whether their 
actions were informed by sheer incompetence, habitual brutality or were 
evidence of a more sinister attempt to attack the demonstration. There was also 
little unanimity about the implications of the riot, which posed a series of 
pressing and difficult questions for the movement. While a violent, defensive 
reaction to police provocation may well be justified, given the by now 
established tendency for anti-poll tax protests to lead to confrontations, would 
any future demonstrations merely serve to weaken the movement and so 
damage the non-payment campaign? But the organised protestors also faced a 
more immediate problem: what attitude should it take towards those charged 
with crimes at the demonstration? 
Defending the Defendants 
The personal consequences for those arrested were potentially serIOUS and 
given the protestors' contention that the riot was essentially a 'police riot" 
could not be ignored. Their eventual organised response took the form of the 
Trafalgar Square Defendants' Campaign (TSDC), an organisation set up in co-
operation with the Haldane Society of socialist lawyers to co-ordinate and 
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assist people accused of crimes. Significantly, not only was the TSDC wholly 
autonomous from the All-Britain Federation, but the two bodies had a very 
uneasy relationship, which broke out into open hostility by October 1990 (see 
below). One of the founding tenets of the campaign was that it should 
'unconditionally support all those arrested', a decision implying that any of the 
protestor's !lctions, even violent ones, were acceptable in this particular 
political context. Consequently, the TSDC tended to define and justify its 
support role in highly 'political' terms (original emphasis):62 
Successful mass defiance of unjust laws, and refusal to be intimidated 
by oppressive policing and hostile propaganda is a great part of our 
traditions, from the original Peasants' Revolt up until today. That's 
how workers won the right to organise, women won the right to vote 
and so on. In all these struggles, it was essential to support those 
victimised, fined and imprisoned. 
THIS WE MUST DO - BY SHOWING UNCONDITIONAL AND 
COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE ARRESTED. 
However, the vanous defences attempted at subsequent trials were rarely 
overtly political, as the main concern of the majority of defendants was 
naturally to secure acquittal or lenient sentences rather than use the court to 
denounce the British state and all its agents. Many defendants therefore 
pleaded guilty, rather than risk a plea of self-defence, which if unsuccessful 
might have led to a higher sentence. 63 
But others chose to contest their case on what may be tenned 'public safety' 
grounds, claiming that their participation in the riot was an honest attempt at 
self-defence in the face of illegitimate, incompetent and potentially dangerous 
police actions. For example, during the early stages of the riot, attempts to 
clear Whitehall resulted in severe congestion, leading some sections of the 
crowd to chant 'Hillsborough! Hillsborough!' at the police, a reference to a 
well known incident of incompetent crowd control tactics at a football match 
that led to a large number of fatalities in 1986. Indeed. many active rioters' 
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accounts of the day display a strong sense that the police had over-stepped 
their legitimate function and attacked the crow~ which in tum justified the 
actions of those who fought back, even for individuals who would not 
normally consider violence against police officers as desirable. 64 This found 
some expression in subsequent trials. One defendant, Michael Conway, an ex-
miner, admi!1ed throwing rocks but pleaded self-defence saying 'I didn't walk 
away because I took a decision to defend the people behind me'. 65 The jury 
acquitted him, although similar pleas did not always prove so successful. 
Many of these concerns were echoed in the case of Joseph Jones, 27, an 
unemployed musician from Southall and the only (known) Ealing resident 
arrested and charged. In the event he was fined £550 and £311 compensation 
for smashing a window. Although the police also claimed that he had shouted 
'Kill the Pigs' the magistrate appeared sceptical, and chose not to impose a 
custodial sentence, apparently agreeing with Jones' solicitor's comment 
explanation that: 66 
he went to the demonstration that day with no intention of getting 
involved with the police. He broke the window out of frustration 
because he was knocked down by the police, which he did not think 
was necessary. 
Jones' experience was probably typical of most defendants who, like him, had 
little or no connection with the organised protest campaign other than their 
attendance at the demonstration. Meanwhile, the anti-poll tax movement 
continued to wrestle with the dilemmas posed by the riot. 
To demonstrate, or not to demonstrate? 
While it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of their problems, the 
leadership of the All Britain Federation emerged from the Trafalgar Square 
demonstration politically wounded. For example, some London groups sought 
to limit the Federation's future public relations role and the London 
Federation adopted 'clear guidelines' to be followed by representatives when 
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talking to the press, including a direction that they should restrict themselves 
to reiterating agreed policy and concentrate on criticising those responsible for 
the poll tax rather than 'judging' protestors. 67 The Federation leaders were 
;0 cautious about the desirability of organising any further national 
demonstrations and faced a number of tactical dilemmas which in turn , , 
exacerbated tensions already apparent between the Militant leadership and 
. 
other factions. 
In particular, Burns and the other non-aligned National Committee members 
felt that the movement should reassert its right to protest and keep up the 
pressure on the government by organising a series of (possibly fortnightly) 
national demonstrations. 68 This reflected the widespread belief among many on 
the left that the East German and other Stalinist regimes had been 'toppled by a 
spontaneous movement of popular sovereignty - peoples' power'. 69 As we saw 
in Chapter Three, the imagery of 'peoples' power' not only suffused the 
rhetoric of the anti-poll tax movement, but was also frequently cited by 
protestors during and after the 31 March demonstration. However, the 
leadership of the Federation remained deeply sceptical about the suggestion, 
arguing that such demonstrations would only serve as a distraction from the 
mass non-payment campaign. The loose structure of the anti-poll tax 
movement, which as we have seen, was primarily local, offered little scope for 
a comprehensive or ordered debate around future tactics and this in turn 
allowed the Federation's leadership to largely ignore calls for an immediate 
national demonstration. Nevertheless, the campaign clearly needed some form 
of national focus and a number of regional bodies and local federations passed 
resolutions and lobbied for a new national initiative. Consequently, the AlI-
Britain Federation called a 'Peoples March Against the Poll Tax' in September 
and October 1990, a largely symbolic protest redolent of the Jarrow crusades of 
the 1930s and the TUC's 'Right to Work' marches of the 1980s. So instead of 
an overt attempt to mobilise 'peoples' power' on the Eastern European model 
through confrontational demonstrations with the state, the Federation seemed 
more intent on evoking powerful myths and symbols of the British labour 
movement. 
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After an often fraught internal debate the London Federation agreed to organise 
a rally in Brockwell Park to 'greet' the arrival of the 'People's Marchers' on 
October 20.70 This deliberately limited event effectively avoided the risk of 
further violent confrontations between police and protestors posed by another 
central London demonstration. However, the arrangement failed to satisfy a 
minority .. of anti-poll tax activists who insisted that the demonstration should 
. 
seek to highlight the situation of Trafalgar Square defendants and generally 
reassert the 'right to demonstrate'. So the TSDC, supported by a some local 
groups and F ederatio~s, called for pickets of first Horseferry Magistrates Court 
on the morning of the 20 October, and then, after the main rally, a break-away 
march to Brixton prison in the afternoon, where four rioters were incarcerated. 
The protest organisers were now effectively divided between the London 
Federation and the TSDC, each promoting rival a demonstration, with different 
aims. The potential for conflict was apparent to all sides. 
Predictably then, the All-Britain and London Federations made few, if any 
meaningful efforts to promote the proposed Brixton demonstrations. In part 
this reflected their parlous financial position, as well as an ongoing desire to 
scotch the efforts of opposition factions. Interestingly, according to 
Waddington the police were kept well informed of the financial difficulties 
and internal disputes within the London Federation, which had been infiltrated 
by Special Branch informers and this information helped direct the course of 
the rally along 'safe' lines.71 The TSDC meanwhile held separate meetings 
with the police and agreed changes to the route to minimise traffic disruption. 
The campaign also established a legal liaison system, with sixty observers, 
many equipped with cameras and video cameras, to monitor police tactics and 
behaviour and a 48 hour co-ordination office staffed by sympathetic solicitors 
and doctors was established. 72 
But just as protestors are not homogeneous, then neither is the modem state, 
which comprises a number of different agencies, each with its own particular 
interests and policy agenda. This became evident in oflicial reactions to the 
proposed October demonstration. For example, the proposed demonstration 
occurred during a period of contlict within the Conservative Party, which was 
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highly alarmed at the apparently deep-seated electoral unpopularity of the poll 
tax. Further scenes of disorderly protest were therefore distinctly unwelcome 
and the police were given to understand that any request to ban the 
forthcoming demonstration would be met sympathetically by the 
government.73 However, marches and demonstrations in London can only be 
banned by the Home Secretary at the request of the police and the suggestion 
. 
was fiercely resisted by senior officers, who opposed the banning of 
demonstrations on the pragmatic grounds that this would only serve to 
provoke further disorder. Rank and file officers, who had born the brunt of the 
Trafalgar Square fighting, were less sanguine and the organisers expressed 
fears that some officers hoped for a 'rematch' with the poll tax protestors. 
Indeed, Deputy Commissioner Metcalfe the officer responsible for the Brixton 
march conceded at a meeting on the night before the demonstration that he too 
had heard 'rumblings' confirming the rumour, but promised that any officer 
who stepped out of line would be dealt with 'with the utmost severity'. 74 
On 20 October the Federation's rally in Brockwell Park, attended by some 
30,000 people passed largely without incident, although a residue of conflict 
from events at the previous demonstration was apparent. Several leaders of the 
Federation were barracked by sections of the crowd who denounced them as 
'copper's narks' and a degree of tension between different political currents 
among the crowd was evident. In part this reflected its composition, which 
was more heavily weighted towards the organised Left than that of the 31 
March demonstration. Similarly, attendance was down and the number of 
family groups present much reduced - presumably reflecting concerns about 
the possibility of trouble. During the rally supporters of the Brixton prison 
picket circulated among the crowd promoting the breakaway demonstration 
and by 3.45 some 2,500 people had formed up. 
Given the experience of the Trafalgar Square riots it seems safe to assume that 
the majority of the crowd in the breakaway section realised that conflict with 
the police, if not certain, was at least possible. For example, the police 
outnumbered demonstrators with over 3,000 officers deployed. shadowing the 
march in ranks of 2-3 deep. Brixton prison was reached without significant 
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incident. Outside the prison the picket initially remained generally peaceful 
with few arrests, although some protestors chanted 'Maggie Thatcher's Boot 
Boys' at police and some missiles were thrown. At about 4.30 p.m. the police 
began to deploy riot units and proceeded to disperse the picket, which was 
scheduled to run for another hour. In the course of this at times violent 
operation sO.me 120 protestors were arrested and 40 police injured. As usual, 
no figures are available for the number of protestors hurt and no disciplinary 
action was subsequently taken against any officer. 75 
The ferocity and extent of the rioting, certainly in companson with the 
Trafalgar Square demonstration, was small scale - hardly surprising given that 
the police outnumbered protestors throughout. However, the political 
inferences drawn revealed how far the fabric of consensual protest had been 
stretched. In a press conference after the riot DAC Metcalfe claimed that 
'anarchists intent on clashing with police' were responsible for the violence 
and suggested that future anti-poll tax demonstrations may have to be banned. 
Although this suggestion was endorsed by a number of Conservative 
backbenchers, the Home Secretary, David Waddington, was publicly more 
circumspect, and at this stage confined his comments to denouncing the rioters 
and calling for a full report. Nevertheless, this sequence of events inevitably 
served to reinforce widespread fears that, once again, anti poll tax protests 
were being deliberately targeted by police. For example, the Federation 
leaders concluded that the violence was 'pre-planned' and that the police had 
'attacked' the march.76 Similarly the TSDC claimed that: 77 
Police allegations that the protest was hi-jacked by a violent minority 
are simply not borne out by the facts. To the contrary, it appears that, in 
the face of enormous provocation and excessive violence from police, 
demonstrators showed great courage and restraint and their behaviour 
deserves to be applauded. 
What was the attitude of the Ealing protestors to these various developments? 
Overall, the Ealing campaigners remained preoccupied with local issues and 
seem to have seen these national events as a sub-plot to the real drama being 
165 
played out in their locality. So, while they were obviously aware that national 
demonstrations might easily take another violent turn, the Ealing Federation's 
seemed mainly concerned with protecting its supporters in the event of 
trouble. For instance, the Ealing Federation provided some central stewards at 
the October rally and encouraged supporters to go on a chartered bus rather 
than .use.public transport, in order to ensure that there was a 'separate Ealing 
contingent on the march, stewarded by our people,.78 Similarly, when the All 
Britain Federation organised another central London demonstration on 23 
March 1991 'to put the last nail into the coffin of the Poll Tax' the Ealina , /::) 
protestors dutifully publicised the event, provided central stewards at the 
request of the London Federation and attended as a single contingent, with the 
Ealing Hospital APTU organising a local bus. 79 
It would be tempting then, to assign only limited local significance to the 
dramatic confrontations at poll tax protests outlined in this chapter. But any 
local/national dichotomy should not be overplayed. After all, crowds of people 
at national events do not simply gather spontaneously, but are usually 
mobilised locally. Moreover, whether for good or ill, it was the local activists 
who had to deal with most of the consequences. Given the strong association 
between the 1990 poll tax demonstrations and violence there was, as we have 
seen, a clear danger that the local campaigns might be damaged. But as we 
have also seen, this did not emerge as a major problem. Instead, the general 
experience of the national protests - particularly the huge 31 March 
demonstration - was overwhelmingly beneficial to the local campaign. Firstly, 
the riot attracted substantial media coverage and so raised the poll tax as a 
political issue to the forefront of national political discourse. Secondly, each 
demonstration served to galvanise local activity and despite differences over 
tactics, encourage local groups to feel part of a bigger, national movement. But 
ultimately their most important impact of the demonstrations was the obvious 
sense of empowerment and confidence felt by local activists, who emerged 
emboldened by the sheer size and determination of the crowd. It seemed that 
they had been present at a dramatic and important historical event and one 
Ealing protestor felt able to describe the Trafalgar Square demonstration as 
'one of the best days of my life,.80 
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Chapter Six 
Clog Up the Courts! 
This is the first of two related chapters that look in detail at the experience of the 
non-payment campaign. The dramatic national events outlined in the previous 
chapfer sign~lled to local activists that their campaign had now entered a new 
phase. They now had to tum the rhetoric of civil disobedience, of mass non-
payment, into reality. Inevitably given the nature of the campaign, much of the 
subsequent experience of both protestors and the authorities was defined by the 
legal and administrative process used to recover unpaid poll tax. The process 
had two distinct stages. The first stage - the subject of this chapter - was 
dominated by the liability hearings. The intention here was to encourage non-
payers to express 'people's power' through a mass attendance of charge payers 
which would effectively 'clog up' the court. This in tum would help render the 
tax unworkable. The second distinct stage of enforcement - the use of bailiffs 
and the imprisonment of non-payers - is the subject of the next chapter. 
However, given the intense political controversy generated by the tax, the legal 
process was always related to (and ultimately proved subordinate) to more 
overtly political considerations. So in Ealing, Acton magistrates' court also 
came to serve as a local arena in which differing conceptions of the proper role 
of the active citizen could be contested. 
From Liability to Imprisonment - The Legal and Administrative Process 
It is a feature of all bureaucracies that wherever possible changes are introduced 
on the basis of past policies and procedures. So the legal framework for 
enforcement under the Local Government Finance Act 1988, and the resulting 
administrative procedure deployed by most council Finance departments to 
recover unpaid poll tax, broadly followed that utilised under the rates. The 
recovery procedure had two broad phases. 1 The first concerned the 
establishment of liability for debt: 
o First bill issued to every charge payer. 
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0·· First reminder issued. 
o Second reminder (optional). 
o If bill still outstanding seven days after the first reminder is served the 
, 
charge-payer loses right to pay in ten monthly instalments. 
o Fourteen days after first reminder is served, local authorities can begin court 
proceedings . 
. 
o Summons to Liability hearing by local magistrates' court. 
Once a liability order had been issued, the second phase of the recovery 
procedure ensued. Although this will be the subject of the next chapter, it is 
worth briefly identifying the three main methods the local authority could use to 
recover the debt and the 'ultimate sanction': 
o Attachment of earnings order to deduct money from the wages or salary of 
the debtor. 
o Deductions from Income Support, if applicable. 
o Distress - the seizure (or 'distraint') of goods and property by certified 
bailiffs. 
If this distress failed to elicit payment the local authority then had the right to 
apply to the magistrates court for a warrant of commitment in an attempt to get 
the debtor sent to prison for a maximum of three months. While poll tax non-
payment was a civil rather than criminal offence across the UK, there were some 
notable differences between the initial legal recovery procedure in Scotland and 
that applied later in England and Wales. 2 For example, in Scotland local 
authorities could not have take non-payers to court and all proceedings were 
dealt with by post. However, in both England and Scotland there were no fines 
for non-payment, although legal costs could be added (together with a 10010 
surcharge in Scotland only). 
Don't Panic, Don't Pay! . 
Although the authorities possessed substantial coercive powers, mounting 
evidence of large-scale non-payment in Scotland in 1989/1990 suggested that 
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most were likely to experience collection problems. For example;, by the end of 
September 1990 1,200,000 warrants had been issued by Scottish local 
authorities. If a similar rate of non-payment occurred in England and Wales 
;orne 12,000,000 people would be summonsed, out of a total population of 
35,652,150 eligible charge-payers. 3 As early as June 1989 Ealing's Policy 
(Finance). Sub-Committee heard estimates from officers that the 15 000 , 
summonses Issued under the rates was likely to increase to 60,000.4 Block 
booking of 30 days court-time for summer 1990 was subsequently arranged, 
with the aim of taking the first defaulters to court in July. Public statements from 
councillors and council officers further reinforced expectations that a shortfall of 
collection was likely. 
In a remarkably frank interview, Tim Daunceya, the Assistant Director of 
Fi~ance, outlined some of the expected difficulties. 5 Political problems with the 
tax included telephone threats to blow up Ealing Town Hall by a doubtless 
mythical terrorist group calling itself the Shining Path Anti-Poll Tax Unit. b The 
Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation seemed positively moderate in comparison, 
pledging merely to 'cause difficulties if the council attempts to prosecute non-
payers' . Dauncey also cited a number of compelling practical problems, 
including the update of the community charge register, which by April 1990 was 
already out of date. As he conceded, 'unless you do door-to-door canvassing 
every day you are not going to keep on top of the situation'. On a more positive 
note the expected number of summons to be issued was reduced from the 
earlier figure of 60,000 to 10,000 (presumably for public consumption). But any 
optimistic forecasts were to prove misplaced, as the timetable for the issue of 
final reminders slipped from May to August. Similarly the date of the first 
scheduled liability hearings was moved from July to October. This slippage was 
problematic for the council on a number of grounds. Firstly, it tarnished any 
claims it may have wished to make about the efficiency of the collection 
machinery. Inevitably, growing public cynicism about ~he council's ability to 
enforce the charge would encourage some to default. Secondly, the delays 
disrupted the accepted procedure, which under the rates had been to 'adopt a 
• Rather optimistically billed as 'The man who turns the Won't Pays into Must Pays' 
b A reference to the Peruvian Maoist guerrilla group 'Scndcro Lwninoso' 
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'. 
hard legalistic line relatively soon after the default on payment so that legal 
sanctions are available and the charge-payer is aware they are waiting in 
reserve,.6 Together, these allowed a substantial breathing space for those 
'ely considering non-payment. 
The Ealing protestors' first task was therefore to encourage people to break their 
. 
previous behaviour patterns under the rates, which most people had paid 
relatively quickly_ Conversely, the council sought to ensure prompt payment by 
establishing 'easy' methods of collection (eg direct debit), promoting incentives 
(eg retention of right to pay by instalments) and by publicising the coercive 
measures available to charging authorities. Inevitably, given these tensions and 
the controversy generated by the new charge, the payment figures came to 
assume a particular significance for all interested parties, including the local 
media, simply because they were the most obvious 'objective' means of 
measuring the relative success of each sides' campaign. In order encourage non-
payment Ealing anti-poll tax: groups utilised a number of campaigning 
techniques between April and November 1990, beginning with a small-scale 
publicity event on 5 May when about 100 supporters gathered on Ealing 
Common to 'Bring and Burn' their poll tax: bills.7 Rosa Ward, the Federation's 
spokeswoman was also keen to highlight administrative problems associated 
with the tax:, citing the case of 'one twelve year old who had received a poll tax: 
bill' as 'an example of just how chaotic the system is,.8 Similarly, the Federation 
organised a local demonstration on 7 July around the slogan 'No Poll Tax: - No 
Cuts', with financial and logistical support from some local public sector union 
branches, the IW A and tenants activists. 
Although the Federation claimed 'hundreds' in attendance the demonstration 
was smaller than that of the lobby of the council on 8 March. Given the violence 
associated with earlier national protests, the Federation was keen from the outset 
to ensure the event passed smoothly and liased closely with the police.9 After a 
march from Ealing Hospital to Ealing Common, Ealing Federation spokesman 
Kevin Carlin claimed that 'an astonishing' 60010 of Ealing residents had not 
begun payment and Wally Kennedy, Hillingdon councillor and member of the 
ABAPTF National Committee estimated that nationally some 14 million were in 
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arrears. 10 The central theme of non-payment dominated local press reports of the 
event, which were generally sympathetic, with the demonstrators described as 
'families'. 11 
Meanwhile the newly elected Conservative council continued to expenence 
political.and practical problems with the new charge. Although the Conservative 
. 
group had resolved to cut the council budget by some £20 million in order to 
reduce poll tax bills to £370 in the next financial year, Graham Bull, Finance 
Committee chair found that he could give 'no guarantee of anything' without 
knowledge of the nationally-determined grant settlement. 12 The council was also 
hampered by lower than expected collection levels, with only 55% of poll tax 
collected, compared with 75% at the same time in 1989, under the rates. At this 
stage the council's public statements tended to downplay the suggestion that 
non-payment was somehow a political phenomenon, blaming instead a number 
of logistical problems, including an inadequate computer system and a serious 
backlog in applications for Community Charge Benefit. In August the council 
issued some 57,000 'friendly' reminders and later in the month, finally 
succeeded in issuing 14,000 statutory reminders, warning that debtors would 
lose their right to pay by instalments and be liable to further legal sanctions. As 
the Federation saw it (original emphasis): 13 
TillS IS CRUNCH TIME FOR US. There is a danger that people on 
their own will start to buckle under the pressure and pay their poll tax 
unless we are able to reach them ... 
But how was this to be achieved? As we have seen, campaigners used traditional 
methods of communication, such as public meetings, street leafleting and fly-
posting. So a series of leaflets headed 'Don't panic - Don't Pay' were produced 
and distributed throughout the borough between August 1990 and Spring 1991 
in response to various bills and summons. Each emphasised certain key themes, 
such as the sheer number of Ealing residents in arrears r 100,000 people in 
Ealing have not paid. Why should you?')~ the impracticality of the tax ('at this 
rate it will take them THREE YEARS to take [them] to court ')~ and the 
repetition of certain key legal 'facts': 
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REMEMBER: 
Not paying the Poll Tax: is not a criminal offence. 
You will not get a criminal record. 
There are no fines for not paying. 
Bailliffs cannot force their way into your home. 
Y.ou will be charged a court cost whether you appear or nol 
The council on the other hand, tended to rely on a blend of 'bill blitzing' and 
publicity stories in the local press. For example, in November 71,000 statutory 
reminders were issued with prominent threats of court action to follow. The 
results were at first dramatic with some £6 million collected in one week. and 
the local press reported the story under the headline 'Poll tax rebels pay up ... if 
they can' .14 But typically even this 'good' news story was marred by the 
seemingly inevitable reports of administrative chaos and insensitive billing, 
including demands made to children and deceased residents. 15 Nevertheless 
Conservative councillors sought to portray the figures as evidence of 'a victory' 
over non-payers, accepting for the first time that the phenomenon was at least in 
part organised. Similarly, Conservative Party publicity material directly 
challenged the protestors': 
Those who [are] being urged not to pay the new charge, to 'clog up the 
courts' etc, should stop and think who will pay the bill in the end for the 
chaos they predict. Answer: the taxpayer, and that means all of us, 
including the protestors. 16 
The protestors were also aware that the civil disobedience campaign would call 
for more direct means of communication with potential supporters. The 
favoured method employed in Ealing and elsewhere was the creation of 
telephone 'advice lines', staffed by volunteers able to dispense information on 
the likely implications of non-payment. Thus every leaflet, poster and press 
release produced by the Federation invariably listed a series of telephone contact 
numbers, usually representing each local anti-poll tax union, together with a 
central '24 hours hotline' number. The information given invariably concerned 
the various stages of the recovery process or issues relating to Community 
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Charge Benefit; although the Federation even fielded a few calls from local 
businessmen experiencing problems with the Unified Business Rate. 
[he system of 'hot-lines' reflected the federal structure of the Ealing campaign 
and callers were encouraged to call their local anti-poll tax union. 17 In addition 
a '24 hour hotline' number allowed people to leave their name, number and 
geographical area on an answer machine. The co-ordinator would then collate 
all the messages and distribute their details, according to area, among a pool of 
about ten volunteer advisers, who then would return the calls. While it is 
impossible to accurately assess the number of calls received during the height of 
the agitation (1990-mid 1991), it seems that the 'hot-line' was generally busy, 
with at least 50 calls a week and 'on a bad week [there] could be a hundred'. 
Even assuming an average of 50 calls a week, the Federation 'hotline' alone, 
would have dealt with over 2,700 enquiries in the first year after of the poll tax's 
introduction. However this excludes calls direct to local groups and thus almost 
certainly underestimates the total number of callers. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps given this volume of calls, the co-ordinator recalled 
'going home from work with a sense of dread ... to a series of telephone 
answering machine messages.' 18 Nevertheless the advice lines offered protestors 
the opportunity to encourage non-payers to keep their nerve in the face of 
various council demands and served as a valuable means of putting campaigners 
in touch with people who had been summonsed. But more importantly perhaps, 
the various 'hotlines', together with leaflets, posters, public meetings, Saturday 
mornmg street stalls and articles In the local papers, however 
impressionistically, supported the Federations' claim that 'You will not be 
alone. We shall defend yoU,.19 
All these preparations implied the need to 'educate the educators' and the 
Federation organised two day schools on various aspects of the legal process, 
but with a particular emphasis on training potential 'McKenzie friends' for the 
impending liability hearings. 20 The McKenzie friend procedure allowed another 
person to 'quietly' help, take notes, suggest questions and advise a debtor in 
court, although they would only in the most exceptional circumstances be 
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permitted to directly address the court.21 This was particularly significant as 
defendants in cases of poll tax enforcement were not entitled to legal aid and 
would therefore be otherwise unrepresented. 
The Federation was keen to encourage as many activists as possible to undertake 
the role: ~'You don't have to be a Peny Mason (though if there is anyone of that 
name in your local APTU let us know). The main thing is to give support to 
bewildered people in court' .22 However, the duties of a McKenzie friend 
remained intimidating for anyone without formal legal training and the training 
sessions - organised by a group of sympathetic teachers and the Federation's 
legal officer - were therefore geared towards promoting confidence based on 
practical knowledge of the law. 23 Activists were provided with copies of 
relevant legal briefings (based upon material produced by the Poll Tax Legal 
Group and Dyfed Poll Tax Opposition), a list of 98 potential questions the 
defendants could ask the court and the likely response of the magistrates. The 
session then undertook various role-plays, with activists taking it in turns to play 
the McKenzie Friend and going through a series of 'typical' cases: 24 
A Mrs Gill says that she never received a reminder from the council, 
although she agrees that she has not paid any poll tax. The council 
claim that they did send a reminder and within the specified time. 
B. Mr 10hnson had chosen to pay by direct debit. Because of computer 
problems, the system broke down and Mr Johnston was asked 
instead to pay by instalments with his paying-in book. He has 
refused to do this. 
It is significant that these examples display no wish on the part of the protestors 
to encourage non-payers to attempt a 'political' defence at liability hearings. 
Instead they anticipated the likely effect of the tax on 'ordinary' people in 
realistic circumstances, with a view to fashioning a credible defence within the 
narrow terms allowed by the law. This suggests that protestors initially assumed 
that the court would be generally impartial and allow inconvenient or sustained 
legal argument. 
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On the other hand, the Ealing protestors, like many British leftists, were growing 
increasingly concerned about the supposed impartiality of the British justice 
system. In part this reflected worries about the apparent drift towards 
authoritarianism displayed by the police, the courts and the govemment.25 But it 
also reflected a more general ideological and social hostility to the magistracy, 
which the protestors believed, was largely comprised of 
(usually rich) amateurs. You do not have to call them "your worship" 
and more than likely the poll tax activists will know as much or more 
about the poll tax law. Many are Conservative Party members. If they 
are we should be able to challenge them on the basis of political bias?6 
This last claim was based on the semi-official manual used by magistrates' 
courts - Stone's Justices' Manual - which stated that a magistrate should not 
judge cases where they were 'in some way associated with an organisation 
which is a party to the proceedings' .27 However, a statutory instrument issued by 
the Conservative government in March 1990 clarified the matter. It ruled that 
any JP who was a member of the Conservative Party could not be challenged on 
the grounds of a potential conflict of interest simply because the poll tax 
happened to be a Conservative policy.28 Defendants could therefore safely 
assume that there were no substantive grounds for 'a reasonable and fair-minded 
person [to suspect] that the magistrate was incapable of approaching the case 
with impartiality and detachment which the judicial function requires'. 29 
The First Hearing 
The tirst liability order hearings in Ealing took place on 11 October 1990 at 
Acton magistrates' court. From the outset it was clear that all the organised 
interests involved with poll tax collection, including the council, the protestors, 
the magistrates' bench (on this occasion chaired by Lady Henrietta Bennett) and 
the local press were well aware of its symbolic significance. The event therefore 
usefully highlights some of the main features of the hearings, such as the 
protestors' tactics, the attitude of court officials and the local magistracy, the 
council's policy and the behaviour of non-payers with no previous record of 
178 
political activity who turned up to contest their cases. As usual, the Ealing 
protestors were kept well informed of the councils' planned legal moves, the 
exact numbers that were to be summonsed, the time and date of the first hearing 
and which areas were to be covered. This allowed time for careful preparation, 
including the organisation of 'Makenzie' s [ sic] friends in court, people in the 
public galle?, stewards outside, a runner between inside and out, a welcoming 
committee, a photographer' and provision for a creche in the nearby West 
London Trade Union Club. 30 However, experience in other areas had shown 
that these efforts would only be effective if combined with a mass attendance: 31 
if 1 in 37 appear, courts will be unable to cope ... Under the rates the 
council was able to proceed by hundreds of orders going through on the 
nod. If in your town you can get 5,000 people to contest their actions for 
only 20 minutes that's nearly 1,667 hours, or 278 days of a courts time. 
Excluding weekends there are only 261 days a year! The system would 
collapse. 
Events at liability hearings throughout the country from the summer of 1990 
onwards certainly suggested that unusually high attendance levels could be 
expected. For example, liability hearings for 3,000 non-payers held in the Isle of 
Wight were abandoned following problems with evidence and crowd pressure. 
In this case a local anti-poll tax activist successfully argued that the council had 
failed to allow sufficient time between the service of the reminder notice and the 
taking out of the summons. 32 Similarly, at one London court in January 1991 
1,500 non-payers turned up for a hearing of 5,000 summonses.33 Meanwhile, 
Ealing council was just as keen to see a low tum out as the protestors were to 
see a high one. Although the civil nature of the recovery procedure tended to 
discourage attendance by taking away the threat of arrest if debtors did not 
appear, the council also attempted a number of other strategies. For example, the 
numbers summonsed to the first batch of hearings in winter 1990 was kept 
deliberately low at only 200 per hearing in order to encourage a speedy 
resolution of all cases and establish sound procedures for future hearings. 
Similarly, a one page notice, printed in large bold red type was enclosed with 
every summons, which simply read (original relative point size retained) 
179 
IMPORTANT 
YOU 00 Nar HA VE TO A ITEND COURT 
TO MAKE AN ARRANGEMENT TO PAY 
YOUR COMMUNITY CHARGE 
CONTACTTHECOUNCa 
IMMEDIATELY 
ON THE TELEPHONE NUMBER 
SHOWN ON THIS SUMMONS 
In the event, only 25 of the 200 summonsed for 11 October paid up beforehand 
and a dozen of the 175 outstanding cases (7%) turned up to contest liability.34 At 
court the Federation's welcoming committee approached all defendants, offered 
to provide help, a McKenzie friend and urged them to actively contest their case. 
Most agreed to be assisted by Ben Savill (the Federation's legal officer). Rather 
surprisingly, the court chose to interpret the applications for McKenzie friend 
quite literally, asking Savill how long he had known the defendant and how he 
had met them? 35 As Savill's 'friendship' with the defendants was obviously of 
rather brief duratio~ the application 'brought sarcasm into the court clerk's 
voice,.36 In his initial application the council's lawyer, Mr Humphries: 37 
made reference to the activities of Anti-Poll Tax Groups, encouraging 
people to delay court proceedings and circulating lists of questions to be 
used to waste court time; [he] reminded the magistrates that question 
should be limited to the specific issue [ of liability]. 
Humphries was also particularly keen to emphasise that 'political objections to 
this tax are not matters for this court, Parliamentary procedure is the mechanism 
for that,?8 
When the bench began to process the cases most defendants were surprised to 
discover that it initially proposed to deal with them in batches, presumably to 
speed the process along. However, on Savill's advice, each requested and was 
granted the right to an individual hearing. Perhaps emboldened by 'a packed 
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public gallery of young and old [ which] gave good-natured support', the first six 
defendants 'laughed, chatted and shuftled around as they stood in line before the 
bench,.39 But, as the proceedings moved into individual hearings it became 
obvious that most were over-awed by the atmosphere of the court, hampering 
Savill's efforts to act as a McKenzie friend: 40 
the mam problem is that all the defendants were very nervous: no 
sooner had I told them what to say than they had forgotten it - they got 
the wording muddled and didn't ask the right things - and when they 
reluctantly got into the witness box, they soon ran out of things to say. 
Partly this reflected the narrow line taken by the court clerk on questions 
regarding the accuracy and legal validity of the council's evidence - the only 
substantive grounds upon which to contest the liability order applications -
which tended to be brushed aside or brusquely ruled as 'irrelevant'. This 
particularly annoyed the protestors as 'the council did NOT have a copy of the 
people's entry on the register and offered no evidence that bills/reminders had 
been sent out other than the word of the council officer in the witness box. 
Despite repeated objections ... the magistrates accepted his word as gospel' 
(original emphasis).41 Although legal argument failed to halt the proceedings, it 
took some 2 Y2 hours to process the dozen contested cases, an average of twenty-
five minutes per defendant. Moreover, the Federation clearly succeeded in 
politicising the hearings. Subsequent press reports cast the hearings primarily as 
a political event and highlighted Ealing Federation's intention to 'stall' the 
proceedings. 42 The press also sympathetically reported the administrative chaos 
and travails of 'ordinary' non-payers, which prompted one defendant, Gerald 
Gresley of Northolt, to describe the hearings as 'a kangaroo court'. 
Understandably perhaps, the Federation was rather pleased with the outcome: 43 
I hope you all saw the tront-page article in last week's Ealing Gazette. It 
made marvellous publicity for our local campaign. That will only be a 
bit of compensation that 174 liability orders were passed ... They still 
have to get the money out of them, though. And at the present rate of 
lSI 
knots it will take them twenty years just to get the legal OK to move 
against all the non-payers in the borough. 
Every other Thursday ... forever 
This. soon proved over-optimistic as a number of factors encouraged a robust 
. 
response. Firstly, the level of default in the borough left the council with little 
option but to escalate court action. Secondly, the Conservative councillors, on 
the basis of party loyalty alone, could be expected to strive to make the new tax 
work as well as possible. Thirdly, they naturally displayed ideological 
opposition to the leftist protestors and seemed to increasingly equate non-
payment with the organised non-payment campaign. In any case, with only a 
few months left to go before the end of the financial year, the Ealing 
Conservative's needed to boost collection levels if they were to fulfil their 
election pledge to reduce poll tax bills to £370 in 1991/2. For disturbingly, 
Ealing was one of the ten London boroughs with the worst (or as the protestors 
saw it the 'best') percentage of registered charge-payers who had paid nothing 
by 3 1 December: 44 
Authority % who 
had paid 
nothing 
Lambeth (Lab) 43% 
Hackney (Lab) 38% 
Haringey (Lab) 31~o 
Southwark (Lab) 290/0 
Camden (Lab) 270/0 
Westminster (Con) 270/0 
Waltham Forest (Lab) 23~o 
Ealing (Con) 210/0 
Hounslow (Lab) 18% 
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Consequently, between January and March 1991 alone the following liability 
hearings were arranged in Ealing: 45 
No. summonsed Area 
Jan 24th 4,000 Mainly closed accounts (i.e. people who • 
closed standing orders & fell in arrears). 
Feb 7th 4,000 North 
11th 2,000 Central 
12th 4,000 West 
13th 2,000 East 
14th 2,000 North 
20th 2,000 Central 
21st 4,000 West 
25th 2,000 East 
Mar 4th 2,000 North 
5th 4,000 West 
6th 2,000 East 
7th 4,000 Central 
38,000 
While dramatic, these sorts of figures were not particularly unusual in London. 
For example 11,000 people were summonsed in Camden alone in January 
1991.Thereafter, a relentless pace was maintained in Ealing with liability 
hearings held 'every other Thursday... forever,.46 By early July 1991 
approximately 60,000 summonses had been issued47, rising to 74,052 by January 
199248• By October 1992, the total number of outstanding liability orders stood 
at around 100,000.49 
The sheer scale of these proceedings seemed to offer a golden opportunity to the 
Ealing protestors to clog up the courts. On the basis of previous hearings in 
winter 1990, a turnout of between 5-10% of non-payers might reasonably be 
expected. According to the Federation, although the hearings were unlikely 'to 
involve many hard core refuseniks', these sorts of numbers meant that 'anything 
[could] happen and we have to make sure that it does!"o this was no mere 
rhetorical threat and as early as January 1991 it had become clear that the courts 
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were under considerable strain. So much so, the government actively considered 
by-passing the justice system altogether and giving local authorities powers to 
issue liability orders directly, subject to the right of appeal at a magistrates' 
court. However, the plan was quietly shelved, possibly because of concerns 
raised by the opposition, with David Blunkett noting that 'no tax is worth the 
erosion of civil liberties and democratic rights required to make poll tax in some 
way workabie,.51 
Over the following months the protestors deployed various strategies and legal 
arguments to delay the proceedings, but despite the increased numbers 
processed by the courts, they failed to halt a single one. As one protestor 
recalled: 52 
It was like trying to climb a greasy pole ... Even though we never got the 
majority of people summonsed to tum up to the magistrates court, on 
many occasions we managed to get sufficient numbers of people to hold 
up the proceedings for quite a considerable period of time and make the 
magistrates sit through hours of stupid questions. 
But the fact remained that the Acton magistrates invariably passed the vast 
majority of liability orders, whether defendants turned up to actively contest 
their case or not. Again this seems to have been fairly typical of the experience 
of organised protestors in London, prompting some activists to conclude as early 
as February 1991 that 'the battle can't be won in the courts. However ... 
[ campaigners] should still tum up in order to delay and frustrate the council's 
progress."", make contact with non-payers and for publicity'. 53 
Why then, did the protestors in Ealing and elsewhere fail to clog up the courts? 
Firstly, the numbers of non-payers being processed soon came to pose as serious 
a logistical problem for the Ealing Federation as it did for the council. In order 
to meaningfully affect the outcome it was necessary to have at least half a dozen 
activists with a reasonable knowledge of the legal procedure present. As most 
protestors were in full time employment activists had to take days off work, or 
more riskily, pull a 'sicky'. Clearly, this level of activism could only be 
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sustained temporarily and an almost apologetic note began to creep into the 
Federation's appeals for court advisers during 1991: 
we really do need to maintain some sort of presence... Preliminary 
reports seem to indicate that much fewer people are turning up second 
time .around, knowing the court hearing is a farce, but there are always 
people i~ some sort of trouble there. 54 
In any case a decline in the numbers of non-payers attending the court had 
become apparent soon after the abolition announcement. The high-point of 
attendance appeared to be the autumn/winter 1990, when an estimated 10% of 
those summonsed contested liability. 55 A survey by All Britain Anti-Poll Tax 
Federation noted that the announcement had the effect of diffusing the poll tax 
as a national issue [but paradoxically] this has led to many people ignoring court 
summonses believing the poll tax has been abolished'. 56 Even so, the numbers 
were still significantly higher than under the rates, when only 1 % of summonses 
were contested. 57 For example, of the 3,494,701 liability hearings up to 25 
October 1991, 152,275 were contested (4.3%).58 Nor did the overall number of 
summonses significantly decline, with over 4 million people summonsed 
nationally in just the fITst six months of the 1992/3 tax year. 59 
A third factor reducing the impact of the campatgn was the increasingly 
successful attempts by court and council officials to encourage non-payers not to 
actively contest their case and instead reach an accommodation as to future 
payments. For the first few hearings council employees were forced to mingle in 
the court foyer alongside with defendants and protestors. Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, many members of staff felt intimidated and in March 1991 NALGO 
members of the Community Charge Collection section threatened to withdraw 
cover at Liability Order hearings due to fears of 'violence and possible tragedy' 
at the hands of 'angry defaulters,.60 Thereafter the court made a room available 
for council use and the court ushers actually directed defendants towards the 
council officials. Naturally, the spectacle of the court openly colluding with one 
of the parties in the case did little to bolster its claims of impartiality. 
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Moreover, in January 1991 the Acton magistrates banned the use of McKenzie 
friends. Unable to directly intervene in the proceedings (except on the relatively 
frequent occasions an active supporter of the Federation was summoned), the 
)rotestors were reduced to distributing written and verbal advice to non-payers 
before hearings, or offering vocal support from the public gallery. Nevertheless 
the p'rot~stors energetically continued to encourage all non-payers to 'have their 
day in court' and one 'anti-poll tax advice sheeC warned non-payers (original 
emphasis): 61 
CAREFUL OF THE COUNCIL! 
DON'T DO A DEAL! 
As you enter the magistrates [ sic] court, council officials hanging 
around the lobby will try to get you to do a deal. They want to avoid the 
hassle of you going to court. In the past they have made offers to people 
and at the same time the court has been stamping out liability orders 
against the same people ... You have nothing to gain. You can do a deal 
just as easily afterwards ... DON'T BE INTIMIDATED 
Increasingly then, many of the activities of Federation court advisers could be 
cast as apolitical. Their advice tended to emphasise the welfare and personal 
economic circumstances of individual defendants, irrespective of their 
motivation for turning up. Only a small proportion of the advice was directly 
addressed to 'won't payers' and the bulk concerned the situation of 'can't 
payers', particularly those defendants receiving benefits. This included 
information on their potential right to a rebate, getting court costs waived elf 
you don't ask you don't get') and information on how to secure an adjournment 
for those who 'can't face going into court'. 
As we have seen, the government built a 80% rebate into the system, however, a 
number of problems tended to undermine the effect of the provision. Firstly, the 
Community Charge Benefit (CeD) section appeared unable to cope with the 
huge number of applications submitted and experienced a series of 
administrative, technical and logistical problems, which often led to claims 
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simply disappearing. As the protestors noted;) this was 'important as probably 
the majority of plaintiffs in Poll Tax cases have cited problems with CCB as a 
factor which affected their ability to pay.' 62 Similarly, the local press routinely 
ran stories highlighting the inadequacy of the council's computer system, which 
frequently issued summonses to people who had either started paying or even 
paid .uP tn full. 63 But from the outset the Acton court chose not to consider the 
relevance of any outstanding claims for benefit when judging liability - a 
position later confrrrned by the High Court, sitting under Lord Justice WatkinsC 
in a test case in may 1991.64 Whatever the legal validity of the position, it led 
many defendants to become frustrated. As Eve Turner recalled:65 
It was important to have [activists] there just to talk to people, to give 
them confidence and advice ... [just moral] support really. Because a lot 
of people found the court experience really shocking. They couldn't 
believe that nobody was interested in the fact that they couldn't afford 
to pay. 
For most protestors, all this seemed to confIrm the general impression that any 
attempt to contest individual liability through purely legal argument tended to be 
futile. In any case, the impact of the liability hearings proved less limited than 
the authorities' hoped znd the protestors originally feared. For example one 
national survey found that at least 86% of individuals with outstanding orders 
against them had still not paid up and were consequently being pursued by 
bailiffs. 66 So as Oliver New saw it, the authorities' behaviour was shaped by the 
failure of the liability hearings to decisively check the growing levels of non-
payment in the borough:67 
They thought that by [summonsing] people down the courts it was all 
over. Then they discovered that it wasn't and that caused immense 
frustration... It meant that the courts had to resort to... ignoring the law 
in their attempts to process people. It was a staggering thing to watch 
and [on the rare occasions] when a solicitor would come in all the 
o Ajudgement by Watkins, L.l. also upheld magistrates' right to deny defendants the assistance 
of a MacKenzie friend. discussed below. 
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procedures suddenly stopped for the duration of that hearing. And when 
[s/he left] they went back to ignoring the legal provisions again. 
~ew's use of 'they' to describe council and court was significant, for like the 
majority of the Ealing protestors, he came to see these two supposedly separate 
institutions as working in tandem. I will return to this serious accusation shortly, 
. 
but it is worth noting here that a diminishing sense of respect for the impartiality 
of the court may explain the tendency of some protestors and members of the 
public to treat the proceedings increasingly irreverently. 
Chaotic scenes 
Despite the best efforts of the Acton magistrates:> their staff and the police, the 
liability hearings were often rowdy affairs. This atmosphere flowed from the 
sheer number of people packed into a relatively confined space, the stressfulness 
of the situation, the activities of the protestors' and the reaction of members of 
public incensed by the court's apparent refusal to treat their case with the sort of 
respect they believed it deserved. As we have seen, the ability of the Federation 
to disrupt the hearings became evident at the frrst liability hearing which 
'threatened to descend into farce' due to heckling and clapping inside the court 
and 'a loudhailer which kept up a constant anti-tax tirade from demonstrators 
outside,.68 Occasionally, during the course of later hearings fire alarms were 
also set off or mock bomb threats occasionally made to the court, but these sorts 
of activities were not approved of by the protestors who thought they would 
only serve to antagonise the magistrates. That said, campaigners often 
deliberately (or more usually spontaneously) interrupted court business from the 
public gallery by shouting, clapping or loudly cracking jokes. In order to curb 
this, a couple of policemen were normally stationed by the public gallery in 
order to eject troublemakers or arrest and imprison them in the court cells, 
pending an impromptu hearing for contempt. 
For example, on one occasion the chief magistrate, Stanley Shindler 'lost 
patience with repeated questions posed by defendants' and ordered the arrest of 
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SIX people for contempt, including two Federation McKenzie friends amid 
, 
'chaotic scenes,.69 As Rachel Jones, recalled: 
he took exception to the fact that I was wearing an anti-poll tax T-shirt 
and insisted I remove it. So someone threw me a jumper. Then he took 
exception to the fact that I was chewing gum. Basically he was doing 
everything in his power to undermine me and put me off my stride. I 
think it was actually for chewing gum that he had me arrested for 
contempt of court! It was unbelievable - I was then hoicked out by two 
burly coppers and locked up. 
An hour or so later I was called up to the court again and he said 
to me "Are you going to apologise to the court?" I'm a very stubborn 
person and I just thought 'Why the hell should I apologise for chewing 
gum?" [So] at first I refused and then he informed me that I would be 
found formally in contempt of court and either be fined [up to £ 1,000] or 
sent to prison [for 28 days]. And I can remember people in the gallery 
shouting at me "Apologise! Apologise!" So eventually through gritted 
teeth, in the most surly manner I could muster, I apologised. 
Unfortunately the local press reported the incident and Jones, a secondary 
school teacher who had rung in sick in order to attend the court, was later the 
subject of disciplinary action at her school. 
Given the number of people summonsed there was always a fair chance that 
each hearing would include one or more activist supporters of the campaign. 
Their presence, even without the right to a McKenzie friend, sometimes allowed 
these individuals to mount relatively sustained challenges to the council's 
evidence and signal their general defiance. Much depended here on the ability of 
the protestor/defendant to withstand interruptions or hostile interjections from 
the bench and then form coherent and credible questions which could not 
immediately be dismissed as 'irrelevant'. One protestor, Tony Ward, recalled his 
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appearance: 
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I was summoned to the court and I had a look at all the letters and poll 
tax bills I'd received from the council. And there was a stupid little 
mistake. Some of them were addressed to ''Flat 1" and some to "Flat 
IA". So when I was in the dock I first of all asked if I could be quoted 
the address on my record. The clerk said they didn't have to do that and 
I became lawyer-like and said "I think you'll find it will be relevant". So 
[the council official] quoted the record as ''Flat 1". 
Then I said "I actually live in Flat IA and this is a serious 
matter". I went into lawyer mode again and made a little speech: ''What 
would be adequate? Would it be sufficient if you sent letters to the 
house next door? A house on the same street? The nearest town? The 
same country? What is required?" I don't think they were impressed by 
the oratory but the magistrate began to back off and asked "If we defer 
the case, when would you pay?" And at that point I said I was morally 
opposed to the poll tax anyway and even if Postman Pat himself had put 
the summons in my hand I still wouldn't have paid it! 
Such sallies were guaranteed a favourable reaction from the public gallery and 
more able defendants sometimes got a round of applause. But most surreal or 
comic moments came from members of the public with no previous connection 
to the campaign. For example, Gill Reavey and Jude Sutherland recalled sitting 
in the public gallery watching a case when a man suddenly stood up, pointed 
dramatically at an adjacent policeman and screamed: 'That man has got boots on 
and I am intimidated by bootS!,71 On another occasion a defendant placed a tape 
recorder on the bench and to the considerable annoyance of the court clerk 
played a recording of what appeared to be traffic noise at high volume. Brushing 
aside all attempts at interruption the defendant defiantly asked 'Why should I 
pay the same poll tax as everybody else when I have to put with this noise?' 
while 'the court clerk's eyes nearly popped out of his head,.72 
However the conduct of the hearings left many members of the public confused, 
humiliated or merely angry and in Septemberl991 an Ealing council employee 
was assaulted in the court foyer. 73 At the first hearing 'wheel-chair bound 
William McDonald went home after waiting outside for an hour-and-a-half 
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having allegedly been told there was no wheel-chair access - "He should have 
been carried in" said a surprised court official'. 74 Another incident witnessed by 
Michael O'Connell was equally fraught: 75 
Some man was in front of the magistrate [who] was being really severe 
qn hjm. His wife, who was pregnant, was in the public gallery. She 
stood up and shouted at the magistrate, full of rage, [lots ot] bad 
language and swearing. The magistrate was shocked and asked the 
policeman to arrest her but she ran off and got away. I don't think the 
police were motivated to chase a pregnant woman. 
Indeed, reports from other London courts suggest that the Acton officials and 
police were if anything relatively laid back about the presence of public and 
protestors. For example, at a liability hearing in December 1990 Greenwich 
magistrates only allowed four anti-poll activists in the court and even then the 
police demanded their names. 76 But a number of Ealing protestors recalled that 
some police, council staff and even low level court officials were often 
surprisingly friendly and would privately admit that they too opposed the poll 
tax and were often embarrassed by the proceedings. 77 
It is also worth emphasising that while 'chaotic scenes' did regularly occur the 
vast majority of court business was expedited speedily and efficiently, with over 
a hundred thousand orders passed in Acton (and millions nationally) between 
1990 and 1993. In part this was possible because only a minority of defendants 
turned up, in part because of the specific measures taken by court and council to 
facilitate business, some of which, as we have seen, proved controversial. 
Certainly the Ealing protestors' levelled two broad charges against the 
authorities each of which deserves more detailed consideration. Firstly, they , 
claimed that the local magistracy was politically and socially prejudiced 
Secondly they suggested that this bias encouraged the bench to distort~ 
misconstrue or even ignore the law. But how far are these charges actually 
supported by the evidence? As the second charge directly flows from the first. it 
seems appropriate to begin by looking at the social and political composition of 
the bench. 
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A Prej udiced Magistracy? 
In 1990 the 27,000 or so magistrates in Britain dealt with 97% of all criminal 
cases and possessed wide sentencing powers (which had been substantially 
increased by the passage of the 1982 Criminal Justice Act).78 Therefore the 
primary P!lrpose of the magistrates' courts was (and is) to deal with criminal and 
not civil cases. Under the rates, liability hearings and other hearings connected 
with debt enforcement formed a minority of those civil cases that fell within the 
purview of the local bench. So the relentless series of poll tax hearings could 
easily be seen as an unwarranted interruption to the magistrates' proper job. 
Common sense suggests that this institutional factor played a part in shaping the 
courts' antagonistic response to the organised protestors. 
However, even keen proponents of the principle of a lay magistracy conceded 
that its reputation for impartiality was in decline. As Sir Thomas Skyrme saw it, 
'much of the population' holds the 'erroneous' view that justices 'are 
prejudiced, prosecution minded, middle-class bigots, motivated by lust for 
power and totally lacking in any feeling for those who appear before them,.79 
Certainly a high concentration of power in the hands of a few appointed 
individuals could easily seem anomalous in a modem democracy, especially 
given the apparent eagerness of some magistrates to impose custodial sentences, 
often against the expressed advice of the Home Office. 80 
There were also wornes about the apparently unrepresentative social and 
political composition of the bench. The vast majority of justices in 1990 were 
lay people nominated by local advisory committees and appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor, whose 'declared policy is to make sure that each bench is a 
microcosm of the local community in which it operates'. 81 This played an 
important legitimising function as it 'enables the citizen to see that the law is his 
law, administered by men and women like himself, and that it is not the esoteric 
82 . d·~1 preserve of the lawyers'. But as one study of the appomtments system note . 
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The selection of justices of the peace remains a largely personal and 
intimate affair, almost entirely dominated by existing magistrates who 
can easily tum into a self-perpetuating oligarchy. 
A survey of25,934 JPs conducted for the Lord Chancellor's department in 1983 
foun~ an. imbalance in terms of gender with 15,606 men and 10,328 women. 84 
Most JPs also tended to be middle aged and middle class - a 1977 survey found 
that only 8.2% of magistrates were manual workers and some 63.2% were 
drawn from various 'middle-class' occupations including company directors, 
senior managers, landowners, educational professionals, ex-services and a small 
number of trade union officials. By 1985 there were about 200 black or Asian 
magistrates, although again, the bulk of these were drawn from the middle-
class.
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In terms of political composition the magistracy was demonstrably 
Conservative in 1983, with supporters drawn from the following parties: 
Conservatives 41% 
Labour 28% 
Liberals 11% 
SDP 1% 
Plaid Cymru 0.3% 
Independent & not known 18.7% 
In fact this almost certainly underestimates the level of Conservative support 
among nominal 'independents' as local advisory committees, which put forward 
names of potential magistrates, often showed 'great ingenuity in dressing up a 
candidate from one party in the guise of another to satisfy the Lord Chancellor's 
requirement,.86 In any case, according to Burney, successful Labour nominees 
tended to be drawn from the right of the party with left-wingers invariably 
excluded as 'extreme'. 87 
Unfortunately, it has not proved possible to assemble detailed information about 
the Ealing bench at the time of the poll tax hearings, although there is no reason 
to suspect that it differed markedly from the national picture. There were about 
130 magistrates in the early 199Os, covering two courts - Baling and Acton, 
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about five of whom came from an ethruc minority background. 88 The problem 
of Conservative over-representation appears to have been quite marked, with 
only about 25% of justices supporting the Labour Party, although this may not 
have been particularly unusual for the London area where the bench was heavily 
Conservative. 89 For example, political imbalance prompted the Lord Chancellor 
in the late 1970s to seek to introduce more official Labour appointees 'in some 
suburbs and well heeled areas of central London' but without any marked 
success.
90 In Ealing the Lord Chancellors' initiative led to the appointment of 
four youngish Labour nominees in 1980, but all had resigned by 1990. 91 
Although it is relatively easy to show that the political and social composition of 
the national magistracy fell well short of the Lord Chancellor's aspiration that 
the bench should be a 'microcosm of the local community in which it operates' 
it is more difficult to say how this shaped its response to the poll tax protests. 
The political background of most magistrates implied that they would have scant 
sympathy with either the aims or tactics of the Ealing protestors. A sense of 
antipathy is evident from a survey of one specialised legal journal tailoring for 
magistrates and clerks between 1989-1995.92 Initially, although there was a 
recognition that 'the amount of civil unrest which has developed following the 
new [tax] will mean that the courts are in for some hectic times', the dominant 
tone was rather facetious. 93 One court clerk described the protestors at a liability 
hearing in Plymouth as 'mild troublemakers' while the police, on the other hand, 
'were quite wonderful, as ever'. 94 He continued: 
The dress of the public was multi-coloured and varied, as were the 
bodies. Some appeared unwashed .... One chap indicated three or four 
times in a loud voice 'No Poll Tax, No Poll, Tax, No Poll Tax' and 
when I looked up I saw that was emanating from a member of the public 
who, putting it mildly, had a peculiar hair cut... I thought he looked like 
a Red Indian and the chairman later indicated to me that he thought the 
young man's mother really ought to have made sure his jeans were 
darned, stitched, or whatever .. 
Then came the first attender, a hopefully not too typical example of 
modern youth, accompanied by a McKenzie friend ... We ascertained 
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that the non-payer was a slip of a girl about 19, was a one parent family, 
couldn't afford to pay the poll tax [and] could only follow sentences of 
about five words. 
But as the number of liability and committal hearings mounted the tone shifted 
from. cOI\descension towards annoyance and then alarm at the amount of court 
time swallowed up by poll tax enforcement. So the government's decision to 
abolish the charge came as 'something of a relief.. Such was the level of 
organised opposition ... courts were expected to sit for far longer than originally 
estimated' .95 More damagingly, the fear was increasingly expressed that the 
courts had been 'perceived as merely rubber stamping local authority 
applications,.96 
A rubber stamping machine? 
As we have seen, the Local Government Finance Act (1988) excluded as 
irrelevant any reason why a defendant had not paid, including economic 
circumstances. Only at the committal stage was an enquiry into a defendant's 
means required by law. In order to ascertain liability the court was simply 
empowered to judge whether the local authority had followed the correct 
procedure in placing an individual's name on the register, issuing bills, issuing a 
correct summons and so on.97 As one anti-poll tax legal guide noted:98 
Naturally, the law has been so structured ... as to make it as easy as 
possible for local charging authorities to obtain these orders, and 
consequently, little if anything which could be possibly described as a 
legal defence is available. 
Similarly, enforcement procedures relating to routine offences (including debts 
incurred under the old rating system and most road traffic offences) had also 
excluded almost every conceivable defence. Once liability had been established, 
the onus was clearly on the individual chargepayer and the local authority to sort 
out any outstanding problems. 99 It seemed then that the discretion available to 
the court was highly restricted, implying that any vehement criticism of the 
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magi~tracies' behaviour might easily be misplaced. Nevertheless, evidence from 
the protestors, comment in legal journals, the reaction of 'ordinary' defendants 
and the general tenor of press reports all seemed to indicate that at best the 
, 
conduct of the magistrates and officials at liability hearings often provoked a 
degree of unease among those who witnessed it. At worst, it was cast as an 
abuse. of 12ower. Four main accusations emerged over the course of the hearings. 
Firstly, the protestors claimed that the court discouraged people from actively 
contesting their case by promoting a hostile atmosphere at hearings, disallowing 
reasonable questions in a brusque and rude manner, and frequently interrupting 
defendants. It was claimed that such behaviour was particularly serious as the 
vast majority of defendants were 'law-abiding' citizens who were already over-
awed by the unfamiliar atmosphere of a court. So, according to one Ealing 
protestor, 'bullying' by clerk, magistrates and council officers 'increased 
peoples' nervousness and made them 'just want to get it over with'.lOO In fact, 
the court officials rather than the magistrates tended to bear the brunt of most of 
the criticism, as the clerk (the only legally trained official in court) played a very 
active role, inter-reacting with the defendants, asking questions and advising the 
lay magistrates on points of law. This surprised one Ealing campaigner, who 
recalled, 'the persona of the magistrates was about as important as the colour of 
the wallpaper. [The court clerk] was actually running the show and the 
magistrates just sat there like turnips all day!' 101 As the public face (and voice) 
of the justice system it was perhaps inevitable that the clerk should have become 
something of a bete noire for the protestors, who variously described him as 'a 
most unpleasant man', 'horrible', 'irritating', 'pompous' and 'pooterish'. More 
seriously, the course of the hearings fuelled suspicions that the clerk was 
'blatantly hostile and may well have been colluding with the council's lawyers 
as to how to hurry the process along... he was antagonistic and patronising and 
tried to be intimidating'. 102 
On the other hand, the protestors themselves were also 'blatantly hostile' to the 
proceedings and quick to seize upon anything they considered to be an 
'injustice'. Similarly, it is always difficult to measure fairly and objectively such 
intangible human qualities as tone of voice, manner or demeanour. One person's 
196 
businesslike countenance may be another's calculated condescension. Moreover, 
even if court officials did on occasion behave in a manner that could have been 
interpreted as prejudicial to the organised protestors (and indeed anyone who 
sought to contest liability), perhaps that was wholly understandable given the 
fraught context. After all, why should the magistrates and court officials in 
Actoq anq elsewhere have simply accepted the protestors openly stated intention 
to 'clog up'- their court with equanimity and continue to act as a sort of 
bumbling, institutional straight-man while the protestors openly mocked, 
subverted and disrupted the hearings? So in taking a firm line the magistrates 
may have been upholding the spirit and sanctity of the law. 
A similar justification could be used in relation to a second frequently levelled 
accusation - that because defendants were processed in 'batches' they were 
effectively denied the right to an individual hearing. Every court had a different 
procedure, with some hearing all cases individually and others considering 
batches of up to fifty defendants at a time. 103 The Acton court seemed to have 
followed a rather mixed policy. First the council witness stated the case against 
batches of five or more defendants. The court then allowed individuals an 
opportunity to cross-examine the official and take the witness stand to argue 
their case. However, many defendants were too nervous to press the point and 
most cases were quickly dispatched. Nevertheless, as Ben Savill conceded, the 
fact remained that at the Acton court 'every defendant was given a chance to 
cross-examme the council witness, albeit he refused to answer most 
• , 104 questions. 
Nevertheless the use of a conveyer belt system tended to discredit the procedure 
for many non-political defendants who left the court aggrieved that their own 
Pe(S.9naI circumstances :had not ~n properly considered. On another level, the 
s~~~~cle of (often confused) batches of defendants milling around before the 
bench added little to the dignity of the proceedings or promote the appearance of 
fairness. For example, magistrates in the neighbouring borough of Brent 
following similar procedures to the Acton court, prompted Ken Livingstone, MP 
for Brent East, to observe that the liability hearing he attended resembled a 
'cattle market': 10' 
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Clearly the magistrates were biased against us all the way. They tried to 
keep as many people out [of the court] as possible. This is clearly an 
attempt to rubber-stamp it and roll the process forward ... If someone is 
done for murder they don't tum up and find there are seven or eight 
othec murderers being dealt with at the same time. You have the right to 
be heard and make your point and this is what we are fighting about 
here. 
The third charge, that defendants were deliberately denied the right to McKenzie 
friends, again relates to the magistrates' efforts to speed up the proceedings. In 
January 1991 the High Court, under Lord Justice Watkins held that the 
magistrates' court had discretion to permit or refuse applications for a McKenzie 
friend. 106 His judgement expressed concern that local justices were increasingly 
'being placed in the intolerable position of being faced with people claiming to 
be friends of defendants who are either politically motivated or activists, whose 
function it is to oppose some authority whose function it is to carry out the 
wishes of Parliament'. 107 Acton magistrates responded by immediately banning 
all McKenzie friends from the court. All this provided further evidence that the 
magistracy was growing increasingly bullish in the face of what they believed to 
be organised disruption. Considered in that light the judgement could be cast as 
a reasonable response to a highly unusual and potentially damaging situation. 
Nevertheless Watkins' judgement was generally ill-received. Some believed that 
'if not overturned, [it] will encourage magistrates' courts to continue to give 
priority to the speed at which they dispose of poll tax cases, and to the 
convenience of local authorities, rather than to safeguarding due process and the 
rights of defendants' . 108 Concern was not confined to organised protestors or for 
that matter, the usual liberal suspects, although Liberty (the renamed National 
Council of Civil Liberties) did write to the Lord Chancellor as early as 
September 1990 expressing its 'grave concern' about the conduct of some 
liability hearings. 109 For example. one consistently conservative law journal 
suggested that justices use the judgement sparingly, 'lest the proceedings should 
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bear the hallmarks ofunfaimess,.lIO Un surprisingly perhaps, the judgement was 
overturned on appeal by the High Court in August 1991. 
The judgement had potentially wide implications for the relationship between 
the law, citizen and state. As defendants in poll tax cases were unable to claim 
legal.aid,.th~ High Court effectively seemed to confirm that they had no right to 
expert representation. As one Ealing protestor complained, 'while liability 
hearings are continuing, we have found that legal knowledge is disregarded 
unless backed up by a professional qualification and right of audience in the 
courts' .111 So local justice did indeed seem to be the esoteric preserve of the 
lawyers and that the sort of popular, voluntary advocacy proposed by the 
protestors was deemed to be incompatible with the British legal system. This 
was especially problematic given the contention that many magistrates' courts 
were simply ignoring all objections to the evidence presented by council 
officials. But then, there may have been nothing particularly unusual here. As 
one Welsh campaigner saw it 
long experience, and what few surveys have been done, have always 
tended to show a very strong tendency in the magistrates' court, over a 
jury trial, to favour the probative value of the evidence of "officialdom" 
(especially police evidence) over that of the troublesome oiks what have 
been brought to court for correction! 112 
Even so, lawyers supporting the national anti-poll tax campaign warned that the 
admissibility of computer evidence 'was in doubt'.113 Given the host of 
administrative and technical problems associated with the new tax, it was 
certainly easy to see from a 'common-sense' perspective why some scepticism 
about the accuracy of computer information may have been appropriate. But in 
the highly politicised and often fraught context of the hearings any irregularities 
came to assume a new significance, as they implied that many of the liability 
orders issued, which stated that individuals owed a certain sum, could simply 
have been wrong. However, the chief contention of the Poll Tax Legal Group 
related to a narrower issue. They claimed that 'council witnesses in court ... rely 
on statements displayed on computer screens or computer print outs as the 
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source of their knowledge to show non-payment. As officers do not have direct, 
personal knowledge but rely on out-of-court statements from others (in this case 
computers), the evidence is hearsay and inadmissible'. 114 While it was perhaps 
easy to characterise such objection as a merely technical point, many legal 
campaigners believed that the amateur composition of the magistracy led them 
to apply inappropriate 'common-sense' judgements on important points of law. 
In this instance, justices were being 'swayed by what they consider to be [the] 
probative value' of evidence when considering it admissibility - a basic error in 
law. 11S 
Remember, lay justices are not lawyers, and although they are informed 
about important (legal matters] during their brief initiation into the 
magistracy, very many, especially the "experienced ones", behave as 
though it is mere legal mumbo-jumbo which doesn't really apply to 
them. 116 
So despite repeated attempts from summer 1990 to argue the point 10 
magistrates' courts throughout the England and Wales, it was only finally (and 
tentatively) accepted in Bury St Edmunds in December 1991. In January 1992 
the case was firmed up substantially when Clerkenwell magistrates court also 
accepted that computer evidence was legally 'hearsay'. (It may be significant 
that a Stipendiary magistrate, a professional lawyer, rather than a lay justice 
chaired the court.) In February the High Court also confirmed that computer 
evidence was 'hearsay' and potentially inadmissible in poll tax cases, allowing 
people who had had a liability order served against them in the previous three 
months leave to appeal. 117 The potential implications of the judgement were far-
reaching as it suggested that some four million or so liability orders may have 
been wrongly issued. Consequently magistrates' courts in 40 areas adjourned 
nearly 250,000 summonses pending clarification. Others, including the Acton 
court, chose to continue to process the cases regardless. 
The Ealing Federation therefore wasted no time in launching a test case. On 30 
January a banister connected to the Poll Tax Legal Group attended Acton 
magistrates' court and argued that Ealing's computer evidence was 
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inadmissible, but the bench chose to reject the submission. 118 Later, in the light 
of the High Courts' judgement, Oliver New, an Ealing activist, initiated a 
request for a judicial review of the validity of a liability order issued against him 
bruary 1992.
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However, as New, a train driver, was not eligible for legal 
~&~ ule potential costs of the case meant the game wasn't worth the candle and 
after.a desultory correspondence the case was allowed to lapse. 
In any case, the government immediately signalled its intention to close the 
'legal loophole', both through issuing statutory instruments and by incorporating 
the necessary legislation in the new Local Government Finance Act 1992, then 
being considered by the Lords. Interestingly, the Labour Party offered no 
opposition to any of these moves, restricting its criticisms to complaints that the 
government had not acted quickly enough and had declined Labour's offer of 
co-operation with 'an instant change in the law,.120 Even so, the judgement 
seemed to serve as a vindication of several years of onerous, detailed (and 
unpaid) legal research and advocacy in various magistrates' courts undertaken 
by anti-poll tax legal campaigners. Understandably perhaps, some could 
scarcely contain their excitement: 121 
At long last... justice has been done and seen to be done - with 
enormous implications ... if the Department of the Environment changes 
the law at this stage it will be impliedly admitting to the biggest blunder 
in 20th century legal history. 
It will be an admission of a collossal [ sic] mistake which has 
resulted in millions of people being denied justice and the protection of 
the law. It implicates the Government, local authorities and Magistrates' 
courts ... The need for major refonns in the law and the way in which the 
poor are ~eated before the courts is becoming increasingly obvious. 
While it is tempting to see the disputes over the evidence presented by local 
authorities at liability hearings as a rather obscure procedural issue, the quality 
of evidence used in judgements obviously has wider significance for the justice 
system as a whole. As one anti-poll tax legal guide rather sarcastically put it, 
'the rules of the ''Law of Evidence" ... have long been the proud boast amongst 
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the rights, liberties and freedoms supposedly enjoyed by Englishmen, 
distinguishing English Law Courts from those of lesser foreign lands, where 
people may be fined, jailed and even executed on the basis of mere speculation 
d h ,122 L I . an earsay. ega campaIgners were therefore keen to compare the issue of 
(allegedly) tainted evidence at liability hearings with other spectacular 
cont~mpQrary miscarriages of justice by equating the 'Guildford Four, the 
Birmingham· Six and the Poll Tax Seven Million?' 123 
Ultimately this author is not qualified to attempt any sort of judgement on the 
merits or demerits of the legal arguments put forward relating to evidence. 
However, it seems fair to conclude that at the very least, such legal disputes 
further undermined the legitimacy of the tax by reinforcing the perception that it 
was an ill thought out law. But more seriously, when all the complaints about 
the conduct of the court were considered in aggregate, it is easy to see why a 
diverse range of political opinion should have concluded that the legal 
authorities were acting in an arbitrary manner. Given the importance of the idea 
of the 'rule of law' in regulating relations between the individual citizen and the 
state within the British polity, this was clearly of relevant to the wider question 
of citizenship. 
The Public Interest 
The liability hearings revealed several faces of the active citizen, embodied by 
the principal players at the proceedings, including the Ealing Federation, the 
thousands of 'non-political' members of the public who turned up to dispute 
liability, the local magistracy and of course Ealing council. Each of these players 
brought to the arena of the court a distinct vision of where the 'public interest' 
lay in relation to the tax. 
As we have seen, supporters of the Ealing Federation sought to pursue the public 
interest by clogging up the courts in an attempt to make an unjust ta."( 
unworkable. But in practice, their attitudes and behaviour were far more complex 
and two apparently distinct approaches became evident. The fir~ and most 
obvious was a highly political approach to the liability hearings as an occasion 
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upon which citizens could collectively protest against the tax and in the process 
make it unworkable. This implied that the actual content of the hearings, legal 
argument and so on were of little importance and primaril y designed to waste the 
courts time. The second approach was far more legalistic and individualistic. 
This tended to see the representation and assistance of individual non-payers as a 
useful political activity in its own right. It followed that protestors should be 
positive about the capacity of the courts to dispense justice and not simply 
assume 'that Magistrates have no regard for the plight of PoIl Tax debtors .. At 
the very least they will be conscious of the need to be seen to act as fairly as 
possible in the hearing of Poll Tax cases given the controversy surrounding the 
tax' .124 Similarly, influential legal anti-poll tax activists sought to encourage a 
sense of empowerment and questioned the idea that 'local authorities are 'CSig 
Brother" - all powerful organisations which have powers to do what they like. 
Local authorities have to follow the law - if they do not they can be taken to 
rt ' 125 cou . 
There was always a tension between these two approaches. For example, any 
political campaign hoping to mobilise 'people's power' would inevitably tend to 
view the efforts of small groups of usually legally qualified individuals as 
potentially discouraging wider popular involvement. An undue focus on the 
limited sphere of the courts could easily obscure the political basis of the anti-
poll movement and instead refocus attention on arcane disputes over points of 
law. Moreover, the experience of the liability hearings seemed to show the 
apparent futility of much legal argument. For example, despite the controversy 
over the admissibility of computer evidence in early 1992 the Acton court 
simply carried on regardless. Meanwhile, the government changed the relevant 
law. On the other hand, legal campaigners could argue that a politically hostile 
approach to the courts was counter-productive and merely served to antagonise 
the authorities. Following the decision to exclude McKenzie friends the Poll Tax 
I· d h· 126 Legal Group be leve t at It was: 
of lasting regret that there have been some anti-poll tax campaigners 
who used the M¥Kenzie friend procedure as a tactic for disruption of 
courts and - even more astonishingly - actually wrote and published 
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their intentions ... Such antics have blurred the real issues involved and 
provided a wonderful excuse to cut back on civil rights. 
Certainly, all the evidence suggests that most protestors did seek to use 
McKenzie friends as part of the civil disobedience campaign. But they also saw 
this as cOJIlpatible with the provision of helpful and accurate legal advice to non-
payers. Can "the potential contradiction between these two sorts of activity be 
reconciled? Several practical factors tended to blur the distinction between the 
Federation's activities as a protest organisation and as a support group for non-
payers. Most obviously, they could best hope to clog up the court through 
sustained legal challenges in individual cases. Similarly, the 'legalistic' 
protestors' efforts were most likely to succeed if the poll tax remained 
politically controversial, focussing public and media attention on the behaviour 
of the courts. So despite occasional tensions, legal campaigners and various 
national and local non-payment campaigns retained a close working 
relationship, especially in relation to the jailing of non-payers (considered in the 
next chapter). 
But at least one major problem remams. The evidence suggests that the 
protestors initially worked on the assumption that the courts would stick to the 
letter of the law, however inconvenient this may be for the authorities. Why else 
would the Ealing protestors have expended considerable time and effort 
developing expertise on the various aspects of poll tax law and then sought to 
maintain a presence at the hearings? And yet theirs was an organised campaign 
of civil disobedience, actively promoting the idea of law-breaking as a means of 
effecting political change. Could the Ealing protestors reasonably cry foul when 
the local magistrates (and the wider legal system) seemed to distort or ignore the 
law? Was this a case of the protestors seeking to have their cake and eat it? 
However this assumes that the legal system is, ultimately, a highly po/iliciseJ 
institution dedicated to upholding the needs of the state, rather than impartially 
dispensing justice. And yet much of the courts' legitimacy rests on their claim to 
be impartial. For example, all newly appointed magistrates continue to swear an 
oath promising to uphold the law 'without fear or favour, affection or ill will'. 
12~ 
But as two academic observers of events in the poll tax courts noted: 
Some basic requirements of the rule of law are that the courts should act 
impartially in disputes between citizens and the state, apply relevant 
laws and ensure that legal procedures are fully and properly followed. 
There is plenty of evidence that magistrates' courts allover the country 
have;lOt observed these standards. 
In that sense, the protestors' activities should have been largely irrelevant to the 
conduct of proceedings. If, as the protestors claimed, there was overt collusion 
between the judiciary and the state, it was perfectly reasonable to 
simultaneously demand that the courts apply the law 'without fear or favour, 
affection or ill-will' and at the same time advocate an act of civil disobedience 
against a particular law. The general and the specific were in effect, separate 
issues. As Oliver New saw it: 'Because we were pointing out that the courts 
were acting in a partisan and political way on behalf of the council it politicised 
what the courts were doing. ,128 Another activist put it more starkly: 129 
There was a sort of moral and political imperative to make these people, 
these individuals who put themselves in the position of sitting as 
magistrates actually face the consequences of their decisions ... we were 
actuall y [trying to make] them do what they were supposed to do 
anyway. 
For arguably, it was the mass of ordinary, largely apolitical non-payers who 
suffered most from the tendency of the courts to 'rubber stamp' liability orders. 
As we have seen, despite the best efforts of the council relatively large numbers 
of people turned up to contest their liability orders, although this declined after 
the government announced its intention to abolish the poll tax in March 1991. 
But it is less clear how far this can be seen as primarily a political phenomenon, 
for whether or not they personally agreed with the poll tax, the vast majority of 
defendants did 1I0t attend Acton magistrates court in order to stage a calculated 
political protest. Instead, the evidence suggests that most hoped to secure a 
detailed, individual hearing of their circumstances, which would prove that a 
liability order should not be issued against them. Nevertheless. this was a sort of 
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active citizenship, as people demanded their rights, had their say and so in a 
sense, sought to hold the authorities accountable. But given the narrowness of 
the issues to be considered and the court's evident wish to speed the process 
along, most defendants emerged from the experience disappointed. So even the 
Magistrates' Association came to fear that the quality of justice on offer had 
tainted the reputation of the system. As one conservative legal trade journal 
ruefully conceded: 130 
nine out of every ten persons appearing before the Community charge 
courts have had no political axe to grind, but have expected justices to 
... well ... administer justice. Many of those summonsed have come with 
hard luck tales of limited income, disability, incompetence by local 
authorities in the provision of services etc., and not unreasonably have 
genuinely expected the courts to be able to something about their 
problems. 
Ironically, most Ealing protestors would have broadly agreed. For example few 
harboured illusions about how far the anti-poll tax campaign was responsible for 
the relatively high tum out of defendants. As Mick Brooks saw it: 
It wasn't necessarily us that clogged them up actually. People clogged 
them up on their own volition ... they'd just tum up because they were 
outraged about the poll tax and they just wanted to say something to 
somebody about how unfair it was. 
Thus even at the height of the agitation only a small number of those 
summonsed to each hearing contacted the Federation advice lines beforehand
lJ1 
This seemed to be confirmed by events at a liability hearing held in January 
1993, when the poll tax had only three months left to run, which saw several 
hundred people tum up to contest the charges amidst the by now familiar 
'chaotic scenes,.1J2 Not only was the Ealing Federation largely moribund by this 
stage, but the political significance of the poll tax had also faded. Similarly. as 
we have seen activists tended to be realistic about the primary motivation of 
most defendants once they reached court. For example. the court brietings 
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prepared by the Federation consistently emphasised 'practical' issues, like 
outstanding community charge benefit claims, rather than rhetorical 
denunciations of the poll tax. Moreover, the protestors knew full-well that many 
of the defendants they encountered (described as 'as a representative cross 
section of the British people') tended to be initially rather suspicious of their 
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motIves:. 
A lot of people wouldn't talk to you [at first] because they realised that 
you were probably some sort of communist and [thought] you were 
probably going to 'use' them. And then they realised that they didn't 
know what the hell they were going to do ... and that you were telling 
them useful things. 
So on those occasions when the court did allow McKenzie friends there was 
rarely a shortage of defendants willing to be represented. Others, caught up in 
the drama and excitement of the proceedings, or incensed by what they 
perceived as high-handed treatment, joined with organised protestors in the 
public gallery to directly voice their approbation. Nevertheless, it seems hard to 
claim that the majority of those contesting liability hearings were engaged in a 
form of overtly political form of active citizenship. But that does not necessarily 
imply that the defendant's actions were without political significance. For 
irrespective of their individual motivation in turning up, the inter-reaction 
between large numbers of 'ordinary' people and the highly organised protestors 
at the liability hearings effectively helped make the tax 'unworkable'. It also 
helped politicise the procedure at a period of great sensitivity for the ruling party 
and the local judicial and state authorities. 
Certainly the protestors tended to bracket the Acton magistrates alongside the 
local council as part of largely undifferentiated, faceless 'authorities' This in 
tum implied that the justices could best be seen primarily as coercive 
instruments of state power, bestowing a veneer of legitimacy on a largely 
political process. However, it is worth remembering that each individual 
magistrate was an active citizen in herlhis own right. As lay volunteers 
magistrates claimed to serve the community by impartially dispensing 'local' 
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justice and so upholding the rule of law. In that sense they could be seen as 
perfect examples of the New Right's vision of an active citizenship based on 
voluntary service in the 'public interest', within the existing structures and 
traditions of British social and political life (see chapter one). Thus the conflict 
between the protestors and the local magistracy can also be seen as emblematic 
ofa wider tension between two contradictory visions of the 'public interest'. 
Interestingly, some anti-poll tax legal campaigners suggested that activists could 
best seek to pursue the public interest by becoming magistrates themselves: 134 
Experience has shown that there is no shortage of legal ability, given the 
number of non-lawyers who have assisted debtors at community charge 
hearings. Some may consider helping the court by sitting on the Bench 
rather than acting as a McKenzie friend... it is hoped... sufficient 
numbers of people [will be] prepared to consider this aspect of public 
service and [so] make the service more representative. 
But as we have seen, the selection process for lay justices ensured that not only 
was a majority of the bench Conservative, but that any individuals deemed to be 
'extreme' by the existing justices were simply not appointed. So it is hard to see 
how any sort of distinctly radical approach to local justice would have been 
compatible with the majority view on the 'public interest' held by individual 
magistrates and the institution as a whole. 
For as one study of local juvenile sentence policy in the period noted, there was 
ample evidence of a largely received 'magistrates' ideology' shaped by local 
tradition, the experience of senior colleagues and training given by the court 
clerk. All this encouraged a sense that justices were 'special people who have a 
unique position in both the local community and the local court'. 135. Magistrates 
strongly believed that they were 'pretty experienced, sensible people... [who] 
136 • I·· I know what's what and who's who ... not easily fooled.' Problematic po Itlca 
issues or the social background of defendants were therefore quite irrelevant. 
But the application of a common sense 'magistrates' ideology' in poll tax cases 
inevitably came to assume a greater political significance: the protestors were £l 
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priori 'extremists' deliberately seeking to undermine the law, while the justices 
were 'moderates' who sought to uphold it. In that context, it was wholly 
reasonable to ban the use of McKenzie friends, even though this might leave 
'genuine' defendants (defined within the magistrates' ideology as those 'with no 
political axe to grind') wholly unrepresented . 
. 
All this seems to suggest that lA.G. Griffiths' characterisation of the senior 
British judiciary can also be usefully applied to the local magistracy. Senior 
judges, he believes, do not have a 'conscious and deliberate intention to pursue 
their own interests and the interests of their class'. 137 Instead they honestly seek 
to uphold the 'public interest'. However, by the very nature of the role judges 
are called upon to perform, they make political decisions: 
which are sometimes presented to them, and often by them, as 
determinations of where the public interest lies; that their interpretation 
of what is in the public interest and therefore politically desirable is 
determined by the kind of people they are and the position they hold in 
our society; that this position is a part of established authority and so is 
necessarily conservative, not liberal. 
Thus during the liability hearings, Acton magistrates' court instinctively chose 
to define the 'public interest' as facilitating Ealing council's efforts to collect the 
poll tax, a choice that was wholly in line with the prevailing 'magistrates' 
ideology'. 
Finally, gIven the apparently adversarial relationship between the Acton 
magistrates and the organised protestors it is easy to obscure the role played by 
Ealing's Conservative council. As we have seen the evidence suggests that Tory 
councillors increasingly appeared to see non-payment as a deliberate act. Their 
duty was therefore to uphold the law and protect the council's financial position 
by breaking the back of non-payment. Such a view was wholly typical of the 
majority of councillors from all parties, who were faced by October 1993. with 
11 million people in arrears in England and Wales. u8 Indeed by early 1992 It 
was clear from official figures that Labour controlled authorities were if 
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h· l'k 1 . 139 anyt mg more ley to Issue summonses to defaulters. This generalised sense 
of purpose among would become more obvious as Ealing Council sought to fIrst 
levy 'distress' against non-payers through the use of bailiffs, and then imprison 
some of them. 
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Cha pter Seven 
Defending Non-Payers 
This .is t~e second of two related chapters that considers poll tax non-payment as 
a political phenomenon. By early 1991 the protestors had concluded that 
attempts to clog up the liability order hearings could only go so far. Instead their 
focus shifted to the two main coercive measures applied to non-payers after a 
liability order had been granted, namely the threat of bailiffs and the 'ultimate 
sanction' of imprisonment. Campaigning around each of these issues over time 
came to alter the nature of local campaigns, which increasingly moved away 
from overt calls for civil disobedience towards advocacy and support for 
individual non-payers. However, these shifts in emphasis were largely prompted 
by the dramatic decision of the new Major administration to scuttle Thatcher's 
flagship. 
We've won - well almost 
Following the Trafalgar Square riot the poll tax continued to exert a malign 
influence on the fortunes of the Conservative Party, although opinion polls 
suggested that it recovered somewhat from its nadir at the time of the tax's 
introduction. In particular, a majority of the public seems to have perceived the 
poll tax to be Thatcher's tax and this, together with concerns about her personal 
style, led the Prime Minister's personal ratings to fall behind those of her party. 1 
Moreover the idea that Thatcher and 'Thatcherism' was increasingly 'extreme' , 
gained wide currency. For example, a poll in April 1990 found that three out of 
every four respondents thought that Mrs Thatcher was 'extreme' while only 
18% regarded her as a 'moderate,.2 Given the value traditionally placed on 
moderation within British political culture this was a serious problem and does 
much to explain the increasing willingness of many Tory MPs to ditch her at the 
first opportunity. It is also significant that following Thatcher's resignation, all 
the candidates in the second round of the Tory leadership contest committed 
themselves to 'a fundamental review' of the poll tax. Indeed. an attempt to kill 
~ . ... 
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the poll tax as a political issue became central to John Major's efforts to re-
brand himself as a One Nation Conservative, anxious to leave behind 'the Poll 
Tax riots, the exclusion of so many minority groups and those left outside the 
race to prosperity that we had seen in the 1980s.,3 Following Major's election, a 
review of both local government finance and the wider role of local government 
was. thet.:efore initiated, led by the new Environment Secretary, Michael 
Heseltine, a iong-standing critic of the tax. 
Given the purpose of this study, it is not necessary to describe in anything but 
the most superficial terms the rather vexed and at times contradictory course of 
Heseltine's review. 4 However, some issues can usefully be highlighted here. 
Firstly, powerful forces within the Conservative Party wished to continue with 
the tax, albeit in a modified form and with much reduced bills.5 Both Thatcher 
and her supporters maintained that the decision to abandon the charge 
represented either a collective loss of nerve on the part of the Conservative 
parliamentary party, or more sinisterly, part of the ongoing machinations of the 
Prime Minister's opponents. 6 They maintained that 'more and more people were 
coming to believe that everyone ought to contribute something to the upkeep of 
services which they use'. 7 Even at a local level many Conservative councillors 
still supported the basic principles of the tax. For example in April 1993, 
Councillor Graham Bull, leader of Ealing council concluded that 'the 
community charge was a fair tax. I'm disappointed its gone.' 8 
However, developments both outside and inside the Conservative Party 
continued to make abolition ever more likely. In February Major was accused of 
'dithering' by sections of the media and increasingly felt compelled to establish 
his own authority as leader, by pushing forward the process of reform. On 7 
March the Ribble Valley by-election saw the loss of the Conservatives' 
thirteenth safest seat and was widely perceived as a referendum on the poll tax, 
with one survey finding that 57% of all voters (and a third of all Conservatives) 
cited the tax as the issue that would most affect their voting intentions.
9 
On 19 
March Norman Lamont presented his first budget and promised to cut every poll 
tax bill by £140 per head, with average personal bills now set to fall from £)92 
to £252. The move not only took some of the sting out of the charge for 
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traditional Conservative supporters, but also effectively signalled the 
government's intention to abolish it. As any return to a policy of increasing 
progressive income taxes was ruled out, the reduction was to be funded by 
increases in indirect taxation and VAT subsequently rose from 15% to 17.5%. 
At this stage Heseltine was still unclear about the details of any alternative and 
instead sought to establish some fundamental points. The government was 
unequivocal that whatever the shape of its eventual replacement, the poll tax 
would 'at the earliest possible moment' be abolished. 10 Moreover, any 
replacement tax would be based on 'two essential elements, the number of 
adults living there and the value of the property'. Clearly a return to the status 
quo was imminent, a point apparently confirmed by the new Council tax, which 
had four main features. Firstly, it was based on property values, with properties 
assigned to eight 'bands'. Secondly, it retained a minor 'personal' element, with 
a personal discount of 25% available for single householders. Thirdly, there 
were 100% rebates for low income groups. Fourthly, councils would only issue 
one bill per household. Significantly, the legislation also included a provision 
debarring any councillors who had failed to pay either poll tax or council tax 
from voting on financial issues. 
The announcement of a new council tax based on these principles did much to 
allay public concerns, but played less well among the protestors and the left in 
general, many of whom concluded that 'we've won - well ... almost!' For as 
E I" " d 11 a mg campaIgners note: 
Whereas the Council Tax will generate a differential of only 21/ 2: 1 
between richest and poorest (eg £600:£240) the rating system had 
differentials of 20: 1 within boroughs."" It is clear that there is a very 
large flat rate element in the Tories' new proposals. 
Similarly, the Council Tax would continue to allow local authorities to raise 
only 20% of their income, leaving central government very much in control of 
the Unified Business Rate and with the right to cap budgets. So from the outset 
anti-poll tax protestors and local authority trade unionists in Ealing believed that 
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the new tax would have essentially malign effects for local government and 
services, pointing out that in its first year (l993) the borough made 125 teachers 
redundant and cut other services. 12 
But in a sense, the detail of the policy shift may have been less important than 
the 8:ccotnpanying spin. The government's media presentation of the abolition 
announcement was, under the circumstances, very slick indeed - although it 
would probably be wrong to exaggerate the difficulty of the task given the 
marked Conservative bias of British newspaper proprietors. Thus after spring 
1991 'the issue disappeared almost completely from the national news agenda, 
despite the fact the tax still had a two year period to run'. 13 Similarly, whatever 
national media coverage did arise tended to faithfully follow the government's 
agenda, even if it often drew radically different conclusions. This may have 
been important. One detailed study of media reporting of the poll tax conducted 
by Deacon and Golding found a clear correlation between public perceptions of 
the salience of the tax as a political issue (as measured by opinion polls) and the 
quantity of national media coverage. 14 This. apparently confrrmed the 
proposition that 'the media may not tell us what to think but they are very 
influential in telling us what to think about' .IS 
What then, were people to think about the government's decision to abolish the 
poll tax? The main explanations put forward by politicians of all parties, the 
media and academics flagged up conventional factors, such as letters to MPs, 
by-election results, opinion poll evidence, intra-party power struggles and policy 
disputes. The fact that millions of people had not paid the tax was, however, 
noticeably absent from most of these accounts. This was surprising, for by 
spring 1991 non-payment levels were over 20% in some urban areas and 10% in 
non-urban districts. Moreover, this fiscal time bomb was unlikely to be defused 
by the coercive instruments then available. For example, surveys of local 
authorities conducted by the Audit Commission found that coercive sanctions 
against non-payers, including wage and benefit deductions, use of bailiffs and 
even the threat of impris~nment had not produced payment in 80 per cent of 
cases. 16 Moreover the Scottish experience suggested that non-payment was if 
anything likely to groW.17 
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Although such levels of non-payment might be containable in the short teI11\ 
they promised a spiral of ever-increasing bills (adjusted to make good collection 
shortfalls) followed by surging public anger, followed by more non-payment. 
This in tum implied that even in the medium term the collapse of the poll tax 
was a re'll possibility. So by 21 March Major felt compelled to warn the cabinet 
that 'in the final analysis, difficulties of collection rendered [the tax] 
unworkable' and the majority of the population continued to consider it 
'unfair' .18 The cabinet then formally decided to abolish the tax and later that day 
Heseltine made the necessary announcement in the House of Commons. While 
it is commonsensical to acknowledge that the tax had proved 'uncollectable', 
most accounts have pointedly underplayed, or more usually ignored altogether, 
the role played by the organised anti-poll tax campaign in promoting non-
payment. I will return to this important question in the next chapter, which 
considers the meaning of non-payment within the wider context of active 
citizenship and the left. The focus here is necessarily narrower and concerns the 
impact of the abolition announcement on the protestors' efforts to defend non-
payers. 
The reaction of most local campaigners was surprisingly mixed. Initially there 
was an obvious, and perhaps understandable, sense of euphoria: 19 
One year after the anti-poll tax movement launched a mass campaign of 
non-payment, abolition has been announced. Our campaign provoked a 
political crisis which forced Thatcher to go ... This is the most significant 
climb down since the Tories came to power in 1979. 
Moreover, this victory, against all predictions, had primarily been secured by the 
exercise of 'peoples' power', undertaken by 'millions who took direct action by 
refusing to register, by refusing to pay, by bashing the bailiffs. And it's one in 
the eye for those traitorous politicians who bleat vote for us and we'll scrap the 
poll tax. ,20 But any sense of triumphal ism was tempered by a number of other 
concerns. While the Ealing protestors continued to characterise non-payment as 
part of a wider 'campaign', there was also a frank recognition about their limited 
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ability to influence non-payment, which had by now gathered its own 
momentum: 21 
There is no sign that the non-payment campaign is collapsing. On the 
contrary it seems to have drawn strength from the news of abolition. 
Though it is possible that some '\von't payers" will conclude that we 
have already won, and others will be pleased with the reduction of Poll 
Tax bills this year, on the other hand people are joining the campaign 
because so many millions are seen to get away with it. 
Inevitably then, the 'one thing we can be sure of is that [there will be] people 
who genuinely cannot afford to pay still being taken to court, still having bailiffs 
come round and still being sent to prison'. 22 
All this posed a simple and immediate question - should the campaign carry on 
advocating non-payment, or for that matter, carry on at all? Both the London 
and All-Britain Federations remained unequivocally committed to maintaining 
the non-payment campaign as a means of forcing an amnesty for non-payers. 23 
However, other prominent individual campaigners and organisations disagreed. 
For example, Len Lucas of the Poll Tax Legal Group, together with the SNP 
abandoned non-payment, as did the vast majority of those left-wing Labour MPs 
who had up to now refused to pay.24 After all, now that the campaign had 'won' 
there was no longer any justification for continued civil disobedience. In that 
sense, it was hard to justify the escalating personal costs of non-payment for 
non-payers. On the other hand, there were strong arguments to continue. For the 
consequences of poll tax for those who could not afford to pay would continue 
unabated. There was, therefore, an obvious moral imperative for all those who 
had advocated non-payment to carry on 'defending' non-payers. By simply 
abandoning 'can't payers' to their fate, the protestors would have confirmed 
their opponents' oft-repeated accusation that they were simply 'using' people 
for their own (extreme) political ends. In any case, there was also an 
unashamedly political imperative. Although the Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation 
was always a single-issue campaign, it drew its strength from a broadly anti-
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Tory coalition. In carrying on, the protestors could therefore seek to hold both 
the local Conservative council and the central government to account. 
t. j eighing all these factors, the Ealing Federation urged local citizens not to 
'give up now! Don't be fooled into thinking it's all over!,25, Nevertheless, many 
active pn)testors voted with their feet and after the abolition announcement the 
levels of activity of local groups and activists began to rapidly wane (see chapter 
two). Even so sufficient number of others chose to continue, but unless the anti-
poll tax campaign was simply to provide apolitical support to non-payers in the 
form of legal support, the campaign required a political demand around which to 
campaign. This took the form of demands for an amnesty for all non-payers. 
Amnesty 
Any demand for a full amnesty for all poll tax non-payers could be seen as 
perverse. After all, why should the majority of law-abiding citizens, who had 
paid the poll tax, be discriminated against? By granting an amnesty in such 
circumstances the state would, in effect, be colluding with those who had defied 
rule of law, a point unequivocally spelt out in a letter to the Ealing Federation 
from the Department of the Environment, which emphasised that: 26 
the Government are adamant that there will be no amnesty for non-
payers ... To withhold payment for whatever reason simply puts the 
[local] authority under extra pressure and adds to the strain of people 
who have diligently and rightly paid their charge. It is one thing to 
disagree with Government policy, but quite another to break the law by 
failing to pay. 
As if to underline its determination, the government subsequently issued an order 
in council that allowed local authorities six, rather than two years, in which to 
collect outstanding debts. 27 
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Similarly, the Labour Party signalled its continued opposition to non-payment 
and a motion arguing for a full amnesty received short shrift at the party's 1991 
Annual Conference. 28 Significantly, the two most prominent non-paying Labour 
MPs, Dave Nellist and Terry Fields, were also baITed from attending conference 
as part of ongoing expulsion proceedings and even the minority of left-wing MPs 
who had Iefused to pay up tended to distance themselves from the campaign for 
an amnesty.19 On the other hand, support grew for a partial write off of poll tax 
debts. For example, by the Spring of 1991 local government associations, the 
Poll Tax Forum (supported by the Labour party and trade unions) and even the 
Audit Commission had publicly come out in support of a limited form of 
amnesty, directed at those eligible to pay 20% of the charge. Similarly, it was 
suggested that councils should be given the power to write off unpaid bills on the 
grounds of hardship. None of this was necessarily motivated by altruism, as the 
Audit Commission concluded that the cost of pursuing poorer debtors was 
'disproportionate' and 'not a good use of scarce recovery resources,.30 
But ultimately these various suggestions failed to move the government, which 
argued that essential principles were at stake, including the rule of law and the 
primary duty of citizens to pay their taxes. How then did the protestors seek to 
justify their call for an amnesty? Firstly, they maintained that an unjust law 
remained an unjust law. If the poll tax was discredited, as the government had 
admitted, why continue 'persecuting the poor'? Given that many of the poorest 
could not pay such a course was actually futile, as well as immoral. Secondly, it 
was the government that was responsible for the parlous state of local 
government finances, not the non-payers. The fact that the government had 
squandered prestigious amounts of public money on no less than seven attempts 
to revamp the charge by mid-1991 implied that resources could be found. As 
one protestor acerbically noted: 31 
The cost of implementing the Poll Tax was at least £ 1 0 billion. then £5 
billion more was pumped in to lower the tax in its second year. . to 
make the government more 'attractive' in local elections. The £ 1.6 
billion of poll tax debt is peanuts in comparison. 
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Nevertheless the problem of those who had paid remained and, significantly, 
tended to be ignored in the various leaflets, documents and memoirs written 
after the abolition announcement. The nearest the anti-poll tax campaign came 
to ( erent policy on the issue, was formulated by a group of London activists, 
who enjoyed little influence with the All Britain Federation. They rejected 
proposals for a local 'tax holiday' and instead suggested the government should 
back-date any replacement tax to April 1989 for Scotland and April 1990 for 
England, and then subtract the revised charge from actual payments made for 
poll tax. 32 Given that the charge would be lower than the poll tax for most 
citizens, this would lead to either a partial reimbursement, or in the case of 'the 
poor', a full refund. As the government was responsible for the poll tax, it 
should, as a special measure, write off the extra money owed by wealthier 
households who would have to pay more under the new system. Even so there is 
no evidence that this was taken up by the Ealing protestors, who in common 
with almost all local anti-poll tax campaigns tended to rely on emotive, broad-
brush arguments for an amnesty. Inevitably perhaps, such arguments proved less 
than convincing and as the Ealing Federation itself rather lamely admitted: 
We recognise that none of [our] demands will be graciously conceded, 
they will have to be fought for. It is unlikely that any government, 
Labour or Tory, will formally forgive the Poll Tax debts. The best way 
to get [them] written off is to carry on not paying. If we keep up the 
pressure and the bailiffs continue to be a failure they may be forced to 
'1 h '1 33 bump the level of central government grants to bal out t e counCI s. 
With all the rigour that the law will allow 
Needless to say, if given the choice, Ealing council would have happily rejected 
this particular offer of assistance. For by the end of November 1991 it was clear 
that only £76 million out of a total of £92 million had been collected for the 
1990/1 tax year, a non-collection rate of over 17 per cent.H While some of these 
debts were to prove recoverable later, the council still projected a non-collection 
rate of 10% in the 1991/2 and 1992/3 tax years. More worryingly, at the end of 
the second quarter of 1991/2 tax year only 73% of Ealing residents had made 
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any payment and the council considered whether to organise a 'no amnesty, 
publicity campaign. However, the news was not all bad. When set against that of 
neighbouring London boroughs, Ealing had improved its collection rate slightly 
for the second quarter of 1991/2:35 
Borough 
. . % of CC payers Receipts of 9112 Receipts of 90/1 
. 
making payment charges as a % of charges as a % of 
for 91/2 by 30-9-91 9112 budgeted yield 90/1 budgeted yield 
by Sept 1991 by Sept 1990 
Ealing 73.2 38.1 37.6 
Brent 36.8 
Hammersmith & 
Fulham 67.8 26.8 44.3 
Harrow 83.0 40.0 46.1 
Hillingdon 78.9 29.6 37.9 
Hounslow 75.2 36.2 37.9 
Nevertheless, the council experienced problems right up to until the poll tax' 
abolition, with over 200,000 community charge accounts· in arrears at the 
beginning of April 1993, owing a total of £25 million.36 In London as a whole, 
some £ 160 million of poll tax remained uncollected, even though £220 million 
had been written off37 
How did Ealing Conservative councillors' explain this unprecedented shortfall? 
While it is always wise to distinguish between politicians' public statements and 
their real opinions ( or motives), two broad explanations for non-payment can be 
readily discerned. Firstly, councillors explained non-payment as an almost 
inevitable consequence of the tax itself: which as we have seen, was relatively 
easy to avoid and plagued by administrative and computer problems. However, 
the evidence also suggests that the council increasingly came to see non-
payment as a deliberate act by individuals seeking to evade their responsibilities 
to the wider community. Given the existence of a vociferous non-payment 
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campaign in the borou~ it was but a short step to conclude that at least some of 
the defaulters were organised. So perhaps inevitably, the Ealing Anti-Poll Tax 
Federation became the target of a certain degree of opprobrium from 
'. Conservative councillors. In part this reflected an ideological dislike of the 
leftist extremists protestors, who, it was felt, were flouting the law of the land 
and in the process, 'using' people in pursuit of their extremist political goals. In 
. 
particular, by issuing 'misleading' advice, the protestors would encourage 
otherwise law-abiding individuals to needlessly suffer. For example, following 
the committal of Maurice White ( see below) the council issued a press release 
that was clearly aimed at attempting to discredit the protestors:38 
The Anti-Poll Tax Union's advice to the public can be detrimental. By 
refusing to pay, the public faces distraint and removal of their property 
and possible jail sentences, all of which can be costly to the individual ... 
The public are advised to contact the council rather than follow the 
Anti-Poll Tax Union's advice. 
On other occasions, councillors urged the public not 'to be the dupes of the 
Anti-Poll Tax Federation'. 39 
Conservative councillors also vigorously contested many of the key arguments 
put forward by the protestors and appear to have considered their calls for an 
amnesty, or even a more 'humane' enforcement procedure as quite simply 
perverse. Thus in a letter to the protestors Councillor David Millican sought to 
throw their accusations of' heartlessness' back in their faces: 40 
The attitude of your organisation in advocating non-payment of a legal 
tax is callous and uncaring in the extreme... Who has to make up for 
their non-payment? There is no magic fairy who will create £5 notes 
from rose petals to pay for aU the services provided by the council. The 
vast majority of Jaw abiding citizens in the borough, including those on 
I Theoretically, by 1993 one individual OOU;Id have ~ on three separate 'accounts' for each 
of the tine tax years the poD tax had been an operaDon. 
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low incomes, will have their community charge increased next year to 
cover for the non-payers. What will you say to them? 
It was certainly undeniable that charges of those who had paid were boosted as a 
result of non-payment. For example, by 1992 chargepayers in London had to 
pay an ~verage surcharge of £28 per head due to late or non-payment. 41 In 
Ealing, Conservative councillors were keen to lay the blame for any rise in the 
level of the charge in 1992/3 at the door of non-payers. As Councillor Bull 
explained in Ea/ing Voices, a magazine produced by the council and delivered 
free to every household, 'we have held the increase to a minimum but it would 
have been lower still if it were not for those people who haven't paid their 
bills. ,42 But such appeals were rather moderate compared to those attempted in 
some other London boroughs. For example, in neighbouring Brent the council 
published the names and addresses of thousands of local non-payers in full page 
advertisements in the local press. 
The councillors also had scant sympathy with the contention that many residents 
would simply be unable to pay. Instead they pointed to the provision of 
Community Charge Benefit (CCB) and increases in benefit levels instituted after 
1988 to help towards the 20% contribution as evidence that sufficient provision 
had been built into the system. As Michael Heseltine saw it, this was 'hardly 
"naked oppression of the poor"! ,43 On the other hand, CCB - based largely on 
the Housing Benefit system 44 - was in practise quite hard to qualify for as a full 
rebate would only be eligible for those whose weekly income was close to that 
provided by Income Support (£57.53 in 1990). In effect, a couple with two 
children would both be eligible to pay the full charge if their joint income 
exceeded £135 per week.45 Nevertheless, councillors and council officers were 
adamant that the recovery procedure contained built in safeguards that would 
prevent the poor being arbitrarily treated. For the option of committal was 'only 
taken as a last resort', 'a persons ability to pay is considered prior to any 
decision' to prosecute and 'all outstanding benefit claims were investigated 
before the hearing'. 46 Unlike Hillingdon (Tory) council, which set up a hardship 
committee of councillors to explore whether each individual was capable of 
paying before proceeding, Ealing Conservatives were content to leave matters in 
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the hands of council officers. For ultimately, even if they erred the court would 
institute a proper means enquiry that would ensure that justice was done. As 
Councillor Richardson confidently asserted: 47 
No British court will jail anyone who cannot afford to pay their 
~omIJ1unity charge. Those who are sentenced to prison are those who 
are able "to pay but who wilfully refuse to do so. 
Moreover, many councillors argued, if as the protestors claimed, those jailed 
were too poor to pay, why did the vast majority of them subsequently secure 
their release by paying up? 
Nor did the protestors appear to receive much support from the Ealing Labour 
group. Although one individual - councillor John Gallagher - did ask officials 
questions when approached by the Federation concerning individual cases and 
the general principles underpinning the council's collection strategy. But even 
Gallagher was at pains to point out that he was 'in no way opposing the Council 
in using its ultimate sanction [eg imprisonment] to collect the revenue required 
to discharge its many financial obligations. I am solely concerned that the 
council is not acting in a manner which may be unduly harsh or oppressive 
against many of our citizens whose circumstances are so straightened as to make 
collection unproductive,.48 Similarly, John Cudmore, the group leader, side-
stepped direct appeals to oppose either the use of bailiffs or the jailing policy 
and blandly noted: 49 
My colleagues and I share your concern over the many people in the 
Borough who find themselves in difficulties because they are simply 
unable to pay this unfair tax. I would urge you to put such people in 
touch with their Labour councillors and we will do everything possible 
to help them and make sure they get all the Benefits they are entitled to. 
As we saw in the last chapter, Labour authorities were actually more likely to 
issue liability orders in connection with 'this unfair tax'. However, the evidence 
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does suggest that Labour councils were more reluctant to initiate committal 
proceedings. For example, of the 156 individuals who had served their sentences 
by December 1991 in England and Wales, only 29 were residents of Labour 
f. au -ties (with Labour controlled Burnley accounting for 23 ofthese).5o 
It see)11ed .. then, that irrespective of their party affiliation, Ealing councillors 
were committed to pursuing 'those who fail to pay with all the rigour that the 
law will allow'.S! Not only was there a statutory duty to collect the poll tax52, 
but more importantly there was a duty to the majority of law-abiding residents 
who had paid the charge. As one Tory councillor put it, if this meant 'that some 
individuals are sent to Prison, then so be it. ,53 A similar spirit of detennination 
informed the council's use of bailiffs. 
A blunt instrument 
The previous chapter outlined the legal and administrative process up to the 
liability order stage. Once an order had been granted in the magistrates' court, 
the local authority was empowered to move to the next stage in the recovery 
procedure, namely an attempt to 'levy distress,.s4 This involved the use of 
certificated bailiffs, who were legally authorised to 'distrain', or seize goods in 
respect of the outstanding debt. As the tenninology suggests, the origins of the 
system - described by Lord Denning as an 'archaic remedy' - went back to the 
early middle ages. Nevertheless, most local authorities, including Ealing, 
assumed that bailiffs would prove an important means of poll tax enforcement. 
For under the rates, the mere threat of distraint had invariably proved sufficient 
to elicit payment. For example, of the 1.2 million warrants issued to bailiffs by 
county courts in 1988, only 2,393 (0.2%) cases led to the sale of seized goods." 
Even so, the prospect of burly bailiffs physically seizing goods to secure unpaid 
taxes projected an emotive and controversial image and the Law Commission 
recommended its abolition in 1986. Such problems. were magnified given the 
political sensitivity of the poll tax. As one legal guide, aimed at local authority 
finance officers noted: '6 
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Distress has proved to be a very effective method of obtaining rates' 
payments but it is a blunt instrument which must be tempered by strict 
policy guidelines on how bailiffs are to perform their duties. 
Consequently, Ealing council's own code of conduct/operational guide showed 
a keen awareness of the potential damage illegal or heavy-handed bailiff action 
might inflict upon the reputation of the authority in general and the Community 
Charge Department in particular, which would 'have a very much higher profile 
than hitherto, being the focus of attention for all adults resident in Ealing. 57 Thus 
bailiffs employed should 'bear in mind that they are acting as ambassadors for 
the London Borough ofEaling.,58 
However, in comparison with their colleagues in Scotland, the thousand or so 
certificated bailiffs operating in England and Wales were relatively constrained 
by a number of legal restrictions. 59 In Scotland, if attempts to freeze non-payers 
bank accounts or deduct wages failed (in the event they were never 
systematically applied due to logistical problems) then local authorities could 
issue a warrant and then attempt a 'poinding'. This involved Sheriffs Officers 
(eg bailiffs) forcibly entering a defaulters home and valuing 'non-essential' 
goods. These could then be sold at public auction ( a 'warrant sale') to clear the 
debt, although this sanction was rarely invoked. Bailiffs in England and Wales 
did not enjoy the right to force entry into an individuals home. Indeed, as one 
anti-poll tax legal guide noted, 'their powers of entry are rather like those 
traditionally associated with vampires - they have to be invited in or allowed in 
by an occupant of the property, or find an already open door or window.60 The 
police would only attend in the event of a possible breach of the peace. There 
were also a number of other legal restrictions relating to the conduct of bailiffs, 
the sorts of goods they could seize and the method by which they might be sold. 
In general then, it was relatively easy to confound any attempt to levy distress. 
But this in tum assumed that debtors were aware of their rights and bailitTs 
adhered to the relevant legal restrictions. 
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Bailiff-busting 
The first bailiff visits in Ealing began in November 1990 and almost from the 
outset problems arose. According to the protestors, the council's initial tactic 
appeared to be to target about 15 or so people and then begin 'continually 
harassing. them,.61 The Ealing Federation also alleged that letters from the 
council's bailiffs (Madagans) were threatening and misleading, as they stated 
that they could 'remove goods, even in your absence, with police in attendance 
if necessary,.62 In the event, of the 858 liability orders in the hands of the 
council's bailiffs, there was only one case of distraint (eg the seizure of goods) 
by 22 January 1991. But embarrassingly, even in this case the council was 
forced to backtrack and retrospectively grant benefit and return all goods 
seized.63 Nevertheless, the successful use of distress under the rates led anti-poll 
tax protestors in Ealing and elsewhere to conclude that if unopposed, bailiffs 
could seriously undermine the civil disobedience campaign. But how was this to 
be achieved? Initially, in common with most English anti-poll tax campaigners, 
the Ealing protestors envisaged a collective response by the community to the 
bailiffs.64 This sought to emulate tactics pursued by Scottish anti-poll tax unions 
which regularly boasted that by the middle of 1991, some eighteen months after 
the poll tax's introduction, 'not a single person has had their possessions taken 
away ... The federation has mobilised people every time the Sheriffs have tried to 
visit a home. They have always retreated. ,65 Even though the claim was a little 
disingenuous - 'poindings' (eg forced entry followed by valuations of goods) 
had occurred, even if they were not followed up a warrant sale - the lesson 
seemed clear enough. Collective acts of protest would continue to make the tax 
unworkable. 
So in Ealing, in late 1990 and early 1991 when the use of bailiffs for poll tax 
collection was very much at a fonnative stage, groups of protestors were 
mobilised to 'protect' non-payers. For example, in December 1990 members of 
Acton APTU 'barricaded' themselves in the home of a Mr and Mrs White, who 
had been warned of a forthcoming bailiff visit. 66 On this (as in numerous other) 
occasions the bailiffs failed to attend. Such tactics were ultimately , 
unsustainable given the small number of activists available during the day 
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relative to the total number of non-payers in the borough and the Ealing 
protestors were therefore keen to promote a form of 'community self-defence'. 
For example, one leaflet handed to people leaving liability order hearings in 
early 1991 claimed (original emphasis): 
REMEMBER YOU ARE NOT ALONE. The Anti Poll Tax movement 
. 
is at this moment building up a 'telephone tree' in your area of people 
prepared to turn up at a moments notice to beat the bailiffs. Bailiffs are 
scum. We'll make sure they know what local people think of them. We 
are canvassing now in your area to set up squads of BAll-IFF 
BUSTERSb ... If we get a crowd of people there, they won't get up to 
their usual tricks ... WE INTEND TO LOOK AFTER OUR OWN. 
As the leaflet suggested, once a group of 'bailiff busters' had been recruited in a 
specific council estate or group of streets, it was hoped to utilise a 'telephone 
tree' as a sort of modem 'hue and cry'. So, for example, some anti-poll tax 
protestors circulated details of the make and registration number of cars used by 
various firms of bailiffs. People available in the day would pledge themselves to 
phoning three others if bailiffs were sighted, who would then phone two others, 
who would then phone one other. But as the Federation conceded, it would 'be 
A LOT OF WORK organising this' (original emphasis), not least in finding 
enough people willing to join the tree.67 
In the event, the idea ever took off and the protestors soon downgraded their 
ambitions, aiming to establish 'the minimum' of a local daytime telephone 
number 'to give people the confidence to carry on'. 68 The Ealing Federation, in 
common with most English and Welsh protestors, therefore tended to 
concentrate on circulating information regarding the various rights enjoyed by 
bailiffs, through the use of posters, leaflets and 'hotlines'. In particular, efforts 
were made to promote the pithy slogan: 'Don't let them in and they can't win!' 
which gained wide currency. This was confirmed by reports from the Audit 
Commission which concluded that the bailiffs' general lack of success was , 
h The name 'Bailiff Busters' was a play on the title of a popular US comedy film. 'Ghostbustcrs'. 
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largely 'due to defaulters being aware of their rights in relation to gaining access 
to premi ses' .69 
Some anti-poll tax campaIgners also organised pUblicity stunts, such as 
occupations of bailiff's officers or by giving local councillors a taste of their own 
medicine by organising mock bailiff-style visits to their homes. For example, in 
March 1991 London campaigners threatened to call on every council leader at 
6am claiming to be bailiffs - a tactic described by Margaret Hodge, Labour 
leader of Islington council as 'intimidation that symbolises the worst in 
politics,.70 Martin Mallam, the leader of Ealing council's comments was a little 
more intemperate: 71 
I imagine I will be up at 6 am, but if these people do carry out the visits 
I only hope the magistrates, seeing their well publicised campaign, will 
treat them fairly when they appear before the courts for non-payment of 
their poll tax. 
Although it does seem that a few individual activists did regularly phone local 
councillors, sometimes at unseasonable hours,72 the Ealing Federation as a 
whole never actively sought to apply unconventional direct pressure on the 
borough authorities on the assumption that this might serve only to antagonise 
them further. 
A few protestors also sought to exploit legal loopholes, most notably through the 
drafting of 'bills of sale' - a legally binding written contract that legally 
transferred all an individuals possessions to 'a trusted' friend or family member 
for a nominal sum.73 The theory here was that even if bailiffs secured entry to a 
person's home, their possessions would be 'owned' by someone else and there 
would therefore be no goods and chattels to seize. Clearly, such a scheme was 
far-fetched and fraught with legal pit-falls, but is nonetheless indicative of the 
serious light in which bailiffs were viewed. For it is hard to underestimate the 
sense of antipathy felt by many organised anti-poll tax campaigners towards 
bailiffs, who were variously described as a 'form of mass terror', 'thugs 
ransacking your home for property they can steal', 'cowards [ who] targeted the 
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vulnerable' and so on?4 Although the rhetoric was clearly aimed at discrediting 
distress as a form of debt collection, there may actually have been little need for 
such propaganda, as bailiff companies were so obviously unpopular anyway. 
This was particularly evident in inner-city areas. As members of the Certificated 
Bailiffs Association conceded 'You go to the first door and they spit at you. You 
go to the. second and you are refused entry and abused. You go to the third and 
someone takes a swing at you ... It's a tough old world out there but taxes have to 
be paid. ,75 
It would be tedious (and largely pointless) to provide a blow by blow account of 
the relative success of the various bailiffs firms employed by Ealing council 
between November 1990 and 1 April 1993, but in general the evidence supports 
Mick Brook's analysis. 
We thought they were going to be a major problem ... But they were just 
ripping the council off, even in their own terms. They were charging 
£40 just to hand deliver a [threatening] letter as far as I could see. They 
were an extremely non-cost effective method of collection. 
By January 1992 the council found that some two-thirds of defaulters had 
moved by the time bailiffs fIrst visited. 76 In October 1992 the council's Finance 
Committee considered a detailed report on the service provided by bailiff 
companies which concluded that their efforts 'were disappointing and fell well 
short of expectations,.77 Cash collection rates varied between 10-15% of all 
cases and even then, council staff had to support the bailiff companies by 
offering various sorts of time consuming administrative support. It seemed then 
that the bailiffs had been 'busted', but by whom? To a large extent, their failure 
reflected inevitable logistical problems, as only one thousand certified bailiffs 
in England and Wales sought to enforce millions of liability orders. However 
the question is also of direct relevance to any discussion of citizenship and the 
poll tax. For as we have seen, two broad (not necessarily mutually exclusive) 
explanations were advanced by anti-poll tax campaigners. 
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The first largely related to events in Scotland where 'poinding' was the ultimate 
sanction deployed by local authorities, and emphasised a spontaneous collective 
response by local communities, reminiscent of historical instances of working 
class resistance, such as the Glasgow Rent strikes of 1915: 78 
WoItlen in Lanarkshire towns keep lists of [sheriffs] vehicle 
registration numbers in their kitchens. The bush telegraph begins to sing 
if the cars are spotted. Friends and neighbours are called. Children on 
bikes run to the families who don't have phones. Before long a crowd 
has assembled to welcome the sheriffs. 
There is little solid evidence of such widespread, spontaneous anti-bailiff 
activity in England and Wales, although some activists recorded instances of 
more limited mobilisations on specific council estates.79 In general, much 
appears to have depended on the nature of the community involved. According 
to Bums, in the West Country village of Bishops Lydeard, on one 'dramatic' 
occasion a 'large number of the tiny village's population took the day offwork ... 
Barricades were constructed and every vehicle which tried to enter was stopped 
and asked its business,.8o Many of these accounts cast anti-bailiff 
demonstrations as moments of 'collective effervescence', defined by Barker as 
'a sense of changed personal and collective identity, feelings of joy and well 
being, altered forms of public speech and ideas, a sense of self-empowerment, 
the de-legitimation of existing authority, and the creation of new informal and 
formal institutions and networks,.81 So for example, Sheridan associated the 
'poindings' with return to a golden age of shared community: 82 
Sometimes poindings were like gala days, with barbecues in summer 
and rolls and sausage in winter. .. Everybody [ came] with a loaf, cheese 
or ham to help feed the masses. Local shops donated food ... In winter 
we made a brazier from an oil drum and the local coalman often threw 
us sacks of fuel. 
It is sometimes tempting to reach for a large pinch of salt when reading such 
accounts, which portray a highly romantic view of the meaning of 'community' 
in contemporary urban Britain. For any detailed accounts of anti-bailiff activities 
soon reveal the key role played by activists. 83 Sometimes these were local 
community activists, who had helped run food co-operatives, local community 
centres or tenants associations. 84 But in general, it is clear that established anti-
poll tax campaigners, often from outside the area where a 'poinding' or bailiff 
visist w<\s scheduled, were pivotal in mobilising local popular opinion. \Vhile 
this does not necessarily invalidate any claims of community mobilisation, it 
does suggest that their spontaneity can easily be exaggerated. 
Certainly the experience of the Ealing anti-poll tax protestors was altogether 
more mundane. As we have seen, the bulk of the Federation's efforts were 
directed at publicising one simple point: 'If you don't let them in, they can't 
win' and there is ample evidence that this information achieved widespread 
popular currency. However, this implied that non-payers, as individuals, held 
the key to defeating the bailiffs. So any attempt to transfer tactics fitted to the 
solidaristic culture of a Scottish housing scheme or a West Country village 
would fail to resonate in the curtain-twitching, ordered streets of an archetypal 
London suburb. 
That is not to say that in defying bailiff letters and visits non-payers were acting 
in a wholly individualistic manner. For inevitably, as knowledge grew about the 
level of non-payment, people became aware that they 'were not alone'. In that 
sense, any act of defiance came to assume a greater significance, whatever the 
intentions of the people involved. Moreover, the organised protestors continued 
to offer more direct means of assistance. As one activist recalled: 
I can remember one call where the Bailiffs were actually at the door! 
This woman phoned up and the Bailiffs were knocking at the door! She 
was saying "What should I do?" and I was kind of relaying to her what 
to say to the Bailliffs: "Just don't open the door, don't let them in!" And 
she got rid of them. This call went on for twenty minutes and it was 
unbelievable - like being on '999''; or something! 
C A TV police docu-drama 
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So in Ealing at least, the bailiffs were 'busted' not by set-piece confrontations or 
dramatic demonstrations, but by a widespread individual bloody awkwardness. 
For ng councillors, the failure of bailiffs to significantly dent the levels of 
non-payment was yet more evidence of a burgeoning 'non-payment culture', 
which in .tum encouraged them to consider more extreme measures, including 
imprisonment. 
The ultimate sanction 
Imprisonment for debt had been utilised under the rates as a final means of 
enforcement, but only sporadically. In the ten year period up to the poll tax's 
introduction some 4,000 people had been imprisoned for rates default, working 
out on average, as one per local authority per year. 85 This relatively low figure 
was partially explained by the legal framework, which assumed that 
imprisonment could only be initiated by local authorities as a 'last resort'. More 
specifically, before applying for committal, councils' had to show that all other 
stages of the recovery procedure had been exhausted, including attempts to 'levy 
distress' through the use of bailiffs. 
The committal hearing itself was supposed to take the form of a detailed 'means 
enquiry', usually conducted by the court clerk who would question the 
defendants as to their ability to pay and establish their overall circumstances. 
The means enquiry was then used by the magistrates as the basis for any 
subsequent sentence. Here the magistrates enjoyed wide powers, including the 
right to imprison debtors for up to three months if the court believed they had 
been guilty of 'culpable neglect' or 'wilful refusal'. However, the court also had 
the right to set payment conditions and write off debts altogether. At any stage 
of this process, the debtor could halt proceedings by paying up, assuming they 
had the necessary wherewithal. 
The 1988 Finance Act (and subsequent secondary legislation) did not allow the 
local authorities to 'legally remit or write-off a poll tax liability', suggesting that 
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in drafting the legislation the government may have suspected that some local 
authorities could have been tempted to play politics with their discretionary 
powers. 86 Thus, although only a minority of London local authorities had 
chc to invoke the 'ultimate sanction' by the end of 1991 its use was 
, 
arguaOlY, inherent in the recovery procedure. Nevertheless this system left local 
autho.ritie~ very much in the driving seat. This was important, for the practise of 
jailing rate defaulters (or any other sort of debtor for that matter) had long been 
a source of controversy. For example, in 1969 the Report of the Committee on 
the Enforcement of Judgement Debts' (Cmnd. 3909) advocated abolition of 
imprisonment for civil debt, other than for maintenance. By 1990 England and 
Wales were the only countries in Western Europe (including Scotland) that still 
applied the sanction. 
There were certainly several powerful rational and moral arguments against the 
practise, most of which were taken up by the Ealing Federation, which sought to 
cast it as 'archaic', 'Dickensian' and ultimately, irrational. For example, the 
protestors noted that it hardly seemed in keeping with Tory principles of cost-
efficiency to jail individuals for debt when the cost of their incarceration to the 
state (and thus ultimately the tax-payer) far exceeded the amount owed. 
Similarly, how could people repay a debt from prison? The Ealing Federation 
therefore produced posters noting that it cost '£200 a day to put a prisoner 
away', although this may was probably an exaggeration, as the government 
claimed it cost £49 a day in a prison, but £220 in a police or court cell.87 The 
protestors· also sought to highlight their contention that almost by definition, 
only the poor would suffer. After all, how many people would willingly go to 
prison, even if they felt strongly about the poll tax? Thus at demonstrations, 
Federation supporters displayed placards reading 'Poverty is not a crime, why 
should people do the time?' and, tongue in cheek, urged the courts to 'Jail The 
Tories Not The Poories!' 88 
Moreover, given the sheer numbers of non-payers in Ealing (and elsewhere), 
threatening individuals with imprisonment was. easily likened to a perverse sort 
of lottery (original emphasis): 8~ 
235 
The council cannot possibly jail the 50,000 people who haven't paid in 
Ealing. THEY ARE PICKING ON A FEW PEOPLE TO TRY AND 
INTIMIDATE THE REST OF US INTO PAYING. We must all defend 
the unlucky few. 
However. the campaigners also recognised that publicity about jailings posed its 
own dangers and were 'a bit leary about spreading alarm and despondency 
among non-payers by stressing the threat of prison'. 90 
While it was easy to rail against the perceived injustices associated with jailing 
poll tax defaulters, it was less easy to persuade local councillors, as the ultimate 
decision-makers, to desist from the practice. The Federation therefore sought to 
apply two broad forms of pressure simultaneously. Firstly, attempts were made 
to mobilise public opinion. The tactics used, however, were not particularly 
innovative and initially centred around lobbies of council meetings, which may 
have only served to antagonise already hostile councillors. As ever, these had 
the potential to become rowdy. On 23 July, two days before Ealing's first 
committal hearing, 'more than 50 people burst into the council chamber, 
chanting and singing anti-poll tax slogans' as 'councillors promised to jail 
Ealing residents who refused to pay,.91 Again, on 17 August some 100 
protestors gathered outside Ealing Town Hall, and heard speeches denouncing 
the jailing of Stephen Hynes', the first person to be imprisoned in the borough.92 
Around 30 of them then dispersed throughout the local shopping centre to 
distribute the following leaflet, which is perhaps worth quoting at a little 
length. 93 
GUILTY 
- OF BEING POOR 
Eating Council has jailed Stephen Hynes for not paying the Poll Tax. He has committed 
no crime. Stephen has been unemployed since November and should really be entitled 
to a rebatc. Instead he has been billed for the full Poll Tax and then jailcd because he' s 
too poor to afford it! 
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The Council has the discretion to start or not to start comrnittaJ proceedi Eal' ngs. mg 
Tory Council has decided to put the boot in. We know that at the end of the day. it "ill 
be people who just haven't got the money who will end up in jail. 
They won't get any money off Stephen this way. Your 'debt' is cancelled once you are 
imprisoned. This callous and vindictive jailing is simply about persecuting the poor. 
PROTEST! 
Let your councillors know exactly what you think There is a list of the real guilty ones 
on the back of this sheet. .. 
The reverse of the leaflet then reproduced the home telephone numbers of all 
Ealing councillors, irrespective of party and asked readers to 'phone your 
councillor now!' Similarly, people were urged to use their existing membership 
of community groups as a means of exerting pressure: 'Whether you are a 
member of a trade union, tenants' association or just a concerned individual, let 
your local councillor know how you feel. ,94 
The local media offered another means of influence and the Federation proved 
increasingly able to shape the local news agenda. For in contrast to the national 
coverage of the poll tax, which declined after the abolition announcement of 
March 1991, local reporting continued at a fairly high level. But 'whereas the 
national media readily subscribed to the view that anti-poll tax groups were 
stalking horses of the extreme left, such conspiracy theories were less evident in 
local reporting. ,95 This was potentially significant, as studies of local newspaper 
circulation in the period found that in some areas, the local paper was read by as 
much as 80% of the population.96 In Ealing, the trend was reinforced by the 
existence of two rival 'free-sheets', delivered to every household in the borough, 
each claiming a circulation of over 100,000. But in a sense local press interest 
was probably inevitable, as difficulties arising from the tax were simply too 
manifest to ignore. These stories tended to highlight three main aspects of the 
poll tax as a 'problem': continued administrative 'chaos'; the impact non-
payment on the local counciL and most usefully for the organised protestors. 
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regular personal 'hard-luck' stories of vulnerable individual residents threatened 
with coercive recovery measures. 
In this period several factors served to boost the credibility of the Federation 
amongst the local press, the most important of which was undoubtedly the 
govemm..ent's decision to scrap the tax, apparently confIrming that the 
protestors' had been right all along in characterising the system as 
fundamentally 'unjust' and 'unworkable. For example, following the 
imprisonment of Steven Hynes, the News Editor of the Ea/ing Ga=ette indicated 
in a letter to the Federation that as 'the poll tax [is] discredited as a fonn oflocal 
taxation, I would be keen to write a follow up story from Stephen's [sic] point of 
view,.97 The subsequent report cast Hynes in a highly favourable light: 98 
Steven, who lives at home to care for his disabled mum, stopped 
working in November... but in court had no evidence showing that he 
was on unemployment benefit. 
Such stories allowed the Federation to secure a platfonn for more overtly 
political comment, including a full page 'Viewpoint' article setting out the 
Federation's detailed criticisms of the councils' policy of jailing for debt99 and 
quotes on most poll tax related stories. As the campaigners had ready access to 
'inside information' from sympathetic council workers they could also 
sometimes offer journalists genuine 'scoops'. For example, a front-page article 
one of the borough's free-sheets prominently repeated Federation 'revelations' 
that 'the council was heading towards financial disaster'; that 'payment had dried 
up'; that 'the condition of the computer system is critical'; and that the council 
was 'still chasing rate arrears from the 1970s'. 100 Similarly, as individuals with 
hard-luck stories regularly approached the Federation it was relatively easy to 
feed the local press embarrassing examples of 'injustices'. For example, in June 
1991 the protestors took up the case of Ken Purnell, a 68 year old South Ealing 
resident and pensioner, suffering from bronchial asthma and 'kept alive by a 
101 0 
mini-ventilator' who had nevertheless been pursued for the full charge. nee , 
informed of Purnell's position, the council quickly backtracked and 
retrospectively granted benefit. Nevertheless, such stories lent the protestors a 
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I. 
certain authority and perhaps chipped away at the legitimacy of the council's 
recovery efforts. 
However, all these overtly political activities largely failed to dent the council's 
resolve to jail those non-payers whom they believed to be 'wilful refusers'. As a 
resul~, th.e Federation increasingly concentrated on providing advice and direct 
legal assistance to all those threatened with imprisonment. As the dynamic of 
the anti-poll tax campaign shifted further and further towards individual case 
work, calls to 'clog up the courts' were replaced by attempts at advocacy and 
even the central issue of non-payment receded from the protestors' rhetoric. As 
Mick Brooks recalled (my emphasis): 102 
If they came to us [beforehand] we would try and move heaven and 
earth to get a lawyer there ... There was no question of putting people up 
to suffer for our cause. Our aim was to keep people out of prison if at 
all humanly possible. 
The machine strides on 
Ealing began its attempts to jail non-payers with the first committal hearing held 
at Acton Magistrates' court on July 25, 1991. Forty-nine were summonsed, but 
only nine turned up for court and in general, in Ealing, about 800/0 of those 
proceeded against failed to tum up unless arrested. IOJ Given the gravity of the 
potential penalty, this low tum out surprised most activists, but was to prove 
fairly typical of cases in other London Petty Sessional Areas.
I04 
Of the nine 
defendants that did attend the hearing, two were immediately committed to 
prison. The first - a female Ealing council worker - avoided jail by paying her 
outstanding debt in full, although according to the protestors this 'left her with 
no money for the rest of the month' (see chapter four alsO).I05 As we have seen, 
the second, Stephen Hynes an unemployed warehouse worker. was jailed for 30 
days _ the first Ealing resident to be imprisoned for non-payment and only the 
second individual in London. 
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The Ealing Federation was quick to suggest that 'even in terms of the poll tax 
legislation, this is a miscarriage of justice [as Hynes] has been unemployed and 
h ' , I d ' 106 so e IS entlt e to a rebate . Moreover, the behaviour of council officials in 
court during the hearing suggested that the council was more interested in 
securing exemplary punishment than collecting revenue. This was particularly 
signifj.can: as defendants in poll tax cases were not entitled to legal aid and were 
therefore invariably without legal representation. As a result 'the council plays a 
large part in determining the procedures adopted by the court through its 
t t ' t" 107 A d' . represen a Ives sugges Ions . ccor IDg to the FederatIOn, the council's 
recovery officer, a Mr Keady was a 'disgrace', with the official 'pressing for 
prison' even though an offer of payment had been made. This last claim was 
strenuously contested by council officers who stated that Hynes had never 
offered any payment either before or during the court case. 108 
In a sense, these various accusations and counter-accusations served to highlight 
the protestors' inability to directly influence events in court. However well 
prepared (or well intentioned), the Federation advisers were generally marginal 
to the proceedings and the campaign soon fonnally conceded that 'what we can 
do on the day when committals are being heard is limited', although supporters 
were encouraged to take detailed notes of the proceedings. I09 They therefore 
looked outside their own ranks for assistance, but again, these attempts to secure 
legally qualified representation for defendants only ever achieved patchy 
success. 
Despite the existence of a loose national network of sympathetic barristers in the 
Poll Tax Legal Group and the Campaign Against Poll Tax Imprisonment 
(CAPTIVE), there were simply too many cases to cover. This in tum prompted 
complaints from CAPTIVE that defendants were, in effect, being denied a basic 
human right. Injustices were bound to arise, as defendants 'were facing hearings 
ill-equipped and ill-prepared' while 'procedures for obtaining bail pending 
, 110 Thi I' I t appeal or judicial review [ were] unclear and complex , s c aun was a er 
confirmed by a judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (Benham v 
UK, 1995), which reaffirmed, under Article 6.3 of the Convention, that all 
• 111 
defendants in poll tax cases should be entitled to legal representabon, 
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Meanwhile, questions over detailed evidential matters tended tied 
o go unexp or 
during the hearings. 
Similarly, as we have seen, Hynes' case, like so many others, involved disputed 
or outstanding benefit claims. This was potentially important, for although the 
court. w~ empowered to continue to proceed while rebate applications were 
outstanding, . common sense suggested that this was a good reason to adjourn 
proceedings. According to the protestors, most people summonsed for 
committal claimed that they had applied for rebates for the 1990/91 tax (original 
emphasis): 112 
We know that a very large number of rebate applications were not 
logged during the whole of 1990 because of software limitations etc. It 
is also common knowledge that many CCB claims went missing 
without any means of tracing them. It is therefore regrettable that 
Council officials in court (whether through ignorance or duplicity) deny 
point blank that rebate applications have been received. 
But while council officials were prepared to accept that significant backlogs 
Housing Benefit/Community Charge did exist - approximately 12,000 cases in 
April 1991, shrinking to just over 8,000 by May 1992 - they maintained that 
rigorous checks were made to ensure that each person summonsed did not have 
an outstanding claim.113 Nevertheless, the Ealing protestors continued to claim 
that the council was not exhausting all other options before instituting committal 
proceedings, including the a minimum of three visits by bailiffs within the 
prescribed time laid down for executing distress warrants, as set out in the 
council's own guidelines. 114 
Other means of recovering poll tax debts were not initiated, including direct 
deductions from income support, although this was not particularly unusual and 
by the end of May 1991 only 58,000 people nationally were having arrears 
deducted from benefit. 1l5 Similarly, by January 1992 no attempt had been made 
to institute an attachment of earnings order in Baling, described by one official 
U 'administratively onerous' due to the problems of compiling accurate 
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information from the defaulters' employer. 1l6 Ironically, gIven the flat rate 
nature of the poll tax, council officers also contended that such orders: 117 
are arbitrary in effect, since they take no account of the chargepayer's 
financial commitments... Given the economic recession and the down 
tum.in the housing market, it is like I y that a blanket attachment of 
earnings policy could lead to homeowners at the margin, being unable 
to pay their mortgage ... and possibly lose their homes. 
According to the Federation, these admissions added up 'to the disturbing fact 
that Ealing Tory council is flouting the law, which states clearly that jailing is a 
last resort' .118 
Similar allegations surfaced in relation to the case of Maurice White an , 
unemployed brick-layer, who was jailed in September 1991 for three months 
Again, the Federation claimed that the means enquiry was fundamentally flawed 
and failed to establish that White was due to start a job a week after the hearing. 
As usual, White's case also involved problems with outstanding 
housing/community charge benefit claims. White's family (and the Federation) 
also claimed that the council rejected an offer to pay half of the outstanding sum 
before the hearing. 119 In the event, his wife Assumpta borrowed the £517.50 
owed 'from friends' to secure his release. 120 
All these allegations were rejected by the council, which instead publicly 
attacked the Federation for offering the White family 'detrimental advice' (see 
above). These comments, together with the fact that the family had publicly 
been identified as anti-poll tax supporters in a local press report concerning the 
use of bailiffs in late 1990, led some to suspect that the Whites may have been 
deliberately targeted. Whatever the truth of this - and there is no evidence to 
substantiate it - other London campaigners noted 'a worrying trend of councils 
picking on anti-poll tax activists to be jailed'. 121 For example, in Barking three 
local activists, including the chair and treasurer of the borough Federation. 
received committals for the same day. 
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Of more pressing importance for the Ealing Federation was its mounting belief 
that the Acton court was using the threat of jail as 'a form of hostage-taki ,1::2 ng , 
For example, in the case of one (unnamed) man jailed for 28 days on 17 
October, protestors claimed that: 123 
the Glerk of the court asked [the defendant] irrelevant questions about 
his father's employment and how many members of his family had the 
use of a car - obviously trying to ascertain whether anyone would be in 
the position to come up with his payment should he be committed to 
pnson. 
In the event the man's family did indeed pay up. At a national level, legal 
campaigners were also disturbed by the conduct of means enquiries at committal 
hearings. As Alan Murdie of CAPTIVE saw it, some 'of the things that have 
been going on don't fit into any concept of English justice. I haven't seen one 
committal hearing where the magistrates have used the law properly. There is 
meant to be a proper means enquiry by the court before someone is sent to 
prison.' 124 
The Acton benches robust sentencing policy also emerged as a major source of 
complaint. As Mick Brooks saw it: 'It seemed that they only knew one sentence 
and that was the maximum of three months, every time, at least for the first 
while. I think they were told to cool it at some stage because they suddenly 
started issuing one month, two month [ sentences].' Certainly, in February 1992 
alone there were 5 Ealing non-payers in prison125 and by March, Acton 
Magistrates had jailed more people for non-payment than all other London 
boroughs put together. Similarly, although other London Petty Sessional Areas 
began increasingly to imprison debtors at the request of their respective 
councils, the Ealing bench retained its place as the court most likely to imprison, 
with 100 individuals committed according to the DoE figures for the 1991/2 tax 
year,126 
Clearly this was a relatively large figure, but does it necessarily show that both 
Ealing council and the Acton court were intent on punishing non-payers. rather 
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than enforcing debt recovery? By 20 October 1992, Ealing council officials 
claimed that committal proceedings had been taken against 1,428 residents, with 
76 of these being immediately imprisoned. Leaving aside the fact that this 
estimate does not agree with the Department of the Environment's tally, it could 
be argued that the record does support the efficacy of the judgements. For where 
atten~anq,e was secured, either voluntarily or through coercion, payment was 
made in 90% of cases. 127 Of those sentenced, only three served their full term, 
with the rest discharging their debt or securing release part way through their 
sentence. 128 In that sense, the jailing policy could be cast as an effective terms of 
securing unpaid poll tax in difficult cases. 
Nevertheless such an approach was far removed from the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities' advice on 'best practise' which assumed that 
whichever 'enforcement procedure an authority uses should depend as far as 
possible on the particular circumstances of the charge-payer'. 129 Problems 
therefore began to surface when some of these cases were put forward for 
Judicial Review. For example, on 16 January 1992, Osman (,Dino') Tossoum, 
an ex-council worker and unemployed musician, was jailed for three months. 130 
However, on 13 February a lawyer organised by the Ealing Federation secured 
bail at the High Court and Tossoum was released. The judgement was partly 
based on the fact that Tossoum was in receipt of Income Support, but also cited 
an earlier High Court ruling which quashed the imprisonment of Stephen 
Benham, an unemployed and 'penniless' man of Poole, Dorset who had been 
found guilty of 'culpable neglect' because he had nine '0' levels and could 
therefore have been expected to get ajob. 131 
However, the case of the Farrar family seems to have acted as the most 
significant catalyst for change. In July 1992 Anthonyl' Linda, Tony and Kirk 
Farrarl' residents of Northol~ all received jail sentences of three months each. 
Again, disputes over benefits surfaced during the hearing, as both the sons 
(Tony and Kirk) were unskilled labourers who had experienced bouts of 
unemployment during the 1990-91 tax year. In passing the maximum sentence, 
the court appeared surprisingly indifferent to the fact that a number of minors 
would effectively be left without parental supervision, or that Mrs Farrar was 
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caring for two of her nieces' children, who presumably would have had to be 
placed in care in her absence.132 This immediate family crisis was partially 
resolved when, following a collection by 'friends and neighbours' Linda (the 
mother) was released. 
Ther~ is po evidence that the Farrars had any political intention to refuse to pay 
and as soon ·as the family could borrow the necessary wherewithal, secured the 
1 fth .. &: ·1 133 re ease 0 e remalmng ~aml y members. The father, Anthony, was first to be 
released after serving fourteen days in Pentonville. Meanwhile, Kirk, aged 18, as 
a minor served 31 days of his sentence at F eltham Young Offenders Institute, 
but became increasingly depressed and upset. The family therefore borrowed 
more money to clear his remaining debt. However, this proved impossible in the 
case of the remaining family member, Tony Farrar, whose release was only 
secured after the Ealing Federation, in conjunction with CAPTIVE, organised a 
judicial review on 28 September 1992. The High Court then ordered Farrar's 
release and reminded the Acton bench that imprisonment should only be used as 
'the last resort in exceptional circumstances'. 134 
The next committal hearing, attended by Hugo Charlton, a barrister from the 
Poll Tax Legal Group and the Revd. Paul Nicholson of CAPTIVE therefore saw 
'a complete departure from normal proceedings' with 'not a single person jailed' 
and the cases of those present being adjourned indefinitely so long as they paid 
off between £5 - £15 a week. 13S However, hostility between the magistrates' 
bench and the organised protestors remained much in evidence. At the hearing, 
the chair of the magistrates, a Mrs Fraser, attempted to have both men arrested 
for contempt, but was apparently checked by the clerk who 'informed her it 
wasn't on'. 136 
While the Ealing protestors were increasingly alarmed by the courts' apparent 
willingness to jail poll tax debtors, the proceeding ~ere in some ways less 
controversial than those in other Petty Sessional Areas. For example, on 13 
March 1992 the High Court ruled that Sittingbourne magistrates were wrong to 
imprison a 67 year old woman, Anne Ursell, without notifying her of the 
hearing. Mr Justice Schiemann, awarding Ursell all legal costs, noted that 
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although the local magistrates apparently 'believed she had nothing new to say' 
it was generally considered good practise to allow defendants the right to put 
their case before sentencing. He also cautioned both the local bench, and her 
ocal authority, against re-instituting proceedings, as 'this lady has already 
served half her sentence and is not getting any younger'. 137 Another case in 
Haringay_ saw the jailing of a man who was apparently 'searched in court after 
he said he had no money on him. When £11 was found the magistrate decided to 
jail him.' However his mother paid to get him out on the same day. 138 
If anything, concerns over the apparently punitive intent of some sentences grew 
after the tax's abolition. A study by Rona Epstein and Richard Wise found that 
by the year ending March 1994, 1,202 people served jail sentences for non-
payment, compared to 704 in the 1991/2 tax year and only 10 in 1990/1. 139 
Whereas the average sentence had been 27 days in 1992, it had risen to 32 days 
by 1994. The study backed up the protestors' contention that only the poorest 
and most vulnerable debtors would face jail. For example, of the 143 cases 
granted leave for judicial review, 56 people were on income support, 20 
received other benefits, 19 had no income at all, 10 had serious physical 
disabilities, five suffered mental disability and 27 had serious illnesses ranging 
from epilepsy through to arthritis and asthma. Moreover, the High Court had 
declared magistrates' sentences as unlawful in nearly 100 of these cases - a 
success rate of 95% compared to an average judicial review success rate against 
magistrates of circa 15%. The study concluded that despite repeated 
admonishments from the High Court that magistrates' powers to jail was to 
enforce, not punish, they were 'continuing to make the same errors and continue 
in increasing numbers to punish the vulnerable'. 
So far this discussion has raised a number of obvious legal and ethical questions 
regarding the conduct of the magistrates' courts and the general efficacy of 
jailing poll tax debtors. It will also have become obvious that the experience of 
committal hearings was highly emotive, especially for both protestors and 
'ordinary' defendants alike. As one protestor put it 
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It was the most depressing experience. I think Gandhi was once asked 
what he thought about British civilisation and he said he "thought it 
would be a good idea". Basically that's what I think of British justice 
after seeing these poll tax committal proceedings. 
In p~rt this reflected the formal nature of the of the proceedings, which 
sometimes left defendants visibly fearful, trembling, stuttering replies and even 
crying in the dock. l40 Inevitably perhaps, the legal basis of much of the language 
used by key actors in the court also at times encouraged a mutual sense of 
incomprehension, as so many defendants obviously had enjoyed little education, 
or on occasion, did not use English as a first tongue. One protestor recalled that 
the 'language the clerk of court used was quite comical. He'd be asking these 
working class [ defendants] things like ''How much is your monthly 
remuneration" and they'd say "What?" 141 But generally the course of the 
hearings had few, if any, light moments: 142 
People were so demeaned. Because people had to prove they were 
unable to pay the clerk would ask questions like ''Do you have a TV?" 
''Have you bought any clothes recently?" And I can remember a woman 
and her husband from Southall who were so humiliated. People who 
were trying to live a dignified normal life, having to explain their small, 
minor purchases, which to you or me would go unremarked ... It 
sickened me, to see how the machine, the bureaucracy would stride on, 
casting people aside in its wake. 
However, it is important not to lose sight of the political context in which the 
cases occurred and their wider implications for the meaning of active citizenship 
in the period. For while the evidence clearly suggests that the majority of those 
imprisoned were 'can't payers', at least three Ealing residents did refuse to pay 
the tax on political grounds. 
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Three 'won't payers' 
The frrst imprisonment of a principled 'won't-payer' in Ealing occurred on 1.+ 
November 1991, when Frank Matthews (aged 53) and his wife Sylvie (aged 49) 
of the South Acton estate were sentenced to 90 days each for 'wilfully refusing' 
to pay the poll tax. Instead, when asked if she could pay, Mrs Matthews replied 
'I could, but I have no intention of doing so', as did her husband. 143 Each 
subsequently served their full sentences in Holloway and Pentonville prisons 
respectively. Ealing Council was keen to highlight the Matthews case as what 
they saw as a prima facie example of the deliberate defaulter. As Councillor 
Phillip Richardson put it: 144 
Magistrates decided on hearing the evidence that both Mr and Mrs 
Matthews were able to pay the outstanding charge. They subsequently 
refused, so there is no alternative but to send them to prison. 
In fact, as the protestors immediately sought to point out, there was clear 
evidence that the Matthews were in significant financial difficulties at the time. 
For example, both were unemployed and Sylvie therefore had no personal 
income or savings. The couple faced eviction from their council flat on release 
from prison in February 1992, owing over £4,000 in rent arrears. 145 The 
Federation therefore argued that instead of seeking a committal the council 
should 'at the very least' have sought to deduct a weekly sum from their benefit. 
Significantly, the couple did not contact any of the organised groups before the 
hearing and were therefore legally unrepresented. If they had sought assistance 
beforehand it is clear the Federation would have strenuously advised them that 
given their overall level of indebtedness and low income, a defence of 'can't 
pay' during the means enquiry should have been attempted. 146 
However, the Matthews primary motivation in refusing to pay appears to have 
been a moral objection to the tax. For although neither could have been 
meaningfully described as an 'activist' they were clearly politically motivated. 
As Mrs Matthews saw it: 'The Poll Tax is immoral and unethical: money by 
threat and legal extortion. Why should the poor man be made to suffer? It's the 
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principle that matters here' .147 But it was one thing to oppose the tax in principle 
and another to go to prison. Mrs Matthews explained her stance thus: 148 
after saying right from the beginning that I would not pay Poll Tax, I 
felt that when the crunch came, I should have the courage of my 
convjctions to say no. It is my own personal feeling that it is wrong and 
stating so publicly to the magistrate was my only way of making my 
opinion felt. 
After the initial shock of imprisonment, both Mr and Mrs Matthews maintained 
a plucky air throughout, with Mrs Matthews likening conditions in Holloway to 
a 'Boarding School' and praising the prison staff, who were 'great' and 
'understanding' .149 Other prisoners gave Matthews a round of applause when 
she first entered the canteen. Meanwhile, Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners, in 
co-operation with the Matthew's family, attempted to secure their release 
through public campaigning. Activities included a letter writing campaign to all 
councillors, a petition and a lobby of a council meeting on 26 November 1991. 
Throughout the protestors sought to cast the jailing decision as grotesque ('This 
time they've gone too far') and flagged up their status as grandparents ('This 
woman deserves your support'). Following the couples' release on 13 February 
1992 the Federation organised a St Valentines' day 'Welcome Home' party to 
celebrate, with all proceeds going to the Matthews. 
Interestingly, there does appear to have been some tension between the 
Matthews' approach and that of the organised protestors. For example, the 
Federation originally hoped to highlight the effect of the Matthews' 
imprisonment on their grand children, one of whom had 'special needs', who 
couldn't 'possibly understand why granny and grand dad can't spend Christmas 
with them. ,150 But an over-emphasis on the personal aspects of the case was 
vetoed by the family, who judged it to be in 'bad taste,151 Instead the couple 
saw their protest as very much an individual moral stand against a particular 
injustice. Nevertheless, the Matthews' personal situation came to dominate 
subsequent campaigning, with the couple regularly described by both the 
protestors and the local press alike as the 'poll tax grandparents'. 151 However. it 
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would be misleading to exaggerate the importance of these differences in 
emphasis although a certain tension between the sort of individualistic protest 
favoured by the Matthews and the tactics and goals of the organised protestors 
remains evident. For example Mrs Matthews subsequently extended her 
'heartfelt and deepest thanks' to the campaigners and 'the hundreds of people 
that hav~ sent cards, letters, leaflets, notes etc. ,153 
The individualistic character of the Matthew's protest is perhaps best 
appreciated when their experience is contrasted with that of Ealing's other 
'won't payer'. In September 1991 Michael O'Connell (aged 27), a prominent 
Acton anti-poll-tax campaigner and a member of Militant, was summonsed to 
appear for a committal hearing. 154 At the time he was unemployed. Although 
there is no evidence to suggest that O'Connell was deliberately targeted by 
Ealing council from the outset he signalled his intention 'as a leader of the local 
campaign ... to go all the way.' The protestors therefore consciously sought to 
use the threat of imprisonment as a means of highlighting the wider issue of poll 
tax jailings in the borough. Before the committal hearing, scheduled for 17 
October 1991, a public meeting was held and (the by now familiar tactic) of 
lobbying a council meeting was employed to publicise the case. 155 Similarly, 
local trade union branches were approached for support, although only 
O'Connell's own union, MSF, offered meaningful support and his branch 
subsequently donated £500 to pay help his mortgage during the time he was in 
prison. On the day itself, a march was organised from Ealing Town Hall to the 
Acton court. Once there O'Connell addressed a crowd of about 50 protestors. 
After denouncing the effect of the poll tax on local residents, he then 
dramatically ripped up the summons, declaring that 
I will never willingly pay my poll tax [and] I am going to make it as 
difficult as possible for them. What I'm not prepared to do is go into 
that court today where there is no justice whatsoever and listen to Tory 
. . T I 156 
magistrates and Tory court clerks Implementmg ory aws. 
He then got into a waiting car and 'sped off' to the 'cheers of the crowd'.) ~"7 In 
his absence, the magistrates issued a warrant for his arrest. Unusually for poll 
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tax cases, the local police energetically sought to arrest him. Over the next two 
months they 'called round at six in the morning. They were banging on the 
windows, banging on the doors, shining torches inside and happened four or five 
times'. These unwelcome visitations finally prompted O'Connell to stay at a 
friend's flat. However, the authorities finally caught up with him in early 
January 1.992 as he signed on for unemployment benefit. Again, most unusually 
in a case of civil debt, the police and Benefits Agency co-operated in the arrest 
, 
with officials deliberately delaying him for three quarters of an hour at the 
office. When he finally left he was arrested by a plain-clothes policeman and 
then taken straight down to a special sitting of Acton magistrates' court, where 
he was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment for 'wilful refusal' to pay. During 
this short period he received over 100 letters of support from members of the 
public and various political and anti-poll tax groups. After serving 30 days 
O'Connell's family paid the outstanding debt and he was released. 
The protest - described by O'Connell as 'a bit of a stunt' - proved dramatic 
enough to attract regional media interest and a filmed report appeared on 
Thames News on the night of 17 October. However, paradoxically, the main 
local paper ignored the story and it was only reported in one of the local free-
sheets. Interestingly, as O'Connell was an Irish citizen, his case aroused 
particular interest in Ireland. Some of this, such as extensive coverage in the 
Irish Times was welcome, others less so. For example, O'Connell's story was 
taken up by Ulster, the paper of the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association, 
which noted how it was 'funny how that squalid republic in the south can 
always find some malcontent to live in Britain [and] use our facilities but pay 
nothing. ,1'8 Rather menacingly, the UDA sent a copy of the magazine to his 
London address. 
Clearly then, the protest at least partially achieved its goal of securing publicity, 
but it also proved controversial to some Ealing campaigners. For example, a 
sympathetic barrister had been arranged for the October hearing and when 
O'Connell failed to attend court the majority of Ealing activists, who had not 
been informed of the planned protest before-hand, were rather taken aback. 
While the Federation naturally continued to support his campaign, this failure in 
2S1 
communications led some activists to conclude that his action was very much a 
'Militant thing'. 
Similarly, although Ealing Federation activists admired the commitment and 
courage displayed by both the Matthews and Michael O'Connell, some were 
concem~d that such protests might actually prove counter-productive. For as we 
have seen, following the abolition announcement the context within which the 
Ealing campaigners were operating had changed radically. In particular, the 
focus of their efforts had shifted away from 'broad brush' protest and towards 
the defence of individuals threatened with jail. The key contention of the 
protestors here was that those people facing prison were largely unable to pay 
the tax. From this perspective there was a danger that those 'won't payers' 
openly thumbing their nose at the council and the legal system might undermine 
the wider argument for an amnesty. 
The council certainly seems to have believed that there were positive virtues in 
highlighting cases of 'won't payers'. For example, in November 1991 the 
council issued summonses to liability orders to over 10,000 residents and 
enclosed a photo-copied article from the local paper reporting the jailing of 
Sylvie Matthews, headlined 'Poll tax protestors face Christmas in prison,.159 
However, the tactic backfired, provoking 'scores' of complainants according to 
the local paper, with one resident noting that 'it was like getting a letter from the 
d 160 Mafia'. Another letter to the local paper, from a Ms J Couzens conclude : 
May I remind the council and the director of finance that we live in a 
mature democracy which demands a certain standard of them as 
servants of the public, not the masters. 
But in justifying the tactic, Councillor Philip Richardso~ Tory finance 
committee chairman, suggested that 'I don't think it's over the top or 
intimidating to tell people about the threat of prison. The situation IS very' 
serious and it's more important to safeguard our services than to safeguard the 
feelings of those who refuse to pay'. Whatever the truth of this, the council did 
not repeat the exercise. 
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On the other hand, it could well be argued that the publicity benefits of these 
high profile protests outweighed any potential costs, especially as the council 
had apparently shown itself immune to political pressure over the jailing policy 
and the court largely uninterested in legal argument. As Michael O'Connell saw 
it, such <\ protest could show 'a defiant picture. Someone who was willino to 
::: 
say, "I'm not the slightest bit frightened of being jailed". It was a dangerous and 
subversive message.' Thus the very act of going to prison served to expose the 
political bias of a supposedly impartial justice system and potentially give 
confidence to other non-payers. These protestors were, In effect, 'bearing 
witness) against an immoral law. 
In any case, there was a sense that by 'taking it all the way' both the Matthews 
and Michael O'Connell were remaining consistent with their earlier vocal 
support for non-payment. For example, in a letter from prison written early in 
her sentence, Mrs Matthews implicitly contrasted her own willingness to face 
prison with the apparent unwillingness of most anti-poll tax protestors in Ealing 
and elsewhere to do the same: 161 
I would assume and hope that more people will have the courage of 
their convictions to say 'stop', enough is enough. I can also appreciate 
that there are extenuating circumstances for lots of people but all those 
who that do the shouting and writing about the Poll Tax should stand 
firm. 
However, Michael O'Connell thought that any decision as to payment was 
largely contingent on individual circumstances, believing for example, that 'it 
would be ludicrous to lose your job by going to prison' over the poll tax. This in 
tum highlights a clear difference in purpose between activists like O'Connell 
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and individualists like the Matthews. As Mr Matthews made clear: 
our stand has been taken as individuals against an individual (personal) 
tax. We have taken individual (personal) action [and] I personally did 
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not expect the reaction that my wife and myself have had from the 
public. 
But most Ealing protestors believed that such an approach tended to undermine 
the opportunity to turn 'the whole thing against the Tory council and the powers 
that be'. ~63 Interestingly, Michael O'Connell agreed and was only prepared to 
countenance prison within the wider context of a political movement: 
From a practical point of view, if you feel a law is bad, then to attack 
that law, to break it individually, without the weight of a movement 
[behind you] is stupid. There's no point. There are lots of laws that 
people disagree with, that are maybe not that morally correct. But 
you've got to have a campaign there. With the poll tax you had that. 
General Election 1992 
However, national developments, in the shape of a Conservative victory at the 
1992 general election were soon to deal a mortal blow to the Ealing anti-poll tax 
campaign, which was in any case fast declining. Although, as Sanders suggests, 
it is sensible to assume that the 'poll tax furore had left a legacy of resentment 
amongst large sections of the electorate', the issue failed to playa decisive role 
in the campaign. 164 Certainly Labour efforts to re-ignite the controversy 
generally had little effect, despite its continued unpopularit/65 and Major was 
largely able to cast himself as 'the man who got rid of the poll tax'. 166 Thus a 
number of factors, including the personal shortcomings of the Labour leader, a 
late swing from Liberals to the Conservatives, concerns about Labour's tax 
proposals and the desire for a 'safe' response to the recession, combined to 
T . 167 ensure a ory VIctOry. 
The Ealing Anti-Poll Tax Federation played only a very limited role in the 
election, restricting its intervention to a poster campaign, which read (original 
relative point size): 
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• 
EALING ANTI-POLL TAX FEDERATION 
DON'T VOTE 
POLL TAX! 
DON'T 
VOTE TORY 
No more poll tax jailings 
No more bailiffs harassing the poor 
Indeed, many of the remaining activists, despite their mounting concerns about 
the right-ward drift of the party, reverted to type and campaigned for Labour. 
But as both sitting Conservative MPs in the borough (Harry Greenaway and Sir 
George Young) were re-elected, there is little evidence to suggest Ealing voters 
heeded the Federation's advice 'not to forgive or forget!,168 The experience in 
Scotland was a little more encouraging for the campaigners, where Tommy 
Sheridan, standing as a Scottish Militant Labour non-payment candidate, 
secured 20% of the vote in Pollock. Nevertheless the implications of the 
Conservative victory were of decisive and immediate importance for the 
campaign. Firstly and most obviously, there was now no realistic chance of 
"-
securing an amnesty for non-payers - its sole remaining substantive political 
demand. But more significantly, in common with most British leftists, many 
Ealing anti-poll tax campaigners were rendered profoundly demoralised. 
But in another sense the poll tax did play a decisive part in determining the 
result of the 1992 general election, as at least 700,000 individuals disappeared 
off the electoral roll, presumably in an effort to avoid registration. 169 On a 
moderate estimate this might have left the government with a majority of three, 
not 21. Reputedly, this happenstance prompted Margaret Thatcher to observe on 
election night that 'the poll tax worked after all'. 170 If Thatcher was referring 
here to Labour voters voluntarily going off the electoral roll, it appears that her 
previous lofty declaration that the poll tax was an attempt to 'tum dependants 
into citizens' was nothing more than cant. Whatever the truth of this, the tax 
certainly seems to have encouraged a significant number of poorer voters to 
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surrender their most important political right. But the general election result was 
also ironic in another way, as this most conventional of political events 
decisively cut the ground from under the civil disobedience campaign. 
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Chapter Eight 
The popular politics of the poll tax: 
an active citizenship of the left? 
The fun~amental duty of a citizen is to be public spirited. Tory policy 
means running the country for the benefit of a few. Socialist policy 
means running the country for the benefit of all. 1 
Introduction 
Silence is the door of consent 
Poll Tax = Tax On The Poor 
Pay No Poll Tax2 
This study has consistently argued that the defining characteristic of the poll tax 
was its unpopularity. This hostility was rooted in main three objections to the 
tax, namely that it cost more than the rates (for most), was seen as grossly unfair 
and represented a threat to local public services. As a result, a large majority of 
the British public consistently expressed their opposition to the poll tax in 
principle. This was significant, for as chapter one showed, the poll tax can best 
be understood as a conscious attempt by the Conservatives to implement the 
New Right's conception of the 'active citizen' as an economic, social and 
political player. By establishing a clearer link between voting and the payment 
of taxes, individual citizens would be encouraged to playa more responsible 
role in local civil society. The citizen/consumer would have a direct incentive to 
ensure value for money in local services and keep taxes low. This would also 
encourage active citizens to develop as altruistic individuals, willing to 
responsibly participate in political and social life and undertake acts of charity 
for their neighbours. 
The New Right's conception of active citizenship was roundly condemned by 
the British left which remained committed to the maintenance and extension of , 
positive political and social rights, paid for by a system of progressive taxation. 
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The poll tax therefore came to assume a strong symbolic significance, as it so 
obviously violated what Marquand described as the 'inexplicit and imprecise 
ethic of communal responsibility for common needs' embodied by the welfare 
'. policies of the consensus years.3 However, this chapter will not explicitly 
address any further the left's conception of social citizenship, not least because 
the r~latiye merits of liberal, Marxist and social democratic models of 
citizenship have been extensively debated elsewhere.4 In any case, the debate 
over the left's vision of social citizenship may actually be less important for the 
popular politics of the tax than its implications for political Citizenship, that is 
the means by which active citizens seek to regulate political affairs and effect 
political change. For in practise, there was actually very little dissension within 
the left about why the poll tax should be opposed, but opinion varied hugely as 
to how it could be defeated. These tactical debates revealed obvious differences 
between the 'institutional' and 'radical' left's conception of the 'good' citizen. 5 
However, the implications potentially go beyond the organised British left. 
Given the near-universal character of the charge, citizens were forced to make a 
conscious political choice about a law which most of them opposed. In effect, 
there were four possible responses, namely to obey, to protest within the law, to 
engage in covert disobedience (that is disobey, but quietly) or engage in an act 
of open civil disobedience. As this study has shown, millions of citizens chose 
to either refuse to pay altogether, or more commonly resisted payment despite 
the various coercive measures employed by local authorities. So this chapter 
will also seek to explore the often ambiguous political meaning of poll tax non-
payment. Finally, it concludes by considering the legacy of the poll tax protests 
for the British left's approach to citizenship in the 1990s. 
Political citizenship - the institutional left 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the institutional left's conception of 
active citizenship and consider its implications for the popular politics of the 
poll tax. Firstly, I will seek to briefly outline the dominant characteristics of the 
'good' left-wing institutional citizen and discuss why this sort of activism 
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became increasingly problematic in the 1980s, prompting both the Labour 
leadership and a majority of rank and file activists to reassess and limit the 
boundaries of activism. I shall argue that this shift cannot simply be seen as a 
'. decisive rejection of previous models of left wing citizenship, although this 
impulse was certainly present. But instead it came to involve a subtler process of 
re-e"!phqsis, as the relative importance of key assumptions that had helped 
define the 'good' citizen for most of the post-war era were reordered under the 
impact of Thatcherism. Finally, I shall seek to assess the implications of this 
shifting notion of activism for the course of the poll tax crisis and ask how far it 
helped encourage the anti-poll tax movement's decidedly radical and popular 
character? 
The left-wing citizen - some dominant characteristics 
Any comprehensive discussion of the mainstream British left's conception of 
active citizenship could easily fill several books, let alone a few paragraphs. So 
what follows is necessarily crude, but the following general points broadly hold 
true. Firstly most British leftists started from the assumption that the 
establishment of political rights, the universal franchise and trade union 
immunities under the law rendered illegal or violent political activity largely 
redundant and positively undesirable. As with any general rule, there were 
exceptions, including 'illegal' strikes undertaken in the face of Tory trade union 
restrictions in the 1970s, or violent conflicts with Fascists and racists. But in 
general the rules of the game were well understood: any party that aspired to 
government must ultimately uphold and constructively work within the existing 
political system. 
Indeed, as labour became progressively incorporated into the political and 
industrial system throughout the twentieth century the institutional character of 
the movement became more pronounced. Labour's forward march in local and 
national encouraged more people to serve in parliament and on local councils 
Simultaneously, in industry the trade union movement became more established 
and large numbers of people served as branch officers and shop stewards 
Although the Labour Party and trade unions remained autonomous, they 
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believed themselves to be part of the same Labour movement. This increased 
activity was in part seen as a natural corollary of the creation of a welfare state. 
According to Crosland the 'passive' state had given way to the 'active' state or 
, 
'. at least the 'ultimately responsible' state.6 But such a state needed active 
citizens, willing to accept a measure of 'ultimate responsibility' in order to build 
the N:ew Jerusalem. An active citizenship of the left then, served to not only 
promote the Labour movement, but also facilitate social cohesion, progress and 
democracy through the democratic institutions of society. 
Consequently, most of the sorts of assumptions regarding the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of citizens espoused by the mainstream British left were little 
different from those of other political traditions. The 'good' citizen obeyed the 
law, paid taxes, served the state at times of national emergency, participated in 
the political process and as far as possible, sought to be economically active. 
However, a distinctive 'labourist' tradition of citizenship, built upon a strong 
sense of class-consciousness and the labour movement as an independent 
political and social actor, also developed.7 So left-wing active citizenship 
increasingly equated with Labour party and trade union activism. Of course, 
there were other sources of identity and other means of participation for the 
mainstream left, including the peace movement, co-ops, friendly societies, self-
help groups and workers educational associations, but if anything, these tended 
to be a bridge into the party. 
A number of dominant characteristics therefore informed the work of the 
majority of left-wing active citizens in the post war era: 
o Idealism - The socialist citizen seeks to promote broad principles and values, 
including a sense of fair play, the virtues of the public over the private, the 
collective over the market, a belief in social justice, equality and democracy. 
c Optimism and efficacy - The actions of individual citizens and collective 
organisations can change the world for the better. 
c Realism - Nevertheless idealism and optimism must always be tempered by 
realism. For politics is ultimately defined by what is possible within the 
existing economic system and democratic structures. In that sense, activism 
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'. 
must always be directed towards gradualist reform rather than revolution 
Anything else is mere posturing. 
o Institutionalism - It follows that the overwhelming imperative of the active 
citizen is to ensure that labour can take power, in order to shape existing 
state institutions and policies in the interests of the working class, the poor 
and the vulnerable . 
. 
Cl Responsibility - However, labour is not simply a sectional interest. Public 
service should benefit the whole national community. 
Cl Unity and loyalty - Meaningful change can only be secured if the 
institutions of the labour movement are united and strong. The national 
leadership must therefore be trusted to act as the final arbiters of policy 
formation, presentation and implementation. 
Cl Independence and tolerance - Nevertheless, the grass roots must act as the 
'conscience' of the movement, check the behaviour of its elected 
representatives and ensure that basic principles are upheld through debate 
and participation. The movement should therefore be a 'broad church' that 
encompasses most swathes of leftist opinion. 
Behind these broadly altruistic qualities lurked another, rarely voiced impulse 
for some members: 
o Personal ambition - the labour movement as a source of individual 
advancement, wealth and power. 
This model of citizenship tended to appeal to certain social groups. For most of 
the twentieth century a majority of grass roots activists were drawn from the 
'respectable' working class. But in the post-war era this social composition 
gradually shifted and by the late 1980s public sector workers, such as teachers, 
social workers, local government officials came to predominate.
8 
However, as 
Drucker pointed out, this 'newer generation' of activists and Labour leaders 
were usually 'the children of working people. They are often very conscious that 
their grammar school, provincial university education sets them apart from their 
own people. For this reason, they are the more determined to demonstrate the 
purity of their socialist faith 11 • 9 
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The impact of Thatcherism 
The politics of the 1980s profoundly challenged this model of citizenship, but it 
lad already begun to fray at the edges, as many party and trade union activists 
grew exasperated with the perceived failure of Labour in power. A majority 
ther~fore. demanded the right to influence, or even determine policy, elect the 
leadership and establish mandatory reselection of MPs. Others sought to 
broaden the focus of activism away from a narrow 'class' based politics and 
towards the wider 'community' by addressing the concerns of women. minority 
ethnic communities and tenants groups, fuelling the rise of a more politicised 
urban 'municipal left,.10 Single-issue campaigns like CND enjoyed a resurgence 
and directly influenced policy formation. These developments often sat uneasily 
with many of the labour movement's traditional assumptions regarding the 
proper purpose and limits of activism and the divisions were to be further 
exacerbated by the cumulative impact of Thatcherism. 
A number of factors undermined the institutional left's sense of optimism and 
efficacy in the 1980s. Firstly, the power and influence of trade unions at both a 
national and local level eroded membership and rank and file activism also 
declined. The defeat of the Miners' Strike (1984-5) seemed to graphically 
illustrate the limits of militant trade unionism in the face of mass unemployment 
and the sustained hostility of the central state. So by the end of the 1980s the 
trade unions felt compelled to adopt a defensive posture of 'new realism'. The 
government also made a determined effort to limit the powers and fiscal 
independence of local authorities, culminating in the abolition of the GLC and 
the introduction of a poll tax. Some left-wing councils undertook 'illegal' 
strategies of resistance in the mid-1980s. However, these were easily seen off 
and most Labour councillors abandoned the idea that local government could 
serve as an institutional base from which to challenge Thatcherism. Instead, they 
too adopted a defensive posture through the 'dented shield' strategy, 
concentrating on efficient service provision and delivery, within tight financial 
constraints and with efforts to attract private investment to their areas. 
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Of course, all these developments were only possible because the Conservative 
Party won successive general elections after 1979. These defeats prompted the 
Labour leadership to abandon the party's more 'left-wing' policies, including re-
nationalisation, support for Keynesian style economic management and nuclear 
disarmament, in a bid to capture the 'centre ground' of British politics. But 
surv~ys apd internal elections consistently showed that the majority rank and file 
opinion remained much further to the left. 11 This gap between the policy 
aspirations of the majority of members and their leaders tended to act as a 
disincentive to activism, although this was tempered by an increasing 
willingness on the part of many members to modify their principles in order to 
secure the re-election of a Labour government. 
Overall, party membership and levels of individual activity declined, especially 
after the 1987 general election, when 'literally tens of thousands of Party 
members across the country abandoned any personal involvement with 
politics,.12 Of course there probably never had been a 'golden age' of mass, 
active local Labour parties, firmly rooted in their local communities and the 
party had experienced problems in recruiting, motivating and retaining activists 
before the 1980s. But by the time of the 1992 general election it appeared to 
many that Labour's grass-roots were looking distinctly poorly: 13 
Attendance at Party meetings of all kinds was sparser than anyone could 
remember. Achieving a quorum had become a major problem. And 
finding volunteers to take on the wide variety of tasks to maintain an 
effective local political machine was nearly impossible... People who 
wanted to play an active critical part in local or national politics, or who 
wanted the benefits of unrestricted political debate decided they had 
better things to do with their time and money than give them to the 
Labour Party. 
Certainly the national leadership grew increasingly sceptical ab~ut the benefits 
of rank and file activism, which was seen as 'extreme', divisive and in the final 
analysis, electorally damaging. Indeed, Kinnock tended to define his leadership 
in terms of internal party conflicts over Militant, picket line violence during the 
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miners' strike, the 'loony left' controversy in local government and the anti-poll 
14 h tax protests. T e end of the 1980s saw hundreds of expulsions, including 
'1rominent anti-poll tax campaigners, like Dave Nellist~, Terry Fields MP and 
Lommy Sheridan of the Scottish Federation. Simultaneously, a media dominated 
strategy of political communication was developed, which effectively appealed 
to th~ el~ctorate over the heads of activists. IS Whatever the virtues of this as an 
electoral strategy, it again tended to encourage a sense of disempowerment at 
the grass- roots. 16 
The continued relevance of traditions and identities that had been fundamental 
for most left-wing active citizens were also challenged. In particular, the notion 
that class was now 'unequal to the task of explaining our present reality' became 
commonplace. 17 The point was most vigorously promoted by what Hirst dubbed 
the 'Young Turks' of Marxism Today,18 who suggested that 'Thatcherism' had 
triumphed as a distinctive hegemonic project. 19 In these 'new times' affiuent 
workers were alienated by old fashioned class-based notions of collective action 
and provision. Now people defined themselves according to other points of 
reference, such as race, gender, consumerism or ideology. To many it seemed 
that the labour and trade union movement was left clutching vainly at the coat-
tails of a confusing and ever shifting reality. Such a condition was hardly 
favourable terrain from which to build or maintain a distinctive 'socialist' model 
of active citizenship. As Sennett put it, the 'old habit of Marxism was to treat 
confusion as a kind of false consciousness; in our circumstances it is an accurate 
reflection of reality'. 20 
Many of these themes were questionable on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds and some commentators on the left bemoaned the way class had slipped 
from the centre of political discourse. As Chomsky quipped, 'class' was fast 
becoming 'the unmentionable five-letter word' .21 According, to one, by no 
means radical study of class, this was best seen as a deliberate strategy by the 
political elite which: 22 
for reasons of fear and self interest is struggling to eliminate class from 
the realm of respectable debate. It is doing so by two sleights of mind. 
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The first is the use of the term 'underclass' to denote a minority isolated 
from the mainstream majority. The second is the transformation of this 
mainstream into a 'classless' society, defined by consumerism, mobility 
and meritocracy, operating on that quintessential British arena: the level 
playing field. 
Nevertheless, the mainstream left assumed that a 'class-based' citizenship was 
an insufficient base upon which to build as there was no longer a homogenous 
working class interest in modern society (if there ever had been). As a result, 
such an appeal could never succeed electorally.23 Nor could the left successfully 
renew itself as a coalition of interests, as each disparate interest group would 
resist being subsumed into a single programme. Instead, Labour theorists 
increasingly favoured a vaguer sort of citizenship, based on a framework of 
'rights and responsibilities' within an overwhelmingly market society. I will 
return to this point in the conclusion, which considers some of the legacies of 
the poll tax. 
So the cumulative effect of Thatcherism compelled the institutional left to 
reassess its model of citizenship. Some characteristics became less pronounced, 
especially an emphasis on a distinctive 'socialist', solidaristic sense of idealism. 
Successive electoral and extra-Parliamentary defeats, together with the 
Conservative government's efforts to increase the power of the centre at the 
expense of local government also damaged the left's sense of optimism and 
efficacy. So while the traditional emphasis on institutionalism remained intact, it 
was compromised by a growing sense of impotence. And as Dummett observed, 
for 'citizens to feel like active citizens, there must be useful activities to pursue 
and to some degree control'. 24 The internal party battles of the 1970s and 1980s 
also strained the movement's traditional sense of tolerance to breaking point. A 
more narrow conception of unity came to predominate, that tended to see almost 
all internal debate and dissension as intrinsically damaging. In this schema the 
radical left were cast as 'entrists', 'wreckers' and conspirators'. Appeals to a 
particular brand of 'realism' also became more common: the old emphasis on 
the necessity of gaining power was amplified and in the process seemed to 
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become somehow qualitatively different. Power, it appeared, was no longer a 
means to an end, but an end in itself. 
fhe poll tax and the institutional left 
How. far .then, did this shifting conception of active citizenship play itself out in 
the poll tax' crisis? It is often difficult to convincingly match broad political 
trends with particular events and this is compounded in this case by the marked 
reluctance of many Labour leaders to discuss non-payment, the most interesting 
feature of the crisis, either at the time or later. Nevertheless, the connections 
between the institutional lefts' model of political citizenship seem relatively 
straightforward and can be illustrated by looking at two main areas. namely the 
significance (or meaning) ascribed to the poll tax as a particular policy~ and 
secondly the tactics that were deployed to oppose it. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the criticisms levelled against the poll tax by the 
mainstream left were broadly the same as those made by the Anti-Poll Tax 
Federation. Both accused the tax of being 'unworkable', 'a threat to civil 
liberties', an attack on the independence of local government and 'unfair'. 
However, there was a clear difference of emphasis in the rhetoric deployed by 
the two sides, with Labour and the trade unions initially tending to high-light the 
perceived threat to their own institutional position or the living standards of their 
members, rather than the question of social justice. For example, concerns about 
'civil liberties' predominated, which when stripped of their rhetoric, tended to 
equate with the suspicion that millions of working class voters would not 
register to vote in order to avoid payment. Similarly, the movement seemed 
quite ready to accept that the poll tax would do exactly as the Conservatives 
hoped and encourage voters to support low spending (Tory) candidates on 
'rational' grounds. As one Labour activist cynically recalled (original 
emphasis): 25 
Margaret Thatcher made an uncharacteristic but ultimately fatal mistake 
with the poll tax. She allowed it to cost people more money. If it had cost 
people less money it would have been hugely popular. Council house 
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sales, privatisations, tax cuts - these had all been a way of giving people 
free money and people had consistently thought the idea of free money 
was an excellent one. 
Taxation was certainly a sensitive subject for the institutional left by the end of 
the 198Qs and many concluded that while the electorate might favour higher 
taxes as a means to better public services in principle, they would not actually 
vote for them. So pessimism (or 'realism', depending on your point of view) 
replaced optimism as a defining feature of the left's citizenship. 
A similar point could be made in relation to tactics. As we saw in Chapter Four, 
despite some early wobbles in Scotland, the Labour Party, trade unions and 
leftist voluntary organisations, adopted (and consistently maintained) a clear 
position regarding the proper means by which citizens should oppose the poll 
tax. This assumed that the tax should be defeated through legal means and that 
any public protest against the tax was only relevant in so far as it encouraged the 
return of a Labour government. Consequently, the Labour and trade union 
movement called no major public demonstrations, actively opposed the 
organised anti-poll movement, expelled its supporters and rejected all forms of 
civil disobedience, including non-payment, non-compliance (by local 
authorities) or non-collection (by council workers). In Chapter Four I outlined in 
some detail a number of more immediate political issues and problems that 
informed this stance both at a local and national level and it will be sufficient to 
just outline the main points here. 
Given the capacity of the poll tax to emasculate local government's 
independence it did seem puzzling that Labour authorities should so readily 
agree to implement the tax? However, neither they, nor the movement's rank 
and file ever seriously challenged this position for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
and most obviously, most mainstream leftwing activists, especially those serving 
as elected representatives, did not consider it appropriate (or desirable) to act as 
some sort of radical vanguard willing to mobilise popular opinion through 
illegal means, like mass non-payment or non-compliance. That was not their job 
and would leave them vulnerable to surcharge and disqualification from office. 
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In any case, attempts to resist the government's rate-capping legislation in the 
mid-1980s had proven a failure. Instead, they sought to 'make the best of things' 
pending the election of a Labour government by protecting the fabric of local 
~overnment, maintaining services and by trying to ensure that any political flak 
~aused by the poll tax was directed at the Tories. 
It seemed a,ciomatic then, that non-payment should be opposed as it would 
further reduce the capacity of local authorities to deliver services. All Labour 
groups, like Ealing, therefore sought to collect the tax as 'effectively as 
possible'. Anything less would damage the wider community, who would have 
to make up the shortfalls in income. Indeed, by the time of the 1992 general 
election, two-thirds of all jailings had been initiated by Labour councils. So in 
practice, the Labour party's public position on the enforcement of the tax was 
indistinguishable from that of the Conservatives. The limited campaign against 
the poll tax mounted by the party was also revealing in other ways. For example, 
in establishing a Poll Tax Forum based on a coalition of other 'respectable' 
institutional actors like local authorities, trade unions, leading churchmen and 
voluntary groups, the Labour party (like the anti-poll tax movement itself) 
sought to mobilise a 'moral community' against the tax. But this was almost by 
definition a very limited, elitist sort of 'community', that showed no 
coreesponding interest in mobilising popular opinion. 
Nevertheless, a significant minority of Labour party members did support non-
payment in principle (and presumably in practice). But most did so as 
individuals, not as part of the organised anti-poll tax movement. So there was 
only a limited transfer of activism between the official movement and the 
protest campaign. Again this was wholly in keeping with the traditional model 
of citizenship favoured by the institutional left, which allowed individuals to 
exercise their conscience, but in a way that protected the organisations of the 
Labour movement from charges of irresponsibility. 
While the strategy pursued by the institutional left was undoubtedly 'safe' it is 
hard see it as a success. Certainly the electorate did not show its appreciation for 
the labour movement's 'responsible' stance in the 1992 general election 
271 
(although it could be argued that things would have been much worse if the 
party had still been perceived as radical). Nor did this sort of campaigning 
represent any immediate threat to the tax itself, although this was hardly 
surprising given that its purpose was not to force abolition. Nevertheless this 
failure to prevent implementation prompted many commentators, including 
Butler et. al, to conclude that the response of the all the institutional parties, 
includin~ die Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Nationalist Party was 
generally inadequate and had actually served to 'build walls' between the 
political class and popular opinion.26 For example, surely anti-Conservative 
forces could have suspended hostilities and organised a united campaign over 
this one single issue? This could have included lawful extra-parliamentary 
protests, such as mass demonstrations? At the least, such a strategy would have 
prevented the radical left emerging as the leadership of the anti-poll tax 
movement and at best would might have forced the Conservatives to retreat over 
the issue. 
However, this analysis does the institutional left a disservice. For whatever their 
shortcomings over the poll tax, their response was based upon actual experience 
of radica1 political and industrial movements. Given the depth of popular anger 
against th~ tax, manifest in Scotland as early as 1988 in the Govan bye-election, 
it was obvious to all who wished to see that the poll tax was likely to provoke an 
authentically 'popular' protest movement. Such a movement could not easily be 
managed, as the Labour and trade union leadership knew full well. In that sense, 
the institutional left's response was actually a sensible attempt to keep control of 
events and so uphold the British 'way of politics' in difficult and unusual 
circumstances. Just how unusual the poll tax crisis could prove to be, will 
become obvious when we consider the sort of political citizenship promoted by 
the radical left. 
Political Citizenship - The Radical Left 
Earlier some dominant characteristics embodied by the institutional left were 
identified and it was asked how far they informed its response to the poll tax? It 
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would therefore be satisfying (and neat) to simply repeat the e . . I' 
xerClse In re atlOn 
to the radical left. But, unfortunately, life is rarely so straightforward. For unlike 
the institutional left, which by virtue of its traditions and social and political 
position tended to espouse a relatively cohesive model of citizenship, the radical 
left's ideology and political practise was far more diverse. This heterogeneity 
was eecomi~g more marked as the rise of so-called New Social Movements 
acted as an alternative pole of attraction for many British radicals. Moreover, the 
anti-poll tax movement encompassed a broad range of traditions, organisations 
and interests, including the Labour Left, most varieties of the Marxist left, 
anarchists, libertarians, Greens, animal rights activists, trade unionist, 
community and tenants' activists and most importantly of all, individuals with 
little or no past record of activity. Any attempt to claim that this broad coalition 
of protest shared some easily definable 'dominant characteristics' is likely to be 
problematic. 
Take, for example, the question of leadership. Almost all sections of the radical 
left had long been suspicious of leaders, claiming that experience had shown 
their propensity to 'sell out' for personal gain and prestige once elected to 
office. But there the similarities ended. Groups from the Leninist tradition, like 
the Militant, stressed the continued importance of the revolutionary vanguard 
and in practice their members unquestioningly supported both their party and its 
leaders. Greens and anarchists on the other hand, consciously sought to diffuse 
power by promoting non-hierarchical, informal modes of political participation 
and many favoured the rotation of leadership positions. Meanwhile, the Labour 
Left combined scepticism towards their leaders with an intense loyalty to certain 
individuals, such as Tony Benn or Ken Livingstone, who were seen as somehow 
more representative of the grassroots. The trick here was not to dispense with 
leadership per se, but to establish functional, democratic lines of accountability 
within the labour movement's existing structures. 
Nevertheless, the anti-poll tax movement did seem to embody a number of 
qualities, which meaningfully differentiated it from the institutional left. 
Considered together, these add up to an alternative political approach, rather 
than a distinctive and coherent model of citizenship and actually built upon 
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traditions that had long been evident within the 'official' labour movement, such 
as a sense of idealism, optimism, efficacy and the advantages of unity and 
collective organisation. There was also a strong belief in the personal and 
political virtues of activism: although this could sometimes lead to 
exclusiveness, as activists were often expected to 'earn' a position of respect 
through oonsistent work on behalf of the cause. However other characteristics 
tended to be 'new' - such as a willingness to pursue illegal political tactics. In 
the case of the poll tax at least, this was to prove incompatible with any 
sustained desire to work within institutions to change the world for the better 
and instead, emphasised the potential of popular mobilisation and protest 
Optimism and realism 
The anti-poll tax movement was therefore consistently optimistic about the 
ability of 'ordinary people', acting collectively in a form of 'people's power', to 
sink the tax. In part this reflected a conscious rejection of the Kinnockite notion 
of 'new realism', but it also sprang from personal experience. As one Ealing 
protestor, Michael O'Connell recalled: 27 
The theory at the time was 'post-Fordism'. 'New realism'. There were no 
big industries anymore and therefore the unions were dead and finished ... 
and Thatcher was going to reign for decades. That was the way they were 
talking. But I [got involved] in setting up a union branch in my company, 
amongst people that I consider to be, like myself, mainly from a middle 
class background. Some people were highly qualified, there were some 
Cambridge graduates there. And the secretaries joined. We all joined 
together ... But it led me to the conclusion that these things are possible 
and that all these experts in the media were wrong. We could do 
[something about] the poll tax! 
This up-beat view was typical. For one striking point of consensus that emerged 
from interviews with Ealing activists was that this was a tight they believed 
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could be won. Jim Ward linked this to the 'class' nature of the tax: 
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I thought it was important to get involved because I saw [the poll tax) as 
another attempt at shifting wealth to the wealthy and making large 
sections of the working class pay more for less services. Principally, the 
fact that it was not linked to ability to pay ... had to be fought. It generated 
the chance of widespread collective action against the continuing 
onslangh~ of wealth shifting through the 80s. 
Others rejected the suggestion that 'Thatcherism' had in any real sense 
triumphed and pointed to the contingent nature of the social and political 
changes enacted by Conservative governments in the 1980s. As Rachel Jones 
saw it, class was also an issue: 29 
We'd been through the boom and now we were heading into the bust. 
Rapidly. I think [the poll tax] was a class issue as much as anything else 
There was a general mood of economic dissatisfaction among people 
who'd been sold this ideal - things like the right to buy - things that gave 
working class people the feeling that they were getting access to things 
that had been the privilege of the middle class previously. And suddenly 
they started to realise it was a bit of an emperor's new clothes situation. 
This implied in tum that a more determined response from opposition forces, 
particularly from Labour, the traditional party of protest, could have 
successfully mobilised its working class supporters. That this did not occur, 
according to Mick Brooks, was largely because: 30 
the national labour movement, the ruc and the Labour Party... were 
running like whipped dogs from what they saw as this hugely hegemonic 
movement of Thatcherism at the time. [But] the fact is that Thatcher was 
very dependent on luck and her luck ran out on this one. 
However, the protestors' did not simply rely on class as a mobilising force. For 
they assumed that the universal nature of the charge would enable them to 
mobilise a 'moral community' that would cut across traditional class. gender. 
ethnic geographical and political lines (see chapter three). Poll tax non-payment 
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offered a standard around which this 'moral community' could rally and 
ultimately secure a speedy victory. So in a sense, the radical left's feeling of 
efficacy was actually contingent upon the particular (and peculiar) nature of the 
poll tax, which by any realistic calculation, offered a unique opportunity to 
mobilise popular opinion. For the government had not simply miscalculated by 
allow;ing.it to cost more than the rates. Nor did the obvious 'unfairness' of the 
tax necessaiily mean it was doomed. The Conservative's real error was 
abandoning their customary 'salami tactic' of tackling individual interest or 
social groups separately. Such hubris must inevitably be punished. 
The virtues of activism 
Almost all sections of the radical left believed that a successful anti-poll tax 
movement was unlikely to somehow spontaneously arise and would instead 
require collective organisation, led and co-ordinated by experienced activists. 
So, as we saw in Chapter Two, the protest campaign in Ealing ( and elsewhere) 
was kick-started by the Labour Left, public sector trade unionists and sections of 
the revolutionary left, of which Militant was the most important. Interestingly, 
they initially directed much of their efforts at winning over the labour movement 
to a policy of non-implementation and non-collection. This stress on the 
importance of existing institutions as a focus of struggle was in tune with the 
traditional notion of labour as an independent political and social actor, capable 
of challenging the state. Similarly, the means by which they sought to win the 
argument were also conventional and centred largely on attempts to shift policy 
by passing resolutions at meetings and conferences, combined with the odd 
public lobby or demonstration. Given the dominant mood of the official labour 
movement at the time, it is not hard to see why they failed. As a result, non-
payment emerged almost by default as the favoured tactic. 
Support for mass non-payment radically altered the nature of the campaign 
which, as we saw in Chapter Two, stood in stark contrast to the British left's 
t traditionally bureaucratic organisational approach. There was nothing 
particularly new about this, as radical single-issue pressure groups and protest 
campaigns had been a growing force in British politics since the 19705. Indeed, 
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the anti-poll tax campaign shared many of the characteristics associated with 
such organisations. For example, it was primarily local, based on autonomous 
networks of activists who operated largely separately from the national or 
regional federations. It also tended to be non-hierarchical, based on loose 
decision making structures geared towards expressive action, rather than policy 
debates. As a result, the movement proved socially and politically diverst? 
Again, all these attributes tended to reflect the simplicity of the poll tax as an 
issue and the practical imperatives of the non-payment campaign, rather than 
any considered or radical redefinition of the left's favoured modus operandi. 
The protestors' also continued to favour 'old fashioned' means of political 
communication that had been utilised by active citizens since the advent of mass 
democracy. These included such hardy perennials as the leaflet, the street stall 
or the public meeting, together with more innovative methods, such as telephone 
'hodines'. All this set the movement apart from the media dominated approach 
favoured by the mainstream political parties in the period and to an extent 
underlined its 'popular' character. For the protestors hoped that their message 
would reach millions through word of mouth within community and family 
networks. Hence the appeal printed on leaflets outlining the practical 
implications of non-payment, asking readers to 'photo-copy this and pass it on 
to your friends, family, neighbours and colleagues'. There is compelling 
evidence that attempts to mobilise this popular level of political discourse had 
some success, especially in relation to the legal rights of entry enjoyed by 
bailiffs (see chapter seven). 
However this infonnation ~ving-role also highlighted a certain tension about 
, e 
what the movement was actually for. As one Ealing protestor recalled: 31 
What we were trying to do was convince everyone we met and would 
spend time lots of time discussing with them. They would then go and 
discuss with others. That must have happened because we were too small 
to have had such influence... But there were two approaches. [One 
assumed] that we were an advice body ... the other that we were a 
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political movement. They were two distinct thl·ngs We ' 
. weren t a 
citizen's advice bureaux. 
But as the detailed account of campaign contained in chapters six and seven 
shows, things were rarely so clear-cut. As the movement sought to defend those 
people fac~d with coercive sanctions, the emphasis shifted away from 
propaganda and the campaign became a highly politicised support group for 
non-payers, especially those threatened with prison. These were invariably poor 
people to whom the poll tax was just one debt among many. Again, this sort of 
advocacy was not particularly new and was quite similar to the 'case work' 
traditionally undertaken by trade union representatives and local councillors. 
Ironically, this sort of voluntary work might also be equated the New Right's 
rhetoric about 'active citizenship', which envisaged individuals helping out their 
neighbours in time of trouble. Needless to say, that was not how the local 
authorities saw it. For it is worth emphasising that the ensuing drama was 
primarily played out at a local level, with all the key decisions regarding the 
implementation and enforcement of the tax taken by local councillors and lay 
magistrates. So the non-payment campaign actually pitted local active citizen 
against active citizen. Certainly, the authorities pooh-poohed the idea that the 
protestors were actually providing meaningful help to non-payers and instead 
accused them of 'misleading' and 'using' ordinary people in pursuit of their own 
'extreme' political agenda. 
However, as we saw in chapters six and seven, the protestors were well aware 
that opposition to the poll tax as a single issue did not necessarily equate with 
support for the wider politics of the radical left. Even so they believed that in 
practice, there was little difference of purpose between themselves and the many 
'ordinary' people galvanised by the poll tax: 32 
I think people sometimes differentiate between politicos who are seen as 
people who attach themselves in a parasitic manner to genuine causes 
and other individuals who are swept wholeheartedly into these causes. 
That is a false distinction in my opinion. Most politicos start with the 
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perception that the world is an unjust place and they want to make it 
better. 
Moreover, the protestors' vanous attempts to defend non-payers In local 
magistrates' courts revealed a strong sense of personal responsibility: 33 
If I'd realised at the beginning how greatly I was going to become 
involved I might have thought twice about it. But I found that once I got 
involved, seeing at ftrst hand the conditions that people were living in, 
particularly when I was doing the case work side of it, made me feel 
there was a moral imperative to continue. Because frankly, if people like 
me and you and others didn't actually do what we were doing these 
people were going to ftnd themselves in jail.' 
This sense of responsibility underlined the point that mass non-payment as a 
tactic had obvious costs, as well as beneftts. But the protestors continued to 
believe that their advocacy of civil disobedience was justifted as a reasonable 
response to a particularly unjust law. In contrast to so many of the campaigns 
waged against government policy by the institutional left in the 1980s it seemed 
to get results (see chapter six). Without mass non-payment, they argued, the 
anti-poll tax movement would have been just one in a long series of left-wing 
single issue protest campaigns; perhaps a little more successful than most, 
perhaps supported by a broader social and political base than normal, but 
ultimately incapable of reversing a 'flagship' policy. Whatever the truth of this, 
it is clear non-payment remained at the very heart of the popular politics of the 
poll tax. However, as I seek to show in the next section, the meaning of non-
payment was often more ambiguous and less overtly political than most 
protestors were wont to claim. 
The active citizen and poll tax non-payment 
It is important to emphasise from the outset that the majority of citizens did pay 
up fairly promptly, or at an early stage in the recovery procedure. However. 
some 20% of residents in urban areas and 10% in rural areas did not. So by the 
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end of 1991alone, 8,023,621 liability orders had been issued, with some 23,558 
court hours expended on the poll tax and 195,845 individuals turning up to court 
h . 34 Th to contest t elf cases. ese figures actually understate the problem, as many 
people simply disappeared and therefore failed to register in the official 
statistics. Ostensibly then, poll tax non-payers violated two obvious duties 
traditionally associated with citizenship, namely a duty to obey the law and a 
. 
duty to contribute to the state, through taxation. Indeed, some people went even 
further and surrendered their most important political 'right' by failing to 
register to vote in order to evade the tax. 
Given the sheer scale of non-payment it is safe to assume that no single 
explanation could possibly explain poll tax non-payment as a social and political 
phenomenon and a simple typology of non-payers reveals five possible 
motivations: 
o Frustrated conformists - willing to pay but unable to do so due to 
administrative/billing problems 
o Freeloaders - motivated by a selfish, 'rational' desire to avoid payment 
o Opportunists - if so may others are getting away with it, why shouldn't 
they? 
o Can't payers - a simple inability to pay due to economic circumstances. 
o Won't payers - refusal to pay as a political or ethical act 
Clearly the relative importance of each for this discussion varies considerably, 
but all are of at least some relevance to the wider question of active citizenship 
and each therefore deserves separate consideration. 
Frustrated conformists 
It is hard to exaggerate the administrative chaos that accompanied the 
introduction of the tax. Cheques were lost, computer systems broke down, 
children, pets and dead people were billed and benefit applications frequently 
disappeared. This last problem was particularly acute for pensioners, most of 
whom expected to receive a rebate. As a result, many law abiding individuals, 
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who declared themselves perfectly willing to pay in principle delayed stumping 
up the cash until the council 'sorted out the mess' and sent them a 'correct' bill. 
However, the existence of even a considerable body of 'frustrated conformists' 
probably has small bearing on any notion of citizenship, other than that the poll 
tax disappointed a reasonable expectation that the state should display at least a 
minimal level of competence. In that sense, the 'unworkability' of the tax 
. 
probably did much to undermine its legitimacy among otherwise conservative 
residents. 
Freeloaders 
The growth of non-payment as a phenomenon can be seen as an opportunistic 
attempt to 'free-load', to receive valuable public goods without payment. Such 
an individualistic (or selfish?) response might fit well with the more extreme 
varieties of neo-liberal theory, which tend to assume that everyone is a rational 
'utility maximiser', even if that means violating quite fundamental duties of 
citizenship. As Bellamy put it: 35 
the modem liberal tendency to argue on individualistic grounds that 
stress the moral autonomy of agents and their inalienable right to pursue 
their own good in their own way ... has potentially undermined any 
philosophical basis for a distinctly political obligation to obey the law. 
Certainly, poll tax freeloaders were displaying scant loyalty to the law, or for 
that matter, much respect for state authority. 
A number of factors may logically have encouraged a desire to 'freeload' in 
relation to the tax. Firstly, the dominant political discourse of the 1980's tended 
to be openly hostile to taxes per se, which were increasingly cast as a burden on 
productive citizens and a check on entrepreneurship. This was particularly 
evident in the case of local government, which was routinely accused of 
promoting 'loony leftism' on the rates and generally wasting tax-payers money. 
In this context, the poll tax, as a personal 'charge' for local services may 
actually have encouraged a feeling that it was acceptable to withhold payment. 
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After all, if the relationship between the local state and citizen is defined in 
tenns of the customer/provider, then it is wholly logical for individuals to 
approach state services in the same way as they might a tin of beans in their 
local supermarket. Did these citizen/consumers simply conclude that the poll tax 
was not 'value for money' given the level of services they received and decide 
not tQ 'bl!Y'? If so, the actual mechanics of the tax (people move about, houses 
don't) aided ~my attempt to avoid payment, as did the sheer administrative chaos 
that accompanied its introduction. 
Opportunists 
There is ample evidence of a bandwagon effect. For example, non-payment 
levels tended to grow in its second year of existence and by the end of June 
1991 over a third of the population had paid nothing for 1991/2 tax year, 
compared to less than a quarter at a similar stage in 199011.36 According to one 
statistical study, a distinctive 'neighbourhood effect' (eg the idea that high levels 
of non-payment in particular areas would encourage others not to pay), became 
more pronounced in 1992-93, the final year of poll tax collection.37 But this only 
goes so far in helping us to understand why people chose to become 
'opportunistic' non-payers. 
On one level the bandwagon effect raises a number of intriguing questions 
regarding the sources from which ordinary people receive infonnation. As we 
saw in chapters six and seve~ non-payment tended to be largely absent from 
media reports about the poll tax, which tended to focus on 'elite' political 
concerns, such as the effect of the tax in undermining Thatcher's leadership 
position. Supporters of the non-payment campaign rarely appeared in the 
national media, and more significantly perhaps, neither did any information 
regarding the legal consequences of non-payment. However, the local press was 
far more likely to report the issue, especially as it became clear that local 
authorities were facing a very serious cash-shortfall. 
The anti-poll tax movement therefore emerged as the only significant provider 
of detailed information on the legal implications of non-payment. This may have 
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been particularly important in the case of'opportunists', who probably tended to 
be more conscious of the possible costs of non-payment. As numbers grew, then 
so did confidence and knowledge about the less-than-dire personal 
consequences of non-payment. As one Ealing protestor recalled: 'There was a 
lot of word of mouth going on and in fact, some of the later callers would say 
'Oh,· I talked to my sister and she called you and so on ... ,38 In that sense the 
progressive growth in the number of non-payers may be indicative of a 
'popular' level of discourse, transmitted through family, friends, work-
colleagues and neighbours. 
However, it is less clear that this discourse was overtly 'political' except in one 
important sense. Almost by definition, the dominant norms and values of any 
liberal democracy are, supposedly, shared by the majority of its citizens. The 
existence of a bandwagon effect suggests that shifts in popular discourse may, in 
certain situations, prove capable of modifying existing conceptions of what 
constitutes the actions of the 'good' citizen? Obviously, this should not be 
exaggerated in the case of the poll tax, as only a minority failed to pay, but it 
does suggest that dominant norms and values regarding the payment of taxes 
may have been suspended on this occasion. Hence the frequently voiced 
complaint among Ealing's local authority finance officers that the poll tax had 
encouraged 'a developing non-payment culture among a significant cross 
section of the community'. 39 
Can't payers 
Despite their advocacy of non-payment as a political act, most protestors tended 
to work on the assumption that millions of people would not be able to afford 
the tax. This conviction was reinforced by actual experience of the liability and 
committal hearings and from the day-to-day public enquiries fielded by activists. 
As one Ealing protestor, who co-ordinated the Ealing Federation's anti-poll tax 
hotline recalled: 40 
the majority of people who phoned were people who genuinely could not 
. . It' g It was pay. It was very rarely people who were on pnnclp e no paym .. ' 
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mainly working class people who were on benefits or low wages who 
simply did not know what to do and were very, very frightened. So a lot 
of it was [about] reassuring people. But there came a point when things 
reached a sort of critical mass. 
This perception was in line with detailed studies of the likely implications of the 
poll tax for the poor, which from an early stage concluded that it would 
disproportionately disadvantage pensioners, people on benefits, students, the 
disabled and low paid workers.41 In particular, it was claimed that the increasing 
tendency for social security benefits to be means tested would tend 'to act in 
concert with the poll tax' and ensure that the 'near poor' were not eligible for 
rebates and 'the very poorest will slip through the net of protection'. 42 This also 
accords with the experience in Ealing, outlined in chapters six and seven, which 
showed that problems with benefits were a significant factor in encouraging 
non-payment. However, there were others, including the sudden loss of 
employment following onset of recession in the early 1990s8 , large-scale 
mortgage default and a noticeable rise in 'multiple debt' .. n Again, this last 
problem tended to exacerbate non-payment, as individuals threatened with 
coercive measures under the poll tax found themselves in a spiral of debt, of 
which the tax was but one. 
What were the implications of all this for any discussion of citizenship and the 
poll tax? On an obvious level it questions how far non-payment can be seen as a 
conscious political act. But that does not necessarily diminish the wider political 
significance of a considerable body of 'can't payers'. For if a law is so cast as to 
render even a minority of those asked to obey it unable to do so, it is not simply 
a bad law, but a discriminatory attack on the poor who become, in effect, a sort 
of second-class citizen. So far from dragging the 'underclass back into the ranks 
of responsible society' as Thatcher claimed she intended (see chapter one), the 
poll tax actually served to diminish social cohesion and worsen the economic 
position and self-respect of millions of Britain's poorest citizens. 
• In Eating unemployment ran at 11.1 % according to the D. of E. count or 15.3% according to 
the Unemployment Unit index in October 1992 
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Won't payers 
In assessing whether any act of civil disobedience is justified in a liberal 
democracy the political theorist LJ MacFarlane suggested that people should 
apply four questions: 44 
• 
. 
a What cause does the disobedience serve? 
a Why does this cause demand rejection of obligation to the state and its laws? 
a Do the means further the cause? 
a Do the consequences justify the protest, does the end justify the means? 
It seems to me that this is a useful approach that (hopefully) will reveal the 
political meaning of non-payment for 'won't payers'. The rest of this section is 
therefore structured around MacFarlane's schema. 
What cause did the disobedience serve? 
Ostensibly, its purpose was very narrow: to secure the repeal of an 'unjust' tax 
by making it 'unworkable' and individual citizens from all political traditions 
and none were asked to unite around this single tactic. In part, this was a purely 
defensive reaction to a law that immediately threatened the living standards of 
'ordinary' people and the public services they used. However, as we saw in 
chapters one and three, the poll tax was widely perceived to be an unusually 
ideological measure. Consequently, opposition to the poll tax encompassed a 
number of other discontents. In particular, it served to galvanise an evident fear 
among large swathes of public opinion that the tax (and the Prime Minister with 
which it was so closely associated) was increasingly 'extreme' and had gone 
'too far'. There was therefore a moral imperative to resist the tax. 
Why did this clUlse demand rejection of obligation to the state and laws? 
Ultimately, non-payment was based on moral opposition to the tax and/or the 
government that introduced it. However, as an action, it also implicitly 
questioned the legitimacy of the state. Certainly the British political system was 
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increasingly criticised in the period, across a surprisingly wide range of political 
" 4S I h' OpinIon. n part t IS reflected the nature of Britain's 'majoritarian' democracy, 
which according to Ljiphart tends to encourage social and political cleavages at 
times of rising social and political tension.46 Other problem areas included a first 
past the post electoral system that routinely allowed a minority of adult citizens 
to select Yte ~overnment of the day, an 'over-mighty' Executive unchecked by a 
powerful second chamber or a written constitution, and a unitary state that 
allowed no meaningful devolution of power within the UK. Evidence from 
attitudinal surveys also revealed a growing disrespect, even contempt for the 
political class which was widely perceived to put its own interests over those of 
the country. Policy convergence between the main political parties may also 
have tended to reduce incentives for participation, although one possible 
expression of this - low voter turnout - was restricted to local government 
elections at this stage, rather than national polls. Many critics of the poll tax 
therefore sought explain its shortcomings in terms of the wider failings of the 
existing political system, which they argued, allowed governments to pass 'bad' 
laws which did not accord with the norms and values held by the majority of 
citizens. 47 
However, there is no convincing evidence that the poll tax crisis either reflected, 
or provoked a systemic legitimacy crisis in Britain and the mass of the public 
remained committed to the principles of liberal democracy. But did this hold 
true for the radical left, who could be expected to be most disaffected by the 
neo-liberal, centralising thrust of government policy in the 1980s and more 
cynical about the capacity of the existing system to secure change? Common 
sense does suggest that there was a direct relationship between poll tax non-
payment and the left's wider sense of political frustration. After all, a key claim 
made by the anti-poll tax movement was that it actually embodied the popular 
will over the tax far better than the institutional parties? 
But again, things were not so clear-cut in practice. For whatever their concerns 
about the limits of liberal democracy, there was little to suggest that the radical 
left had come to reject participation in the electoral system wholesale. So 
support for civil disobedience as a form of citizenship is best seen as a specific 
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response to a specific issue7 rather than part of a routine defiance of state 
authority. In part this reflected the fact that notwithstanding Labour's 
'modernisation' project, the organised labour movement remained a powerful 
pole of attraction for many anti-poll tax activists. In that sense, most protestors 
drawn from a socialist tradition interviewed for this study tended to see the non-
payment-ca~paign as wholly untypical of their previous political experience: 48 
This ended up as a campaign of the citizenry, which is extremely 
unusual. I know of no other co-ordinated national revolt of local 
government tax payers. A priori you would tend to take the position that 
such a campaign could not succeed. I mea~ if you were just sitting in 
your study and thinking about things in 1924 or something, you would 
rule out not paying local tax as a legitimate form of class struggle. But 
you'd have been wrong. 
However, given the broad-based nature of the campai~ such an orientation 
towards labour was by no means universal. As another Baling protestor 
recalled: 49 
Although I'm member of the Green Party, the anti-poll tax campaign 
showed me that ifpeople get together, you don't need to be in a political 
party to bring about change. I was acting as an individual member of the 
local community against the poll tax, rather than as a Green Party 
member. 
Others shared this perception of the movement as a model of community based 
politics upon which the radical left could build in the future. Such a citizenship 
would bypass a political system, which merely served to 'co-opt our struggles 
into [the] party system' and so turned 'victories into bureaucracy':so 
It is time for activists involved in single issue community based 
campaigns, such as the Poll Tax, to use their experience in the wider 
community struggle, for example defending and if necessary creating 
services - such as community controlled centres, taking control of 
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housing and other resources, defending sections of our community 
under attack, providing counter information. 
The problem with this strategy was that it seemed to assume a state of 
permanent revolution, in which sections of the community would perpetually 
'struggle-' ~ith the state authorities. In the process they would create 
autonomous, popular institutions or centres of power. Clearly this was never a 
realistic possibility in the early 1990s. 
Indeed, while the non-payment tactic may have been suited to the poll t~ there 
was little evidence that it might be usefully transferred to other areas of social 
life. For example, an attempt by some Scottish campaigners to widen the non-
payment campaign and encourage citizens to refuse to pay water charges failed 
to secure widespread popular support. 51 However, while non-payment as a form 
of civil disobedience was of limited relevance, many on the left sought to apply 
illegal tactics to an increasing number of issues, including animal rights protests, 
peace protests, roads protests, campaigns against the arms trade and so on. I will 
return to these important issues in the conclusion of the chapter. 
Did the means further the cause? 
As we saw in chapter seven, the radical left claimed that poll tax non-payment 
undertaken as a conscious political act, defeated the poll tax and there does not 
seem much point in belabouring the point, except to say that for them at least, 
the means clearly did further the cause. However, this interpretation has 
received few supporters within the British political class, the media or 
academics either at the time or since. Instead, such accounts tend to explain the , 
remarkable fact that the tax was repealed after only a year of operation in 
England and Wales as a consequence of election results and to a lesser extent, 
power struggles within the Conservative Party. Thus the episode could be cited 
as evidence of the system's flexibility and the capacity of the political class to 
eventually reflect public opinion. Butler et at's comments are typical of this 
tendency and are therefore worth quoting at a little length: 52 
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Non-payment as a campaign by the Anti-Poll Tax Federation and others 
was but one aspect of the mass agitation, and on its own played a fairly 
insignificant role in the downfall of the tax. A Glaswegian [eg Tommy 
Sheridan] who stood from goal as a non-payer in Pollock in the 1992 
general election polled 20 per cent of the vote, but such isolated 
demonst:ations were more than outweighed by the enfeeblement of the 
Labour leadership produced by having to wrestle with the issue of non-
payment among party activists. However, if non-payment as a campaign 
was of limited consequence, non-payment as a fact in inner city areas 
undoubtedly helped undermine the poll tax. A first principle of taxation 
is that should be collectable with broad consent. Ultimately the poll tax 
was not. That sealed its fate. 
Leaving aside the rather dubious proposition that it is possible to judge the 
relationship between the organised protestors and the bulk of non-payers on the 
basis of a single general election result, the message seems clear enough. 
Most protestors freely acknowledged that non-payment was 1101 an organised 
campaign in the sense of a disciplined body of opinion, united under a single 
leadership. This became immediately obvious in March 1991, when activists 
debated whether to carry on non-payment after government signalled its 
intention to abolish the charge and concluded that: 53 
The millions of people who took the decision not to pay were not 
"acting under instructions" from the Anti-Poll Tax Federations. We are 
therefore in no position to call off the campaign even if we wanted to. It 
is a simple fact that non-payment will go on as long as the Poll Tax 
remains in force ... 
Nevertheless the radical left believed that the existence of a vociferous anti-poll , 
tax movement was decisive. Firstly, while more people would probably have 
defaulted than under the rates, the total figure would have been smaller 
Moreover, non-payment would also have been devoid of political significance. 
So the claim that non-payment in inner-cities (or anywhere else for that matter) 
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could not be meaningfully linked with activities of the protestors was, they 
argued, merely a self-serving attempt by the establishment to rewrite history _ 
an obvious case of 'they would say that wouldn't they?' Any greater 
acknowledgement would endorse the virtues of civil disobedience as a means of 
securing political change and challenge conventional stereotypes of the radical 
left as {"Jctremists and 'loonies', whose ideas had no significant popular 
resonance. 
The protestors therefore flagged up their role in encouraging individuals to make 
that first, decisive step and withhold payment on 1 April 1990 and then later, to 
continue to resist coercive measures undertaken by the council. After all, 
normally law-abiding people would be extremely reluctant to break long 
established habits acquired under the rates and risk sanctions unless they were 
aware that they 'would not be alone'. Many must also have had at least a basic 
understanding of the likely legal consequences. In that sense, the protestors' 
sustained efforts to disseminate detailed information on the practical 
implications of non-payment to every household in their area and the provision 
of direct assistance in the form of advice and help at court, was of real 
significance. 
So whatever else they may have achieved, the protestors were sure that their 
campaign had succeeded in politicising non-payment. Certainly the evidence 
outlined in chapters six and seven suggests that not only did the protestors tend 
to see it as part of a wider, vaguely defined 'movemenf against the tax, but so 
did the authorities. As a result, the phenomenon assumed a certain symbolic 
significance, irrespective of the real motives of the individuals involved. 
However, this process of politicisation could cut both ways and efforts to aid 
non-payers in committal hearings were undoubtedly hampered by a perception 
among local councillors, magistrates and others associated with the enforcement " 
of the tax, that most people summoned before the bench tended to be a case of 
'won't pay' rather than 'can't pay'. 
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Did the consequences justify the protest, did the end justify the means? 
Assuming that the civil disobedience campaign did force the government to 
abandon the tax, then the ends clearly justified the means. As two Ealing 
protestors,. Jude Sutherland and Gill Reavey saw it: 54 
direct action is sometimes the only way to achieve change, and I see no 
problem in encouraging people to break a law that is morally wrong. 
When I was on the [anti-poll tax] union's information stall people would 
sometimes say that there was no point in not paying as they would just 
get into trouble and nothing would change. But we used to refer them to 
the Suffiagette movement and that women would not have won the right 
to vote if it hadn't been for the law-breaking campaign. 
Nevertheless,. the non-payment campaign did have a number of consequences 
for both local government and individual citizens. For example, high levels of 
non-collection forced councils to raise the overall rate of the charge for the law-
abiding majority, even if this rise was obscured by direct subsidies by 
government and Lamont's £ 140 across the board reduction of 1991. 
However,. alarmist predictions that non-payment would compel local councils to 
make drastic cuts in services made by Conservative and Labour politicians 
proved unfounded. Although conditions varied across the country, local 
government maintained its long-term share of GDP and council spending 
actually rose in the period. Again losses from the poll tax were offset by 
increased government subsidies, ultimately paid for by a rises in another 
regressive form of taxation - Value Added Tax. So if one intention of the 
campaign had to been to encourage the idea that taxes should be more fully 
linked to ability to pay, it was a failure. Nor did the non-payment campaign do 
anything to defend the independent tax raising powers of local government, as 
the government retained its capping powers under the new council tax and 
ensured that only some 30010 of local revenue was raised locally. 
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There were other deeply ironic ( or unfortunate) consequences from a left-wing 
perspective. For example;, nearly a million people disappeared off the electoral 
register and their failure to vote directly contributed to the Conservatives' 1992 
general election victory. More intangibly, mass non-payment may have served 
to undermine the rule of law and the expectation that citizens should pay their 
taxes. This ~as certainly an ambiguous outcome for the left. After all, many of 
the proponents of the non-payment campaign were also vociferously calling for 
a reassertion of social citizenship rights and better state provision, all of which 
would ultimately have to be paid for via higher taxation for the wealthy. In that 
sense, respect for the law may actually serve as a progressive force and protect 
the weak and vulnerable from the irresponsibility of the rich and powerful. Was 
then non-payment a case of the radical Left having its cake and eating it? 
No protestor would have accepted the charge. Without an alliance of 'can't 
payers' and 'won't payers' the poor would effectively have been left to deal 
with the tax as best they could. For all the individual injustices encountered 
during committal hearings, the protestors believed that the politicisation of non-
payment tended to limit the authorities' room for manoeuvre. For example, less 
people were jailed for poll tax non-payment than the rates. In any case, most of 
the radical left tended to consider pious pronouncements about the sanctity of 
the law made by politicians as deeply hypocritical. After all, tax avoidance was 
(allegedly) commonplace among British business and the government seemed 
happy to turn a blind eye to offshore tax havens and other loopholes. ss As one 
delegate to the Labour Party's 1990 Annual Conference fulminated: s6 
Working class people are the most law-abiding section of the community, 
unlike the casino cowboys of the City, plundering state assets for graft 
and corruption and Tory ministers who can hold down three or four jobs 
while millions do not have one. 
Similarly, the authorities' vigorous response to poll tax non-payment did 
nothing to blunt the belief that the law was generally class-biased. As one 
protestor recalled:" 
292 
At about the same time as the poll tax the supermarkets were actual I y 
breaking the criminal law by opening on Sunday and managed to get it 
changed. But then these were organisations run by the rich and powerful. 
A number of other factors also served to limit the personal consequences of non-
payment .for. individual 'won't payers'. Firstly, the recovery procedure became 
hopelessly truncated or simply broke down all together under the weight of 
numbers. Secondly, non-payment of the poll tax was a civil, rather than a 
criminal offence and the status of non-payers was therefore that of a debtor. 58 
This was obviously significant, as few people would relish the prospect of 
acqUlnng a criminal record, however deep-felt their opposition to the tax. 
Thirdly, assuming you had the necessary wherewithal, anyone could end their 
protest by simply paying up, with little or no other personal cost to themselves. 
Unless the non-payer chose to tell others, nobody else need know. In the event, 
most 'won't payers' therefore tended to hold out to at least the bailiff stage of 
the recovery procedure, confident in the knowledge that the council's bark was 
definitely worse than its bite. 'Won't payers' could look therefore forward to 
next year's bill with a certain degree of wry equanimity, as the whole dreary 
process started allover again. 
In this respect, the vast majority of activists were no different from the wider 
body of non-payers in Ealing and elsewhere, who almost inevitably paid up 
when faced with the ultimate sanction of imprisonment. As we saw in chapter 
seven, while some fifty thousand people had liability orders served against them 
in Ealing in 1990-91, only three individuals actually went to prison as an overtly 
political act. And even then, two of these had large debts and could just as easily 
be characterised as 'can't payers'. So while it is right to describe poll tax non-
payment as an act of civil disobedience, experience was to show that it was 
actually a rather mild and relatively low-cost one. It may therefore be better to 
see the mass non-payment campaign as a peculiarly British form of civil 
disobedience, a display of 'bloody mindedness' on the part of millions of 
individuals rather than a militant, concerted movement. 
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So perhaps the government only had itself to blame. The poll tax offered every 
citizen an opportunity, if they had the nerve or the inclination, to put two fingers 
up either at the tax itself, the government, or both at the same time. Moreover, 
this chance to meaningfully express dissent literally popped through their 
letterbox and could be activated simply by 'sitting at home and doing nothing, . .59 
A rather .sedate act of active citizenship perhaps, but a conscious political act 
nevertheless. 
Conclusion 
The dominant concept of citizenship within liberal democracies is predicated 
upon a sense of belonging. Political rights enjoyed by citizens allow them to 
meaningful participate and shape society, in an orderly and democratic manner. 
But this in tum implies, even demands that citizens obey laws that they might 
not happen to agree with and generally act in accordance with the established 
norms and values that govern social and political life. However, as this study has 
shown, such verities are often challenged, subverted or disregarded altogether 
by citizens, as they struggle to find solutions to the problems that confront them. 
The poll tax was definitely a 'problem' for most British people, let alone the 
Left. 
The poll tax crisis therefore served to high-light at least two broad models of 
left-wing citizenship. Put crudely, one worked on the assumption that change 
could and should be secured by working constructively within the institutions of 
the existing political system. The other, fiustrated by the apparent failure of 
those institutions to effect change or reflect what it perceived to be the dominant 
values of society, sought to mobilise people's power. The purpose of this 
conclusion is therefore to ask how these two broad models of citizenship are 
related to each other and in the process, identify some of the implications of the 
poll tax crisis for the British left at the end of the twentieth century. 
It is certainly tempting to see a direct relationship between shifts in the political 
practice of the institutional left in the 1980s and the growth in support for an 
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anti-poll tax movement willing to use illegal means of protest and civil 
disobedience. After all, the growth of 'New Realism' in the Labour movement 
would presumably have prompted some existing (or potential activists) to 
consider more radical alternatives. As Tony Benn (and many others on the left) 
saw it during the high-tide of anti-poll tax agitation in the Spring of 1990:60 
. 
The poll tax revolt may mark a welcome return to the belief that we have 
the right to be participants in shaping our own future and regain the 
power that ought to be ours, as of right, and that it is not about what 
someone else will do for us when they are in power. This view of the 
meaning of democracy is unlikel y to be confined to those who live under 
foreign dictatorships and may soon be seen to be as necessary here, 
where British feudalism has imposed its own unacceptable limits on our 
freedom. 
However, support for direct action in the early 1990s, even among the radical 
left, had definite limits, with for example, few believing that political violence 
or the routine defiance of the law was a viable mode of political participation. 
So although poll tax non-payment as a tactic enjoyed considerable popular 
support, this was wholly contingent upon a particular historical circumstance 
and the peculiar characteristics of the tax. Once the tax was repealed, the 
agitation dissipated with remarkable speed, prompting some activists in Ealing 
and elsewhere to conclude that their experiences had no long term implication 
for British politics. However, others were not so sure:61 
It's obviously quite easy to look at the situation now in 1997. You 
know, you occasionally meet people who were active in local anti-
poll tax unions and they say "hello", and that's it. Then you think 
right, that's it, they're back to living their own lives. Nothings 
changed fundamentally. I think that would be wrong, because there 
has been a huge change. That was a real education for people in the 
school of hard knocks. And that kind of experience is not lost. You 
know, you learn to ride a bike and then you don't ride a bike for the 
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next ten years. But the next time you get on one you can ride it 
agam. 
In fact this tends to underestimate the extent to which left-wing citizens have 
been willing to engage in direct action (or at least support those who do) in the 
1990.s. FoOr example, attacks on GM crops, attempts to physically stop road-
building and a new militant temper at 'anti-capitalist' demonstrations, including 
physical attacks on property owned by the state and corporations have emerged 
as more common forms of political action. Similarly, despite the obvious 
practical problems posed by any non-payment campaign, attempts have been 
made to withhold the payment of university tuition fees, which draw directly 
upon the poll tax protest for inspiration. 62 Other radicals have encouraged 
people to use their power as consumers, by boycotting GM food. According to 
one activist, 'people have refused to be passive citizens and instead have 
become active citizens: refusing to buy GM food in the shop; removing GM 
plants from the fields; and supporting organic food and ecological 
alternatives' . 63 
In themselves such protests cannot credibly be cast as a decisive rejection of 
liberal democracy and all its works. But they have occurred at a time when large 
sections of the public, particularly the young, appear to be disengaging with the 
electoral process, established political parties and interest groups. For example, 
turnout at the 1997 general election was the lowest since the Second World War 
and only 40% of young people bothered to vote. Voter tum-out at local, regional 
and European elections since 1997 has declined further. Similarly, activism and 
membership of the institutional political parties remains limited, with only one 
person in fifty belonging to any party. This is obviously important, for political 
parties are essential to the British model of liberal democracy. 
As a result the institutional left undertook a concerted attempt to re-energise and 
reshape the internal structures of the Labour Party in the 1990s. As Tony Blair 
·64 put It: 
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We must build a programme for government which embodies our belief 
and principles in strong communities and responsible citizens ... That is 
why I am so passionate in the belief that we need a mass-membership 
party, reaching into every community, to be the driving force for 
achieving government. 
By the time" of the 1997 general election Labour claimed that it had 410.000 
members, 220,000 of which had joined since Blair became leader in 1994.65 
However, this growth in membership has been accompanied by a concerted 
drive to flag up the importance of the leader, changes in the role and system of 
appointment to the party's National Executive Committee and the introduction 
of plebiscitary forms of internal participation. According to Mandelson and 
Liddle, the aim of these cumulative changes was to ensure that 'this new party 
will not, as in the past, be a source of trouble for the Labour government but will 
instead be Prime Minister Blair's strongest ally. ,66 
Similarly, the government has undertaken a series of measures aimed at 're-
legitimising' the institutional political system. Firstly, the party has recognised 
the problem of growing cynicism by deliberately seeking not to promise more 
than it can deliver within what it claims are the constraints of a globalised 
market economy. Secondly, various devolution measures have aimed to 
decentralise power, although the extent to which this will actually occur under 
the new arrangements should not be exaggerated.67 Leading New Labour 
politicians have also sought to reaffirm a culture of 'civic patriotism' and 
emphasised the duties and obligations that accompany citizenship rights, 
including interestingly, appeals to give to charity and to get involved in local 
I . . 68 vo untary organIsatIOns: 
Call it community, call it civic patriotism, call it the giving age, or call it 
the new active citizenship, call it the great British society - it is Britain 
becoming Britain again. 
Such patriotic rhetoric sits fairly easily with that employed by the British New 
Right at the time of the poll tax crisis. And like Thatcher before them, the 
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institutional Left has promoted social policies that seem t . I·· I 
o tmp tClt y assume a 
direct link between economic activism and polt·tt·cal actt· . h Vlsm, suc as the 
welfare to work scheme. 
This drive to encourage responsible citizenship has come to involve a mixture of 
exhortation. and coercion. For example, the Crick Report has sought to 
reintroduce a form of 'civics' in the curriculum, described by David Blunkett as 
an attempt to aid the 'development of young people who accept responsibility 
for themselves and towards society as a whole,.69 At the same time, changes to 
public order legislation and the criminal justice system are proposed, that 
according to the government's critics from the left, will potentially outlaw most 
types of direct action. Whether these various attempts to boost the legitimacy of 
the political system actually succeed remains to be seen. However, the very fact 
that they have been attempted at all suggests that the poll tax protests might best 
be seen as part of a rising tide of 'sod them' politics, described by one 
contemporary politician as 'an ill wind we would do well to understand,.70 
1 'Licinius', Vote Labour? Why?, Gollancz, London 1945, pp74-5 
2 Graffiti painted on wall of Benefit Agency office, Halifax, West Yorkshire, 1990. 
3 David Marquand, The Unprincipled SOCiety, Jonathan Cape, London, p28 
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last card and lost, and in the loss, parliamentary institutions may be engulfed' . 
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Appendix 1 
The Queen of the Suburbs 
'. 
The London Borough of Ealing began to shift from a predominantly rural area 
whose ~hie! industry was farming and market gardening for the London market, 
to an industrial suburb from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 1 Transport was 
the key and the borough has traditionally been well served by railways, the 
Grand Junction Canal (which encircles it) and the presence of several major 
roads, including the Western Avenue and the Uxbridge Road. So the London 
Borough of Ealing, like most London suburbs, is an essentially modem entity 
that owes little to tradition and much to rapid industrialisation and the actions of 
national politicians and policy-makers. The borough, as it now exists, was 
formally created during the 1965 reorganisation of local government, as an 
amalgam of three different municipal borough councils, which had themselves 
progressively incorporated a number of long standing Middlesex settlements, 
villages and towns. The legacy of these settlements still informs the four 
administrative districts within the borough, namely Southall, Greenford, Acton 
and Ealing (see map). Each area has more or less avoided being totally 
submerged under the rising tide of industrial and housing development in the 
twentieth century and so continues to act as a certain locus of identity . 
. Ealing 
Ealing was incorporated as a borough in 1901 and later incorporated the Urban 
districts of Hanwell, Greenford, Perivale, West Twyford (all 1926) and Northolt 
(1928). The present administrative district is more limited, covering three areas 
grouped around the Uxbridge Road, namely Ealing, West Ealing and Hanwell. 
As elsewhere in the borough, private housing sits alongside deprived council 
estates in Hanwell and West Ealing. The steady rise in the price of property in 
the central Ealing area in recent decades, together with the building of a new 
shopping centre in Ealing Broadway, has tended to exacerbate social division and 
encourage the process of gentrification. But in the late 1980s Ealing Broadway 
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London Borough of Ealing - Administrative Units 1983 
Parliamentary Constituencies: 
A. Ealing Acton (Conservati've) 
B. Eating North (Conservative) 
C. Ealing Southall (Labour) 
Districts: 
D 
tIIm1 
EEJ trm 
Ealing 
Acton 
Greenford 
Southall 
Wards: The 24 wards are named after people and places (farms, common fields ere) 
in the Borottgh)s past . 
Taken from Kate McEwan, Ealin g Wa lkaboll I: ,J ollrneys in 10 Ihe Hi slory oJ a LO/l don Borollgh, Pulse 
Public41tions, Warrington. 198~ 
and its environs contained a larger number of private rented dwellings and could 
broadly be described as 'bedsit land'. 
. ,'. So the district remains, in general, the most affluent part of the borough. The 
politics of the area has tended to reflect this fact and the Conservative Party 
predomina~d . in local and national elections. This was important, for Ealing 
formed half of the Ealing-Acton constituency, which regularly returned a Tory 
:MP, Sir George Young in the 1980s. Young proved himself to be no Thatcherite, 
something of a wet and a vociferous opponent of the poll tax within parliament 
up until the passage of the Local Government Finance Act in 1988. After the tax 
became law he ceased to make public statements on the issue and received a 
junior ministerial post in the revamped Major administration of 1990. 
Acton 
By the seventeenth century Acton had emerged as a fashionable spa town 
favoured by wealthy Londoners seeking to escape the rigours of city life, who 
built country residences there. The development of the railways prompted a 
process of suburbanisation that burgeoned in the twentieth century. Large scale 
industries also developed, including the establishment of up to 170 laundries in 
the South Acton area by the 1890s, which became known as 'soapsud island'. 
Reflecting a rapid growth of population and light industry after 1914, the 
Municipal Borough of Acton was created in 1921 to co-ordinate public services. 
The council pushed through a number of housing developments in the post-war 
era and cleared slums in South Acton, East Acton and the Vale. However, the 
South Acton estate soon reverted back to its former state of deprivation. These 
areas served as a base for the local Labour Party. On the other hand, other parts 
of Acton prospered as high quality, tree-lined suburban private housing was built 
in West Acton and Bedford Park throughout the twentieth century. 
Southall 
By 1936, when the municipal borough of Southall was created, the 
predominantly industrial character of the town was well established. Major 
industries included light engineering, mass-food production and railway yards, 
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although all these had significantly declined or left the area altogether by the late 
,'·1980s. However, the adverse economic effects of these changes have been 
mitigated somewhat by the presence of a large Asian community, which rapidly 
establi~hed.new mercantilist traditions. Nevertheless, Southall remains one of the 
most economically deprived areas in the borough. Minority ethnic communities 
comprise some fifty percent of the local populatio~ with Sikhs and Indians the 
largest group, followed by a smaller number of Pakistanis and Somalis. 
So the question of ethnicity has perhaps inevitably shaped the politics of Southall 
in recent decades. Although racism has led to some tensions between the various 
minority ethnic communities, it has also soured relations between some white 
working class residents and their Black and Asian neighbours. Tensions broke 
out in the late 1970s and early 1980s when a number of attempts by Fascist 
groups to meet in Southall provoked riots and demonstrations organised by a 
coalition of Asian community groups and the socialist and trade union left. In 
1979, Blair Peac~ a member of the Socialist Workers Party, was bludgeoned to 
death by police officers at a 1979 anti-racist demonstration.:1 His death continues 
to mobilise the local left, is still commemorated by anniversary marches and a 
Southall school is named after him. As a result, whatever support the Far Right 
may have been able to muster in the borough was effectively driven off the 
streets and organised Fascist groups have ceased to play any significant role in 
Ealing ever since. Conversely, the disturbances prompted the creation of a 
number of Asian community groups and strengthened others, some of which 
received official funding. By the late 1980s the Indian Workers' Association 
(IW A), the Southall Monitoring Group and Southall Black sisters continued to 
act as a political force on the left. 
The main political party in the area - the Labour Party - was also transformed in 
the 1980s through the recruitment of a large number of Asian members. This 
growth was not simply a reflection of traditional electoral support among 
minority ethnic communities for the Labour Party, as the Southall CLP 
experienced a number. of intefllal disputes as different groups of Asian 
lOJ 
councillors jockeyed for position and personal prestige. Similarly, the late 1980s 
saw a detennined attempt by some Asian members and the Labour Left to force 
the reselection or resignation of the longstanding and aged Labour MP Sid 
r. Bydwell, and replace him with a younger candidate drawn from the Asian 
community. After a bitter internal power struggle that prompted some allegations 
of imPfopt:!ety, Piara Khabra, an elderly local businessman, President of the IW A 
and ex-defector to the SDP eventually secured the nomination and was later 
elected MP in the 1992 general election. Khabra was (allegedly) selected after 
promising to serve for only one tenn, but has since refused to step down, to the 
considerable annoyance of his rivals within the party. 
Greenford and N ortholt 
~" 
Northolt and Greenford largely retained their rural character up until the Second 
'( 
World vy ar. However, rapid population growth and economic development in the 
post-war eta decisively transformed the area, which can be seen as the archetypal 
. .r.'· 
suburban sprawl. A mixture of private hotjsing builtin the 1930s and 1950s, 
, 
. ,,~ \ -
large council esiat~s, factories~ warehouses and:-reven some green spaces around 
" ".. 1.. .... ..-!. ~ ~'~. 
Hanger Hill (rather optimistically designated Ealing's 'Nature Reserve') sit 
uneasily alongside each other. Wide and busy through-roads also serve to disrupt 
the cohesion of the area and in lieu of any obvious natural geographical centre, 
the main shopping street, Greenford Broadway, serves as the focus for 
community and commercial life. 
The ethnic mix in Greenford and Northolt is predominantly, but by no means 
exclusively, white. In the late 1980s there was some political controversy among 
white residents about proposals to build a Mosque in the area, an issue 
subsequently taken up by the local Conservative MP Harry Greenway. But in 
general, ethnicity has not featured strongly as an issue. The Ealing North 
constituency operated a two party system in the 1980s, with the Conservative 
Party consistently winning parliamentary elections, and Labour councillors 
returned in most working class areas. The 1997 general election saw Greenway 
replaced by a veteran Labour councillor, Steve Pound, as MP for Ealing North. 
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Ealing in 1991 - some facts and figures 
On 21 April 1991 the. nineteenth national census was conducted throughout 
" ·Britain. It became immediately apparent that the poll tax had served to distort 
some its findings, especially in terms of the number of people participating. For 
exampl~, wpile the census found that 275,257 people were resident in Ealing, a 
drop of 5.7% since 1981, the council continued to claim that the borough had a 
population of 290,000? Nevertheless, the exercise revealed a number of useful 
facts and figures that cast some light on the borough's social and economic 
position at the time of the poll tax crisis. 4 
Firstly, 65% of residents were economically active compared to a national 
average of 61%. Of these, 67.6% were in full-time employment, 10.3% part-
time, 10.2% self-employed and 11 % unemployed. The proportion of households 
with an economically active head were classified according to occupation as 
follows: 
Average 
Occupation Ealing* for England and Wales 
Professional I 8.1% 7.0% 
Managerial & technical II 37.9% 32.2% 
Skilled non-manual m(N) 18.0% 14.2% 
Skilled manual ill(M) 20.0% 27.7% 
Partly skilled IV 1l.3% 14.1% 
Unskilled V 4.7% 4.8% 
• based on 10% sample (6,700 households) 
Clearly, Ealing contained a relatively larger number of residents in higber status 
occupational groups. But as we have seen, residents in some areas also 
experienced a considerable degree of poverty and tbe unemployment rate was 
higher than the official national average. According to a measure of 'multiple 
stress' based on a combination of economic, social and housing measures, wards 
in Southall and Acton were the most deprived, followed by NortholtlGreenford 
and then Baling. 
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The census' findings on dwelling type and housing tenure also emphasise the 
lack of uniformity in the borough - scarcely surprising as so much development 
,t. has occurred either through large~scale public housing projects in the 1930s and 
1950s, or speculative projects by private firms. 
Dwelling type • Ealing Outer London Greater London 
Detached house 3.2% 7.9% 5.1% 
Semi-detached house 18.8% 25.6% 16.7% 
Terraced house 35.2% 33.6% 16.7% 
Purpose-built flat 29.2% 25.3% 34.5% 
Converted, or partly 
converted accommodation 12.8% 7.2% 13.3% 
Shared dwellings 0.8% 0.5% 0.7% 
Of these, 63.8% were owner occupied, 15.8% rented from the council and 20.4% 
privately rented. Average household size was 2.5. 
However, the borough's most unusual characteristic was probably its 
heterogeneous ethnic mix. In addition to a large minority ethnic community 
drawn from Commonwealth countries, for historical reasons there was also large 
Irish and Polish communities which were subsumed under the general category 
of 'white' in the census. 
Ethnic group Ealing Greater London 
White 67% 80.0% 
Black 7% 8.0% 
Indian 16% 5.2% 
PakistanilBangladeshi 3% 2.6% 
Chinese 1% 0.8% 
Others 6% 3.4% 
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The Queen of the Suburbs? 
There is often a tendency for people to see their own locality as somehow 
,t. extraordinary or wholly distinct from other places. In the case of Ealing, such a 
temptation should be resisted. True, the borough had a larger than usual Asian 
community.. than in other London boroughs and tended to have a larger 
proportion of residents in higher status occupations than the national average, but 
the statistics can easily belie the sheer ordinariness of the place. For Ealing was 
and remains a typical suburb, criss-crossed by orderly car-lined streets and 
estates, delineated by railway lines and well stocked High Streets, punctuated by 
the occasional park. Many of its residents are in-comers, drawn to London from 
other parts of the UK or other countries and continents by a wish to see 
themselves and their children 'get on'. 
Such a diverse social, ethnic and economic mix contains much potential for 
conflict and the people of Ealing, like other suburbs, have unconsciously (and 
perhaps sensibly) developed strategies to minimise the personal impact of 
difference and dissension. This is a polite world, where chat about house-prices, 
pets, children and schools sits (sometimes uneasily) alongside the weather. For 
obvious reasons political and religious controversy is steadfastly downplaye~ a 
threat to whatever social-glue binds suburban society. For many residents it can 
also be an anonymous, lonely place, shorn of solid community ties as even the 
potential of work as a strong source of social identity is dissipated in the hours 
spent swaying on the overcrowded commuter trains into central London. But 
sometimes an issue like the poll tax prompts private and political passions to rise, 
the laminated calm becomes disturbed, and the suburb twitches in its sleep. 
I Unfortunately no decent modem history of Eating exists. However, ~te ~cEwan, ~ing 
Walkabout: Journeys into the History of a London Borough, Pulse ~bli~ti~DS, Warrington, 
1984, sets out the history of the borough and provides a comprehensive bibliography . 
2 See National Council of Civil Liberties, Southall 23 April 1979: The Report of the UnojJiaal 
Committee of Enquiry, London, 1980 
] London Borough ofEaling. Ealing Borough Guide, 1991 
4 The following information comes from a summary of the. ~nsus ~ts~ London Borough of 
Ealing. This is Ealing, Central Policy Unit, 1991 and subsidiary publications 
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Appendix 2 
The Subject as Object 
The slogans we ought to raise are surely these: 
Every man his own methodologist! 
Methodologists! Get to work! 1 
The introduction of this thesis sought to alert the reader to a methodological problem, 
namely the author's own involvement with the object of study. Between 1989-1993 I 
was a committed anti-poll tax activist, although my primary motivation was to 
promote socialist ideas in general, rather than protest about a single-issue. I 
undertook a number of formal roles within the Ealing Federation serving as 
chairperson and as a member of the its organising committee. I also attended 
numerous meetings and events organised by London-based and national anti-poll tax 
organisations. As a participant in the formal decision making structures of the 
Federation and on an ad hoc basis in response to day-to-day developments, I made 
strategic decisions about the direction of the local campaign. So I was a participant 
not a participant observer, seeking to secure political goals, not gather data. At no 
time did I expect to be looking back at these experiences in a structured way (let 
alone undertaking a doctoral thesis around them). I kept no log or diary, accumulated 
no systematic collection of contemporary documents (although luckily others did), 
and maintained no relationships with fellow participants with a view to future 
research possibilities other than those dictated by friendship or shared political 
concerns. 
This may only be an extreme manifestation of a problem common to any work of 
contemporary history, as the contemporary historian invariably lives through the 
events they describe. Other historians might well ask 'problem, what problem?' After 
all, an increasingly influential body of theory in historical studies (and social studies 
generally) suggests that any work of history cannot ultimately be seen as an objective 
record of the past, but instead an interpretation of the past derived from current 
prejudice and experience. The importance of subjectivity and relativism in human 
affairs and human discourse are emphasised and as a result it is assumed that 
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historical sources do not embody 'facts' and are not there£'. f lore an accurate 0 
reflection of social and political reality. Historians who claim to be objective actually 
promote a false unity by compiling disparate 'facts' into a coherent narrative. Such 
. ,'. coherence was absent from the past Gust as it is in the present). In short, it is claimed 
that historians 'do not reflect the past - they signify and construct it: meaning is in 
the eye ofthe.beholder'? No means of research can be convincingly seen as wholly 
'scientific' or 'value free' and the 'time when science was thOUght to involve the 
steady accumulation of knowledge through a neutral medium of observation has long 
since gone'. 3 
It is not my purpose here to directly engage with these claims in any sustained 
manner, but it is necessary to note that this study has been written on the assumption 
that good history, like good social research, is always based on sound evidence.4 
True, all evidence is problematic, but an awareness of the bias contained within the 
document and a genuine desire to record events, can mitigate against the problem. It 
is therefore possible to meaningfully claim that any account or arguments proffered 
are firmly rooted in the historical record. In that sense some form of positivism must 
continue to serve as a gauge by which the researcher and the wider academic (and 
non-academic) community judge the value of a research project. Such an approach 
may be imperfect and may well be subject to fierce theoretical criticism, but at the 
end of the day it is the best on offer. Certainly, in this case at least, anything less 
would be blinkered, insufferably arrogant and reduce contemporary historical 
research to the status of autobiography, polemic or even fiction. 
The aim of this appendix is therefore to draw up an honest balance sheet of the 
strengths and weaknesses of this researcher's direct personal involvement with the 
object of study, so that the reader can make up hislher own mind about its claims to 
objectivity. It also asks whether an alternative methodological approach, based on 
attitudinal surveys and official data may have been preferable to the qualitati~e 
approach ultimately adopted, that utilised sources long familiar to the historian, such 
as written records, autobiography and oral history? By way of a conclusion, a rough 
'code of practise' is proposed. 
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The problem baldly stated 
Most obviously, there is the danger of systematic bias, of viewing a complex 
,'. historical episode through the narrow lens of personal experience. Certain events and 
themes may become exaggerated. Others may be downplayed or ignored altogether, 
as the reseilfcher enters a bizarre state of denial in which essential knowledge and 
values, the sum of ones own life, are conveniently abandoned in an effort to conform 
to an abstract ideal of scientific objectivity or an orthodox academic discourse. On 
the other hand, a creeping sense of nostalgia may gradually blunt the spirit of critical 
enquiry and any commitment to objectivity. There are more insidious dangers as 
well. In studying the actions of men and women who you once knew (or in some 
cases still know well), the researcher/acquaintance/friend will inevitably be wary of 
giving offence and so leave some verities unchallenged. The actions and motivations 
of other political actors, council officials and lay magistrates who were in a real 
sense 'enemies' in the past must now be viewed objectively and fairly. 
Direct personal experience and emotional engagement with the subject may also 
compromise the usefulness of sources, which in other hands, might have been taken 
for granted. Take, for example, the primary written evidence that has served as the 
staple source for this study. Put bluntly, when some of these same documents refer to 
that researcher by name, or even worse, were actually written by the researcher, 
albeit ten years ago, what hope academic detachment? Of course some political 
scientists would suggest that this is merely a more extreme manifestation of a 
problem inherent in all studies that rely on observation (participant or otherwise). For 
'unlike other methods of social research, eg the interview and the experiment [?], 
observation does not fulfil to the same extent the demand for a strict method because 
the distortion of perception by the observing subject can only be reduced to an 
insufficient degree' . .s All this tends to suggest that those researchers who have been 
intimately involved with their area of study will be hard-pressed to und~~ 
unbiased research, especial I y if they rely on qualitative, rather than quantitative 
methods. 
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Quantity or quality? 
Would then, a quantitative approach be preferable? In part, any answer to this question 
ultimately depends on the relative merits ascribed by the researcher to quantifiable and 
qualitative evidence, as well as the practicality of gathering such sources. 
Traditionally many historians have tended to be suspicious of an exclusive reliance on 
. 
quantifiable data, such as official statistics, Royal Commissions reports, Parliamentary 
Papers and from the 1930s onwards, mass observation or public opinion surveys and 
so on. For while such records remain a primary source, they are 'at a stage removed 
from the individuals with whom they deal' and 'necessarily represent a bias, one way 
or the other, of the investigator who decided what questions were to be asked and 
framed them in his own way; witnesses were led - sometimes consciously, more often 
unconsciously - to make responses to particular selected questions which were the 
most important to the observer but not necessarily to the witness'. 6 Similar objections 
would equally apply to oral history and to the mass of surveys undertaken by social 
scientists, commentators and government officials since 1945, although most 
historians would probably be leary of wholeheartedly endorsing Hobsbawm's 
contention that: 7 
modern social sCience has pursued a model of scientism and technical 
manipulation which systematically, and deliberately, neglects human, and 
above all historical, experience. The fashionable model of analysis and 
prediction is to feed all available current data into some notional or real super-
computer and let it produce the answers. Plain human experience and 
understanding does not lend itself to that. 
In any case, there are overwhelming practical and theoretical impediments to any 
study of the popular politics of the poll tax predominantly based on survey work. 
Unlike political parties and formally organised interest groups, the anti-poll ta?c 
movement did not generate large amounts of the sort of data that can be subjected to 
quantitative analysis, such as membership figures, trade union affiliations and so on. 
Nor did it possess a definable population with a significant degree of institutional or 
social continuity, allowing regularities to be established over time through mass 
surveys. While the success of political parties can largely be set against their 
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eleClorru perrormance, popular protest movements generally do not offer such 
obvious criteria for measurement. Indeed, the anti-poll tax campaign proved 
unusually short-lived, aiming to repeal a particular law and it rapidly waned once 
that grievance was removed. 
The spontaneity, short life-span and limited aims of the anti-poll tax movement 
. 
would not sit easily with any methodology that assumes 'causation is a matter of 
regularities in relationships between events, and that without models of regularities 
we are left with allegedly inferior narratives'. 8 While quantitative evidence, from 
whatever source, can go some way to indicating the extent of a particular political 
phenomenon - for example, we roughly know how many people disappeared off the 
electoral roll and how many liability orders were issued against non-payers - it is 
generally an insufficient basis on which to formulate theories about the meaning 
ascribed to social and political events. In particular, it would be unlikely to tell us 
much about the complex and intangible relationship formed between local anti-poll 
tax protestors, other political and institutional actors and the wider public. And yet 
this relationship remains central to the broader questions of political participation and 
the duties and rights that were expected of active citizens in the period. 
How might such a relationship be measured in quantifiable terms? Opinion polls and 
surveys of political attitudes and public participation have typically been employed 
by political scientists to assess levels of popular support for contemporary protest 
movements. Political action studies of the 1970' s even attempted, in the true 
scientific tradition, to predict the attributes and 'protest potential' of their subjects. 
Although this evidence is extremely valuable, it cannot be applied directly to a 
particular political issue or crisis. Nevertheless, given the scale of anti-poll tax 
protest and non-payment, which as the study shows involved millions, a quantitative 
approach would seem tempting. 
But where would the data come from? Again, practical problems arise, as it is 
doubtful that the results of a survey gathered this late in the day would be accurate or 
particularly illuminating, even assuming the hard-pressed researcher possessed the 
resources to undertake such an exercise. A number of general problems could be 
expected to come into play, including the vagaries of popular memory and the 
312 
existence of highly mobile populations in urban areas. But more importantly the key 
issue in the study - poll tax non-payment - remains a dangerous subject and common 
sense suggests that many respondents would be unlikely to admit in the semi-official 
atmosphere of a structured interview that they still owe substantial amounts of 
money to their local council, let alone put it in writing in a questionnaire. The stigma 
associated w!th tax avoidance, even one as unpopular as the poll tax will also 
inevitably affect the results. 
So it seems then, there is little scope for a thoroughly quantitative analysis of the 
popular politics of the poll tax. As a result, there is no obvious methodological 
'instant' solution that might be applied to nullify the problem of the author's direct 
personal involvement in the object of study. 
Some possible benefits 
On the other hand it is not at all clear that personal experience must, per se, hinder 
efforts to provide a convincing account of the recent past. Indeed, social scientists 
using the method of participant observation have strenuously argued that far from 
being a source of weakness, personal involvement can encourage a strong sense of 
empathy, or verstehen: 9 
There is no necessary conflict between personal, subjective interests or values 
and the scientific goal of truth ... Personal interests hold potential for new 
insights and creativity inspired by emotional and intellectual identification 
with the topic of study ... Rather than deny personal interests and values, the 
method of participant observation requires an awareness of how these 
thoughts and feelings influence research. By reporting personal interests and 
values, other people are able to evaluate further the influence of values. 
However, such 'insights' cannot convincingly stand-alone and require more 
substantial support in the form of 'hard' evidence. The validity of the study therefore 
stands or falls on the qualitative sources (or as Plummer puts it 'documents of life') 
that it deploys. 10 
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These sources tend to be local"";' does this exacerbate the problem of bias? On one 
level, all historical studies, even those purporting to look at issues from a national (or 
international) perspective are ultimately 'local'. For example, Butler et als account of 
the 'high' politics of the poll tax is largely derived from sources that reflect the 
concerns of a .relatively narrow group of elite politicians, journalists and academics 
clustered around the 'Whitehall village'. However, their experiences, decisions and 
actions were arguably more important than those undertaken by local actors simply 
because they had more power and so shaped events more decisively. Nevertheless, the 
ensuing drama was played out locally and ultimately the poll tax failed as a national 
policy because it failed to secure popular legitimacy and so proved difficult to enforce 
at a local level. Clearly, in the case of the poll tax at least, the national and local 
experience is inextricably linked. 
However, local history remains, well ... local. It cannot be assumed that the experience 
of the poll tax crisis in Ealing was representative of the South West, Scotland or even 
other London boroughs. In order to gain a more complete picture it would be 
undeniably better to set detailed local study against local study in a systematic way. 
Unfortunately, the literature surrounding the poll tax crisis remains limited and those 
local accounts that do survive were invariably undertaken by activists with a clear 
polemical intent. In any case, while the poll tax was a parochial issue, it expressed 
itself in remarkably uniform way across England and Wales. In part this reflected the 
role of a nationally orientated mass media, national political parties and the relative 
simplicity of the issue. But it also stemmed from the nature of the legislation itself, 
which as chapters six and seven showed left little scope for local discretion on the part 
of the relevant authorities. In that sense the experience of the tax in Ealing was 
probably little different from that of other urban areas in England and Wales. 
However the same claim could not be made for Scotland, which operated a different , 
recovery procedure and where the anti-poll tax cause soon became embroiled with ~e 
wider question of Scottish nationalism. 
Studies of local radical protest movements perhaps inevitably tend to rely on specific 
forms of evidence. In Ealing, as in other areas, the borough-wide federation and local 
anti-poll tax unions used written documents as the primary means of communicating 
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WJLU LU~ fJUUU\i. ~uuune orgamsatlOnal records, such as correspondence circulars 
, , 
minutes and newsletters that show how decision-making structures operated and why 
certain tactics were pursued also survived. In particular, the Ealing Federation's legal 
Nork led to the production of a plethora of detailed records, including internal reports 
of court cases, training material for court advisers, material from day schools and legal 
notes. Natu[ally, general problems of accuracy, factionalism and personality apply as 
equally to these records as they would to those of any other political organisation. But 
they also differ markedly from those left by, say, trade unions, which reflect a high 
degree of institutional continuity. Instead, they tend to be more ad hoc, less 
comprehensive and widely dispersed among a range of sources. It follows that 
empathy with the ideology and modus operandi of the participants may be more than 
usually important. 
Previous engagement with the object of study may also allow the researcher to locate 
and utilise local sources that would otherwise have been lost or remain hoarded in 
wardrobes, cupboards and under beds. This was certainly true in the case of this study, 
but even then, a number of people only agreed to make their papers available on the 
condition that they would ultimately be deposited in a reputable archive, while others 
loaned them. In the meantime the documentary evidence remains in the author's filing 
cabinet and is therefore not verifiable, in the same way as a Cabinet minute lodged at 
the Public Records Office. This, rather than any natural predilection towards pedantry 
on the part of the author (hopefully!) explains the large number of endnotes and 
references that appear at the bottom of each chapter. 
The study has also utilised qualitative interviews. But, from an early stage it soon 
became apparent that detailed memories had already grown hazy and any claims made 
by interviewees have been cross-checked against written evidence as far as possible. 
As a result written sources have generally tended to predominate and oral evidence 
has most usually been used for illustrative rather than descriptive purposes. In part ~s 
reflects the general limitations of oral history, which have been discussed elsewhere~ 11 
But in any case, the oral evidence gathered for the study should not be seen as 
conventional oral history, in the sense that A.J.P. Taylor pungently dismissed it: 12 
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'In this matter I am an almost total sceptic ... Old men drooling about their 
youth: no!' 
For many of the women and men interviewed retained a strong feeling of political 
efficacy and a desire to change the world. Their testimony therefore often reflects 
ongoing pQlitical commitment and this in tum shaped the meaning they ascribe to 
their experiences. Similarly, the issue of the poll tax remained surprisingly 
controversial among mainstream political actors such as local MPs and councillors 
, 
few of whom agreed to be interviewed. This presumably reflects the fact that the tax 
remains a problematic issue for both main parties, although Conservative politicians 
seem particularly keen to move on from the entire episode. But many Labour 
councillors also remain uneasy, for while they are happy to verbally denounce the poll 
tax in principle, in Ealing and elsewhere they have continued their attempts to recover 
poll tax revenue from defaulters. 
Conclusion 
This brief discussion has probably raised more questions than it has answered. If 
anything it has served to confirm C. Wright Mills suggestion that an undue 
preoccupation with methodological issues should not be allowed to get in the way of 
actual research - approaches will vary according to the subject under consideration 
and the questions asked. In general, the methodology employed in this study has 
tended to be eclectic as it sought to bridge the gap between 'popular' opinion on the 
poll tax and the actions of much smaller groups of active citizens within a highly 
specific milieux. So evidence from political autobiographies, pamphlets, leaflets and 
qualitative interviews with participants, sits alongside survey data gathered by 
political scientists, secondary sources, official records and press reports. Such an 
approach seems to bear out the rather bland point that the complexity of human 
experience is reflected in a correspondingly diverse range of sources, and that th~re 
should be no methodological absolutes. 
It has also suggested that individual researchers are capable of transcending their own 
personal experience and of consistently applying a meticulous and critical approach to 
historical evidence, although that does not necessarily mean that they always succeed 
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a Avoid entering a 'state of denial': acknowledge my own personal history and build 
it into the research plan. 
a Make a deliberate and sustained effort to empathise with the views of people and 
institutions to which I was hostile as an anti-poll tax campaigner. 
a Ensure th.at all viewpoints are fairly represented in the text, through the use of 
direct quotation if possible, so that the reader can make herlhis own mind up. 
a Meticulously record the sources used in the study in detailed footnotes and 
rigorously compare any conclusions drawn from them with authoritative secondary 
sources. 
a Aim to place all the primary evidence collected in a reputable archive. 
Hopefully, these good intentions are reflected in the final results. 
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